HON.  HORACE  BINNEY, 


ON  THE  QUESTION  OF 


THE  REMOVAL  OF  THE  DEPOSITES. 


.>  » 

DELIVEHEI) 


IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES, 


JAXUAIIY,  1834. 


WASHINGTON: 

PRINTED  BY  GALES  AND  SISA'J  ON. 
1834. 


SPEECH. 


The  House  having-  resumed  the  consideration  of  the  motion  to  refer  to  ths- 
Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  the  reasons  assigned  by  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  for  the  removal  of  the  public  deposites,  with  Mr.  McDurriE's 
motion  for  instructing1  the  committee  to  report  a  bill  for  restoring1  them  to 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States — 

Mr.  BINNEY  addressed  the  Chair  to  the  following  effect: 

Mr.  SPEAKER:  The  amendment  offered  by  the  gentleman  from 
South  Carolina,  [Mr.  McDuFFiE,]  proposes  to  instruct  the  Committee 
of  Ways  and  Means  "to  report  a  joint  resolution,  providing  that  the 
public  revenue,  hereafter  collected,  be  deposited  in  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States,  in  conformity  with  the  public  faith,  pledged  in  the 
charter  of  the  said  Bank."  It,  therefore,  presents  directly  the  ques 
tion  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  Secretary's  reasons  for  removing  the 
public  deposites  from  the  Bank,  and  for  making  the  future  deposites 
elsewhere;  and  brings  up  for  the  consideration  of  this  House  every 
thing  that  can  bear  upon  the  great  topics  of  national  faith  and  public 
safety  that  aro  involvod  in  the  issup. 

I  mean  to  discuss  this  great  question,  sir,  as  I  think  it  becomes  me 
to  discuss  it,  on  my  first  entrance  into  this  House;  as  it  would  be 
come  any  one  to  discuss  it,  having  the  few  relations  to  extreme  party 
that  I  have,  and  being  desirous,  for  the  short  time  that  he  means  to* 
be  connected  with  the  station,  to  do  or  omit  nothing  that  shall  be  the- 
occasion  of  painful  retrospect.  I  mean  to  discuss  it  as  gravely  and 
temperately  as  I  can:  not,  sir,  because  it  is  not  a  fit  subject  for  the 
most  animated  and  impassioned  appeals  to  every  fear  and  hope  that 
a  patriot  can  entertain  for  his  country — for  I  hold,  without  doubt,  that 
it  is  so, — but  because,  as  the  defence  of  the  measure  to  be  examined 
comes  to  this  House  under  the  name  and  in  the  guise  of  "  Reason^* 
I  deem  it  fit  to  receive  it,  and  to  try  its  pretensions  by  the  standard 
to  which  it  appeals.  I  mean  to  examine  the  Secretary's  paper,  as. 
the  friends  of  the  measure  say  it  ought  to  be  examined — to  take  the 
facts  as  he  states  them,  unless  in  the  same  paper,  or  in  oilier  papers- 
proceeding  from  the  same  authority,  there  are  contradictions;  and  then 
I  must  be  allowed  the  exercise  of  private  judgment  upon  the  evidence — 
to  take  the  motives  as  the  Secretary  alleges  them — to  add  no  facts, 
except  such  as  are  notorious  or  incontestable,  and  then  to  ask  th%e 
impartial  judgment  of  the  House  upon  my  answer. 

Sir,  the  effort  seems  to  be  almost  unnecessary.  The  great  practi 
cal  answer  is  already  given  by  the  condition  of  the  country.  No  rea 
soning  in  this  House  can  refute  it;  none  is  nccessarv  to  sustain  it.  It 


comes  to  us,  it  is  hourly  coming  to  us,  in  the  language  of  truth,  and 
soberness,  and  bitterness,  from  almost  every  quarter  of  the  country; 
and,  if  any  man  is  so  blind  to  the  realities  around  him  as  to  consider 
all  this  but  as  a  theatrical  exhibition  got  up  by  the  Bank,  or  the  friends 
of  the  Bank,  to  terrify  and  deceive  this  nation,  he  will  continue  blind 
to  them  until  the  catastrophe  of  the  great  drama  shall  make  his  fac 
ulties  as  useless  for  the  correction  of  the  evil,  as  they  now  seem  to  be 
for  its  apprehension. 

Mr.  Speaker,  the  change  produced  in  this  country,  in  the  short 
space  of  thflee  months,  is  without  example  in  the  history  of  this  or 
any  other  nation.  The  past  summer  found  the  people  delighted  or 
contented  with  the  apparent  adjustment  of  some  of  the  most  fearful 
controversies  that  ever  divided  them.  The  Chief  Magistrate  of  tho 
Union  had  entered  upon  his  office  for  another  term,  and  was  receiv 
ing  more  than  tho  honors  of  a  Roman  triumph  from  the  happy  peo 
ple  of  the  Middle  and  Northern  States,  without  distinction  of  party, 
age,  or  sex.  Nature  promised  to  the  husbandman  an  exuberant  crop. 
Trade  was  replenishing  the  coffers  of  the  nation,  and  rewarding  the 
merchant's  enterprise.  The  spindle,  and  the  shuttle,  and  every  instru 
ment  of  mechanic  industry,  were  pursuing  their  busy  labors  with  profit. 
Internal  improvements  were  bringing  down  the  remotest  West  to  the 
shore.-]  of  the  Atlantic,  and  binding  and  compacting  the  dispersed  in 
habitants  of  this  immense  tcrritoiy,  as  the  inhabitants  of  a  single  State. 
One  universal  smile  beamed  from  the  happy  face  of  this  favored 
country.  But,  sir,  we  have  had  a  fearful  admonition,  that  we  hold 
all  such  treasures  in  earthen  vessels;  and  a  still  more  fearful  one,  that 
misjudging  man,  either  in  error  or  in  anger,  may,  in  a  moment,  dash 
them  to  the  earth,  and  break  into  a  thousand  fragments  the  finest 
creations  of  industry  and  intelligence. 

Sir,  there  is  one  great  interest  in  this  nation,  that  is,  and  I  fear 
will  for  some  time  continue  to  be,  peculiarly  subject  to  derangement; 
and  yet  every  other  interest  is  intimately  and  inseparably  involved  in  it: 
I  mean  the  currency.  We  have  some  twenty  scores  of  banks  from 
which  this  currency  is  derived.  We  have  from  eighty  to  a  hundred 
millions  of  bank  notes,  with  a  metallic  circulation  along  with  it,  not 
greater,  perhaps,  than  as  one  to  seven.  We  have,  it  may  be,  one  hun 
dred  and  forty  to  fifty  millions  of  bank  notes,  and  bank  dcposites,  per 
forming  in  part  the  same  office,  with  about  the  same  proportion  of 
specie  in  the  banks  to  sustain  it.  It  is  a  system  depending  essentially 
for  its  safety  upon  public  confidence,  and  tiiat  confidence  depend 
ing  of  course  upon  the  regularity  of  the  whole  machine,  which  again 
depends  upon  tho  control  that  governs  the  whole.  When  compared 
with  the  currencies  of  England  and  France — in  the  former  of  which 
the  metallic  circulation  is  estimated  as  nearly  one-half,  and  in  the  lat 
ter  as  nine-tenths  of  the  whole — it  may  be  seen  how  much  more  con 
fidence  is  required  here,  and  how  much  greater  the  liability  to  shock 
and  to  derangement.  Yet,  by  the  regulation  and  control  of  the  Na 
tional  Bank,  ever  since  that  regulation  and  control  have  obtained,  the 
system  has  worked  well,  and  it  has  worked  well  only  by  means  of 
them.  Sir,  this  regulation  and  control  have  been  thrown  away — 


thrown  away  wantonly  and  contemptuously.  In  an  instant,  sir,  al 
most  in  the  midst  of  the  smiling  scene  I  have  described,  without  any 
preparation  of  the  country  at  large,  with  nothing  by  wav  of  notice 
but  a  menace,  which  no  one  but  the  Bank  itself,  and  she  only  from 
the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  seems  to  have  respected,  this  most 
delicate  of  all  the  instruments  of  political  economy  has  been  assault 
ed,  deranged,  and  dislocated;  and  the  whole  scene  of  enchantment 
has  vanished,  as  by  the  command  of  a  wizard.  The  State  banks  are 
paralyzed — they  can  do,  or  they  will  do,  nothing.  The  Bank  of  the 
United  States  stands  upon  her  own  clefeiic.e.  Sue  can  do,  or  she  will 
do  nothing,  until  she  knows  the  full  extent  of  .the  storm  that  is  to  fol 
low,  and  measures  her  own  ability  to  meet  it.  Prices  are  failing,  do 
mestic  exchange  is  falling,  bank  notes  are  falling,  stocks  are  fall  ins1, 
and,  in  some  instances,  have  fallen  dead.  The  gravitation  of  the 
system  is  disturbed,  and  its  loss  threatened;  and  it  being  the  work  of 
man,  and  directed  only  by  his  limited  wisdom,  there  is  no  La  Place 
or  Bowditch  that  can  foretell  the  extent  or  the  mischiefs  of  the  de 
rangement,  or  in  what  new  contrivance  a  compensation  may  be  found 
for  the  disturbing  force. 

Sir,  whence  has  come  this  derangement?  It  comes  from  the  act 
of  the  Secretary  in  removing  the  deposited,  and  in  declaring  his  doc 
trine  of  an  unregulated,  uncontrolled,  State  la?:/.;  pdjx.r  currency. 
It  is  against  all  true  philosophy  to  assign  mere  causes  than  are  suf 
ficient  to  produce  the  ascertained  effect.  This  cause  is  sufficient — 
this  I  verily  believe  has  produced  it — and  I  hope  for  the  patient  at 
tention  of  the  House  to  my  humble  efforts  hereafter  to  shew  that  no 
thing  else  has  produced  it. 

Sir,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  has,  in  my  poor  judgment, 
committed  one  error  which  is  v/holl}'  inexcusable;  it  is,  in  part,  the 
error  of  the  argument  that  has  proceeded  from  the  honorable  member 
from  Tennessee.  That  error  lies  in  supposing  that  there  were  but 
two  objects  to  he  considered  in  coming  to  his  decision  upon  the  de- 
posites — the  Administration  and  the  Sank.  The  COUXTP.Y  has  been 
forgotten.  The  Administration  was  to  vindicate  its  opinions.  The 
Bank  was  to  be  made  to  give  way  to  them.  The  consequences  were 
to  be  left  to  those  whom  they  might  concern;  and  they  are  such  as 
moderate  human  wisdom  might  have  foreseen,  such  as  are  now  before 
us.  While  the  Administration  is  apparently  strong,  and  the  Bank  un 
disturbed,  the  country  lies  stunned  and  stupefied  by  the  blow;  and  it 
is  now  for  this  House  to  say  whether  they  will  continue  the  error,  by 
forgetting  the  country  here  also,  or  will  endeavor  to  raise  her  to  her 
feet,  and  assist  her  in  recovering  from  the  shaft  that  was  aimed  at  the 
Bank,  but  has  glanced  aside  and  fallen  on  her  own  bosom. 

Mr.  Speaker,  I  cannot  better  show  the  extent  of  the  derangement 
which  this  act  is  certain  to  produce,  unless  it  is  corrected,  than  by  a 
statement  of  the  uses  which  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  has  annu 
ally  afforded,  in  various  ways,  to  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
I  take  the  year  1832,  for  which  the  returns  are  complete  as  to  the 
item  of  exchanges,  and  the  years  1832  and  1833  for  some  other  items 
of  nearly  equal  moment. 


The  amount  of  domestic  bills  of  exchange,  purchased  in  all  parts  of 
the  Union,  in  1832,  was     -  -  $67,516,673 

[The  half  year  from  December,  1832,  to  June,  1833, 
was  $41,312,982,  showing  a  large  increase  in  that 
line  during  the  first  half  of  this  year.] 

The  amount  of  domestic  bills  collected  for  others,  was       42,096,062 

The  amount  of  drafts  by  Bank  United  States  and  its 

offices,  on  each  other,  -     32,796,087 

Drafts  by  Bank  United  States  and  its  offices,  on  State 

banks,  -     12,361,337 

.Notes  of  Bank  United  States  and  its  branches,  receiv 
ed  and  paid  out  of  place,  viz:  at  places  where  there 
was  no  obligation  to  pay  them,  -  -  39,449,527 

Notes  of  State  banks  received  by  Bank  United  States 

and  its  branches,  where  they  were  not  payable,         -     21,630,557 

Transfers  of  funds  for  the  United  States,  -  -     16,100,000 

Transfers  of  office  balances,     -  -  9,767,667 


'Making  a  total  of  domestic  exchanges,         -       '  rr   ,      -  241,717,910 
Add  to  which  the  amount  of — 

Foreign  exchange  purchased,    -      .'.••    $9,253,533 
Do.  sold,     -  -'      4,203,204 

13,456,737 


Making  the  total  amount  of  exchanges,  by  means  of  the 

Bank  of  the  United  States,  within  the  year  1832,       255,174,647 

The  amount  of  premiums  on  domestic  exchange,  received  by 
the  Bank  for  the  same  period,  was  $217,249  56,  which  is  about 
one-eleventh  of  one  per  cent,  on  the  aggregate  amount  of  the 
domestic  operations  of  the  Bank,  say  $241,717,910;  and  this  has 
been  the  whole  cost  of  this  circulation  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  by  the  aid  of  which  their  property  of  every  description  has 
been  passing:  in  a  copious  and  uniform  current,  from  one  extremity 
of  this  nation  to  the  other.  To  this  extensive  aid  must  be  added 
that  derived  from  the  Bank  discounts,  which,  with  the  domestic  bills 
purchased,  amounted,  in  the  year  1832,  to  an  average  sum  of 
$66,871,349,  and,  in  the  year  1833,  to  an  average  of  $61,746,708; 
and  that  also  derived  from  the  constant  circulation  of  her  notes, 
.averaging  $20,309,359  for  the  year  1832,  and  $18,495,436  for  the 
.•succeeding  year. 

Now,  sir,  it  appears  to  me  that  I  do  no  injustice  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  or  to  any  one  who  has  directed,  or  authorized,  or 
superintended  this  act,  by  saying  that  it  was  the  design  of  the  removal 
of  the  deposites  to  break  up  this  whole  machinery;  that  this  was  not 
to  be  a  casual,  unexpected,  unpremeditated  result;  but  that  the  removal 
was  ordered  for  the  very  purpose  of  drawing  the  circulation  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States  out  of  the  hands  of  the  people  into  the 
hands  of  the  Bank;  to  compel  her,  with  this  view,  to  reduce  her 
discounts,  and  diminish  the  amount  of  her  purchases  of  domestic 
exchange;  and  thus  to  cut  all  the  ties  which  united  the  Bank  to  the 


internal  trade  of  the  country.  I  do  no  injustice  by  saying  this, 
because,  in  the  letter  of  the  Secretary,  if  I  read  it  right,  this  design 
is  there  explicitly  avowed  and  defended.  But  whether  designed  or 
not,  this  will  be  the  effect,  and  the  necessary  effect,  of  the  measure, 
if  it  shall  prove  successful.  It  must  throw  the  whole  machinery  of  the 
Bank  out  of  gear;  compel  her  at  once  to  begin  the  process  which  is 
to  liquidate  and  close  her  transactions;  separate  her  from  the  people, 
and  the  people  from  the  Bank;  and  deliver  over  these  vast  concerns 
and  interests  to  confusion  and  misrule.  It  is  by  the  revelation  of 
this  design,  and  by  the  necessary  consequences  of  the  measure,  as  this 
intelligent  people  have  apprehended  them,  that  great  distress  has 
already  been  produced,  and  the  just  anticipation  of  greater  distress 
hereafter.  Can  any  one,  after  this  view  of  the  recent  uses  of  the  Bank, 
and  of  the  effects  which  have  followed,  and  are  to  follow,  their  in 
tended  or  necessary  interruption,  ask  the  reason  of  the  want  of 
employment,  the  want  of  money,  the  stagnation  of  trade,  which  pre 
vails  in  most  of  our  cities'?  Can  he  ask  the  cause  of  the  syncope  into 
which  this  people  have  fallen?  No,  sir,  no  one  can  for  a  moment 
doubt  the  cause  of  all  this.  It  lies  in  the  act  of  removing  the  deposites, 
taken  in  connexion  with  its  design  and  doctrine.  It  is  not  the  mere 
transfer  from  one  place  to  another.  That  is  a  circumstance  which 
might  happen,  and  has  happened  already,  in  the  history  of  this  Bank, 
without  producing  any  alarm  whatever.  It  is  not  the  removal  of  the 
deposites  simply,  but  the  design  with  which  that  removal  was  made, 
and  the  effects  which  belong  to  it.  The  alarm  proceeds  from  looking 
at  the  necessary  consequences  of  such  a  design,  unless  Congress  shall 
interpose  to  avert  them. 

Permit  me,  sir,  before  I  come  to  the  regular  discussion  of  the 
reasons  adduced  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  removing  the 
deposites,  to  occupy  a  few  moments  in  drawing  the  attention  of  the 
House  to  some  matters,  which,  to  many  gentlemen  here,  are  no 
doubt  familiar,  but  which  ought  to  be  known  and  considered  by  all 
who  would  form  a  sound  judgment  on  the  question  before  us.  I 
have  said  that  the  removal  of  the  public  deposites,  if  it  had  been 
a  mere  transfer  of  so  much  money  from  one  bank  to  other  banks, 
judiciously  regulated  as  such  transfers  may  be,  would  not  have 
produced  the  train  of  consequences  which  we  have  already  seen  to 
flow  from  it.  There  are  gentlemen  in  this  House  familiar  with  as 
large  operations  in  finance,  that  have  produced  no  inconvenience. 
The  effects  of  such  a  measure  must  depend  upon  the  condition  of 
trade  at  the  moment  of  removal,  upon  the  continued  or  interrupted 
application  of  the  money  transferred,  to  the  same  uses  to  which  it  has 
been  before  applied,  and  upon  the  prosecution  or  discontinuance  of 
the  general  system  of  banking  operations  which  prevailed  at  the  mo 
ment  of  transfer.  What  its  effects  must  have  been,  and  must  continue 
to  be,  in  the  actual  circumstances  of  the  country,  taken  in  connexion 
with  the  imputed  design,  it  is  not  difficult  to  show. 

Sir,  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  held  of  the  public  deposites, 
of  every  description,  on  the  1st  of  August,  1833,  according  to  the 
statement  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  the  sum  of  $7,599,931; 
and  they  were  in  a  course  of  increase,  which  the  Bank  knew  as  well 


8 

as  the  Secretary,  up  to  the  1st  of  Octohcr,  1833,  when  they  amounted 
to  the  sum  of  $9,868,435;  say  ten  millions  of  dollars.  How  was 
this  money  to  be  paid?  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had  a  right 
to  demand  its  payment,  when,  where,  and  in  such  sum  or  sums,  as  he 
thought  fit.  He  had  such  a  power  to  c!o  it  in  point  of  form,  that  the 
Bank  could  not  question  its  exercise  in  point  of  right.  It  was  the 
duty  of  the  Bank  to  he  prepared  to  pay  it;  and  the  question  must  be 
answered,  how  was  the  money  to  be  paid? 

The  answer  given  to  this  question,  and  given  with  a  view  to  involve 
the  Bank  in  odium  and  prejudice,  is  this:  that  she  ought  to  have  paid 
it,  or  whatever  the  Secretary  chose  to  require  of  it,  in  specie,  from 
her  vaults,  without  distressing  the  community,  by  calling  upon  others 
to  pay  their  debts  to  her.  To  say  nothing  of  the  fact,  sir,  that  the 
Bank  lias  always  paid  every  one,  the  Treasury  included,  in  specie, 
unless  they  preferred  something  else,  the  doctrine  that  she  was  to  pay 
in  specie  to  the  Treasury,  without  putting  herself  in  a  condition  to 
require  it  from  some  one.  else,  is  a  doctrine  which  I  cannot  admit. 
It  is  one  that  will  not  bear  examination. 

The  Bank,  on  1st  October,  1833,  had  specie  in  all  her  vaults  to  the 
extent  of  $10,663,441.  If  she  had  been  so  situated  at  that  time  as 
that  this,  or  any  considerable  portion  of  it,  had  left  her  vaults,  without 
being  brought  back  again,  the  consequences  might  have  been  of  the  most 
pernicious  character  to  herself  and  to  the  whole  country.  The  Bank 
had  a  circulation  of  more  than  eighteen  millions  to  sustain,  exclusive 
of  her  private  deposites.  A  new  era  had  opened.  A  new  system  was 
about  to  be  adopted  in  the  fiscal  affairs  of  the  Union.  Its  effects  were 
to  be  seen.  The  extent  to  which  the  Treasury  was  about  to  assail 
her  could  not  be  known.  The  slightest  interruption,  the  slightest 
fear  of  interruption,  to  her  promptness  and  punctuality*  would  have 
raised  that  apprehension  for  her  stability  which  has  been  excited 
for  others.  Sir,  to  ask  this  Bank,  under  these  circumstances,  to 
empty  her  vaults  of  specie,  without  taking  any  measures  of  precau 
tion  to  replenish  them,  would  have  been  to  ask  the  able  directors  to 
throw  away  their  whole  capital  of  reputation%  and  that  of  the  Bank 
also.  They  would  have  proved  themselves  unworthy  of  the  occasion 
on  which  they  were  called  to  act.  What,  sir,  at  the  very  outbreaking  of 
the  storm,  when  no  human  intelligence  could  tell  how  long  it  was  to 
last,  or  what  would  be  the  fury  of  its  violence,  to  ask  the  pilots  of  this  bark 
to  keep  all  her  sails  set,  and  to  throw  her  ballast  overboard!  No,  sir; 
the  Bank  was  bound  to  do  as  she  has  done.  She  was  bound  to  pre 
pare  for  the  trial.  She  was  bound  to  strengthen  her  position,  by  di 
minishing  her  discounts;  and  she  has  diminished  them,  in  my  judgment, 
most  wisely,  most  discreetly,  and  most  tenderly.  And  yet,  sir,  it  is 
from  this  circumstance — the  mere  reduction  of  loans  and  purchases 
of  bills,  without  locking  either  to  the  necessity  for  that  reduction, 
or  to  the  extent  and  effect  of  it — that  some  men  of  honest  and 
upright  minds  have  been  prejudiced  against  her.  I  can  show,  with 
out  difficulty,  that  it  is  a  mere  prejudice. 

The  Bank  had  to  pay  over  ten  millions  of  public  deposites,  and  she 
ought  not  to  have  exposed  herself  to  lose  any  material  portion  of  her 
specie,  without  being  in  a  condition  to  recall  it.  She  had  then  but 


9 

one  resource,  and  that  was,  unless  the  interest  of  her  dehtors  did  of 
itself  produce  the  effect  by  diminishing  their  loans,  to  call  upon  them 
to  assist  her  in  paying  the  amount.  There  was  no  other  way  open  to  her; 
and  the  degree  to  which  she  must  call,  in  order  to  obtain  assistance  to 
a  given  extent,  is  a  point  in  practical  banking  to  which  it  is  material 
for  gentlemen  to  advert. 

In  explaining  this  operation,  so  as  to  make  it  intelligible  to  that 
portion  of  the  House  which  may  not  be  familiar  with  banking,  i  will  state 
the  argument  against  the  Bank.  It  is  said,  sir,  that  whatever  amount 
she  requires  her  debtors  to  pay,  or  witbholds  from  other  borrowers  af 
ter  it  is  paid,  is  to  be  set  down  as  an  actual  increase  of  her  ability  to 
meet  the  demand  for  the  public  deposites.  This  is  a  very  specious 
but  wholly  unsound  proposition.  In  the  process  cf  reduction  of  dis 
counts,  with  a  view  to  increase  the  ability  of  a  bank,  two  and  two  do 
not  always  make  four;  they  sometimes  do  not  even  make  two.  The 
Bank  not  only  has  debtors,  but  she  is  herself  a  debtor  to  the  Trea 
sury  for  the  public  deposites,  and  to  individuals  for  tbeir  private  de 
posites;  she  is  a  debtor  for  her  notes  in  circulation,  and  to  other  banks 
for  any  balances  due  to  them.  When,  therefore,  she  calls  upon  her 
debtors  to  return  a  part  of  the  debt  they  owe  her,  these  very  persons 
may  be  her  creditors  by  dcposite,  or  may  borrow  'from  such  as  are, 
and  may  call  upon  the  Bank  to  pay  what  she  owes  to  them.  Thus, 
if  a  person  who  is  required  by  the  Bank  to  pay  a  note,  has  at  the 
same  time  a  deposite  or  credit  in  bank,  the  one  may  be  made  an 
offset  against  the  other;  and  if  the  two  are  equal,  it  is  manifest  that 
the  Bank  has  no  more  ability  to  pay  its  debt  to  others  after  this  trans 
action  than  she  had  before.  She  h.'ts  merely  paid  a  debt  that  she  owed 
an  individual,  by  the  extinguishment  of  a  demand  which  the  Bank  had 
upon  him.  .Sir,  this  effect  is  universally  seen  in  the  practical  busi 
ness  of  banking,  that  when  a  Bank  calls  in  what  is  owing  to  her,  a 
part  of  the  demand  is  paid  by  drafts  upon  herself;  and  as  her  line  of 
discounts  goes  down,  so  does  her  line  of  individual  deposites. 

It  will  be  easy  to  show,  sir,  the  effect  of  this  circumstance  upon  the 
resources  of  the  Bank  while  the  reductions  of  August  and  September 
last  were  being  made. 

In  August  and  September  the  Bank  loans  and  purchases  fell,  accord 
ing  to  the  Secretary's  letter,  4,066,147  dollars,  as  follows  : 
The  amount  of  notes  and  bills  in  AmriKst  was  $64,160,349 
And  in  October  following         -  -     60,094,202 

$4,066,147 

But  the  private  deposites  in  August  were          10,152.143 
And  in  October  they  had  fallen  to  -         8,008,862 

Making  a  reduction  by  payment  of  these  deposites  equal  to     2,143,281 

And  leaving  the  Bank  the  better  inability  to  pay  the  public 

only 1,922,866 

the  difference  having  been  paid  away  to  her  own  depositors  or  credi 
tors.  This  result  is  familiar  in  the  history  of  all  banks.  As  a  bank 
calls  upon  her  debtors  to  pay,  they  call  upon  her  in  like  manner;  and 
she  retains  only  the  difference  between  her  receipts  and  payments. 


10 

Sir,  while  the  process  of  reduction  was  going  on  in  August  and 
September,  1833,  the  public  depositcs  to  be  withdrawn  in  October  were 
increasing  against  the  Bank,  having  been  in  October  the  amount  be 
fore  stated  -  -  $9,868,435 
While  in  August  they  stood  at  '-  ...  7,599,931 


Making  an  increase  of  2,268,504 

so  that,  regarding  these  elements  alone,  the  increased  ability  of  the  Bank 
to  meet  the  public  deposites  was  not  equal  to  the  increased  demand 
by  reason  of  the  deposites;  and  the  process  of  reduction  was  of  neces 
sity  to  be  continued.  So  very  insufficient  a  method  is  it  of  ascertain 
ing  the  effect  of  reductions  either  upon  a  bank  or  the  community,  to 
take  the  amount  of  reductions  only. 

But,  sir,  let  me  carry  this  examination  a  little  further.  The  amount  of 
reductions  from  1st  August,  1833,  to  1st  January,  1834,  was  as  follows: 
Notes  and  bills  in  August,  1833,  were  $64,160,149 

in  January,  1834,  they  were  54,911,461 


Making  a  diminution  or  reduction  in  five  months  of  $9,248,688 

The  individual  deposites   in  August,  being 

as  before  ....         $10,152,143 

They  are  in  January,  1834         -  -  6,734,866 


So  that  the  Bank  has  paid  those  deposites  to  the  extent  of   3,417,277 


And  her  ability  so  far  as  the  reductions  gave  it,  was 

increased  by  the  difference  only  -          -          5,831,411 

But  the  public  deposites  in  Oct.  were  as  before  $9,868,435 
And  in  January  they  stand  at         -  4,230,508 


Showing  a  payment  of  the  public   deposites  during  this 

time  of       -        - 5,637,927 


And  leaving  an  increased  ability  to  pay  the  residue,  as 
compared  with  the  1st  Aug.,  1833,  only  to  the  extent 
of  the  difference  of  •>•«  $193,484 

These  statements,  sir,  show  that,  although  reductions  are  necessary 
to  meet  the  withdrawal  of  deposites,  they  do  not  produce  an  increase 
of  ability  to  pay  deposites  in  the  direct  ratio  of  their  amount;  and 
therefore  that  the  amount  alone  is  not  a  test  of  their  having  been  car 
ried  to  a  sufficient  extent.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  payments  of 
debts  to  the  Bank  may  have  produced  distress;  but  these  payments 
have  themselves  been  the  effect  of  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  and 
this  effect  has  been  infinitely  aggravated  by  the  stagnation  of  trade 
and  the  loss  of  confidence  proceeding  from  the  design  of  the  removal, 
and  from  the  manner  of  the  removal. 

Sir,  the  Treasury  might  have  pursued  a  course  that  would  have 
mitigated  the  evil,  by  diminishing  the  cause  of  alarm.  Having  the 
control  of  this  demand,  they  might  have  made  known  to  the  Bank 
the  times,  proportions,  and  places  of  the  intended  transfers,  and  have 
thns  given  assurance  to  the  Bank  that  its  reductions  to  meet  the 


11 

emergency  need  not  exceed  the  proposed  demand.  But  the  Treasury 
took  a  different  course;  and,  if  any  thing  could  raise  the  embarrass 
ment  of  the  Bank,  and  the  community  also,  to  the  highest  degree,  ii 
was  the  course  which  the  Treasury  pursued. 

Mr.  Speaker,  what  was  that  course'?  Is  any  gentleman  in  this  House 
ignorant  of  hi  The  honorable  member  from  Tennessee  [Mr.  POLK] 
has  read  to  the  House  a  passage  from  a  pamphlet,  which  he  was 
pleased  to  call  the  manifesto  of  the  Bank;  I  shall,  therefore,  regard 
that  publication  as  authentic,  and  I  will  refer  gentlemen  to  the  cor 
respondence  between  the  cashier  of  the  Bank  and  the  Treasurer  of. 
the  United  States  that  is  appended  to  it.  They  will  there  find  what, 
by  agreement  with  the  Bank,  had  been  the  practice  of  the  Treasury 
when  there  was  no  alarm  in  the  community,  when  the  Bank  was  ad 
mitted  to  be  in  a  state  of  perfect  security,  and  free  from  the  appre 
hension  of  embarrassment.  The  Treasury  practice  was  to  send  to 
the  Bank  a  daily  list,  specifying  every  draft  upon  the  Bank  from 
the  Treasury,  showing  the  amount  drawn  for  and  the  place  of  pay 
ment,  but  omitting  the  names  of  the  persons  to  whom  payable,  to 
guard  against  fraud.  Another  list  was  sent  weekly,  with  the  dates, 
amounts,  places  of  payment,  aad  names  of  the  payees.  These  were 
intended  not  only  to  guard  the  Bank  against  fraud  and  surprise,  but  to 
enable  the  Bank  to  regulate  the  accommodations  to  its  customers,  as 
they  were  thus  apprized  of  the  points  at  which  their  funds  would  be 
wanted.  Nothing  surely  couid  be  more  natural  than  to  continue  a 
practice  like  this,  when  the  deposites  were  to  be  permanently  removed. 
It  could  not  be  doubted  by  any  one  that  such  a  proceeding  must  cause 
uneasiness  in  the  public  mind;  and  the  very  first  precaution  which 
prudence  would  have  suggested  to  mitigate  the  alarm,  was  the  con 
tinuance  and  increase  of  these  safeguards  of  the  Bank;  certainly  not 
that,  at  the  very  commencement  of  the  alarm,  they  should  be  discon 
tinued.  But  such  was  the  fact.  That  they  were  discontinued,  and 
that  the  Bank,  misled  and  deceived,  had  to  deal  with  the  Treasury  as 
with  an  enemy,  is  an  event  which  belongs  exclusively  to  the  present 
day,  and  to  the  existence  of  personal  feelings  in  the  Department  which 
directed  the  Treasurer,  wholly  unbecoming  the  official  transactions  of 
any  Government. 

Sir,  if  I  meant  to  deal  with  my  enemy  as  is  befitting  the  spirit  of 
honorable  contest,  I  would  give  him  equality  of  position,  of  instruc 
tion,  of  knowledge,  and  let  the.  issue  be  the  result  of  skill  and  the 
better  cause;  but  if  I  meant  to  deprive  him  of  all  chance  of  defence 
or  escape,  to  murder  him  basely,  what  better  course  could  I  pursue, 
than  to  blindfold  him,  or  rather  to  throw  false  lights  into  his  eyes,  that 
he  could  only  know  the  approach  of  the  poniard  by  feeling  it  in  his 
heart? 

Sir,  the  former  practice  was  made  an  instrument  of  imposition  upon 
the  Bank,  by  continuing  to  wear  its  usual  appearances,  while,  in  muh, 
drafts,  to  the  extent  of  nearly  three  millions  of  dollars,  were  pur 
posely  withheld  from  the  lists — drafts  payable  in  unknown  places, 
at  unknown  times,  and  to  unknown  parties.  The  lists  themselves  be 
came  instruments  of  deception,  and  gave  false  information  to  the  Bank 
of  the  state  of  the  Treasury  demand,  while  rumors  gave  out  the  exist* 


12 

ence  of  the  concealed  drafts  in  precisely  that  way  which  was  most 
likely  to  increase  the  deception.  I  call  the  attention  of  the  House  to 
that  correspondence  of  which  I  have  spoken.  The  Treasurer  says 
that  the  drafts  were  of  an  unusual  kind;  that  they  depended  on 
certain  contingencies — contingencies  still  unknown  to  this  House  and 
nation.  Was  this  a  reason  why  the  Bank  should  not  have  notice  of 
them!  Was  it  calculated  to  quiet  the  apprehensions  of  the  Bank  or 
of  the  community,  that  the  presentation  of  these  drafts,  payable  as 
it  now  appears  at  sight,'  was  suspended  upon  unknown  contingencies? 
Sir,  every  unprejudiced  person  who  looks  at  this  transaction,  must 
agree  that  the  course  of  the  Treasury,  in  regard  to  drafts  for  nearly 
three  millions  of  dollars,  hovering  between  Philadelphia,  New  York, 
and  Baltimore,  without  an  intimation  to  the  Bank  of  the  time  and 
place  where  they  were  to  be  presented,  was  of  itself  amply  suf 
ficient  to  justify  even  more  alarm  than  the  Bank  felt,  and  greater 
reductions  than  the  Bank  required. 

There  is  one  other  fact  to  which  I  will  advert  before  I  close  these 
preliminary  remarks;  it  is  of  great  use  in  explaining  the  influence  of 
the  removal  in  producing  the  present  distress.  The  honorable  mem 
ber  from  Tennessee  [Mr.- POLK]  expressed  great  surprise  that  any  dif 
ficulty  should  be  apprehended  from  transferring  deposites  from  one 
side  of  a  street  to  anoiher,  inasmuch  as  the  community  would 
derive  the  same  amount  of  accommodation  from  them  in  one  place 
as  in  the  other.  Sir,  the  consequence  did  not  follow.  The  same 
amount  of  accommodation  was  not  derived,  and  it  is  for  those  who 
know  the  condition  of  the  deposite  banks  to  give  the  reason.  This 
House  does  not  know  what  their  circumstances  were.  Their  capital 
may  have  been  employed  in  furnishing  capital  to  Western  banks,  or 
in  discounting  upon  their  own  stock;  or  the  amount  of  their  private 
deposites  may  have  been  lessened  by  the  apprehension  of  remaining 
in  company  with  a  public  depositor  and  preferred  creditor.  There  is 
one  decisive  reason  why  the  deposite  State  banks  can  never  so  effi 
ciently  further  the  'accommodation  of  the  trading  community  as  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  that  is,  that  the  circulation  of  the 
one  extends  over  the  whole  Union,  and  never  enters  one  of  her  banks 
in  its  course,  but  it  issues  again  to  repeat  the  circle.  But  the  circu 
lation  of  a  State  bank  is  at  her  own  door.  It  cannot  leave  it  to  any 
material  extent.  Contrivances  to  extend  it  are  abortive.  It  does  not 
answer  the  purpose  of  exchange,  and  its  excess  as  currency  instantly 
returns  upon  the  bank  for  something  that  is  better  than  her  bank  notes. 
The  discounts  of  the  State  banks,  on  the  faith  of  the  deposites  placed 
in  them,  cannot  have  been  equal  to  the  reductions  of  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States  to  pay  thorn.  And,  in  addition  to  this,  there  is  an  im 
mense  mass  of  private  capital  usually  loaned  out  on  the  security  of 
stock,  at  moderate  interest,  which,  at  a  moment  of  danger  and  alarm, 
retires  from  the  scene.  The  days  of  exorbitant  interest  are  not  the 
days  of  the  capitalist,  but  of  men  who  desire  to  make  exorbitant  pro 
fit  upon  small  investments. 

Still,  sir,  it  is  not  easy  to  account  for  the  height  of  the  present  dis 
tress  by  the  mere  change  of  the  deposites,  nor  by  the  diminished  use 
of  them  in  the  State  banks,  when  compared  with  their  use  in  the  Bank 


13 

of  the  United  States,  from  which  they  were  taken.  These  circum 
stances  had  an  effect,  but  they  do  not  stand  alone.  There  is  an 
intense  apprehension  for  the  future  connected  with  this  operation — -an 
apprehension  which  springs  from  the  Treasury  determination  that 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  existing  circulation  of  exchanges  is  to  cease; 
and  cease  it  must,  to  a  great  extent,  if  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  is 
not  to  collect  the  public  revenue. 

The  Bank  of  the  i./nitcd  States,  Mr.  Speaker,  has  performed  her 
great  offices  to  this  people  by  the  concurrence  of  two  peculiarities, 
which  belong  to  her — her  structure,  and  her  employment  in  the 
collection  of  the  public  revenue.  No  Slate  banks,  by  any  combi 
nation,  can  effect  the  required  exchanges  to  a  considerable  extent. 
No  Bank  of  the  United  States,  without  the  aid  of  the  public  revenue, 
can  effect  them  to  the  extent  which  the  necessities  of  trade  require. 

Sir,  the  structure  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  contributes  to 
this  operation  in  a  way  which  every  one  may  comprehend.  The  whole 
circulation  of  the  United  States  is  employed  in  effecting  the  exchange 
of  the  crops  with  the  merchandise  of  the  country.  It  is  employed 
in  transporting  the  crops  to  market,  and  merchandise  to  the  places 
of  its  consumption.  Now,  sir,  a  National  Bank,  with  branches  spread 
over  the  whole  Union,  knows,  from  experience,  and  by  her  means 
of  observation,  where  the  amount  of  demand  will  fall  and  rise, 
and  at  what  time  these  changes  will  occur.  She  knows  beforehand 
where  she  may  with  safety  diminish  her  resources,  and  where  she 
must  enlarge  them.  Wherever  her  resources  are  placed  for  use,  it 
is  the  same  thing  to  the  Bank.  Her  profit  is  the  same  every 
where;  and  this  ability  to  give  them  the  position  which  the  trade  of 
the  country  requires,  is  sustained  by,  and  in  a  great  degree  dependent 
upon,  her  employment  as  the  depository  of  the  public  revenue.  In 
this  character  the  Bank  receives  the  revenue,  and  holds  it  until  the 
time  of  disbursement;  and  the  knowledge  which  her  accomplished 
President  and  the  Board  of  Directors  obtain  through  their  relations 
to  the  Treasury,  and  by  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  fiscal  opera 
tions  of  the  Department,  enables  them  to  reconcile  all  the  demands 
of  the  Treasury  with  the  demands  of  trade,  at  the  same  time  that 
they  preserve  the  whole  currency  of  the  country  in  that  due  pro 
portion  to  demand  which  makes  it,  and  which  alone  makes  it,  sound 
and  invariable. 

But  now,  sir,  this  revenue  is  to  be  collected  against  the  Bank. 
She  is  to  assist  in  paying,  not  in  receiving  it.  Her  situation  is  to  be 
entirely  reversed.  The  wants  of  the  community  are  to  become  se 
condary  to  her  own  preservation;  and,  instead  of  placing  her  funds 
where  trade  will  most  require  them,  she  must  place  them  where,  from 
the  presence  of  rivals  supported  by  the  Government,  she  will  require 
them  herself  for  her  own  protection.  Sir,  this  is  to  be  the  future 
operation  of  the  measure  taken  by  the  Treasury  Department.  The 
theory  of  a  National  Bank  with  branches  not  collecting  and  disbursing 
the  revenue,  is  an  absurdit}7.  It  never  was  conceived  of  until  the 
present  day;  and  even  now,  though  complaints  are  made  against  the 
Bank,  as  if  her  powers  were  not  impaired,  no  one  can  seriously  regard 
the  measure  of  removaj  except  as  a  measure  of  intended  destruction.  It 


14 

is  particularly  a  measure  of  intended  destruction  to  all  the  usual  opera 
tions  of  exchange.  The  Bank  cannot  perform  them  as  she  has  done.  If 
the  State  banks  promise  to  perform  them,  it  is  all  delusion.  If  they  have 
contracted  to  perform  them,  they  will  break  their  contract;  and  if  they 
do  not,  they  will  break  themselves.  If  by  possibility  they  could  make 
themselves  a  Bank  of  the  United  States  and  its  branches,  which  they 
cannot  do,  what  would  the  country  gain  by  such  a  contrivance  but 
a  bank  with  the  powers  of  the  present  Bank,  subject  to  no  re 
strictions  or  control  by  law,  and  dependent  only  on  the  pleasure  of 
him  who  controls  the  deposites?  Sir,  the  whole  property  of  the  coun 
try,  in  its  transfer  from  place  to  place  within  it,  is  to  undergo — has 
already  undergone — a  violent  change.  There  is  not  a  man  who  can 
now  take  the  management  of  a  crop  in  the  South,  or  of  a  manufac 
ture  or  importation  in  the  North,  who  is  able  to  foresee  how  he  shall 
conduct  it  to  its  close;  and  the  consequence  is,  that  he  will,  if  possible, 
have  nothing  to  do  with  either.  This  derangement,  actual  and  pros 
pective,  sir,  enters  materially  into  the  present  excitement  and  distress. 

And  does  the  honorable  member  from  Tennessee  propose,  as  a 
remedy  for  all  this,  to  have  an  inquiry  into  the  affairs  of  the  Bank? 
Is  it  for  difficulties  of  this  description  and  magnitude  that  he  demands 
a  sifting  inquiry,  an  inquiry  into  \\\e  printing  accounts  of  the  Bank? 
Is  his  great  object  to  ascertain  how  $7,000  of  unvouched  payments 
have  been  distributed,  and  who  is  the  owner  of  the  National  Intelli 
gencer?  Sir,  I  confess  my  profound  astonishment  that  gentlemen, 
having  the  welfare  of  this  great  nation  confided  to  them,  will  de 
scend  to  inquiries  like  these,  will  run  after  petty  accounts  with  printers 
and  the  concerns  of  the  National  Intelligencer,  and,  in  the  ardor  of 
pursuit,  forget  the  country  that  is  intrusted  to  them.  The  time  has 
come,  or  I  greatly  mistake  the  indications  around  us,  when  the  country 
demands  that  our  attention  be  given  to  objects  of  a  higher  nature. 

I  humbly  hope,  then,  Mr.  Speaker,  that  this  House  will  inquire 
into  nothing  but  the  question  before  it,  and  from  which  we  cannot 
escape — the  evil  which  now  threatens  the  country,  and  the  proper 
remedy  to  be  applied.  An  inquiry  of  this  character  is  worthy  of  all 
attention,  and  of  the  devotion  of  all  our  faculties  and  efforts.  In  such 
an  inquiry,  no  person  will  be  more  ready  than  myself  to  forget  the 
Bank,  if  that  shall  be  the  course  of  patriotism  and  safety.  Except  as 
she  ministers  to  the  public  good,  I  regard  her  as  nothing,  and  less 
than  nothing.  The  public  good,  in  the  preservation  of  the  public 
faith,  in  the  maintenance  of  the  public  currency,  and  in  the  support 
of  the  constitution — this  is  an  object  which  this  House  should  never 
cease  to  regard,  and  to  which,  in  my  further  remarks,  1  shall  endea 
vor  to  keep  my  own  attention  fixed,  without  yielding  it  to  any  other. 

Mr.  Speaker,  the  immediate  question  before  the  House  is,  whether 
the  reasons  assigned  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  removing 
the  public  deposites  are  such  as  ought  to  satisfy  Congress  and  the 
country;  and,  if  not,  what  is  the  remedy  which  it  is  the  duty  of  Con 
gress  to  apply? 

The  reasons  assigned  are  remarkable,  sir,  in  a  particular  which 
cannot  have  escaped  the  general  observation.  The  letter  of  the 
Secretary  consists  of  certain  general  propositions,  by  which  he  en- 


15 

deavors  to  sustain  his  authority,  and  of  certain  particular  reasons  or 
statements  of  fact,  by  which  he  endeavors  to  justify  its  exercise.  The 
general  propositions  upon  which  all  his  particular  reasons  depend,  he 
does  not  condescend  to  argue  at  all;  and  I  have  listened  with  all  due 
attention  to  the  gentleman  who  has  preceded  me,  the  honorable  mem 
ber  from  Tennessee,  without  being  able  to  perceive  that  his  course 
has  in  any  respect  differed  from  that  of  the  Secretary.  The  Secre 
tary  asserts,  sir,  that,  by  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  by  and  through 
his  absolute  and  unconditional  power,  whether  the  act  was  in  itself 
right  or  wrong,  with  or  without  cause,  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 
is  put  out  of  court,  and  the  nation  discharged  from  the  contract,  with 
out  any  violation  of  faith.  He  further  asserts,  that  while  his  own 
power  was  absolute,  that  of  Congress  over  the  same  subject  was  gone, 
having  been  alienated  to  him;  that  the  Legislature  were,  as  to  the 
treasure  deposited  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  in  a  condition  of 
impotency  and  imbecility;  that  they  had  bound  themselves  hand  and 
foot  by  the  charter  of  the  Bank;  and  that,  while  they  had  given  un 
limited  authority  over  the  subject  to  him,  they  had  reserved  no  power 
whatever  to  themselves  or  to  the  people;  and,  consequently,  that  in 
no  event,  not  even  if  the  deposites  were  unsafe,  or  the  ultimate  law 
of  all  Governments — the  safety  of  the  people — should  imperiously  have 
demanded  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  was  it  in  the  power  of  Con 
gress  to  touch  them,  without  a  violation  of  the  public  faith.  He 
further  asserts,  that  the  rightful  exercise  of  his  power  is  not,  even  in 
point  of  responsibility  to  Congress,  dependent  on  the  safety  of  the 
deposites,  or  on  the  fidelity  of  the  Bank  in  its  conduct  to  the  Govern 
ment;  but  that  it  was  his  right  and  duty  to  remove  them,  if  the 
removal  tended  in  any  degree  to  the  interest  and  convenience  of  the 
public.  He  finally  asserts,  that  as  it  was  his  right  to  remove  the 
deposites,  so  it  was  his  right,  as  a  consequence,  to  select  the  places 
of  new  deposite;  and  he  did  so. 

Sir,  these  are  startling  propositions.  They  involve  grave  conse 
quences.  They  deserve  careful  consideration.  They  are  far  from 
being  self-evident.  It  was  worthy  of  the  officer  who  asserted  them, 
and  who  was  bound  to  justify  the  assertion  to  Congress,  to  favor 
that  body  with  at  least  an  outline  of  the  train  of  reasoning  by  which 
he  came  to  these  remarkable  conclusions.  But,  sir,  there  is  no  such 
thing  in  the  book.  I  have  looked  carefully  through  it,  to  borrow 
some  light  on  this  subject  from  the  mind  of  the  Secretary,  by  which 
I  might  enlighten  my  own;  but,  beyond  the  simple  dogmas  which  I 
have  stated,  there  is  nothing  to  be  found,  except  the  causes  of  his 
particular  determination,  which  were  of  no  sort  of  importance  what 
ever,  nor  worthy  of  the  least  consideration,  if  his  general  propositions 
are  true.  I  am  compelled,  therefore,  from  necessity,  to  assert  the 
contrary  of  all  that  the  Secretary  has  asserted,  and  to  take  the  burden 
of  refuting  what  it  would  seem  to  have  been  rather  his  duty  to  es 
tablish.  These  are  points,  sir,  to  which  I  shall  especially  call  the 
attention  of  the  House,  as  involving  principles  of  the  highest  public 
importance — principles  which,  if  this  House  shall  affirm  them,  they 
will  affirm  that  all  power  over  the  Treasury  is  gone  from  Congress, 
and  that  there  is  but  a  single  Department  in  the  Government. 


16 

The  first  proposition  is  that  with  which  the  Secretary  begins  his 
letter.  The  Secretary  says — 

"  It  has  been  settled  by  repeated  adjudications,  that  a  charter 
"  granted  by  a  State  to  a  corporation  like  that  of  the  Bank  of  the 
li  United  Slates  is  a  Contract  between  the  sovereignty  which  grants 
"  it  and  the  stockholders.  The  same  principle  must  apply  to  a  char- 
"  tor  granted  by  the  United  States;  and,  consequently,  the  act  incor- 
"  porating  the  Bank  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  contract  between  the 
"  United  States  of  the  one  part,  and  the  stockholders  of  the  other; 
"  and,  by  t\\$  plain  terms  of  the  contract,  as  contained  in  the  section 
"  above  quoted,  the  stockholders  have  agreed  that  the  power  reserved 
"  to  the  Secretary  over  the  deposites  shall  not  be  restr,'  :ted  to  any  par- 
"  ticular  contingencies,  but  be  absolute  and  unconditional,  as  far  as 
"  their  interests  arc  involved  in  the  removal.  The  order,  therefore, 
41  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  directing  the  public  money  to  be 
"  deposited  elsewhere,  can  in  no  event  be  regarded  as  a  violation  of 
"  the  contract  with  the  stockholders,  nor  impair  any  right  secured  to 
44  them  by  the  charter." 

That  the  House  may  have  before  them  the  section  to  which  the 
Secretary  refers,  I  beg  their  attention  to  it.  It  is  the  16th  section  of 
the  Bank  Charter,  which  enacts: 

"That  the  deposiles  of  the  money  of  the  United  States,  in  places 
"  in  which  the  said  Bank  or  branches  thereof  may  be  established, 
u  shall  be  made  in  said  Bank  or  branches  thereof,  unless  the  Secretary 
44  of  the  Treasury  shall  at  any  time  otherwise  order  and  direct;  in 
11  which  case,  the  Secretary  of  ths  Treasury  shall  immediately  lay 
"  before  Congress,  if  in  session,  and,  if  not,  immediately  after  the 
"commencement  of  .the  next  session,  the  reasons  of  such  order  or 
44  direction." 

I  beg  the  House  to  remark  that  this  document  proceeds  from  a 
gentlemen  of  distinguished  reputation  as  a  jurist,  trained  to  legal  in 
vestigations,  and  fully  acquainted  •with  the  legal  effect  and  value  of 
every  word  which  he  has  used.  The  language  he  has  adopted  runs, 
"  by  the  plain  terms  of  the  contract,  as  contained  in  the  section  above 
quoted,  the  stockholders  have  agreed,"  &c.  Sir,  if  the  Secretary  had 
said  that  the  contract  gave  him  this  power  by  implication,  or  that  he 
possessed  it  by  the  fair  interpretation  of  the  section,  or  by  its  reason, 
spirit,  scope,  or  intention,  my  perplexity  would  have  been  less;  but 
when  he  asserts  that  his  authority  is  derived  from  the  terms  of  the  sec 
tion,  and  from  its  plain  terms,  and  that  by  those  terms  it  is  not  restricted 
to  any  particular  contingencies,  but  is  absolute  cWid  unconditional,  I 
feel  some  doubts  whether  there  is  that  common  medium  of  a  common 
language  between  the  honorable  Secretary  and  myself  which  is  so  in 
dispensable  to  profitable  argument.  If  I  rightly  understand  the  pro 
position,  it  has  no  authority  in  the  terms,  nor  in  the  reason,  spirit,  or 
intention  of  the  section;  and  it  is  as  revolting  to  good  sense,  in  the 
strength  of  the  language  which  the  Secretary  has  used,  as  it  is  to  the  . 
rules  of  law.  It  asserts  that,  in  no  event,  right  or  wrong,  not  even 
in  the  extremest  case  of  wilful  injustice  or  fraud,  (a  case  which  I  am  far 
from  supposing  to  have  been  in  the  view  of  the  Secretary,  though  his 
language  comprehends  it,)  could  the  Bank  assert  the  least  violation  of 


17 

faith  by  the  Secretary's  removal  of  the  deposites.  Sir,  I  submit  to 
the  House  that  the  contrary  proposition  may  be  easily  shown  to  be 
true,  and  therefore  that  the  Secretary's  proposition  is  not  true. 

r|1he  right  of  the  Bank  to  the  deposites  is  derived  from  contract;  a 
valuable  consideration  having  been  paid  for  it,  in  a  bonus  to  the  Trea 
sury,  and  in  a  stipulation  for  expensive  services  to  be  performed 
through  the  whole  term  of  the  charter.  A  right  in  the  Secretary  to 
remove  those  deposites,  without  good  cause,  during  any  part  of  the 
time,  is  not  to  be  presumed,  but  the  contrary;  and  it  should  not  be  con 
ceded,  until  it  is  shown  to  be  required  by  the  clear  and  plain  mean 
ing  of  the  whole  section.  The  terms  of  the  section,  instead  of  giving 
to  the  Secretary  an  absolute  and  unconditional  power  to  remove  the 
deposites,  require  that  he  shall  have  reasons  for  the  removal,  which 
reasons  he  shall  immediately  communicate  to  Congress.  This  is  the 
condition  upon  which  the  Bank  submits  to  the  exercise  of  his  power — 
that  he  shall  have  reasons,  and  communicate  them;  and  such  is  the 
agreement  of  the  parties.  The  whole  section  is  agreement,  as  the 
whole  charter  is.  It  is  all  contract,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end. 
Now,  if  Congress  have  agreed  with  the  Bank  that  the  Secretary  shall 
give  his  reasons  for  the  act,  and,  consequently,  that  he  shall  have 
reasons, the  difficulty,  sir,  is  to  understand  how,  according  to  approved 
rules  of  interpretation,  these  reasons  can  be  considered  as  of  no 
concern  to  the  Bank,  but  only  to  Congress;  how  we  can  understand 
that  it  is  of  no  sort  of  moment  to  the  Bank  whether  there  are  reasons 
or  not,  when  the  Bank  is  to  be  affected  by  the  removal,  and  Congress 
have  agreed  with  the  Bank  that  the  reasons  shall  be  given.  Sir,  in  my 
judgment,  the  Secretary  has  directly  inverted  the  object  of  the  pro 
vision.  The  reasons  concern  the  Bank  only,  and  not  Congress-: 
or  rather,  they  concern  Congress  only  because  they  concern  the 
Bank.  The  contract  for  the  deposites  with  the  Bank  is  a  mockery 
under  any  other  interpretation.  Congress  is  above  the  reasons.  Whe 
ther  good  or  bad,  she  can  do  right  and  justice  to  herself,  whatever 
the  Secretary  may  argue.  The  Bank,  on  the  other  hand,  is  wholly 
dependent  upon  them,  and  has  no  other  protection  from  injustice;  and 
the  stipulation  for  communicating  the  reasons  to  Congress  is,  there 
fore,  for  the  plain  and  manifest  object  of  giving  to  the  Bank  the  bene 
fit  of  a  review  by  Congress,  upon  such  principles  as  ought  to  govern 
such  a  contract. 

Sir,  the  honorable  member  from  Tennessee  seems  to  me  not  tjo 
have  been  fortunate  ift  his  reference  to  the  former  head  of  the  Trea 
sury,  Mr.  Crawford,  for  his  doctrine  on  any  branch  of  this  case.  On 
this,  in  particular,  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Crawford  was  directly  against 
him,  as  well  as  against  the  present  Secretary,  and  in  favor  of  that  in 
terpretation  which  I  suppose  to  be  the  true  one.  On  the  25th  May, 
1824,  the  select  committee  on  the  memorial  of  Ninian  Edwards,  re 
ported  that,  in  certain  instances,  deposites  of  th«r  public  money  were 
made  by  Mr.  Secretary  Crawford  in  certain  State  banks  situated  in 
places  where  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  had  branches,  and  tkat 
he  made  no  such  communication  of  his  reasons  to  Congress  as  the 
charter  requires.  "This  omission,"  says  the  committee,  "is  acknow 
ledged  by  the  .Secretary,  who  says  it  was  owing:  to  inadvertence;  and 


18 

that  the  inattention  to  the  provision  of  the  law  was  unimportant,  in 
asmuch  as  the  provision  was  intended  OBVIOUSLY  for  the  benefit  of 
the  Bank,  and  the  Bank  had  full  notice."  (Reports  of  committees, 
18th  Congress,  1st  session,  document  128.)  The  doctrine  of  the 
present  Secretary  is,  that  the  provision  was  not  intended  at  all  for 
the  benefit  of  the  Bank;  but  that,  so  far  as  regards  the  Bank,  his  power 
of  removing  the  deposites  is,  by  the  plain  terms  of  the  section,  abso 
lute  and  unconditional. 

The  honorable  member  from  Tennessee  is  not  more  fortunate  in 
the  suggestion  of  his  own  reasons  for  supposing  the  provision  to  re 
gard  Congress  and  not  the  Bank.  I  understand  him  to  have  said  that 
the  section  required  this  communication  from  the  Secretary,  that  Con 
gress  might  know,  1st,  where  the  deposites  were  made  by  the  Secretary 
after  their  removal;  and  2d,  whether  the  Secretary  was  or  was  not  liable 
to  impeachment  for  the  act.  Now,  sir,  I  think  myself  entitled  to  ask 
it  as  a  concession  from  the  honorable  member,  that  a  communication 
of  i\\G  fact  where  the  public  money  is  placed,  is  not  a  communication 
of  the  reasons  why  it  was  removed  from  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States.  That  fact  is  precisely  what  the  Secretary  is  not  directed  to  com 
municate.  His  communication  is,  by  the  plain  terms  of  the  section, 
confined  to  the  reasons  for  ordering  and  directing  that  the  deposites 
should  not  be  made  in  the  Bank  or  the  branches  thereof.  As  to  the 
object  of  impeachment,  sir,  it  is  as  much  in  derogation  of  that  prin 
ciple  of  our  constitution,  that  no  man  shall  be  compelled  to  be  a  wit 
ness  against  himself,  as  it  is  of  the  character  of  the  Legislature  for 
plain  and  honest  dealing  with  its  officer,  to  impute  to  it  the  design  of 
drawing  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  into  a  confession  which  may 
be  read  against  him  to  the  Senate.  No,  sir;  this  was  not  the  design 
of  Congress,  nor  can  any  course  of  decent  reasoning  sustain  the  enor 
mous  proposition  of  the  Secretary,  that  his  power  is  absolute  and  un 
conditional.  It  is  a  power  which  Congress  did  not,  could  not,  give. 
An  absolute  and  unconditional  power,  derived  by  implication  from  a 
contract,  for  valuable  consideration,  belongs  to  doctrines  which  a  court 
of  justice  would  spurn  from  its  hall.  It  has  no  countenance  in  our 
institutions;  it  has  none  in  our  constitution,  which  was  ordained  to 
establish  justice,  as  well  as  to  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty;  it  has  no 
countenance  from  any  thing  but  the  poverty  of  the  case,  which,  find 
ing  a  reason  to  be  impossible,  makes  it  unnecessary. 

Sir,  the  interpretation  of  the  section  is,  to  my  mind,  abundantly 
clear.  The  Legislature  did  not  see  fit  to  part  with  the  absolute  right 
to  the  deposites,  nor  to  make  the  right  of  the  Bank  a  judicial  question 
by  defining  the  exceptions  to  it.  In  consequence  of  the  fiscal  rela 
tions  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  the  Bank,  and  of  the  proba 
bility  that  whenever  the  proper  reasons  should  occur  they  would  call 
for  immediate  action,  the  parties  have  agreed  that  he  shall  exercise 
a  provisional  power  over  the  subject,  under  the  stipulation  that  his 
reasons  shall  come  immediately  to  Congress  for  their  review,  upon  such 
principles  as  belong  to  the  contract;  and  if,  according  to  those  prin 
ciples,  the  reasons  of  the  Secretary  are  insufficient  for  the  act,  then 
it  will  be  an  open  breach  of  the  public  faith,  not  merely  sanctioned,  but 


committed  by  Congress,  not  to  send  the  deposites  back  to  the  Bank,, 
whose  right  to  them  is  unimpaired.  If,  after  the  payment  of  a  million 
and  a  half  of  money  as  a  bonus,  and  the  performance  of  costly  duties  to 
this  period  of  the  charter,  and  to  be  continued  to  the  end  of  it,  together 
equivalent  to  an  annual  payment  of  two  hundred  thousand  dollars  for 
twenty  years,  the  Secretary  has  removed  the  public  money  without 
adequate  cause,  it  is  possible,  indeed,  that  an  artificial  argument  may 
be  made  to  sustain  the  act;  but  reflection  in  this  House,  and  by  this- 
people,  will  infallibly  bring:  the  question  back  to  the  ground  upon' 
which  it  must  ultimately  rest — the  ground  of  common  sense  and  com 
mon  justice,  upon  which  alone  the  faith  of  the  nation  is  to  be  defended,, 
if  it  can  be  defended  at  all. 

Mr.  Speaker:  The  second  general  proposition  of  the  Secretary 
affects  this  House  as  a  component  part  of  the  legislative  power,  and 
afiects  the  whole  legislative  power  in  the  most  critical  manner,  as- 
may  be  seen  by  the  proposition  itself.  "  The  place  of  deposite 
"  could  not  be  changed  by  a  legislative  act,  without  disregarding  a 
"  pledge  which  the  Legislature  has  given,"  "  although  Congress 
"  should  be  satisfied  that  the  public  money  was  not  safe  in  the  care 
"  of  the  Bank,  or  should  be  convinced  that  the  interests  of  the  peo- 
"  pie  of  the  United  States  imperiously  demanded  the  removal." 
These  arc  the  plain  terms  of  the  Secretary,  and  the  House  must  see 
what  is  their  plain  meaning;  that,  whereas  the  Secretary  could  over 
throw  this  contract,  with  or  without  reason,  right  or  wrong,  Congress, 
could  not  be  relieved  from  it  by  the  most  imperious  reasons;  that  as  his 
action  could  under  no  circumstances  impair  the  contract,  so  the  action 
of  Congress  upon  it  could,  in  no  event,  be  otherwise  than  illegal. 

Sir,  there  is  one  characteristic  of  these  propositions,  for  which  I 
acknowledge  myself  to  be  indebted  to  the  Secretary;  they  are  so- 
strongly  stated,  that  it  is  impossible  to  mistake  their  meaning.  While 
the  Secretary  asserts  every  power  over  the  subject  in  himself,  he 
denies  the  existence  of  any  power  in  Congress  over  the  same  subject. 
The  use  and  design  of  the  doctrine  are,  at  the  same  time,  as  clear  as 
its  meaning;  it  is  the  only  and  the  indispensable  justification  of  the 
Secretary's  extreme  action  upon  the  deposites  so  shortly  before  the 
present  session  of  Congress;  and,  if  this  justification  fails,  he  is  with 
out  any. 

The  question,  sir,  concerns  the  interpretation  of  a  statute.  The 
extent  of  the  Secretary's  authority,  and  of  the  restriction  upon  that 
of  Congress,  must  be  collected,  therefore,  in  the  ordinary  way,  from 
the  lair  scope  and  meaning  of  its  provisions,  in  their  application  to  the 
subject-matter;  and  the  House  must  consequently  feel  some  surprise 
that  the  Secretarv  should  have  adopted  the  interpretation  which  he- 
asserts,  in  a  state  of  mind  that  ought  to  have  carried  him  to  the- 
directly  opposite  conclusion.  His  letter  proceeds  to  say:  "The- 
"  power  over  the  place  of  deposite  for  the  public  money  would  seem* 
"  properly  to  belong  to  the  legislative  department  of  the  Govern- 
"  me nt,  and  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  why  the  authority  to  withdraw  it 
"  from  this  Bank  was  confided  exclusively  to  the  Executive"  I  must 
state  it  as  an  extraordinary  fact,  in  the  history  of  legal  interpretation, 


that,  when  the  learned  Secretary  admitted  that  he  could  not  imagine 
why  the  moaning  should  be  what  he  asserts  it  to  be,  it  did  not  occur 
to  him  that  this  was  one  of  the  best  reasons  in  the  world  for  holding 
that  its  meaning  is  not  what  he  asserts  it  to  be.  If  a  court  of  justice 
should  be  told  by  learned  counsel  that  he  could  not  imagine  why  the 
meaning  he  gave  to  a  statute  should  be  its  meaning,  he  would  probably 
be  admonished  to  try  the  effect  of  his  imagination  upon  a  different 
construction,  and  it  would  be  very  likely  to  assist  him  in  obtaining  the 
true  construction.  The  Secretary  says,  he  cannot  imagine  why  the 
power  was  confided  exclusively  to  the  Executive.  I  hold,  sir,  with 
submission,  that  the  power  is  not  confided  to  the  Executive,  either 
exclusively  or  at  all.  The  position  is  directly  repugnant  to  his  first 
proposition,  that  the  power  of  the  Secretary  is  absolute  and  uncondi 
tional,  and  it  is  equally  repugnant  to  the  laws  and  constitution,  as 
they  have  created  and  fashioned  the  Executive  department.  The 
-Secretary  is  not  the  agent  or  officer  of  that  department  in  the  per 
formance  of  the  trust  committed  to  him  by  the  16th  section  of  the 
charter,  nor  in  the  performance  of  any  of  the  trusts  committed  to  him 
by  Congress,  in  regard  to  the  control  of  the  public  treasure.  In 
these  particulars  he  is  the  agent  and  officer  of  that  department  which 
levies  and  collects  taxes,  duties,  and  imposts;  pays  the  debts  of  the 
uation;  borrows  money;  raises  and  supports  armies;  provides  and 
maintains  a  navy;  makes  appropriations,  and  keeps  the  public  trea 
sure  under  its  own  control,  till,  in  virtue  of  a  legal  appropriation,  it 
is  drawn  out  of  the  Treasury.  He  is  the  agent  and  officer  of  Con 
gress,  and  not  of  the  Executive. 

This,  sir,  is  a  question  of  vast  importance,  not  more  in  relation  to 
the  recent  transaction,  than  to  the  due  order  of  this  Government, 
under  all  future  administrations  of  it.  It  is  not  a  point,  now  raised 
for  the  first  time,  though  possibly  for  the  first  time  made  a  topic  of 
controversy.  The  distinction  is  coeval  with  the  constitution.  It 
may  be  traced,  in  the  clearest  characters,  through  the  first  organiza 
tion  of  the  Executive  department  and  of  the  Treasury;  and,  if  it  did 
not  lead  to  public  discussion  then,  it  was  because  it  challenged  uni- 
•versal  assent.  It  is  impossible  to  explain  the  structure  of  these  dif 
ferent  departments  or  offices  upon  any  other  theory.  I  ask  the 
-attention  of  the  House  to  the  consideration  of  this  point. 

The  act  of  27th  July,  1789,  entitled  "'An  act  for  establishing  an 
^Executive  department,  to  be  denominated  the  Department  of  Foreign 
Affairs,"  enacts  that  the  Secretary  for  that  department  (now  the  De 
partment  of  State)  "  shall  perform  and  execute  such  duties  as  shall, 
from  time  to  time,  be  enjoined  on  or  intrusted  to  him  by  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States,  agreeably  to  the  constitution,  relative  to 
correspondences,  commissions,  or  instructions,  to  and  with  public 
ministers  or  consuls  from  the  United  States,  or  to  negotiations  with 
public  ministers  frpm  foreign  States  or  princes,  or  to  memorials  ov 
other  applications  from  foreign  public  ministers  or  other  foreigners,, 
or  to  such  other  matters  respecting  foreign  affairs  as  the  President 
of  the  United  States  shall  assign  to  the  said  department:  and  fur- 
£heriRore,  that  the  said  principal  officer  shall  conduct  the  business  of 


21 

the  said  department  in  such  manner  as  the  President  of  the  United 
States  shall,  from  time  to  time,  order  and  direct." 

The  act  of  7th  August,  1789,  entitled  "  An  act  to  establish  a» 
Executive  department,  to  be  denominated  the  Department  of  War,""' 
enacts  that  the  Secretary  "  shall  perform  and  execute  such  duties  a& 
shall,  from  time  to  time,  be  enjoined  on  or  intrusted  to  him  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  agreeably  to  the  constitution,  rela 
tive  to  military  commissions,  or  to  the  land  or  naval  forces,  ships  or 
warlike  stores  of  the  United  States,  or  to  such  other  matters  respect 
ing  military  or  naval  affairs,  as  the  President  of  the  United  States- 
shall  assign  to  the  said  department,  or  relative  to  the  granting  o£« 
lands  to  persons  entitled  thereto  for  military  services  rendered  to  tln> 
United  States,  or  relative  to  Indian  affairs:  and  furthermore,  that  the" 
said  principal  officer  shall  conduct  the  business  of  the  said  depart 
ment  in  such  manner  as  the  President  of  the  United  States  sha'll^ 
from  time  to  time,  order  or  instruct" 

The  act  of  30th  April,  1798,  entitled  "  An  act  to  establish  an 
Executive  department,  to  be  denominated  the  Department  of  the 
Navy,"  enacts  that  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  thr  Secretary  "  to  execute 
such  orders  as  he  shall  receive  from  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  relative  to  the  procurement  of  naval  stores  and  materials,  aixl 
the  construction,  armament,  equipment,  and  employment  of  vessels 
of  war,  as  well  as  all  other  matters  connected  with  the  naval  estab 
lishment  of  the  United  States."' 

The  provisions  of  these  acts  require  no  commentary.  They  plac«r- 
the  departments  wholly  under  the  direction  of  the  President,  agreea 
bly  to  the  constitution,  in  all  that  regards  the  exercise  of  his  constitu 
tional  powers  over  foreign  affairs,  the  army,  and  the  navy. 

The  act  of  the  2d  September,  1789,  for  the  establishment  of  the 
Treasury  Department,  pursues  a  strikingly  different  course.  It  drops 
from  the  title  the  denomination  of  Executive  given  to  the  other  de 
partments — not  by  accident,  but  by  design,  as  the  word  "  Executive" 
was  contained  in  the  title  of  the  bill  when  reported  bv  committee^ 
(see  Journal  1st  &  2d  Cong.  vol.  1,  p.  57,)  and,  what  is  more  material,, 
it  enacts  that  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  "  to  digest  and  prepare 
"  plans  for  the  management  and  improvement  of  the  revenue,  and  for- 
"  the  support  of  the  public  credit;  to  prepare  and  report  estimates  of  the- 
"  public  revenue  and  the  public  expenditures;  to  superintend  thccollec- 
"  tion  of  the  public  revenue;  to  decide  on  the  forms  of  keeping  andstat- 
"  ing  accounts  and  making  returns;  and  to  grant,  under  the  limitations 
"  herein  established,  or  to  be  hereafter  provided,  all  warrants  for 
"  moneys  to  be  issued  from  the  Treasury,  in  pursuance  of  appro- 
"  priations  by  law;  to  execute  such  services  relative  to  the  sale 
"  of  the  lands  belonging  to  the  United  States  as  may  be  by  law 
"  required  of  him;  to  make  report  and  give  information  to  either 
"  branch  of  the  Legislature,  in  person  or  in  writing,  s.s  he  may  he 
4i  required,  respecting  all  matters  referred  to  him  by  the  Senate  or 
"  House  of  Representatives,  or  which  shall  appertain  to  his  office; 
44  and  generally  to  perform  all  such  services  relative  to  the  Jin  antes 
44  as  he  shall  be  directed  to  perform."  The  name  of  the  President 


22 

is  not  mentioned  in  the  act,  except  in  the  7th  section,  which  charges 
the  assistant  with  the  duties  of  the  office,  iti  case  the  Secretary  is 
removed  by  the  President;  and  the  bond  of  the  Treasurer,  prescribed 
by  the  4th  section,  is  not  to  be  approved  by  the  President,  but  by 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  Comptroller. 

It  is  not  meant  to  say,  sir,  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
performs,  or  is  bound  to  perform,  no  duties  of  an  Executive  depart 
ment,  or  that,  in  the  performance  of  any  such  duties,  he  is  not  sub 
ject  to  direction  by  the  President;  but  it  is  meant  to  say  that  the 
Treasury  Department  is  not,  injtsj:ontrol_of  the  Treasury,  an  Execu 
tive  department,  in  the  constitutional  setisepan^TFiat  the  direction 
which  is  to  govern  the  Secretary,  is  left,  by  the  terms  of  the  act,  to  be 
settled  according  to  the  character  of  the  function  to  be  exercised. 
The  Secretary  is  not  the  head  of  an  Executive  department,  in  the 
performance  of  acts  which  concern  the  custody  and  security  of  the 
public  moneys  in  the  Treasury.  His  department  is  not,  in  this  re- 
trespect,  a  Presidential  department.  To  have  placed  the  custody  of 
.the  public  Treasury  within  the  Executive  department,  would  have 
ibeen  a  constitutional  incongruity,  a  solecism,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
•enormous  mischiefs  to  result  from  placing  the  power  of  the  sword 
and  the  purse  in  the  same  hand.  It  would  have  marred  the  harmony 
and  simplicity  of  the  whole  scheme  of  the  constitution,  by  leaving  to 
Congress  the  duty  of  paying  the  debts  and  providing  for  the  com 
mon  defence  and  welfare,  while  the  money  collected  for  these  ob 
jects  was  not  under  their  control,  but  in  the  hands  of  a  different  de 
partment.  It  would  make,  and  the  adoption  of  the  doctrine  does 
make,  the  power  of  appropriation  entirely  futile,  because  the  public 
money  is,  by  force  of  it,  as  little  under  the  control  of  Congress  before 
.•appropriation  as  it  is  afterwards;  and  it  gives  the  control  of  the  pub 
lic  treasure,  so  far  as  the  position  and  distribution  of  it  can  give  such 
a  control,  to  a  department  that  can  wield  the  whole  force  of  the  reve 
nue,  against  the  legislative  department  and  the  people. 

The  argument  of  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Tennessee  here 
cuts  into  the  subject  by  means  of  the  power  of  removal  from  office; 
and,  with  the  aid  of  the  debates  in  Congress,  when  the  act  for  organ 
izing  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  on  its  passage,  he  con 
tends  that  the  President  may  direct  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
in  the  discharge  of  his  duties  of  every  description,  because  he  may 
remove  him.  Sir,  I  do  not  adopt  his  conclusion.  It  does  not  flow 
i  from  his  premises,  and  a  better  conclusion  flows  from  better  premises. 

The  power  of  removal  is  a  great  question,  which  I  do  not  mean  at 
present  to  agitate.  It  has  been  allowed,  by  implication  and  usage,  to 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  for  different  reasons;  and  the  ar 
gument  handed  dovvn  to  us  on  this  head  is  perhaps  not  altogether 
as  clear,  consistent,  and  intelligible  as  the  great  names  connected 
with  it  would  lead  us  to  expect.  It  is  probably  imperfect.  It  is, 
however,  plain,  from  what  remains  of  it,  that  the  gentlemen  who  as 
serted  this  power  did  not  all  do  so  for  the  same  reasons.  It  would 
seem  to  have  been  the  opinion  of  some,  that  the  power  of  removal 
was  an  Executive  power,  or  a  power  of  the  Executive  department. 


Others,  who  did  not  agree  to  this,  thought  it  belonged  to  the  appoint 
ing  power,  which  was  substantially  in  the  President.  And  some,  who 
•differed  from  both,  deemed  the  most  convenient  and  safest  position  of 
the  power  to  be  in  the  President,  who,  by  its  immediate  exercise, 
might  resist  the  aggressions  of  dishonesty,  or  prevent  the  mischiefs 
of  incompetency.  No  one,  sir,  appears  to  have  thought  that  the  t 
power  belonged  to  the  President,  because  he  had  a  right  to  direct  all ' 
officers  appointed  during  pleasure;  although  it  is  clear,  from  the  ar-: 
gument  of  Mr.  Madison,  that  the  force  of  that  principle  was  very 
striking  in  its  influence  upon  the  question  then  directly  before  Con 
gress — tbe  right  to  remove  the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs.  That 
eminent  person  said,  "  It  is  evidently  the  intention  of  the  constitution 
"  that  the  First  Magistrate  should  be  responsible  for  the  Executive. 
11  department.  So  far,  therefore,  as  we  do  not  make  the  officers 
"  who  are  to  aid  him  in  the  duties  of  the  said  department  responsi- 
"  ble  to  him,  he  is  not  responsible  to  his  country."  This,  sir,  is  very 
striking,  but  it  goes  no  further  than  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of 
an  Executive  department,  in  its  constitutional  sense.  If  the  honorable 
gentleman  can  make  it  out  that  the  keeping  and  control  of  the  public 
Treasury  are  duties  of  an  Executive  department  in  that  sense,  he  will 
gain  a  better  support  for  his  argument  than  I  have  yet  heard. 

The  principle  which,  it  seems  to  me,  sir,  must  govern  this  ques 
tion,  and  that  which  I  take  the  liberty  of  stating  to  the  House,  as  the 
only  satisfactory  one  that  has  occurred  to  me,  is  this — that  the  right 
of  direction,  where  it  exists  at  all,  results  from  official  connexion,  subor 
dination,  and  responsibility,  and  not  from  tenure  of  office.  If  the  duty 
belongs  to  the  Executive  department,  the  right  of  direction  is  in  the  head 
of  that  department,  who  is  responsible  for  the  performance  of  all  its  du 
ties.  If  it  belongs  to  the  Judicial  department,  the  right  is  in  the  heads 
of  that  department — the  courts.  If  it  belongs  to  the  Legislative  de 
partment,  the  right  of  direction  is  in  Congress.  The  direction  in  these 
several  cases,  by  force  of  this  principle,  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 
system.  It  proceeds  from  official  responsiblity  in  the  principal,  and 
official  duty  in  the  subordinate  officer  to  follow  what  the  principal  di 
rects.  The  officer  is  bound  to  obey  the  principal,  because  the  prin 
cipal  is  responsible  for  him  in  the  very  matter  directed,  and  his 
direction  is  a  justification  to  the  officer  who  obeys  him.  Any  other 
principle  must  produce  perpetual  conflict  and  confusion.  The  attempt 
to  make  a  test  of  the  removing  power,  fails  as  soon  as  you  apply  it. 
The  marshals  are,  as  to  matters  of  judicial  cognizance,  directed  by 
the  courts,  to  whom  they  are  responsible,  and  for  the  proper  direc 
tion  of  whom  the  courts  are  responsible;  yet  the  courts  do  not  ap 
point,  and  cannot  remove,  the  marshals. 

Sir,  the  question  cannot  well  arise  as  to  acts  plainly  prescribed.  . 
No  one  can  assert  an  authority  in  the  President  to  direct  an  act  to  be  I  j 
done,  which  the  laws,  or  the  courts,  in  conformity  with  the  laws,  U 
direct  not  to  be  done;  nor  the  contrary.  It  arises  only  in  regard  to  dis-  J 
cretionary  acts.  But  the  same  principle  regulates  duties  of  every  \ 
description,  and  especially  duties  which  are  committed  by  the  law  to  ' 
the  discretion  of  an  officer.  For  abuse  of  that  discretion,  if  answerable 


24 

to  any  thing  but  the  law,  he  is  answerable  to  the  head  of  that  depart 
ment  to  which  the  particular  duty  appertains,  and  by  that  department 
he  may  be  directed.  The  marshal  is,  in  judicial  matters,  answerable 
to  the  court;  in  legislative  matters,  to  Congress;  and  in  executive 
matters,  to  the  President.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  as  it  re 
gards  the  Treasury,  is  answerable  to  Congress.  To  give  the  Presi 
dent  the  right  of  directing  or  controlling  his  discretion  in  such  matters, 
is  to  make  the  Secretary  responsible  to  the  President,  who  is  not 
responsible  for  htm.  This,  sir,  is  the  position  upon  which  the  doc 
trine  I  maintain  may  be  safely  placed.  The  President  is  not  re 
sponsible  for  the  duties  which  do  not  appertain  to  his  department. 
His  direction  is  no  justification  to  the  officer  to  whom  the  law  assigns 
the  duty  to  be  performed,  or  to  whom  it  has  given  the  discretion  to 
perform  the  act  or  not;  he  is,  therefore,  not  bound  to  obey  him,  nor 
excusable  for  obeying  him.  Any  other  principle  will  give  to  the  Pre 
sident  the  right  of  directing  and  controlling  the  discretion  of  every 
officer  in  the  land  except  the  Judges. 

The  answers  given  to  these  suggestions,  sir,  are  not  satisfactory. 
It  is  said,  the  President  has  the  undoubted  right  to  remove,  and  may, 
in  this  way,  obtain  the  direction.  Certainly  the  President  may  thus 
obtain  the  direction  of  men  who  prefer  their  office  to  their  duty;  but 
if  he  removes,  to  obtain  a  poictr  of  direction  where  he  has  not  the 
right,  he  violates  his  own  duty.  The  power  of  removal  ought  not  to 
be  so  exercised. 

It  is  further  said,  that  al!  powers  are  legislative,  judicial,  or  ex 
ecutive.  The  Secretary's  power  is  neither  legislative  nor  judicial, 
and  therefore  it  must  be  executive,  and  belong  to  the  Executive 
department.  This  is  a  confusion  of  language.  The  departments 
of  our  Government  are  legislative,  judicial,  and  executive;  and  what 
does  not  belong  to  the  first  two,  belongs  to  the  third.  But  there  are 
executive  acts,  that  is  to  say,  acts  to  be  executed  in  the  Judicial  and 
Legislative  departments,  as  well  as  in  the  Executive  department.  An 
act  to  be  executed  in  the  Judicial  department  does  not  belong  to  the 
Executive  department.  The  question  of  the  right  of  direction  regards 
not  merely  the  act  to  be  done,  but  the  relation  in  which  it  is  to  be 
done. 

It  is  again  said,  that  the  constitutional  power  of  the  President  to 
demand  the  opinion,  in  writing,  of  the  officers  of  the  Executive  de 
partments,  touching  tl»e  duties  of  their  respective  offices,  shows  the 
dependency  of  these  officers  upon  the  President,  and  his  responsibility 
for  them.  This  may  or  may  not  be  so;  but  it  leaves  the  question,  what 
is  an  Executive  department,  in  this  sense,  precisely  where  it  found  it. 

Again:  it  is  said  that  the  President  is  bound  to  take  care  that  the 
laws  are  faithfully  executed.  This  proves  too  much  for  the  argu 
ment,  as,  if  it  proves  any  thing,  it  proves  that  the  President  may  direct 
the  judges  as  well  as  other  officers  during  pleasure.  The  supervisory 
power  cannot  interfere  with  the  exercise  of  discretion  in  the  Secretary, 
when  the  law  gives  it  to  him,  because  the  faithful  execution  of  the  law 
consists  in  the  exercise  of  his  discretion;  and  whoever  disturbs  that 
V.  exercise,  violates  the  law  instead  of  executing  it.  It  is  a  power  that 


25 

does  not  enlarge  the  President's  authority,  but  rather  declares  the 
result  of  other  powers  before  given  to  him  in  the  constitution.  It  is 
corrective,  to  put  aside,  where  his  power  is  adequate,  both  dishonesty 
and  incompetency;  but  it  is  not  directory  nor  transcendental,  to  bring 
all  the  officers  and  operations  of  the  nation  under  his  sway. 

Finally,  it  is  said  that  the  power  of  removal  is  fairly  applied  to 
discharge  an  officer  who  does  not  do  his  duty;  and  how  can  this  be, 
if  the  President  cannot  decide  what  is  his  duty,  and,  consequently, 
direct  its  performance?  Sir,  the  President  is  responsible  for  the 
use  and  abuse  of  his  power.  If  he  exercises  it  fairly,  to  remove  an 
officer  who  does  not  do  his  duty,  it  is  well.  But  if  the  discharge  is 
colorably  for  this,  but  really  to  enforce  a  direction  which  he  had  no 
right  to  give,  he  gains  the  power  he  ought  not  to  have,  by  the  abuse 
of  the  power  he  has. 

These  are  the  remarks,  sir,  which  I  have  supposed  would  show 
the  inaccuracy  of  the  Secretary,  in  that  part  of  his  letter  which  attri 
butes  a  power  over  the  deposites  to  the  Executive,  or  to  the  Secretary 
as  an  Executive  officer.  In  this  matter  of  the  deposites,  he  is  em 
phatically  the  minister  or  agent  of  Congress.  He  is  to  give  reasons 
to  Congress,  and  they  are  consequently  to  be  his  own  reasons.  The 
reasons  of  the  President  are  not  given,  and  would  not  be  a  justifica 
tion  to  the  Secretary,  if  they  were.  The  Secretary  is  to  give  them 
to  Congress,  his  principal,  and  not  to  the  head  of  the  Executive  de 
partment,  to  whom,  in  this  matter,  lie  does  not  sustain  an  official  rela 
tion.  It  is  a  charter  authority,  and  to  be  pursued  as  the  charter  directs. 
Under  this  charter,  the  President  has  several  powers,  such  as  to  appoint 
commissioners  to  receive  subscriptions,  to  appoint  directors,  and  to 
issue  a  writ  ofseire  facias.  The  Secretary,  also,  has  powers,  as  to  re 
quire  transfers  of  public  money,  and  to  remove  the  deposites,  giving  his 
reasons.  It  is  humbly  apprehended  that  these  are  different  powers  in 
relation  as  well  as  in  action,  and  that  the  President  cannot  assume  those 
which  have  not  a  relation  to  the  department  of  which  he  is  the  head. 

But  how  would  it  follow,  sir,  if  this  were  otherwise,  that  Congress 
cannot  remove  the  deposites  in  any  event,  as  the  Secretary  avers?  It 
would  seem  as  if  the  grant  to  the  Executive  was  set  up  as  a  less 
startling  reason  for  denying  the  power  to  Congress,  than  a  grant  to 
the  Secretary  would  be;  but  the  power  is  inherent  in  Congress.  It 
is  one  of  which  they  could  not  divest  themselves  absolutely  and  un 
conditionally.  They  hold  it  now,  as  they  always  must  hold  it,  subject 
only  to  the  right  of  the  Bank;  that  is  to  say,  except  so  far  as  the  char 
ter  gives  the  right  of  possession  to  the  Bank.  This  right  of  the  Bank 
grows  out  of  her  covenant  to  afford  safety  and  to  render  service.  The 
continuance  of  her  right  depends  upon  the  performance  of  her  duty. 
The  covenant  of  the  nation,  to  leave  the  deposites  with  the  Bank,  and 
of  the  Bank  to  keep  them  secure,  and  to  perform  other  duties  in  regard 
to  them,  are  mutual  and  dependent  covenants.  If  the  Bank  commits 
a  breach,  the  covenant  of  the  nation  is  either  discharged  or  suspended, 
and  Congress  may  take  care  of  that  which  is  the  property  of  the  nation; 
and  if  the  acts  imputed  to  the  Bank  were  a  sufficient  cause  of  removal, 
Congress  were  as  competent  to  decide  them  to  be  so,  at  the  present 


26 

session,  as  the  Secretary  was  before.  The  technical  doctrine  of  the 
Secretary  is  inconsistent  with  the  spirit  of  the  charter,  and  with  the 
safety  of  the  nation.  It  strips  Congress  of  all  power,  and  lodges  it 
where  there  is  no  responsibility  either  to  the  Bank  or  to  Congress.  It 
asserts,  that  Congress  could  not  reclaim  the  control  of  the  deposites, 
under  any  circumstances,  from  either  the  Bank,  or  its  own  minister. 
It  leads  to  this  extraordinary  consequence,  that  if  the  Bank  could  have 
propitiated  the  Secretary  to  connive  at  the  most  corrupt  employment 
of  the  public  treasure,  there  would  have  been  no  remedy  for  it.  If 
"  offence's  gilded  hand1'  could  have  shoved  by  the  Secretary,  we 
should  have  seen  "  the  wicked  prize  itself  buy  out  the  law."  The 
proposition  is  wholly  inadmissible  in  every  possible  interpretation  of  it. 

Another  proposition,  sir,  and  the  most  alarming,  from  the  great 
practical  mischiefs  which  must  flow  from  it,  comes  from  the  Secretary 
in  the  following  terms:  "  That  the  power  reserved  to  the  Secretary 
"  of  the  Treasury  does  not  depend  for  its  exercise  merely  on  the  safety 
11  of  the  public  money  in  the  hands  of  the  Bank,  nor  upon  the  fidelity 
"  with  which  it  has  conducted  itself;  but  he  has  the  right  to  remove 
'*  the  deposites,  and  it  is  his  duty  to  remove  them,  whenever  the  public 
44  interest  or  convenience  will  be  promoted  by  the  change."  In  another 
part  of  his  letter,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  says  that  it  is  his 
duty  to  remove  the  deposites  "  whenever  the  change  would  many 
44  degree  promote  the  public  interest."  And  again  he  says:  "  The 
44  safety  of  the  deposites,  the  ability  of  the  Bank  to  meet  its  engage- 
"  ments,  its  fidelity  in  the  performance  of  its  obligations,  are  only  a 
"  part  of  the  considerations  by  which  his  judgment  must  be  guided. 
44  The  general  interest  and  convenience  of  the  people  must  regulate 
44  his  conduct." 

The  application  of  this  doctrine  to  the  present  power  of  the  Secre 
tary  over  the  deposites  in  the  State  banks  may  be  seen  from  another 
part  of  the  letter.  The  Secretary  says:  "  The  law  incorporating  the 
44  Bank  has  reserved  to  him,  in  its  fullest  extent,  the  power  he  before 
44  possessed.  It  does  not  confer  on  him  a  new  power,  but  reserves  to 
44  him  his  former  authority,  without  any  new  limitation"  Conse 
quently,  it  is  the  Secretary's  apprehension  that  he  now  has  the  same 
power  over  the  deposites  in  the  State  banks,  which  he  claims  to  have 
had  over  the  deposites  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States;  and  it  is  this 
which  makes  the  subject  worthy  of  the  special  attention  of  the  House. 

Sir,  it  is  an  abuse  of  language  to  call  the  charter  direction  as  to 
the  deposites,  a  contract,  if  this  be  the  Secretary's  power.  It  has 
none  of  the  features  or  binding  force  of  a  contract.  It  is  wholly  de 
pendent  on  his  mere  favor,  pleasure,  opinion;  upon  any  thing  short 
of,  and  indeed  not  short  of,  the  most  fantastic  caprice.  The  Bank  has 
no  contract  with  the  nation  under  this  construction;  and,  sir,  when  I 
regard  the  necessary  effects  of  the  asserted  power  upon  the  nation  at 
large,  the  interests  of  the  Bank  disappear;  she  ceases  to  be  an  object 
of  the  least  consideration.  What  are  convenience  and  interests? 
Where  are  they  defined!  What  acts  promote  them?  What  is  any 
degree  of  them?  What  law  has  made  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
a  judge  of  them?  This  nation  and  this  House  are  variously  divided 


27 

in  regard  to  almost  all  the  topics  of  general  convenience  an  1  interest 
that  are  discussed  before  them;  and  here  is  a  challenge  of  the  right, 
by  a  single  officer  of  the  Government,  to  direct  the  momentum  of  the 
whole  revenue  of  the  United  States  to  the  support  of  what  he  thinks 
fit  to  regard  as  the  general  interests  and  convenience  of  the  people; 
and  he  challenges  it  as  the  power  with  which  his  office  has  been  clothed 
since  its  creation.  A  more  extravagant  proposition  has  never,  in  my 
humble  judgment,  been  asserted;  and  it  is  as  unsound  in  reference  to 
the  subject  to  which  it  is  applied  by  the  Secretary,  as  it  is  dangerous  to 
the  liberty  and  welfare  of  the  country.  The  question  of  general  con 
venience  and  interest,  in  regard  to  the  public  deposites,  was  settled 
by  Congress  when  they  agreed  that  the  Bank  should  have  them;  and 
it  was  settled  for  the  whole  term  of  the  charter.  The  Secretary  has 
nothing  to  do  with  it.  The  power  of  removal  was  given  to  him  to  be 
exercised  for  the  promotion  of  a  particular  interest,  or  the  remedy  of 
a  particular  mischief,  and  for  nothing  else.  General  convenience  and 
interest  are  results  with  which  Congress  have  never  trusted  him,  or 
meant  to  trust  him,  or  any  body  but  themselves. 

The  authority  given  by  the  charter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Trea 
sury  is  official,  and  not  personal;  and,  by  necessary  implication,  it  is 
limited  by  the  sphere  of  his  office.  His  powers  and  duties  are  fiscal, 
and  the  functions  of  his  office  are  the  index  to  the  reasons  for  which, 
and  for  which  alone,  he  has  authority  to  remove  the  deposites.  His 
reasons  must  grow  out  of  his  relations  to  the  Bank,  to  the  treasure  in 
its  custody,  and  to  the  collection  and  disposition  of  that  treasure,  which 
the  law  confides  to  him.  If  the  deposites  are  not  safe,  his  official 
connexion  with  the  Bank  will  apprize  him  of  it:  he  has  the  means  of 
ascertaining  it  by  the  returns  made  to  him,  and  by  examination  of 
the  general  accounts  of  the  Bank,  if  he  is  not  satisfied  with  the  returns. 
If  the  Bank  does  not  perform  its  duties  to  the  Government,  of  paying 
and  transferring  the  public  funds,  the  Secretary  knows  it,  because  he 
is  the  officer  to  direct  the  service,  and  to  watch  over  the  performance. 
And,  beyond  this,  what  official  authority  has  the  Secretary?  What 
official  duties  does  he  perform  that  can  instruct  him  with  reasons  for 
the  removal  of  the  public  deposites?  Sir,  he  must  leave  his  office 
before  he  can  obtain  them,  and  enter  into  departments  which  do  not 
belong  to  him:  he  must  take  charge  of  interests  that  have  not  been 
confided  to  his  office.  I  have  stated  to  the  House  why  these  reasons 
have  not  been  explicitly  defined  in  the  act,  and  that  it  was  to  continue 
a  control  over  the  Treasury,  which  Congress  thought  might  be  impaired 
if  the  conditions  of  its  exercise  were  more  explicitly  stated.  In  the 
eye  of  a  court,  there  is  discretion,  regulated  by  an  appeal  to  Congress. 
In  the  contemplation  of  Congress,  there  is  limited  power,  regulated  by 
the  duties  of  the  Treasury  Department,  in  its  relations  to  the  Bank. 
Sir,  it  is  a  stain  upon  the  Congress  that  incorporated  this  Bank — it  is 
a  stain  upon  the  first  Congress  that  organized  the  Treasury  Depart 
ment — to  say  that  they  placed  in  the  power  of  unknown  men  for  an 
indefinite  period,  and  fora  period  of  twenty  years  without  the  right  of 
recall,  the  whole  revenue  of  the  United  States,  to  be  used  as  the  Secre 
tary  should  think  the  general  convenience  and  interest  of  the  public  re- 


28 

quired.  Is  it  so,  sir?  And  will  this  House  affirm  this  proposition  of  the 
Secretary?  Let  the  nation  look  to  it.  It*  it  should  be  the  Secretary's 
opinion  that  it  is  for  the  general  convenience  and  interest  of  the  people 
that  manufactures  should  decline  and  die  away,  he  brings  a  dearth  upon 
the  land — he  draws  the  public  treasure  to  another  quarter — and  they 
perish.  If  internal  improvements  are  not  to  his  mind — if  Pennsylvania 
wants  a  loan,  if  New  Jersey  requires  funds,  to  assist  them — if  there  is 
any  proposed  rival  interest  which  would  be  promoted  by  their  decline — 
his  mandate  to  the  State  banks,  in  promotion  of  general  convenience 
and  interest,  consummates  the  design.  The  currency  is  his,  to  regulate 
at  his  pleasure,  and  every  thing  dependent  on  it.  Sir,  if  this  theory  of 
the  Secretary  be  true,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  deposite  banks,  to  submit  to  his  pleasure. 
If  his  power  is  constitutionally  and  legally  what  he  asserts  it  to  be,  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  banks  to  become  his  slaves.  If  all  this  power  over 
the  Treasury  is  his  lawful  power — if  he  is  the  arbiter  of  general  con 
venience  and  interest — if  the  Executive  is  the  only  head  to  direct  and 
control  him — it  is  a  theory  of  universal  subserviency  to  the  Executive, 
for  the  profits  that  are  to  spring  from  the  application  of  the  public 
treasure.  It  never  occurred  to  mo,  sir,  that  men,  treading  the  soil  of 
a  republic,  would  present  such  a  ,doctrine  for  the  review  and  sanction 
of  Congress. 

It  has  been  said,  that  both  Secretary  Crawford  and  Secretary 
Ingham  have  asserted  a  similar  doctrine.  Sir,  without  meaning  the 
least  disrespect  to  those  officers,  I  may  be  permitted  to  say,  that 
arguments  in  favor  of  power  are  not  entitled  to  most  consideration 
when  they  come  from  those  who  are  to  exercise  it.  A  Treasury 
argument,  in  favor  of  Treasury  power,  is  not  quite  as  much  to  be  re 
lied  on,  as  an  argument  for  the  same  power  even  from  some  other 
department.  Cut,  sir,  the  authority  is  not  exactly  as  it  is  appre 
hended  to  be.  In  regard  to  Mr.  Secretary  Ingham,  there  seems  to 
have  occurred  one  or  two  animated  passages  between  himself  and 
the  President  of  the  Bank,  in  the  course  of  which  a  menace  was  let 
off,  as  to  the  use  of  the  public  deposites,  for  a  certain  purpose,  or  in 
a  certain  event;  but  nothing  to  the  effect  threatened  occurred.  Mr. 
Secretary  Crawford  did  act,  but  I  do  not  admit  that  his  action  sustains 
the  present  Secretary;  or,  if  it  does  to  a  small  extent,  its  effect  is 
taken  off  by  the  opinion  of  a  committee  of  this  House,  of  whose  re 
port  a  part  was  read  the  other  day  by  the  honorable  member  from 
Tem*essee.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  invested,  by  the 
joint  resolution  of  30th  April,  1816,  with  tho  largest  powers,  to  cause 
the  taxes  and  other  moneys  accruing,  or  becoming  payable  to  the 
United  States,  to  be  collected  and  paid  in  the  legal  currency  of  the 
United  States.  He  was  required  and  directed  to  adopt  such  mea 
sures  as  he  might  deem  necessary;  ahd  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
such  an  authority  gave  to  that  officer  a  power,  which,  since  theentire  and 
effectual  restoration  of  specie  payments,  has  ceased  to  exist.  The  history 
of  the  disposition  of  the  public  moneys  by  Mr.  Secretary  Crawford,  who 
came  into  office  in  the  fall  of  that  year,  is  given  in  the  report  of  the 
committee  upon  the  memorial  or  address  of  Ninian  Edwards,  made 


29 

to  this  House  in  May,  1824.  There  appear  to  liave  been  in  the 
year  1818,  and  afterwards,  two  descriptions  of  acts  by  Mr.  Crawford 
affecting  the  public  deposites.  One  of  them  consisted  in  using  certain 
.State  banks  to  the  West  as  depositories  of  the  public  money,  for  the 
sake  of  the  revenue  itself,  and  because  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 
would  not  receive  on  deposite,  as  cash,  a-wV  tiling  but  the  legal  cur 
rency  of  the  country  or  its  own  notes,  in  which  the  large  receipts  of  the 
United  States  could  not  at  that  time  be  collected.  There  consequently 
were  cases  in  which  the  deposites  could  not  be  made  in  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States,  because  the  Bank  would  not  receive  them  in  that  form 
alone  in  which  the  Treasury  could  make  them.  It  was  not,  as  I  appre 
hend,  a  case  of  omission  to  deposite  the  public  moneys  in  the  Bank  of 
the  United  States,  but  an  omission  to  deposite  in  that  Bank  moneys 
which  the  Bank  would  not  receive,  arid  was  not  bound  to  receive  as 
moneys  at  all,  because,  although  nominally  they  were  the  notes  of 
specie-paying  banks,  substantially  they  were  not  such  notes  as  the  Bank 
thought  it  could  convert  into  specie.  This  was  not  a  cas«  of  exercise 
of  power  under  the  16th  section,  but  a  case  of  necessity,  arising 
from  the  lawful  refusal  of  the  Bank  to  receive  the  deposiles  in  the 
only  form  in  which  the  Treasury  could  make  them.  The  other  acts 
referred  to  were  of  a  different  kind,  and  they  consisted  of  such  dispo 
sitions  of  the  public  money  as  Mr.  Crawford,  in  his  letter  of  13th  Feb 
ruary,  1817,  cited  by  the  present  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  says  he 
has  authority  to  make:  that  is  to  say,  deposites  made  with  State  banks, 
to  sustain  their  credit.  Upon  this  point,  the  committee  explicitly  say 
that  "this  is  no  legal  employment  of  public  funds;  it  is  nothing  but 
a  gratuitous  loan"  which,  certainly,  the  Secretary  was  not  author 
ized  to  make,  whatever  was  the  practice.  It  was  precisely  of  the 
same  character  as  the  transfer  drafts^  which  appear  to  have  been 
placed,  by  direction  of  the  present  Secretary,  in  different  hands,  du 
ring  the  removal  of  the  public  deposites  from  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  and  which  are  liable  to  precisely  the  same  criticism.  The  au 
thority  of  Mr.  Secretary  Crawford,  therefore,  does  not  seem  compe 
tent  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  has  been  cited. 

The  fourth  and  last  general  proposition  of  the  Secretary  is  that 
which  asserts,  that,  as  the  propriety  of  removing  the  deposites  was 
evident,  it  was  consequently  his  duty  to  select  the  places  of  present 
deposite.  Sir,  on  this  point  I  do  not  mean  to  ask  any  considerable 
attention  of  the  House;  for,  although  I  hold  the  act  of  the  Secretary 
to  be  against  the  law  of  Congress,  and  one  from  which  the  most  crit 
ical  consequences  may  result,  it  is  not  altogether,  as  I  learn,  without 
the  countenance  of  a  previous  Treasury  practice,  and  I  mean  not  to 
press  it  to  any  other  purpose  than  as  a  caution  to  ke  adverted  to  in 
the  disposition  of  the  general  subject.  The  authority  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury,  under  the  16th  section  of  the  charter,  is  not  to 
remove  the  deposites,  as  his  letter  supposes,  but  merely  to  order  and 
direct  that  they  shall  not  he  made  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States. 
When  the  deposite  in  that  Bank  ceases  to  be  lawful  by  the  order  of 
the  Secretary,  the  general  law  takes  up  the  subject,  and  that  law  gives 
to  the  Treasurer  the  power  which  the  Secretary  has  undertaken  to 


30 

exercise.  The  4th  section  of  the  act  of  2d  September,  1789,  is  en 
tirely  explicit,  "  that  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Treasurer  to  receive 
and  keep  the  moneys  of  the  United  States," — "to  submit  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  to  the  Comptroller,  or  either  of  them, 
the  inspection  of  the  moneys  in  his  hands"  and  to  give  bond,  with 
sufficient  sureties,  in  the  sum  of  $150,000,  payable  to  the  United 
States,  u  with  condition  for  the  faithful  performance  of  the  duties  of 
his  office,  and  for  the  fidelity  of  the  persons  to  be  by  him  employed.'1'' 
It  is  the  Treasurer  who  is  to  choose  the  place  of  deposite;  and  lie  is 
the  best  officer  in  theory,  as  well  as  the  only  officer  by  the  law,  to 
perform  the  act;  because  the  doctrines  of  general  convenience  and 
interest  are  not  so  likely  to  reach  him.  His  object  will  be  security, 
and  his  bond  is  the  motive  for  obtaining  it.  If  there  is  a  Trea 
sury  practice  that  has  displaced  the  Treasurer,  the  practice  should  be 
made  to  conform  to  the  law,  or  the  law  to  the  practice.  As  the  case 
now  stands,  the  money  of  the  United  States  is  not  deposited  where  it 
is,  by  direction  and  under  the  sanction  of  the  law.  It  is  placed  in 
the  deposite  banks  by  an  officer  who  has  not  the  authority  so  to  place 
it;  and,  in  case  of  controversy,  it  may  possibly  be  found,  not  only  that 
the  bond  of  the  Treasurer  is  of  no  avail,  but  that  remedies  for  the 
loss  or  detention  of  the  deposites,  are  not  to  be  obtained  in  the  name 
of  the  United  States,  or  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  but  in 
private  names  and  in  State  courts,  with  all  the  contingencies  incident 
to  litigation  in  this  form.  Whatever  may  be  the  practice,  it  is  not 
becoming,  sir,  that  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  should  be  in 
any  predicament  but  that  precisely  in  which  the  law  has  given  its  di 
rection  to  place  it. 

These  general  propositions  of  the  Secretary  are,  then,  1  submit 
to  this  House,  one  and  all  of  them,  unsound,  and  without  foundation 
in  law;  and  some  of  them  are  pregnant  with  most  alarming  conse 
quences  to  the  public  safet}'  and  welfare.  If  his  particular  reasons 
are  dependent  on  them,  as  they  doubtless  are,  they  fall  with  their 
foundation;  and  they  have,  moreover,  peculiar  defects  of  their  own, 
as  will  be  seen  by  the  details  of  more  interest  to  which  their  consi 
deration  will  give  rise. 

Sir,  the  Secretary  admits  that  the  public  deposites  were  safe  in  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States.  He  admits  that  the  Bank  has  faithfully 
performed  its  duty  to  the  Government  in  every  stipulated  form.  He 
admits  it,  by  the  clearest  implication,  in  various  parts  of  his  report  to 
Congress,  and  places  the  order  of  removal  upon  entirely  distinct 
grounds.  The  only  valid  causes  of  removal  are,  then,  in  my  hum 
ble  judgment,  wanting;  and,  if  all  the  particular  causes  asserted  by 
the  Secretary  could  be  sustained  in  fact  and  law,  they  would  fall  short 
of  a  justification.  They  will,  however,  be  found,  one  and  all,  to  be 
without  support. 

Sir,  the  first  and  principal  reason  for  the  order  of  the  Secretary  is, 
that  the  present  charter  of  the  Bank  will  expire  in  March,  1836,  and 
that  it  is  not  to  be  renewed.  I  do  not  mean  to  detain  the  House  with 
a  commentary  upon  the  novel  spectacle  of  a  Secretary  of  the  Trea 
sury  instructing  Congress  upon  the  subject  of  his  constitutional  opin- 


31 


ions  in  regard  to  the  charter  of  the  Bank,  or  upon  what  they  will  or 
will  not  think  fit  themselves  to  do  in  regard  to  the  renewal  of  the 
charter.  For  the  purposes  of  this  inquiry,  I  grant  that  the  charter  is 
not  to  be  renewed.  The  question  is,  how  does  that  circumstance 
justify  the  present  removal? 

The  manner  in  which  the  Secretary  develops  his  reasoning  on  this 
head  is  as  striking  as  it  is  plain  and  intelligible.  He  begins  by  an 
averment,  that,  if  the  deposites  should  be  left  in  the  Bank  until  the 
expiration  of  the  charter,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  Bank  will 
have  the  ability  to  be  prompt  in  paying  them  to  the  Government. 
He  proceeds  to  suggest  that  the  circulation  of  the  Bank,  moreover,  if 
it  continues  out  till  that  time,  will  become  a  depreciated  currency, 
not  merely  by  the  character  of  the  paper,  but  by  the  cessation  of  the 
public  guarantee;  that  the  Bank  should  be  made  to  reduce  her  circu 
lation,  by  reducing  her  discounts;  that  the  removal  of  the  public  depo 
sites  will  compel  her  to  make  this  reduction;  and  that  the  State  bank 
circulation  being  pushed  out,  in  its  place,  by  means  of  these  deposites 
made  elsewhere,  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  will  be 
withdrawn,  and  a  currency  probably  more  uniform  be  substituted  in 
its  place. 

Sir,  whatever  may  be  the  merits  of  this  plan,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
it  is  perfectly  intelligible.  It  is  an  operation  we  are  acquainted  with. 
We  know  what  it  means,  and  what  it  is  to  bring  to  pass.  But  the 
question  in  this  place  is,  what  right  had  the  Secretary  to  take  the  pub 
lic  moneys  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  because  its  charter 
was  to  expire  in  March,  1836?  What  authority  did  Congress  mean 
to  give  him  over  the  deposites,  from  the  simple  fact  of  lapse  of  time? 
1  confidently  assert,  none  whatever.  There  was  no  contingency  in 
the  circumstance.  It  was  matter  of  fatal  necessity.  It  must  occur; 
and  the  Secretary  could  not  be  better  informed  that  it  had  occurred 
in  1833,  than  the  Congress  which  granted  the  charter  in  1816  were 
then  informed  that  it  would  occur.  Sir,  it  was  just  as  well  known  in 
1816  as  it  now  is,  that  the  1st  of  October,  1833,  was  separated  by 
two  years  and  five  months  from  the  1st  of  March,  1836;  and  if  lapse 
of  time  had  not  been  deemed  an  inadequate  cause  for  the  removal, 
Congress  would  themselves  have  ordered  the  deposites  to  be  removed 
at  the  time  they  thought  proper,  and  have  made  the  removal  at  that 
time  a  matter  of  positive  enactment,  and  not  of  contingency.  Now 
Congress  have  not  only  not  done  this,  but  they  have  done  the  con 
trary.  They  have  chartered  the  Bank  for  twenty  year?;  they  have 
bound  her  to  perform  services  for  twenty  years;  and  they  have  ordered 
the  deposites  to  be  made  in  her  vaults,  by  necessary  implication  for 
the  whole  period,  subject  to  the  contingent  exercise  of  the  power  of 
removal.  It  is  a  violation  of  the  charter,  without  reasonable  color, 
for  the  Secretary  to  make  that  removal  upon  the  ground  of  mere  time; 
and  such  is  the  ground  his  letter  occupies,  without  reference  to  any 
contingency  whatsoever. 

The  Secretary  has  wholly  overlooked  the  provision  in  the  charter 
which  allows  two  years  to  the  Bank  for  winding  up  its  concerns,  after 
the  8d  March,  1836.  That  provision  runs:  "And  notwithstanding 


32 

"  the  expiration  of  the  term  for  which  the  said  corporation  is  created, 
"  it  shall  be  lawful  to  use  the  corporate  name,  style,  and  capacity,  for 
"  the  purpose  of  suits,  for  the  final  settlement  and  liquidation  of  the 
*'  affairs  and  accounts  of  the  corporation,  and  for  the  sale  and  dis- 
"  position  of  their  estate,  real,  personal,  and  mixed;  but  not  for  any 
"  other  purpose,  or  in  any  other  manner  whatsoever,  nor  for  a  period 
"  exceeding  two  years  after  the  expiration  of  the  said  term  of  incor- 
"  poration." — Sec.  21. 

"  As  the  act  of  Congress,"  says  the  Secretary,  "  which  created  the 
"  corporation,  limits  its  duration  to  the  3d  of  March,  1836,  it  became 
"  my  duty,  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in  executing  the  trust 
u  confided  to  me  under  the  law,  to  look  to  that  period  of  time  as  the 
"  termination  of  its  corporate  existence,"  "It  was  incumbent  on  me, 
"  in  discharging  my  official  duties,  to  act  upon  the  assumption  that 
"  this  corporation  would  not  continue  in  being  after  the  time  above 
"  specified."  Now,  sir,  the  corporate  existence  is  not  so  limited  as 
the  Secretary  has  felt  it  incumbent  on  him  to  assume.  It  is  to  con 
tinue  two  years  more,  for  the  very  purpose  of  enabling  it  to  do  that 
which  the  Secretary  says  shall  be  done  before.  There  is  no  om; 
operation  which  he  wishes  to  compel  the  Bank  now  to  perform,  that 
she  cannot  most  appropriately  perform  in  the  additional  two  years. 
She  may  diminish  or  reduce  her  discounts  in  any  ratio  she  deems  fit, 
five  per  cent,  or  ten  per  cent,  a  month,  or  more  or  less,  as  circum 
stances  may  require.  She  may  possibly  bring  in  her  circulation,  in 
the  same  proportion,  though  that  depends  on  the  pleasure  of  the 
holder.  She  may  do  every  thing  she  now  does,  but  expand  herself 
after  having  closed  or  liquidated  a  transaction.  She  cannot  make  a 
new  loan,  but  she  may  continue  in  force  the  existing  contracts,  or 
settle  and  liquidate  them  as  she  may  deem  expedient.  Sir,  not  only 
has  the  Bank  the  right  to  keep  out  her  circulation,  and  to  keep  up 
her  discounts  during  the  whole  term  of  the  charter,  which  right  she 
has  purchased  and  paid  for,  but  it  is  her  duty  to  do  it,  unless  she  is 
disabled  by  the  act  of  the  Secretary.  It  was  l>cr  promise  in  accept 
ing  the-  charter.  Her  duty  to  trade  is  to  assist  it;  to  her  stockholders, 
it  is  to  make  an  interest  upon  their  Capital;  and,  above  all,  her  duty  to  the 
nation  is  to  keep  within  the  limits  of  safety,  by  due  control  and  rceiila- 
tion,  the  very  State  bank  paper  which  the  Secretary  desires  to  augment. 
For  these  duties,  in  addition  to  the  greater  design  of  securing  and  distri 
buting  the  public  revenue,  the  Bank  was  created,  and  is  bound  to  their 
performance  as  long  as  she  can  perform  them  with  safety  to  herself 
and  to  the  country. 

Sir,  the  project  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  astonishes  me — 
it  has  astonished  the  country.  It  is  here  that  we  find  a  pregnant  source 
of  the  present  agony — it  is  in  the  clearly  avowed  design  to  bring  a 
second  time  upon  this  land  the  curse  of  an  unregulated,  uncontrolled, 
State  bank  paper  currency.  We  are  again  to  see  the  drama  which 
already,  in  the  course  of  the  present  century,  has  passed  before  us, 
and  closed  in  ruin.  If  the  project  shall  be  successful,  we  are  agais 
to  see  these  paper  missiles  shooting  in  every  direction  through  the 
country — a  derangement  of  all  values — a  depreciated  circulation — a 
suspension  of  specie  payments;  then  a  further  extension  of  the  same 


33 

detestable  paper — a  still  greater  depreciation — with  failures  of  traders, 
and  failures  of  banks,  in  its  train — to  arrive,  at  last,  at  the  same 
point  from  which  we  departed  in  1817.  Suffer  me  to  recall  to  the 
recollection  of  the  House  a  few  of  the  more  striking  events  of  that 
day.  The  first  Bank  of  the  United  States  expired  in  March,  1811. 
Between  the  1st  of  January,  1811,  and  the  close  of  the  year  1814, 
more  than  one  hundred  new  banks  were  established,  to  supply  this 
more  uniform  and  better  currency.  For  ten  millions  of  capital  called 
in  by  that  Bank,  twenty  millions  of  capital,  so  called,  were  invested  in 
these.  In  the  place  of  five  and  a  half  millions,  about  the  amount  of 
circulation  in  notes  of  that  bank  withdrawn,  twenty-two  millions  were 
pushed  out.  Then  came  a  suspension  of  specie  payments,  in  August 
and  September,  1814.  As  an  immediate  consequence  of  this  sus 
pension,  the  circulation  of  the  country,  in  the  course  of  fifteen  months, 
increased  fifty  per  cent.,  or  from  forty-five  to  sixty-eight  millions  of 
dollars;  and  the  fruit  of  this  more  uniform  currency  was  the  failure  of 
innumerable  traders,  mechanics,  and  even  farmers;  of  one  hundred  and 
sixty-five  banks,  with  capitals  amounting  to  thirty  millions  of  dollars; 
and  a  loss  to  the  United  States  alone,  in  the  negotiation  of  her  loans, 
and  in  the  receipt  of  bankrupt  paper,  to  an  amount  exceeding  four 
millions  of  dollars.  I  take  this  summary  from  the  treatise  of  Mr. 
Gallatin,  on  the  Currency  and  Banking  System  of  the  United  States, 
one  of  the  most  valuable  contributions  that  great  sagacity  and  an  en 
lightened  spirit  of  research  have  made  to  the  political  literature  of  this 
country,  and  which  it  is  one  of  the  sins  of  the  present  Bank  that  she 
has  endeavored  to  diffuse  among  the  people.  This  may  enable  us  to 
apprehend  what  was  lost,  in  the  item  of  property  alone,  by  this  better 
currency.  What  it  cost  us  in  reputation,  it  is  impossible  to  estimate. 
Does  Kentucky  wish  to  see  the  return  of  those  days]  Does  Penn 
sylvania  wish  it?  Does  any  man  wish  it,  who  has  property,  or  the 
desire  to  possess  it,  and  reason  to  discern  the  causes  of  its  decay  and 
destruction?  I  thank  the  Secretary  for  the  disclosure  of  this  plan. 
I  trust  in  God  it  will  be  defeated;  that  the  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
while  it  is  in  existence,  may  be  sustained  and  strengthened  by  the 
public  opinion  and  interests  of  the  people  to  defeat  it;  that  the  sound 
and  sober  State  banks  of  the  Union  may  resist  it,  for  it  is  their  cause; 
that  the  poor  men  and  laborers  in  the  land  may  resist  it,  for  it  is  a 
scheme  to  get  from  every  one  of  them  a  dollar's  worth  of  labor  for 
fifty  cents,  and  to  make  fraud  the  currency  of  the  country  as  much 
as  paper.  Sir,  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  in  any  other  relation 
than  to  the  currency  and  property  of  the  country,  is  as  little  to  me 
as  to  any  man  under  heaven;  but  after  the  prime  and  vigor  of  life  are 
passed,  and  the  power  of  accumulation  is  gone,  to  see  the  children 
stripped,  by  the  monstrous  imposture  of  a  paper  currency,  of  all  that 
the  father's  industry  had  provided  for  them — this,  sir,  may  well  ex 
cuse  the  warmth  that  denounces  this  plan  as  the  precursor  of  universal 
dismay  and  ruin. 

I  have   said,  sir,  that  it  is  the  cause  of  the  sound  and  sober  State 
banks  that  I  am  defending.     When  the  evils  of  such  a  currency  pre 
vail,  the  people  do  not  discriminate.     A  bank  note  is  a  bank  note. 
3 


34 

Fear  gives  them  all  the  same  look  to  the  apprehensive.  If  a  few 
banks  suspend  their  specie  payments,  many  will  do  it;  all  must  do  it, 
unless  they  see  the  storm  in  its  approach,  and  close  their  doors  until 
its  fury  be  spent.  The  Bank  of  the  United  States  herself  may  well 
look  for  that  day,  if  it  comes  in  her  time,  with  fear.  Let  her  not  be 
weakened  before  the  hour  of  her  trial.  I  should  regard  that  man,  sir, 
as  one  of  the  greatest  benefactors  of  his  country,  who  would  devise, 
for  the  use  of  this  people,  some  control  over  the  paper  currency  of 
the  State  banks,  and  relieve  us  from  the  perpetual  recurrence  of  con 
stitutional  doubts  and  party  contention,  to  which  the  career  of  a  Bank 
of  the  United  States  seems  necessarily  exposed.  Control  of  some 
kind  is  essential — it  is  indispensable;  there  .can  be  no  property,  or, 
•what  is  the  same  thing,  no  security  or  uniformity  to  its  value,  without 
it.  Let  us  have  a  respite  from  the  evil  while  the  law  will  give  it  to 
us.  Let  us  not  be  turned  off  before  the  warrant  of  execution  calls  for 
it.  Let  two  years  more  be  given  to  sober  reflection  by  the  people,  that 
there  may  be  a  locus  penitential  allowed  to  those  who  are  now  pro 
posing  this  plan,  without  suggesting  the  means  of  control,  or  appear 
ing  to  think  that  they  are  necessary. 

But,  sir,  the  Secretary  says  that  the  deposites  will  not  be  promptly 
paid,  if  they  arc  left  in  the  Bank  until  the  charter  expires,  and  it  is 
his  duty,  therefore,  not  to  leave  them  there.  What  is  it  that  it  is  ap 
prehended  will  cause  this  default?  Does  the  Secretary  suppose  that 
private  deposites  will  continue  in  the  Bank  to  the  same  time,  and,  by 
their  demands,  interfere  with  the  payments  to  the  public?  If  indivi 
dual  deposites  do  not  remain,  all  will  be  admitted  to  be  well.  The 
public  deposites  will  be  paid  then,  as  they  are  now  paid,  promptly. 
If  the  private  deposites  do  remain,  and  the  bank  notes  continue  in 
circulation  to  their  old  amount,  then,  sir,  let  the  Treasury,  for  once, 
trust  to  the  instinct  of  self-interest  in  the  people,  and  believe  that- what 
all  concur  in  doing  for  themselves,  when  they  have  the  readiest  means 
of  doing  otherwise,  if  they  please,  cannot  be  very  dangerous  to  the 
public.  Sound  reasoning  and  experience  alike  expose  this  Treasury 
apprehension.  A  bank,  having  the  resources  that  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States  is  admitted  to  have,  when  she  arrives  at  the  term  of 
her  charter,  increases,  from  that  moment,  in  strength;  because  her  ca 
pital  is  then  to  be  returned  to  her,  and  her  debtors  have  been  pre 
viously  admonished  that  they  must  then  be  prepared  to  return  it  to 
tier.  Other  banks  may  then  assist,  by  their  expansion,  the  liquidation 
of  her  debts,  and  they  may  do  it  safely,  to  a  considerable  extent,  as 
she  cannot  have,  or,  if  she  has,  she  cannot  exercise,  a  power  to  dis 
tress  them  by  her  demands,  without  combining  a  vast  force  of  public 
opinion  against  her,  that  will  effectually  resist  her.  To  ask  of  the 
State  banks  what  it  must  distress  them  to  give,  and  what  is  not  ne 
cessary  to  the  United  States'  Bank  for  operations  then  discontinued, 
would  be  as  idle  in  her  as  the  apprehension  of  it  is  in  others.  It 
cannot  occur.  There  must  be  a  reasonable  arrangement  between 
the  United  States'  Bank  and  all  the  State  banks  who  assist  in  ab 
sorbing  her  loans,  to  prevent  or  to  mitigate  the  distress  that  the 
withdrawing  of  a  large  capital  would  otherwise  occasion.  This, 


35 

therefore,  is  the  moment  when  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  will 
have  the  greatest  power  for  her  own  protection,  without  having  it  for 
the  annoyance  of  the  State  banks;  and,  unless  there  is  a  general  crash 
which  shall  make  deposites  unsafe  every  where,  they  will  be  as  safe 
in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  as  they  can  be  any  where. 

Sir,  this  is  the  result  of  experience,  derived  from  an  operation  which 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  has  strangely  overlooked. 

The  honorable  member  from  Tennessee,  in  the  course  of  his  argu 
ment,  made  one  remark,  which,  not  being  at  all- necessary  in  the  con 
sideration  of  the  present  question,  I  may  be  excused  for  saying,  was 
a  remark  which  I  regretted.  The  gentleman  took  occasion  to  say, 
that  the  first  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  charged  with  having  been 
given  over  to  political  abuses  and  to  the  aid  of  the  aristocracy,  in 
opposition  to  the  Government  of  the  country;  and  that,  in  this  re 
spect,  the  present  Bank  had  followed  in  her  steps. 

Sir,  I  owe  a  debt  to  the  directors  of  that  first  Bank  which  it  would 
ill  become  me  not  to  endeavor  to  discharge,  in  part,  on  such  an  occa 
sion  as  this.  I  am  indebted  to  those  gentlemen  for  having  first  held 
out  their  hand  to  me  in  the  path  of  my  profession.  With  such  of 
them  as  have  passed  awav,  I  lived  in  unbroken  friendship  and  affec 
tion  till  their  death,  and  the  few  who  remain  are  equally  worthy  of 
the  sentiment.  I  should  feel  it  to  be  an  abandonment  of  my  duty  if  I 
did  not  deny  the  imputation  which  has  been  cast  upon  them,  not  by 
the  gentleman  from  Tennessee,  but  by  those  whom  he  quotes.  I  was 
a  director  of  that  Bank  during  the  last  years  of  her  charter,  when  I 
was  too  young  to  govern  her  councils,  though  not  to  understand  them; 
and,  as  one  of  those  directors,  I  have  assisted  in  liquidating  her  con 
cerns.  Sir,  the  directors  of  the  parent  Bank  (I  know  nothing  of  the 
branches,)  were  a  body  of  as  honorable  men,  as  impartial,  and  as 
faithful  to  their  trust,  as  any  men  that  ever  lived.  There  was  not  a 
politician  at  their  board,  nor  a  man  who  gave  up  himself  to  any 
thing  but  the  performance  of  duty  to  his  trust.  At  their  head  was  a 
gallant  soldier,  who,  during  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  was  a  prisoner 
to  the  enemies  of  his  country,  and  who,  a  few  years  since,  descended 
•to  his  grave,  esteemed  and  respected  by  all  who  knew  him,  most  of 
all  for  his  rectitude  as  well  as  fearlessness  of  purpose,  in  the  execu 
tion  of  every  trust  he  undertook.  Sir,  I  know  the  Bank  was  charged 
as  the  gentleman  states,  but  the  charges  were  unjust  and  untrue.  From 
whom  or  why  she  received  the  bad  name  for  which  she  was  hunted 
down,  it  does  not  concern  the  present  question  to  inquire. 

It  is  the  history  of  the  liquidation  of  this  Bank  that  the  Secretary 
has  overlooked,  and  it  is  the  most  triumphant  answer  to  his  doctrine 
of  default  and  depreciation.  Her  charter  expired  on  the  3d  March, 
1811,  when  her  corporate  existence  ceased  at  once  and  forever. 

On  the  1st  January,  1811,  her  situation  was  as  follows: 
The  amount  of  her  notes  discounted  and  loans  was         $17,759,001 
Public  deposites,  -  -  -    $6,474,402 

Private  deposites,-  v  «r~  -       3,855,402 

Notes  in  circulation,  -       6,070,153 

Specie,  -  -  -  5,317,885 


36 

On  the  1st  March,  1811,  it  was  as  follows: 

The  amount  of  discounts  and  loans,         -  $14,587,134 

Public  deposites,  -  $2,874,833 

Private  deposites,  -  *,  -       3,583,596 

Notes  in  circulation,  (- CJ  "       6,552,875 

Specie,  4,835,702 

On  the  1st  September,  1811,  it  was  as  follows: 

The  amount  of  discounts  and  loans,         -  -  $7,152,786 

Public  deposites,  -  -    $    322,349 

Private  deposites,  -  448,112 

Notes  in  circulation,  -      2,963,209 

Specie,  4,500,527 

And  on  the  1st  March,  1812,  it  was  as  follows: 

The  amount  of  discounts  and  loans,       -  -  $3,792,975 

Public  deposites,  -  -  -     $     81,517 

Private  deposites,  -  -         223,442 

Notes  in  circulation,  -      1,070,459 

Specie,  6^116,776 

Thus,  from  the  1st  March,  1811,  two  days  before  the  charter  ex 
pired,  to  the  1st  September,  1811,  the  Bank  paid,  as  the  above  state 
ments  show — 

Public  deposites,  -  ,-       $2,552,484 

Private  deposites,  -         3,135,484 

Banknotes,  -  -         3,589,566 

$9,277,534. 

And  her  specie  fell  only  $335,175. 

From  the  1st  March,  1811,  to  the  1st  March,  1812,  she  paid — 
Public  deposites,  -  -       $2,793,316 

Private  deposiies,  -         3,360,154 

Bank  notes,  ...         5,482,416 

$11,635,886 

And  her  specie  increased  from  $4,116,776  to  $6,116,796,  being  an 
increase  of  $1,281,074. 

Comparing  her  capital  with  that  of  the  present  Bank,  which  is  three 
and  a  half  times  greater,  the  present  Bank  might  stand  with  equal 
safety  on  the  1st  of  January,  1836,  with  the  following  discounts  and 
liabilities: 

Notes  and  domestic  bills,  -  -  $62,156,503 

Notes  in  circulation,     ...     21,245,530 
Public  deposites,  -  -  -     22,660,407 

Private  deposites,  -     13,493,907 

Whereas,  on  the  1st  of  October,  1833,  the  discounts  and  liabilities, 
of  the  present  Bank  were  as  follows: 

Notes  and  domestic  bills,  -  -  $60,094,202 

Notes  in  circulation,     -  -  -     19,128,189 

Public  deposites,       "^  -  -  •-          -       9,868,434 

Private  deposites,      ?  *.'  -  -       8,008,862 


37 

In  one  particular,  and  only  in  one,  was  the  provision  of  the  first 
/Bank  better,  for  the  day  of  trial,  than  that  of  the  present  Bank.  Her 
specie,  on  the  1st  of  January,  1811,  was  $5,317,585,  being  more  than 
equal  to  one-half  of  her  capital;  while  that  of  the  present  Bank,  on  the 
1st  of  October,  1833,  was  $10,663,441 — a  little  more  than  two-se 
venths  of  her  capital.  The  specie  of  the  first  Bank  had  been  greatly 
augmented  by  importations  under  the  royal  orders  from  the  Spanish 
colonies,  which  the  embargo  and  other  restrictions  had  prevented  from 
going  abroad;  but  it  was  increased,  instead  of  being  diminished,  by  the 
liquidation  of  her  concerns.  So  much,  sir,  for  the  probability  of  default 
in  paying  the  public  deposites.  As  to  depreciation  of  her  notes,  which 
the  Secretary  also  apprehends — if  the  notes  are  to  depreciate  because 
they  will  be  paid  on  presentation,  because  the  quantity  in  circulation 
will  be  daily  diminished,  because  the  residue  outstanding  will  be  of 
increased  value  as  exchange,  and  because,  unless  Congress  shall  pass 
a  law  to  the  contrary,  the  public  guarantee  will  continue,  then,  but 
not  otherwise,  the  Secretary's  fears  may  prove  true.  Sir,  the  Secre 
tary  has  erred,  even  as  to  the  matter  of  the  guarantee.  The  letter  of 
the  Secretary  says  that  "  this  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  United 
"  States  will  cease  on  the  3d  of  March,  1836,  when  the  charter 
"  expires;  and  as  soon  as  this  happens,  all  the  outstanding  notes  will 
"  lose  the  peculiar  value  they  now  possess."  The  fourteenth  section 
of  the  charter  says  otherwise.  It  says  "  that  the  bills  or  notes  of  the 
"  said  corporation  originally  made  payable,  or  which  shall  have  be- 
**  come  payable  on  demand,  shall  be  receivable  in  all  payments  to 
**  the  United  States,  unless  otherwise  directed  by  an  act  of  Con- 
"  gress."  They  will  be  notes  of  the  said  corporation  as  much  after 
the  charter  expires  as  they  now  are. 

But,  sir,  this  apprehension  of  the  non-payment  of  the  public  depo 
sites,  if  left  in  the  Bank  until  March,  1836,  will  appear,  from  another 
paper  presented  by  the  same  Department  to  this  House,  to  have  been 
changed  into  an  apprehension  that,  at  that  time,  there  would  be  no 
deposites  any  where  to  be  paid.  "  Judging  from  the  past"  the 
Secretary's  letter  says,  "  it  is  highly  probable  they  will  always  amount 
to  several  millions."  But  a  reference  to  the  past,  only,  is  not  the 
best  way  of  ascertaining  what,  under  our  altered  revenue  system,  will 
be  its  amount.  Accordingly,  in  his  annual  report  on  the  state  of  the 
finances,  made  in  the  last  month,  the  Secretary  judges  otherwise  than 
by  a  reference  to  the  past.  I  ask  the  attention  of  the  House  to  a  few 
extracts  from  this  report. 

The  balance  in  the  Treasury  on  the  31st  of  December,  1834,  is 
estimated  to  be  $2,981,796  05. 

The  Secretary,  after  the  statement  which  he  deems  necessary  to 
justify  this  result,  proceeds  to  say: 

"  In  this  view  of  the  receipts  of  1834,  the  income  of  the  year  will 
"  about  equal  the  estimated  expenditure;  and,  with  the  aid  of  the 
"  balance  in  the  Treasury  on  the  1st  of  January  next,  it  will  be  suffi- 
"  cient  for  all  the  wants  of  the  Government,  including  the  amount 
"  necessary  to  pay  off  the  residue  of  the  national  debt." 

He  further  says:  '*  If  the  entire  amount  of  appropriations  pro- 
'"  posed  in  the  estimates  for  1834  were  also  to  be  required  within  the 


38 

"  year,  there  would  not  be  money  enough  in  the  Treasury  to  meet 
"  them,  after  satisfying  the  balances  above  stated,  and  paying  off  the 
"  public  debt." 

He  says  further:  u  In  estimating  the  balance  in  the  Treasury  at 
"  the  close  of  1834,  I  have  therefore  assumed  that  a  portion  of  the 
"  estimates  of  expenditures  herewith  submitted  will  not  be  used  during 
11  the  year;  and  that  balances  of  appropriations,  equal  to  the  amount 
44  at  the  close  of(the  present  year,  will,  in  like  manner,  remain  in  the 
"  Treasury  at  the  end  of  the  year  1834,  and  go  into  the  expenses  of 
44  the  succeeding  year;  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  raise  money  for  the 
44  public  use  sooner  than  it  will  probably  be  needed.  But  the  balance 
44  stated  at  the  end  of  1834  is  not  to  be  considered  as  a  clear  surplus.. 
44  It  will  still  be  chargeable  with  the  amount  of  appropriations  esti- 
44  mated  to  remain  unexpended  at  that  time. 

44  From  this  state  of  the  finances,  and  of  the  proposed  appropria- 
44  tions,  it  is  evident  that  a  reduction  of  the  revenue  cannot,  at  this 
44  time,  be  made  without  injury  to  the  public  service.  Under  the  act 
44  of  the  last  session,  the  receipts  of  1835  will  be  less  than  those  of 
44  1834,  as  a  further  reduction  in  the  rate  of  duties  will  take  effect  on 
44  the  1st  of  January,  1835;  and  if  the  appropriations  should  be 
44  kept  up  to  the  amount  authorized  for  the  present  year,  the  charge 
44  upon  the  Treasury  in  1835  would  be  more  than  it  could  probably* 
44  meet.  But  the  debt,  w ill  then  have  been  entirely  paid;  and,  if  a 
u  guarded  rule  of  appropriation  is  at  once  commenced,  there  loill  be 
44  no  difficulty  in  bringing  down  the  expenditure,  ivithout  injury  to 
44  the  public  service. 

44  If  the  revenue  is  not  to  be  reduced  more  than  the  existing  laws 
44  provide  for,  there  seems  to  be  no  sufficient  reason  to  open,  at  this 
"  time,  the  vexed  question  of  the  tariff.  The  manner  in  which  duties 
44  are  now  apportioned  on  different  articles  would  be  liable  to  insu- 
44  perable  objections,  if  it  were  to  be  considered  as  a  settled  and  per- 
44  manent  system.  But  the  law  is  temporary  on  the  face  of  it,  and 
44  was  intended  as  a  compromise  between  conflicting  interests;  and, 
44  unless  the  revenue  to  arise  under  it  should  hereafter  be  more  pro- 
44  ductive  than  is  anticipated,  it  will  be  necessary,  in  two  years  from 
44  this  time,  to  impose  duties  on  articles  that  are  now  free,  in  order 
44  to  meet  the  current  expenses  of  the  Government" 

The  existence  of  the  several  millions  in  the  Treasury  in  March,  1836, 
is  therefore  to  depend  on  the  future  action  of  Congress  upon  the  report 
of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means;  and  if  the  existence  of  any 
public  money  in  any  bank  at  that  time  is  to  depend  on  the  future 
action  of  Congress,  how  could  that  constitute  a  motive  for  removing 
the  deposites  in  October,  1833? 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  presents  another  reason  for  with 
drawing  the  deposites  on  the  1st  of  October,  which  is  very  remark 
able.  If  I  understand  the  Secretary,  he  makes  the  removal  in  Octo 
ber  a  consequence  of  the  reductions  by  the  Bank  in  August  and  Sep 
tember.  The  remarkable  feature  of  this  reason  is,  that  the  very 
effect  he  intended  to  produce  by  the  removal,  and  which,  if  the  Bank 
did  reduce,  was  produced  by  the  known  intention  of  removal,  is  pre- 


39 

ferrcd  as  the  ground  of  complaint  against  the  Bank,  and  as  the  justi 
fication  of  the  removal.  He  complains  of  the  Bank,  because  she 
acted  as  if  sho  meant  to  carry  his  design  into  effect;  and  he  removes 
the  deposites  because  the  Bank  took  measures  to  prevent  the  removal 
from  distressing  her.  The  amount  of  reductions  in  August  and 
September,  as  the  •  Secretary  states  them,  was  $4,066,146,  or 
$2,000,000  per  month;  and,  as  her  discounts  and  bills  in  August  were 
$64,000,000,  there  is  a  simple  rule  in  arithmetic  by  which  we  may 
ascertain  the  monthly  reduction  necessary  to  effect  the  Secretary's 
object  during  the  thirty-one  months  of  the  charter  which  then  re 
mained.  It  is  clear,  sir,  that  the  monthly  reduction  must  be  more 
than  two  millions;  and  now  that  the  deposites  are  removed,  and  we 
are  in  the  month  of  January,  when  the  loans  and  bills  stand  at  about 
$55,000,000,  the  monthly  reductions  of  the  Bank  for  the  twenty-six 
remaining  months  of  the  charter  must  be  more  than  $2,000,000,  OF 
the  object  which  the  Secretary  meant  to  effect  will  not  be  accom 
plished.  It  is  remarkable  that  the  apparent  coincidence  of  the  Bank 
with  the  design  of  the  Secretary  should  be  a  ground  of  complaint 
against  the  Bank. 

The  Secretary  says,  and  gentlemen  concur  with  him  in  saying, 
that  the  Bank  have  reduced  too  rapidly.  Suppose  it  to  be  so;  did  the 
Secretary  inform  the  Bank  what  amount  of  reduction  he  thought  suf 
ficient?  Did  he  tell  them  of  the  amounts  to  be  from  time  to  time  re 
moved,  and  the  places  at  which  they  would  be  required]  No.  He 
says  that  "  the  nature  of  the  inquiry  at  the  four  principal  banks,"  (of 
which  the  Bank  knew  nothing,)  "  showed  that  the  immediate  with- 
"  drawal,  so  as  to  distress  the  Bank,  was  not  contemplated;  and  that 
"  if  any  apprehensions  to  the  contrary  were  felt  by  the  Bank,  an 
"  inquiry  at  the  Department  would  no  doubt  have  been  promptly 
"  and  satisfactorily  answered."  What,  sir,  was  the  Bank  to  come  to 
the  Treasury  Department  to  ask  for  the  suspension  of  a  demand, 
which  she  was  bound  to  be  in  readiness  to  pay  whenever  made?  Is 
this  to  be  said  while  the  sound  of  the  honorable  member's  voice,  upon 
the  subject  of  the  three  per  cents,  is  still  in  our  ears'?  While  this 
House  lias  in  its  fresh  recollection  the  charge  against  the  Bank,  that 
she  asked  in  March  a  suspension  of  the  discharge  of  half  the  three  per 
cents,  from  July  to  October,  1832,  "  because  the  Bank  was  not  able  to 
pay  them?"  No,  sir;  that  was  sufficient  warning  to  Mr.  Biddle  not  to 
approach  the  Department  upon  the  subject,  even  had  he  been  invited; 
and,  if  he  had  approached  it,  under  any  circumstances,  we  should 
have  heard  again  the  same  changes  rung  upon  the  inability  to  pay  the 
deposites  that  we  have  heard  in  regard  to  the  three  per  cents.  The 
master  of  the  removal  was  in  the  Treasury.  The  time  and  propor 
tions  depended  upon  him;  and,  if  his  concern  for  the  country  was 
excited,  if  the  reductions  of  the  Bank  were  too  rapid  according  to 
the  Treasury  views,  the  remedy  was  in  the  power  of  the  Treasury, 
and  should  have  been  applied. 

Sir,  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  acted  wisely  and  warily  in 
August  and  September.  Although  the  removal  of  the  deposites  did 
not  take  place  until  the  1st  of  October,  the  intention  to  remove  was 


40 

fully  known  in  July.  The  agency  to  negotiate  with  the  State  banks 
was  announced  in  the  Globe  on  the  25th  of  July;  and,  whatever  the 
public  might  think,  it  was  not  for  the  Bank  to  act  in  any  other  faith 
than  that  the  purpose  would  be  immediately  and  relentlessly  executed. 
It  was  the  clear  duty  of  the  Board  to  prepare  itself  without  a  mo 
ment's  delay.  The  position  of  the  Bank  was  every  where  known  to 
the  Treasury  Department  by  the  weekly  statements.  Her  widely 
dispersed  branches  were  to  be  strengthened  wherever  they  required 
it.  Her  circulation  was  large,  and  she  was  in  the  practice  of  assist 
ing  it  by  an  almost  universal  payment  at  all  points,  without  regard  to 
the  tenor  of  the  notes.  The  House  may  judge  of  the  extent  of  ac 
commodation  which  the  Bank  was  in  the  practice  of  giving,  by  the 
thirty-nine  millions  of  these  notes  paid,  out  of  place,  in  the  year 

1832.  They  may  know  it  further  by  the  fact,  that,  of  these  branch 
notes,  $]  ,540,000  were  paid  at  the  Bank  of  the   United   States  in 
Philadelphia,   during  the  very  months  of  August   and    September, 

1833.  This  circulation  was  to  be  sustained  and  increased,  to  be  still 
more  facilitated,   as   it  since   has  been,   to  keep  the  people  and  the 
Bank  from  feeling  the  consequences  of  the  measure.     All  this  re 
quired  that  the  Bank  should  not  sleep  upon  her  post.     The  least  dis 
honor  suffered  by  that  Bank  would  have  produced  universal  disorder 
in  the  country. 

I  understand  the  honorable  member  from  Tennessee  to  say,  that  the 
reductions  by  the  Bank,  in  August  and  September  last,  were  greater 
than  they  ever  had  been  in  any  other  two  months  since  her  institution. 
I  join  issue  upon  this  allegation.  They  have  been  greater  in  other 
months,  and  they  were  greater  in  the  very  same  months  of  the  pre 
ceding  year. 

In  August  and  September,  1833,  the  amount  reduced 

was    -  -    $4,066,146 

In  August  and  September,  1832,  it  was       -  -       4,315,678 


being  the  difference  between  $68,008,988,  the  discounts  and  domestic 
bills  in  August,  1832,  and  $63,693,310,  their  amount  in  October;  and 
yet  there  was  no  alarm  whatever  in  1832.  There  was,  moreover, 
a  greater  reduction,  by  a  million  and  a  half,  from  July  to  October, 
1832,  than  there  was  between  the  same  months  in  the  present  year, 
and  without  any  distress  or  alarm. 

The  discounts  and  bills  in  July,  1833,  were  -     $63,369,897 

The  discounts  and  bills  in  October,  1833,  were     -       60,094,202 


Reduction,  -       $3,275,695 

The  amount  in  July,  1832,  was    -  ^  *         -     $68,416,081 

The  amount  in  October,  1832,     -  -  -       63,693,310 

Reduction,  <*«       $4,722,771 

There  was   a  greater  State  bank   debt  in  October,  1832,  than  in 
the  same  month,  1833,  and  yet  there  was  no  alarm.     In  October, 


41 

1833,  it  was  $2,285,573,  and  in  October,  1832,  it  was  $2,820,114. 
The  reason  of  the  difference  may  possibly  show  to  gentlemen  that 
mere  reduction  is  an  insufficient  element  for  determining  the  pressure 
in  the  market.  In  October,  1832,  the  payment  of  the  three  per 
cents  was  to  restore  to  the  community  a  portion  of  the  sums  called  in 
by  the  Bank.  In  October,  1833,  the  deposites  were  to  go  where  in 
dividuals  must  have  a  less  beneficial  use  of  them,  and  where  they 
could  have  no  use  of  them,  except  as  the  State  banks  should  choose 
to  lend  upon  them. 

Nor  did  the  whole  reduction,  from  October  to  December,  1833, 
cause  the  existing  distress.  It  is  well,  sir,  to  present  these  details, 
that  the  House  may  reflect  upon  them,  and  learn  how  far  the  Secre 
tary  is  responsible  for  the  condition  of  the  country.  The  Bank  paid 
out,  in  the  two  months  of  October  and  December,  $246,766  more 
than  she  received  from  the  community. 

Receipts. 

In   October,   1833,  her  discounts  and 

bills  were  -  $60,094,202 

In  December  they  were,  -     54,453,104 

$5,641,098 


In  October  the  public  depo-  Payments. 

sites  were  $9,868,434 

In  December  they  were,          5,162,259 

$4,706,175 

In  October  the   private  de 
posites  were        -  $8,008,862 
In  December  they  were,  6,827,173 

1,181,689 

5,887,864 


Excess  of  payments  over  receipts,     -  -     $246,766 

Nor  was  the  reduction  by  the  Bank  of  the   United  States,   in  the 
month  of  December,  the  cause  of  the  distress. 

In  December,  1833,  the  discounts  and  bills  were         $54,453,104 
In  January,  1834,  they  are,      -  -  54,911,461 


Showing  an  actual  increase  of  -  -  -  $458,357 

Yet,  in  that  month,  the  public  and  private  deposites  were  paid  to 
the  extent  of  $1,024,058.  Yes,  sir,  in  this  very  month,  when  it  has 
been  said  that  the  Bank  had  grasped  the  debtor's  throat,  to  compel 
an  outcry  to  Congress  for  the  return  of  the  deposites,  the  Bank  ex 
tended  her  loans  nearly  half  a  million  of  dollars,  while  she  paid  more 
than  a  million  of  her  deposites. 

Nor  was  the  entire  reduction  in  the  four  commercial  cities,  from 
October,  1833,  to  January,  1834,  the  cause  of  the  prevailing  distress. 

In  October,  1833,  the  loans  and  bills  in  those  places  were  as  fol 
lows: 


42 

Philadelphia,         -             -         >  ^  fo  f^?,  <          -  $7,156,487 

New  York,  -  6,180,883 

Bosion,     -  -             -  3,965,283 

Baltimore,                            -          •  ,r.  -             -  2,033,318 


$19,335,971 

In  January,  1834,  they  are  as  follows: 

Philadelphia,  -     $7,979,233 

New  York,  -       5,970,055 

Boston,     -  -       2,316,034 

Baltimore,  -  -         ;>  tl     ...  •--.  -       1,954,045 


$18,219,367 

Making  $1,116,604  reduction  in  the  four  cities  during  the  three 
preceding  months. 

The  cause  of  the  alarm  and  general  paralysis  are  not  to  be  found, 
then,  in  the  conduct  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  They  are  to 
be  sought  for  and  found  in  the  removal  of  the  deposites;  in  the  uni 
versal  derangement  of  the  money  system  of  the  country  by  that 
means;  in  the  just  refusal  of  the  United  States'  Bank  to  extend  her 
self  to  her  own  undoing,  or  to  keep  herself  unprepared  for  the  com 
ing  storm,  by  remaining  as  extended  as  she  was;  in  the  inability  of 
the  State  banks  to  use  the  deposites  as  beneficially  as  they  were  used 
before;  and  in  the  refusal  of  capitalists  to  lend  their  money  and  ad 
venture  their  property  in  the  face  of  a  project  to  overwhelm  the 
country  with  an  uncontrollable  State  bank  paper  currency. 

What,  sir,  does  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  expect  of  the  Bank? 
What  measure  of  justice  does  he  render  to  her?  He  says,  the  de 
sign  of  removing  the  deposites  was  to  compel  reduction,  and  he  cen 
sures  her  because  she  reduces.  He  complains  that  she  increased  her 
discounts  and  domestic  bills,  from  December,  1832,  to  August,  1833, 
more  than  two  millions  and  a  half,  when  this  was  the  very  season  in 
which  trade  requires  the  increase,  and  it  was  wholly  in  the  purchase 
of  domestic  bills.  He  complains  that  she  reduced  her  discounts,  in 
August  and  September,  1833,  four  millions  of  dollars,  when  this  is 
the  very  season  of  payment,  when  trade  does  not  require  the  means, 
and  three  millions  of  the  amount  was  by  the  payment  of  domestic 
bills  which  had  arrived  at  maturity.  He  complains  of  the  increase 
of  loans  in  December,  1830,  when  they  were  $42,402,304;  and 
he  complains  of  reductions  in  August,  1833,  when  thev  were 
twenty-two  millions  more,  viz:  $64,160,349.  He  complains  of 
reductions  in  1833,  when,  in  the  whole,  from  June  to  December, 
they  have  been  but  $610,508  more  than  they  were  in  1832;  and  the 
Bank  has  had  also  to  pay  the  public  deposites.* 

*  The  statements  which  verify  these  positions  may  be  more  intelligibly 
placed  in  a  note  than  in  the  body  of  the  argument,  as  they  were  stated  to  the 
House . 

1.  The  variations  in  the  increase  and  diminution  of  discounts  and  domestic 
bills  through  the  years  1832  and  1833,  are  shown  by  the  following  statement: 


43 

Sir,  it  is  clear  that  the  Bank  must  abide  the  reproaches  of  the  Se 
cretary,  whatever  she  does.  But  what,  has  she  not  a  right  to  expect 
from  this  House,  from  the  People,  from  the  solid  State  banks,  from 
all  who  are  concerned  in  the  currency,  and  the  property  it  circulates? 
Their  safety  depends  on  her  pursuing  the  course  she  has  traced  out, 
from  which  neither  the  reproaches  of  enemies,  nor  the  entreaties  of 
friends,  should  divert  her.  For  the  former  I  have  no  apprehension; 
and  for  the  latter,  although  I  entertain  some  fears,  I  trust  that  an  an 
swer  will  always  be  found  by  the  able  Board  which  administers  the 
concerns  of  the  Bank,  in  the  superior  claims  of  public  duty. 

The  Secretary  asserts,  sir — and  it  seems  to  be  a  favorite  assertion, 
as  it  is  to  be  found  in  more  than  one  place  in  the  letter — he  asserts 
that  the  Bank  has  violated  the  charter.  He  says,  that,  "  instead  of  a 
"  Board  constituted  of  at  least  seven  directors,  according  to  the  charter, 
44  at  which  those  appointed  by  the  United  States  have  a  right  to  be 
"  present,  many  of  the  most  important  money  transactions  of  the 
"  Bank  have  been,  and  still  are,  placed  under  the  control  of  a  com- 
44  mittee,  denominated  the  Exchange  Committee,  of  which  no  one  of 
44  the  public  directors  has  been  allowed  to  be  a  member  since  the 
44  commencement  of  the  present  year.  This  committee  is  not  even 
"  elected  by  the  Board,  and  the  public  directors  have  no  voice  in 
44  their  appointment.  They  are  chosen  by  the  President  of  the  Bank; 
"  and  the  business  of  the  institution,  which  ought  to  be  decided  on 
44  by  the  Board  of  Directors,  is,  in  many  instances,  transacted  by  this 
44  committee;  and  no  one  has  a  right  to  be  present  at  their  proceedings 
*'  but  the  President,  and  those  whom  he  shall  please  to  name  as 
11  members  of  this  committee.  Thus  loans  are  made,  unknown  at 
44  the  time  to  a  majority  of  the  Board,  and  paper  discounted  which 
44  might  probably  be  rejected  at  a  regular  meeting  of  the  directors. 
44  The  most  important  operations  of  the  Bank  are  sometimes  resolved 
44  on  and  executed  by  this  committee;  and  its  measures  are,  it  ap- 
44  pears,  designedly,  and  by  regular  system,  so  arranged  as  to  conceal 
44  from  the  officers  of  the  Government  transactions  in  which  the  public 
44  interests  are  deepty  involved.  And  this  fact  alone  furnishes  evi- 
44  deuce  too  strong  to  be  resisted,  that  the  concealment  of  certain 

January,  1832, 

June, 

December, 

January,  1833, 

June, 

December, 

Total  reduction  from  June  to  December,  1 832,     -  -  7,991,184 

Total  reduction  from  June  to  December,  1833,      -  8,601,692 

2.  The  increase  of  two  millions  and  a  half,  from  January  to  August,  1833, 
was  wholly  in  domestic  bills,  while  the  discounts  were  reduced. 

Domestic  bills.         Discounts. 

January,  1833,  -        ',   - .       £18,069,043       $43,626,870 

August,  1833,  -  -          20,923,243        43,237,106 


Domestic  bills. 
$16,691,129 
22,850,769 
16,647,507 

Discounts. 
49,602,577 
46,712,040 
44,924,118 

Total. 
66,293,707 
69,562,809 
61,571,625 

18,069,043 
22,427,702 
15,672,537 

43,626,870 
40,627,094 
38,780,567 

61,695,913 
63,054,796 
54,453,104 

Increase,        -  -  2,854,200  389,764    diminution. 


44 

44  important  operations  of  the  corporation  from  tJie  officers  of  the 
*'  Government  is  one  of  the  objects  which  is  intended  to  be  accom- 
44  plished  by  means  of  this  committee.  The  plain  words  of  the  charter 
"  are  violated,  in  order  to  deprive  the  people  of  the  United  States  of 
4£  one  of  the  principal  securities  which  the  law  had  provided  to  guard 
44  their  interest,  and  to  render  more  safe  the  public  money  intrusted 
44  to  the  care  of  the  Bank." 

Now,  sir,  the  Secretary  cannot  have  examined  this  matter,  or  he 
would  have  entertained  a  different  opinion.  There  is  no  violation 
whatever  of  the  charter  in  giving  the  President  authority  to  appoint 
the  Committee  of  Exchange,  or  in  authorizing  that  committee  to 
transact  the  business  of  exchange,  or  even  to  discount,  if  such  a 
power  should  be  deemed  expedient. 

The  Secretary  appears  to  rely  on  the  fourth  fundamental  law  of 
the  corporation,  which  enacts,  that  44  not  less  than  seven  directors 
44  shall  constitute  a  Board  for  the  transaction  of  business,  of  whom 
44  the  President  shall  always  be  one,  except  in  case  of  sickness  or 
44  necessary  absence;  in  which  case  his  place  may  be  supplied  by  any 
44  other  director  whom  he,  by  writing  under  his  hand,  shall  depute  for 
*i  that  purpose.  And  the  director  so  deputed  may  do  and  transact  all 
*'  necessary  business  belonging  to  the  office  of  the  President  of  the 
44  said  corporation,  during  the  continuance  of  the  sickness  or  necessary 
*4  absence  of  the  President."  By  transaction  of  business,  the  Secre 
tary  would  seem  to  understand  exclusively  the  execution  of  business; 
the  carrying  of  a  direction,  order,  or  law,  into  act  and  effect.  But 
this  is  not  the  restricted  meaning  of  the  word  in  this  place,  for  several 
satisfactory  reasons.  1.  Such  a  restriction  upon  the  execution  of  the 
various  business  of  the  Bank,  as  that  not  less  than  seven  directors 
should  form  a  quorum  to  do  it,  would  render  the  execution  of  business 
impossible.  Not  a  deposite  could  be  received  or  paid,  or  the  simplest 
operation  of  business  performed,  without  the  presence  of  such  a 
quorum.  2.  Accordingly,  the  charter,  by  the  use  of  a  different  term, 
in  a  different  place,  shows  that  this  is  not  the  meaning  of  the  words 
transaction  of  business.  The  tenth  section  gives  to  the  directors  for 
the  time  being  44  power  to  appoint  such  officers,  clerks,  and  servants 
44  under  them  as  shall  be  necessary  for  executing  the  business  of  the 
44  said  corporation,  and  to  allow  them  such  compensation  for  their 
44  services,  respectively,  as  shall  be  reasonable."  3.  The  word,  in 
its  proper  sense,  includes  both  execution  and  direction.  4.  The 
authority  of  the  Board,  as  would  naturally  occur  to  most  people,  is 
legislative;  and  although  they  can  also  execute  and  perform  defini 
tively  any  business  they  please,  it  must  depend  upon  the  law  which 
they  prescribe  to  themselves,  or  which  is  prescribed  for  them  by  the 
charter  and  by-laws,  what  part  they  will  perform  in  person,  and  what 
they  will  commit  to  others.  The  quorum  is  appointed  for  the  exercise 
of  authority  as  a  Board — for  legislation,  and  not  for  the  execution  of 
the  laws  or  directions  of  the  Board.  The  body  is,  by  the  very  name 
of  its  office,  directive  and  not  executive.  5.  This  is  clearly  implied 
from  the  provision  which  gives  to  a  substituted  director  the  power 
to  transact  all  the  necessary  business  belonging  to  the  office  of  Pre- 


sident,  during  the  continuance  of  the  President's  sickness  or  neces 
sary  absence.  What  is  the  necessary  business  belonging  to  the  office 
of  President?  The  charter  does  not  declare  it.  Perhaps  the  only 
business  which  it  allots  to  him,  expressly,  is  that  of  signing  notes  of  a 
certain  description  to  give  them  a  certain  effect.  Whence,  then,  can 
he  get  it,  except  from  the  Board  of  Directors,  or  the  by-laws  and 
regulations  of  the  Bank?  And  if  he  gets  it  from  the  Board,  they  must 
have  power  to  authorize  and  direct,  and  the  President,  by  virtue 
thereof,  must  have  power  to  execute. 

Sir,  the  power  of  making  by-laws  and  regulations  for  the  govern 
ment  of  the  Bank  has  been  wholly  overlooked  by  the    Secretary. 
The  seventh  section  of  the  charter  gives  to  the  whole  corporation, 
the  stockholders,  the  power  to  "  ordain,  establish,  and  put  in  execu- 
u  tion  such  by-laws,  ordinances,  and  regulations,  as  they  shall  deem 
"  necessary  and  convenient  for  the  government  of  the  said  corporation, 
"  not  being  contrary  to  the  constitution  thereof,  or  to  the  laws  of  the 
"  United  States;"  and  the  present  situation  of  this  power  is  thus:  It 
has  been  settled  for  a  century,  that  where  a  charter  commits  the 
power  of  making  by-laws  to  the  whole  body  of  the  corporation,  the 
general  mass  of  corporators,  they  may  delegate  the  power  to  a  select 
body,  who  then  represent  the  whole  body  in  their  acts  of  legislation. 
The  contrary  of  this  is  held  to  be  the  law  when  the  power  is  given 
by  charter  to  a  select  body,  for  they  cannot  delegate  their  power  to 
any  other  body.     Now,  sir,  the  whole  body  of  the  corporation  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  the  stockholders,  at  a  general  meeting 
held  on  the  6th  January,  1817,  did  delegate  their  power  of  making 
by-laws  and  regulations  to  the  Board  of  Directors,  after  passing  a 
few  by-laws  not  affecting  the  present  inquiry.    The  act  by  which  this 
was  done  declares,  "  that  the  directors  shall  have  power  to  make 
"  such  further   rules,   regulations,  and  by-laws,  as  they  shall  deem 
"  necessary  and  convenient  for  the  government  of  the  Bank  of  the 
"  United  States,  not  contrary  to  these  ordinances,  nor  to  the  act  of 
u  incorporation,  nor  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States."  Consequently, 
the  directors  have,  since  that  time,  possessed  and  exercised,  and  do 
now  possess  arid  exercise,  the  legislative  power  of  the  corporation, 
by  the  gift  and  delegation  of  the  stockholders;  and  the  laws  and  regu 
lations  made  by  the  Board  of  Directors,  whether  for  the  government 
of  their  own  body,  or  of  the  business  of  the  Bank,  not  being  contrary 
to  the  constitution,  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  or  the  by-laws 
made  by  the  stockholders,  are  good  and  valid,  either  by  virtue  of 
their  own  charter  authority  as   directors,  or  the  authority  delegated 
to  them  by  the  whole  corporation. 

Upon  what  principle  is  it,  then,  that  a  regulation  of  the  Board 
authorizing  the  President  to  appoint  committees,  (a  necessary  power 
in  every  legislative  body,)  or  that  authorizing  a  committee  to  take 
order  upon  the  purchase  and  sale  of  exchange,  or  to  perform  any 
other  act  of  banking  which  the  charter  does  not  require  to  be  done 
by  somebody  else,  is  denounced  as  a  violation  of  the  charter,  and  of 
the  plain  words  of  the  charter?  Sir,  the  power  exercised  by  the 
Committee  of  Exchange  is  known  by  all  who  know  any  thing  of 


46 

practical  banking,  as  it  is  now  conducted  in  our  cities,  to  be  not  only 
usual,  but  almost  indispensable;  and,  to  tbe  due  management  of  the 
parent  Bank,  entirely  so.  To  require  a  quorum  of  seven  to  be  pre 
sent  at  every  such  operation,  occurring  as  they  do  every  da}7,  would 
be  to  say  that  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  should  not  give  the 
facilities  to  exchanges  which  the  interests  of  trade  require.  The 
question  of  expediency  is,  however,  for  the  Board,  when  its  legal 
quorum  is  present,  to  decide;  and  they  have  decided  it,  and  the 
stockholders  have  never  questioned  the  decision.  As  to  the  right, 
though  from  convenience,  as  well  as  from  the  regular  recurrence  and 
magnitude  of  the  operations,  the  discounts  of  promissory  notes  are 
directed  by  the  Board  of  Directors  in  person,  there  is  no  legal  differ 
ence  between  discounts  and  exchanges,  or  any  other  branch  of 
banking  business,  which  makes  them  necessarily  subject  to  different 
rules.  The  Board  may  regulate  the  whole  as  it  deems  best  for  the 
Bank. 

But,  sir,  this  alleged  violation  of  the  charter  is  connected,  in  the 
mind  of  the  Secretary,  with  a  design  to  "  conceal  certain  important 
operations  of  the  corporation  from  the  officers  of  the  Government." 
The  particular  operations  concealed  are  not  suggested,  but  the  con 
cealment  is  alleged  as  an  inference  from  the  mode  of  appointing  and 
instructing  the  committees  in  violation  of  the  charter. 

There  are  some  points  of  fact  adverted  to  in  the  Secretary's  let 
ter,  and  in  the  argument  of  the  honorable  memher  from  Tennessee, 
which  it  is  my  intention  to  leave  to  those  who  think  that  the}7  are 
still  worthy  of  additional  notice.  I  am  not  of  that  opinion.  These 
matters  regard  the  particular  items  of  expense  for  printing  and  pub 
lication  by  the  Bank,  and  the  old  affair  of  the  3  per  cents,  both  as  to 
the  suspended  payment  from  July  to  October,  and  the  contract  by  the 
Bank  with  certain  holders  of  that  stock.  If,  after  the  volumes  printed 
by  the  order  of  this  House  at  the  last  session  of  Congress,  upon  these  and 
other  kindred  questions,  something  more  is  required  to  be  said,  I  am 
sure  it  may  be  said  more  profitably  by  others  than  by  myself.  So,  also, 
sir,  as  to  the  discovery  which  the  honorable  member  from  Tennessee 
thinks  he  has  made,  of  a  contradiction  between  the  amount  of  print 
ing  expenses  of  the  Bank  in  ]831,  returned  by  the  Bank  to  the  Sen 
ate  under  a  resolution  of  that  body,  and  the  amount  for  the  same 
year  stated  in  the  pamphlet  which  he  is  pleased  to  term  the  mani 
festo  of  the  Bank — the  former'  being,  as  I  understand,  the  sum  of 
$9,775,  and  the  latter  the  sum  of  $21,708  $3.  That  discovery  may 
not  prove  to  be  as  important  as  it  is  supposed  to  be,  if  gentlemen 
will  advert  to  the  fact  that  the  call  of  the  Senate  embraces  only  the 
expenses  paid  by  the  Bank  for  printing  and  to  editors;  and  the  ex 
penses  in  the  pamphlet  are  the  whole  amount  paid  by  the  Bank  for 
publications  of  every  kind,  by  whomever  printed,  and  not  merely 
the  portion  paid  by  the  Bank  to  printers  employed  by  itself,  and  to 
editors  of  newspapers. 

These,  sir,  arc  minor  points;  but  the  question  of  concealment  in 
volves  sreat  considerations.  It  would  appear  that  the  charge  implies 
a  general  concealment,  from  the  omission  to  appoint  any  one  of  the 


47 

Government  directors  upon  the  Committee  of  Exchange;  and  par 
ticular  concealment,  from  giving  to  the  Committee  on  the  Offices  a 
power  to  modify  the  resolutions  of  the  Board  for  reducing  the  busi 
ness  of  the  institution  as  they  should  deem  expedient,  and  refusing 
to  order  them  to  make  a  report  to  the  Board;  and,  also,  from  refusing 
to  the  Government  directors  a  copy  of  the  resolution  indicating  the 
course  of  policy  proper  for  the  Bank  to  pursue  under  present  circum 
stances,  and  which  the  Government  directors  thought  should  be 
transmitted  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  In  regard  to  the  Com 
mittee  on  the  Offices,  I  find  it  difficult  to  comprehend  that  branch  of 
the  alleged  concealment,  as  by  their  letter  of  the  22d  April,  1833, 
to  the  President,  it  appears  that  one  of  the  Goverment  directors  was 
at  that  time  a  member  of  that  committee.  Possibly,  however,  there 
may  have  been  a  change,  and  I  shall  so  consider  it. 

Sir,  these  questions  are  of  great  importance  to  all  banks,  and  to 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States  in  particular.  The  right  of  the  Go 
vernment  directors  to  the  station  they  aspire  to,  or  to  demand  that 
the  Board  should  make  the  orders  which  the  Board  have  refused  to 
make,  has  not  the  least  foundation.  Their  right  to  be  members  of 
any  committee  has  no  more  legal  support,  than  the  right  of  a  member 
of  this  House  to  be  upon  a  committee  appointed  by  this  House.  It 
depends,  in  this  House,  upon  the  good  pleasure  of  the  House;  or,  what 
is  constructively  the  same  thing,  upon  the  pleasure  of  the  Speaker, 
chosen  by  the  House.  In  the  Board  of  Directors  it  depends  on  the 
pleasure  of  the  Board, 'either  directly  or  indirectly,  as  they  make  the 
appointment  themselves,  or  give  the  power  of  appointment  to  the 
President  of  the  Board.  The  right  to  require  that  a  committee  shall 
make  a  report  to  the  Board,  is  the  right  of  the  Board,  and  not  of  any 
member  of  it.  The  right  to  take  a  copy  of  the  minutes,  for  any  pur 
pose,  depends  on  the  will  of  the  Board  by  whom  they  arc  made,  or 
ordered  to  be  made,  as  the  charter  does  not  contain  any  direction 
upon  the  subject.  It  would  be  the  same  in  this  House,  if  the  constitu 
tion  did  not  require  a  journal  to  be  kept  by  each  House,  and  to  be 
published  from  time  to  time;  though  even  this  is  subject  to  an  excep 
tion,  depending  on  the  will 'of  the  House. 

The  questions  of  right  being  thus,  let  us  examine,  sir,  the  ques 
tions  of  expediency  and  propriety. 

Heretofore,  in  the  history  of  the  Bank,  tho  directors  appointed 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  have  mingled  in  all  the  trans 
actions  of  the  Bank,  mutually  giving  and  enjoying  unreserved  confi 
dence,  and  being  in  no  respect  whatever  distinguished  from  the  other 
directors.  Mr.  Biddle  himself  was  a  director  appointed  by  the  Pre 
sident,  for  many  years,  and  particularly  in  the  important  years  of 
1829,  1830,  1831/and  1832,  as  the  reports  of  the  last  session  show; 
and  other  Government  directors  have,  from  time  to  time,  acted  upon 
all  the  important  committees,  including  the  Committee  of  Exchange, 
so  as  to  give  to  the  Bank  the  benefit  of  their  peculiar  qualifications, 
for  it  must  always  have  been  a  question  of  qualification,  and,  if  a  di 
rector  was  not  qualified  for  a  particular  post,  it  is  not  probable,  what 
ever  was  the  source  of  his  appointment,  that  he  would  bo  placed  in 


48 

it.  But,  sir,  in  the  time  of  the  present  Government  directors,  a 
change  has  come  upon  us  and  upon  the  Bank,  of  a  very  important 
kind,  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  it  has  affected  those  directs  also. 

It  was  vehemently  suspected,  sir,  at  the  time  of  their  ap^oii^nent, 
that  their  notions  of  duty  and  right  were  peculiar;  that  they  -feemed 
themselves  bound  or  entitled  to  use  their  posts  for  the  purpose  of 
making  representations  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  tending 
to  excite  odium  against  their  co-directors,  by  impeaching  their  mo 
tives  and  acts,  and  thus  to  impair  the  credit  of  the  Bank;  that  they 
deemed  themselves  at  liberty,  in  the  performance  of  this  duty,  or  in 
the  exercise  of  this  right,  to  pursue  objects  which  they  did  not  care 
to  avow,  and  which  they  were  not  permitted  to  avow;  and,  finally,  sir, 
that,  in  some  way,  by  some  unexplained  theory  of  their  appointment, 
they  had  come  to  the  opinion  that  they  possessed  political  powers  in 
the  institution,  which  they  were  authorized  to  use  far  political  pur 
poses.  All  this,  sir,.was,  as  I  have  said,  most  vehemently  suspected; 
and,  if  the  suspicions  were  just,  the  propriety  of  placing  them  in  posts 
of  trust  and  confidence  in  the  Bank  was  not  so  clear,  particularly  as,  if 
they  were  so  placed,  it  might  have  been  difficult  to  persuade  other  gen 
tlemen  to  sit  beside  them  in  the  occupation  of  those  posts.  I  say, 
sir,  it  might  have  been  extremely  difficult  to  persuade  gentlemen  of 
character,  having  some  feelings  and  reputation  of  their  own,  to  sit 
in  a  post  of  trust  and  confidence  by  the  side  of  directors  holding 
such  notions  of  duty  and  right,  and  carrying  them  out,  without  avow 
ing  their  objects,  into  measures  of  extreme  personal  annoyance,  as 
well  as  of  discredit  to  the  Bank. 

Sir,  what  was  at  that  time,  perhaps,  no  more  than  vehement  sus 
picion,  is  now,  and,  for  some  time  past,  has  been,  matter  of  unques 
tionable  certainty;  and  the  certainty  is  derived  from  the  best  possible 
authority — the  confession  of  the  very  party. 

Sir,  I  beg  to  call  the  atcention  of  the  House  to  a  part  of  a  letter 
addressed  by  three  of  the  Government  directors  to  the  President  of 
the  United  States  on  the  22d  of  April,  1833,  which  is  annexed  to- 
the  letter  of  the  Secretary.  It  is  the  first  that  has  been  exhibited  to 
this  House,  but  not  the  first  in  the  correspondence  of  which  it  forms 
a  part,  and  which  has  not  been  communicated.  We  know,  even  now, 
but  in  part.  The  three  directors  say: 

"Without  considering  any  portion  of  our  remarks  as  falling  within 
"the  limits  of  those  private  accounts,  which,  as  you  state,  the  charter 
"has  so  carefully  guarded,  since  the  whole  relate  to  the  action  of  the 
"  Board  upon  matters  fully  open,  and  discussed,  before  them,  and  ex- 
"  tend  in  no  instance  to  the  private  debtor  and  creditor  accounts  of 
"  individuals,  yet  we  may  be  excused  for  expressing  much  gratifica- 
"  tion  at  your  assurance  that  the  information  requested  is  for  your 
"own  satisfaction,  and  that  you  do  not  wish  it  extended  beyond  our 
"personal  knoiclcdge.  We  may  be  permitted  also  to  add,  that  the 
"  wishes  and  opinions  which  we  took  the  liberty  of  expressing  in  our 
"  former  letter  have  been  since  more  strongly  confirmed,  and  that  we 
"should  not  only  feel  more  satisfaction  ourselves,  but  be  enabled  to 
"  convey  to  you  more  full  and  correct  information,  were  we  to  proceed 


49 

"in  an  investigation,  WHOSE  OBJECT  WAS  AVOWED,  and  if  we  were 
"  strengthened  by  that  official  sanction  which  we  suggested." 

Then,  sir,  they  were  not  altogether  comfortable  in  their  new 
position;  and  I  do  not  wonder  at  it.  Then  their  object  was  »«f 
avowed,  and  they  were  not  permitted  to  avow  it,  but  were  compelled, 
by  their  own  sense  of  distress,  to  ask  for  an  official  sanction,  under 
which  they  might  avow  it:  then,  further,  they  were  practising  con 
cealment  themselves,  and  trying  to  prosecute  an  investigation,  with 
out  avowing  its  object,  when  that  object  is  now  known  to  have  been 
to  inculpate  the  Board,  and  particularly  the  gentleman  at  the  head  of 
it,  and,  by  means  of  the  odium  thus  excited,  to  justify  to  public  pre 
judice  an  act  of  deadly  hatred  to  the  Bank  of  which  they  were  di 
rectors — the  removal  of  the  public  deposites;  and  then,  sir,  I  say,  in 
conclusion,  that  there  is  not  an  honorable  man  in  this  House,  or  in 
this  country,  who  will  not  respond  to  the  sentiment,  that  they  were 
treated  at  least  as  well  as  they  deserved  to  be,  by  not  being  assisted 
in  the  performance  of  these  remarkable  labors.  With  this  confession 
of  concealment  by  the  Government  directors,  to  which  they  were 
coerced  by  the  Executive,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  arraigns 
the  Board  for  concealing  its  operations  from  them.  He  charges  the 
Board  with  concealment,  in  violation  of  their  charter,  and  in  con 
tempt  of  the  Government,  when  the  head  and  front  of  their  offence 
is  this  only — that  they  would  not  consent  to  be  the  dupes  of  con* 
cealment  that  was  practised  by  others. 

But,  sir,  this  is  not  all.  The  memorial  of  the  Government  di 
rectors  to  this  House,  for  the  doctrines  of  which  \ve  are,  I  presumes 
indebted  to  the  professional  gentleman  whose  name  is  at  the  head, 
cannot  be  too  much  adverted  to,  in  connexion  with  both  the  charge 
of  concealment  03^  the  Board,  and  another  charge,  hereafter  to  be 
noticed,  of  a  graver  description.  It  is  a  document  that  may  be  con 
sidered  as  a  sort  of  small  martyrology — a  history  of  the  sufferings 
incident  to  disappointed  efforts  and  mortified  pretensions;  and  it  con 
tains,  as  is  natural,  a  confession  of  the  faith  by  which  the  sufferers 
have  been  sustained  at  the  stake  where  they  have  placed  themselves. 
I  beg  permission  to  exhibit  it  to  the  House. — "  It  has  pleased  the 
**  majority  of  the  Board  of  Directors,"  says  the  memorial,  "  in  the 
"  document  to  which  we  refer,  in  order,  we  suppose,  in  some  degree 
"  to  extenuate  their  conduct,  in  systematically  nullifying  the  repre- 
"  sentatives  of  the  Government  and  the  People,"  [doubtless  mean 
ing  themselves,]  "  to  deny  that  the  public  directors  are  seated  at 
"  the  Board  in  any  other  relation  than  themselves;  to  deny  the  ex- 
*'  istence  of  any  difference  in  the  official  character  and  duty  of  them- 
"  selves  and  us.  This  extraordinary  denial,  in  the  face  of  all  experi- 
44  ence  of  the  familiar  history  of  the  country,  and  of  palpable  reasoning, 
"  must  rather  be  ascribed  to  the  presumption  which  moneyed  power 
**  is  apt  to  inspire,  than  to  the  ignorance  or  wilful  misrepresentation 
"  of  those  who  make  it.  Nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that  the  PUB- 

u  LIC  DIRECTORS  WERE  DEVISED  AS  INSTRUMENTS  " [I  beg  the  HoUSC 

to  advert  to  the  felicity  of  the  language — "were  devised  as  instm- 
mcnts"]    •*  Nothing  can   be  plainer  than  that  the  public  directors 
4 


50 

ts  were  devised  as  instruments  for  the  attainment  of  public  objects; 
44  that  their  being  insisted  upon  in  the  charter  itself  was  in  obedience 
**  to  the  will  of  those  who  elected  the  legislative  body  by  which  it  was 
**  passed;  and  that  their  appointment  was  given  to  the  President, 
u  with  the  advice  arid  consent  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States, 
"  (not  to  the  mere  fiscal  representative,)  in  order  to  clothe  them  with 
"  all  the  character  of  official  representation,  and  to  exact  from  them 
"  a  discharge  of  all  the  duties,  public,  political,  and  patriotic,  inci- 
**  dent  to  a  trust  so  conferred.  If  we  are  mistaken  in  this,  we  ac- 
41  knowledge  that  our  solicitude  about  the  rights  and  morals,  the 
**  practical  purity  and  freedom  of  our  countrymen,  has  misled  us. 
*4  But  we  know  that  we  arc  not." 

Devised  as  instruments,  and  given  to  the  President,  to  exact  from 
ibem  a  discharge  of  all  the  duties,  public,  political,  and  patriotic,  in 
cident  to  a  trust  so  conferred!  The  sense  would  not  have  been  more 
complete,  sir,  though  the  alliteration  would  have  been  more  perfect,  if 
they  had  described  their  functions  as  extending  to  all  duties,  public, 
political,  patriotic,  and  parti/,  incident  to  a  trust  so  conferred. 

Now,  sir,  without  at  present  saying  whether  this  theory  was  true, 
the  other  directors  had  a  right  to  a  counteracting  theory  for  them 
selves;  and  if  it  is  true  that  the  Government  directors  were  devised 
as  instruments,  and  that  they  are,  by  their  creation,  political  direc 
tors,  the  other  directors,  who  have  not  been  so  devised,  are  entitled 
to  consider  themselves  as  anti-political  directors,  and  not  bound  to 
assist  the  political  operations  of  the  other  branch,  but  rather,  by  the 
momentum  of  their  greater  numbers,  to  keep  them  from  moving  the 
Bank  out  of  place.  But,  sir,  the  heads  of  the  memorialists  have 
been  made  dizzy  by  their  elevation.  Their  theory  has  no  foundation 
in  reason,  or  in  the  charter.  I  deny  that  they  were  devised  as  in 
struments,  whatever  they  may  have  made  of  themselves.  There  is 
not  a  shadow  of  difference  between  the  rights  and  duties,  the  powers, 
or  the  obligations,  of  any  of  the  directors:  they  are  all  directors, 
sieither  more  nor  less,  and  owing  the  same  duties  to  all  the  interests 
confided  to  them.  The  directors  appointed  by  the  President  owe  a 
duty  to  the  nation,  and  so  do  the  others,  and,  in  my  poor  judgment, 
they  have  performed  it.  The  directors  elected  by  the  stockholders 
owe  a  duty  to  the  Bank,  and  so  do  the  directors  appointed  by  the 
President;  but  they  have  neither  performed  nor  acknowledged  it.  They 
are  not  placed  there  to  make  inquiries  for  the  President.  The  Pre 
sident  has  no  authority  to  direct  inquiries  to  be  made  by  them.  This 
is  a  question  of  charter  power,  of  power  over  a  corporation,  all  ot 
whose  privileges  are  rights  of  property.  The  charter  gives  to  the 
President  no  such  right.  It  expressly  gives  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  a  right  of  limited  inquiry,  by  investigating  such  general 
accounts,  in  the  books  of  the  Bank,  as  relate  to  the  statements  which 
the  Bank  is  bound  to  furnish  to  the  Treasury  Department,  but  no 
further.  Congress  have  the  power  to  inspect  the  books  of  the  Bank, 
and  the  proceedings  of  the  corporation  generally.  These  powers 
have  been  expressly  given,  and  they  have  been  so  given  because 
they  would  not  have  been  derived  by  implication  from  the  charter. 


51 

But  here  is  a  power  to  be  implied  greater  than  ail,  and  worse  than 
all — a  power  to  be  exercised  secretly,  and  without  avowal,  ex  partc^ 
without  notice,  without  opportunity  of  reply  or  explanation  being 
given  to  those  whom  it  affects,  and  by  persons  who  arc  holding,  to  all 
appearance,  the  relations  of  amity  with  their  co-directors,  sitting  oa 
the  same  seats,  and  professing  the  same  general  objects.  Sir,  the 
Board  did  right  not  to  aid  them;  it  would  have  done  right  to  resist: 
them;  and  I  inquire  of  the  members  of  this  House,  and  ask  them  :  to 
follow  out  their  honorable  feelings  into  the  reply — would  they  con 
sent  to  sit  in  committee  by  the  side  of  men  who  professed  principles 
like  these,  and  submitted  themselves  to  the  direction  of  another  as 
to  the  manner  in  which  they  should  carry  them  into  execution?  This 
question  concerns  all  banks,  and  this  Bank  most  intimately.  A  hue 
and  cry  is  raised  against  the  directors  of  this  Bank,  because  the 
Bank  will  not  tell  the  Government  directors,  that  they  may  tdl  the 
Secretary,  precisely  how  they  mean  to  wind  up,  if  they  do  mean  it; 
and  here  is  a  new  theory  of  banking,  to  place  by  the  side  of  the 
new  theory  of  political  power — that  all  which  the  Bank  intends  t« 
do  for  its  own  defence,  is  to  be  told  to  an  enemy,  that,  if  he  thinks 
fit,  he  may  defeat  the  measure;  that  it  is  not  sufficient  for  him  to  con 
tinue  to  know  the  precise  condition  of  the  Bank,  in  point  of  fact,  as 
it  actually  is,  and  as  he  must  perceive  it  to  be  by  the  weekly  statements,, 
but  that  he  must  also  know  what  it  is  going  to  be  by  the  operation  of 
measures  of  defence,  that  if  it  is  in  his  power,  and  he  also  thinks  fit, 
he  may  frustrate  the  purpose.  The  private  directors  of  this  Bank  have 
upon  them  the  responsibility  of  taking  care  of  all  the  stockholders — the 
nation,  for  its  seven  millions,  included.  If  others  forget  this  duly,  they 
will  not.  This  House,  I  hope,  will  not;  nor  will  they  join  in  censuring 
these  faithful  men  for  refusing,  under  the  challenge  of  political  power, 
to  give  up  the  direction  of  the  Bank,  by  allowing  to  any  department 
an  inquisition  into  their  concerns,  which  the  charter  does  not  warrant. 
Mr.  Speaker,  it  is  in  connexion  with  this  asserted  right  of  inquiry 
into  the  affairs  of  the  Bank,  that  the  contracts,  made  by  the  Secre 
tary  with  the  new  deposite  Banks,  become  an  object  of  the  deepest 
interest.  The  15th  fundamental  lav/  of  the  Bank  charter  enables  the. 
Secretary  to  require  of  the  Bank  a  weekly  statement  of  the  capital 
stock  of  the  corporation,  debts  due  to  the  same,  moneys  deposited 
therein,  notes  in  circulation,  and  the  specie  in  hand;  and  gives  him  a 
right  to  inspect  the  general  accounts  relating  to  it  in  the  books  of  the 
Bank,  but  not  the  right  of  inspecting  the  account  of  any  private  in 
dividual.  This  ought  to  have  been  sufficient  for  the  Secretary,  as, 
in  the  judgment  of  Congress,  it  was  sufficient  for  the  safe-keeping  of 
the  public  moneys.  It  was  enough  for  safety,  which  Congress  wanted, 
but  not  enough  for  interference  and  control  of  the  Bank,  which 
Congress  did  not  want.  The  contracts  which  the  Secretary  has 
made  with  the  deposite  banks  hold  a  very  different  language,  as  may 
be  seen  by  that  with  the  Girard  Bank.  The  Bank  is  bound,  not 
only  to  make  weekly  returns  of  its  entire  condition,  and  to  submit  its 
books  and  transactions  to  a  critical  examination  by  the  Secretary,  or 
an  agent  duly  authorized  by  him,  but  it  is  expressly  provided  that 


52 

tills  examination  may  extend  to  all  the  books  and  accounts,  to  the 
cash  on  hand,  and  to  all  the  acts  and  concerns  of  the  Bank,  except 
the  current  accounts  of  individuals.  Sir,  I  am  happy  to  learn  that 
the  stockholders  of  the  Bank  of  Virginia  have  disavowed  the  act  of 
ibeir  directors,  in  giving  this  power  to  the  Secretary.  It  is  a  fearful 
power,  and,  with  the  Treasury  interpretation  of  current  accounts, 
(which  is  not  the  language  of  the  charter,  but  accounts  generally  of 
any  private  individual,)  we  may  see  the  extent  of  control,  which, 
with  the  aid  of  the  deposites,  this  clause  of  the  contract  will  give. 
It  is  an  authority  for  universal  supervision  of  all  the  operations  of 
the  Bank,  including  its  discounts,  and  for  granting  and  withholding 
accommodations  at  the  pleasure  of  the  Secretary.  I  humbly  submit 
fto  all  who  feel  any  kindred  sympathies  with  honorable  men,  whether, 
in  the  absence  of  the  mandate  of  a  judicial  decision,  in  a  case  in 
irhich  such  a  decision  has  been  avoided  by  the  power  that  has  a 
right  to  invoke  it,  whether  this  is  a  fit  occasion  to  justify  the  removal 
of  the  deposites  for  violation  of  charter,  because  the  directors  have  not 
adopted  or  assisted  such  principles,  interpretations,  and  aims  as  these? 

The  affair  of  the  French  bill  I  shall  briefly  notice,  as  I  pass  to  the 
remaining  topic  of  the  Secretary's  answer.  I  will  take  the  history 
of  Jhat  bill,  as  it  is  given  by  the  honorable  member  from  Tennessee — 
that  it  was  a  bill  bought  by  the  Bank,  refused  payment  by  the  French 
Goyernment,  and,  upon  protest,  the  amount  was  paid  by  the  agent, 
for  the  honor  of  the  Bank,  to  the  foreign  holder;  that  the  money  was 
not  used  by  the  Treasury  here;  and  that  the  Bank  suffered  nothing 
but  a  few  expenses,  which  the  Secretary  is  willing  to  refund.  I  will 
agree  that  there  is  nothing  but  an  old  statute  of  Maryland  to  give 
damages  on  the  protest,  and  that  it  does  not  include  the  sovereign 
of  the  country.  I  cannot  argue^  the  case,  because  the  honorable 
member  assumes  all  the  law  and  all  the  facts,  and  the  Secretary's 
letter  gives  us  none.  I  must,  therefore,  agree  to  the  case  as  he  pre 
sents  it.  But  the  thing  which  passes  my  comprehension  is,  that  a 
mere  claim  by  the  Bank — a  claim  without  suit  or  other  act — a  claim 
which  it  is  the  privilege  of  the  lowest  and  poorest  to  make  upon  the 
highest  and  richest  in  the  land,  without  incurring  either  forfeiture  or 
damage — that  this  should  be  gravely  put  forth  as  a  brand  of  faithless 
ness  upon  the  Bank,  and  a  forfeiture  of  her  right  to  the  public  depo 
sites.  Sir,  there  must  be  a  strange  perversion  of  mind  in  myself,  or 
in  the  honorable  Secretary,  in  regard  to  this  conclusion.  It  would 
have  been  the  occasion  of  infinite  surprise  to  me,  if  the  faculty  of 
l>eing  surprised  had  not  been  recently  so  much  impaired  by  use,  that 
I  am  no  longer  conscious  of  its  existence. 

The  last  reason  of  the  Secretary  for  removing  the  deposites  ia, 
that  the  Bank  had  employed  her  means  with  the  view  of  obtaining 
political  power. 

I  beg  permission  of  the  House  to  say  a  word  concerning  the  hum 
ble  individual  who  has  the  honor  of  addressing  it.  Had  I  been  a 
director  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  during  the  years  in  which 
it  has  been  its  misfortune  not  to  have  received  the  approbation  of  the 
Secretary,  I  should  have  been  associated  with  men  who  are  an  orna- 


53 

ment  to  the  city  in  which  they  live,  and  an  honor  to  their  country — 
men,  who,  from  earliest  youth   to  their  present  mature  age,  have 
been  beloved,  respected,  and  honored  by  all  around  them,  and  who 
are  as  much  the  standard  of  all  the  virtues,  private,  social,  and  pa 
triotic,  as  the  coins  of  your  mint  are  the  standard  of  your  currency, 
and  without  any  of  the  base  alloy  which  you  mingle  in  your  coins 
to  make  them  fit  for  the  use  and  abuse  of  the  world.     If  I  had  been 
called  upon  to  act  with  such  men  as  these,  in  regard  to  measures  of 
any  kind,  and  had  differed  from  them  in  my  judgment,  I  should  have 
deemed  it  almost  an  act  of  treason  against  the  authority  of  superior 
intelligence,  or  of  arrogance,   exposing  myself  to   reprehension  or 
contempt.     I  should  have   followed  them  fearlessly  wherever  they 
led,  and  with  unshaken  confidence  that  they  could  not  lead  me  where 
either  wisdom  or  virtue  would  be  exposed  to  reproach.     But,  sir,  I 
had  not  this  honor.    I  was  not  a  director  of  the  Bank  in  1829,  nor  in 
1830,  nor  in   1831;  and,  though  chosen  a  director  in   1832,  I  left 
Philadelphia  in  January,  to  pass  my  winter  here,  and  met  the  Board 
but  once  after  my  return,  to  show  respect  to  the  Committee  of  In 
quiry  appointed  by  this  House.     Of  the  measures  now  to  be  adverted 
to  I  was  not   informed,  except  as  the  public  and  this  House  have 
been  informed.     I   can   speak  of  them,  therefore,  without  the  in 
fluence  arising  from  either  participation  or  privity.     As  to  my  pro 
fessional  relations  to  the  Bank,  I  am  proud  to  belong  to  a  profession 
which  has  many  distinguished  members  in  both  Houses  of  this  Con 
gress — a  profession  which  the  confidence  and  affection  of  this  people 
have  raised,  in   more  than  one  instance,  to  the  highest  office  in  their 
gift.      I   will  not    degrade    this   honorable  profession!      I    will    not 
degrade  my  own  rank  in  it,  however  humble,  by  condescending  to 
inquire  what  extent  of    compensation   would  induce   an   honorable 
man  to  sell  his  conscience,  and  his  principles,  as  slaves,  to  his  client! 
Sir,  the  great  accusation  against  the  Bank  is,  that  she  has  endeav 
ored  to  obtain  political  power,  and  interfered  with  the  election  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States.    Grant  the  design  of  the  Bank,  sir; 
and  what  then?     It  has  not  succeeded.     The  letter  of  the  Secretary 
is  an  argument  to  show  that  it  has  not  succeeded,  and  that  the  ques 
tion  of  re-charter  is  settled  against  the  Bank  by  the  voice  of  the  Peo 
ple  at  the  last  election.     The  election  of  the  President — the  appoint 
ment  of  the  Secretary — the  elections  for  this  House — were  all  com 
pleted  before  the  deposites  were  removed;  and  these  are  held  up  to 
show  that  the  design  imputed  to  the  Bank  has  failed  and  fallen  to  the 
ground.     Then  I  ask,  sir,  what  is  the  character  of  that  act  which  has 
removed  the  deposites?     Is   it  preventive,  or  is  it  vindictive?     It  is 
vindictive,  sir.     It  is  punishment  directed  against  the  Bank  for  an 
imputed  design  that  has  wholly  failed  in  its  execution,  and  the  victim 
of  the  infliction  is  not  the  Bank,  but  the  country.     If  it  is  a  matter 
of  grave  belief  that  the  purpose  of  the  Bank  was  that  which  is  im 
puted,  and  that  the  elections  have  given  out  the  answer  of  the  People 
to  it,  what  more  triumphant  refutation  can  be  adduced  of  the  reasons 
that  find  either  a  ground  of  apprehension,  or  a  motive  of  punish 
ment,  in  acts  which  have  thus  failed  of  effect?     If  the  premises  be- 


54 

long  to  the  case,  the  true  conclusion  is,  that  the  people  are  in  no 
danger  from  attempts  to  gain  political  power  by  the  devices  of  the 
Bank,  and  that  she  may  go  on  to  the  conclusion  of  her  charter,  per 
forming  her  constitutional  duties  to  the  country,  as  she  has  always 
done,  with  fidelity  and  success;  leaving  the  question  of  renewing  the 
charter  to  settle  the  extent  of  her  punishment. 

But,  sir,  I  deny  the  charge.  1  say  the  design  was  not  entertained, 
and  that  not  a  particle  of  evidence  has  been  produced  to  infer  the 
contrary.  The  Board  have  printed  and  published,  and  have  assisted 
in  printing  and  publishing,  "  for  the  purpose  of  communicating  to  the 
"  people  information  in  regard  to  the  nature  and  operations  of  the 
"  Bank,  and  to  remove  unfounded  prejudices,  or  repel  injurious  ca- 
"  lumnies  on  the  institution  intrusted  to  their  care."  This  is  the 
declared  purpose  of  all  they  have  done,  and  they  stand  upon  the 
sacred  principle  of  self-defence  in  asserting  their  right  to  do  it.  That 
there  was  nothing  in  the  veto  message  to  justify  the  circulation  of 
the  review  which  the  gentleman  from  Tennessee  has  noticed,  is  more 
than  I  admit;  and  when  the  gentleman  shall  assert,  upon  his  own 
authority,  that  the  Board  have  given  currency  to  a  scurrilous  pam 
phlet  against  any  one,  he  will  find  me  ready  either  to  den}'  the  fact, 
or  to  admit  its  impropriety.  The  constitution  secures  to  every  per 
son,  natural  and  political,  the  right  of  printing  and  publishing,  being 
responsible  for  the  abuse  of  it.  It  prohibits  Congress  from  passing 
any  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  the  press.  If  the  charter  had  in 
serted  a  provision  to  restrain  the  Board  of  Directors  from  printing  or 
publishing,  it  would  have  been  null  and  void.  An  interpretation  of 
the  charter  to  restrain  it  is  equally  so.  They  have  the  universal 
right,  subject  to  the  constitutional  corrective  through  the  judicial  tri 
bunals  of  the  country;  but  to  condemn,  and  then  to  try  them — to 
punish,  and  then  to  hear — belongs  not  to  the  tribunals  of  this  earth, 
nor  to  the  constitution  of  (bis  country. 

Sir,  the  change  of  the  deposites  is  an  extraordinary  mode  of  pre 
venting  their  application  to  the  purposes  of  political  power.  Before 
their  removal,  they  were  in  a  Bank  not  possessing  political  power, 
nor  capable  of  using  it.  They  are  now  wielded  by  those  who  possess 
it,  and  who  are  more  or  less  than  men  if  they  do  not  wish  to  keep  it. 
Then  they  were  in  one  Bank,  under  one  direction;  now  they  will 
be  in  fifty.  Then  they  were  in  a  Bank  which  political  power  could 
not  lay  open  to  its  inquiries  and  control;  now  they  are  in  Banks  that 
have  given  a  stipulation  for  submitting  all  their  acts  and  concerns  to 
review.  Then,  if  these  deposites  sustained  any  action  at  all,  it  was 
in  the  safest  form  for  the  People — action  against  power  in  office; 
now  its  action  is  in  support  of  that  power,  and  tends  to  the  augmen 
tation  of  what  is  already  great  enough. 

I  say,  in  conclusion  upon  this  point,  if  these  publications  are 
deemed  by  this  House  to  have  been  unlawful,  return  the  dcjwsites  till 
the  Bank  has  been  heard.  Go  to  the  scire  facias — give  to  the  Bank 
that  trial  by  jury  which  is  secured  by  its  charter,  and  is  the  birthright 
of  all.  Ask  the  unspotted  and  unsuspected  tribunals  of  the  country 
for  their  instruction.  Arraign  the  Bank  upon  the  ground  either  of 


55 

sedition,  or  grasping  at  political  power.  There  was  ample  time  for 
it,  and  still  is;  and  there  is  a  great  precedent  for  it,  which  I  commend 
to  the  consideration  of  this  House. 

Sir,  in  the  worst  days  of  one  of  the  worst  princes  of  England,  (I 
mean  Charles  the  2d,)  the  love  of  absolute  rule  induced  him  to 
make  an  attempt  upon  the  liberties  of  the  city  of  London,  whoso 
charter  he  desired  to  overthrow.  He  complained  that  the  Common 
Council  had  taxed  him  with  a  delay  of  justice,  and  had  possessed  the 
people  with  an  ill  opinion  of  him;  and,  by  means  of  his  ministers  of 
the  law,  and  by  infamously  packing  the  bench,  having  promoted  one 
judge,  who  was  not  satisfied  on  the  point,  and  turned  out  another 
who  was  not  clear,  he  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  judgment,  under  which 
the  liberties  of  that  ancient  city  were  seized  by  the  crown.  But, 
when  the  revolution  expelled  his  successor,  and  the  principles  of 
the  British  Constitution  came  in  with  the  House  of  Orange,  an 
early  statute  of  William  and  Mary  reversed  the  judgment  as  illegal 
and  arbitrary;  and  from  that  time  it  has  been  the  opprobium  of  the 
bench,  and  the  scorn  of  the  profession. 

The  account  of  it  which  is  given  by  Burnet,  is  thus: — "The 
"  court,  finding  that  the  city  of  London  could  not  be  wrought  on  to 
"  surrender  their  charter,  resolved  to  have  it  condemned  by  a  judg- 
"  ment  in  the  King's  Bench.  Jones  had  died  in  May;  so  now  Pollcxfen 
"  and  Treby  were  chiefly  relied  on  by  the  city  in  this  matter.  Sawyer 
"  was  the  Attorney  General,  a  dull,  hot  man,  and  forward  to  serve  all 
"  the  designs  of  the  court.  He  undertook,  by  the  advice  of  Sanders, 
"  a  learned,  but  very  immoral  man,  to  overthrow  the  charter.  The 
"  two  points  upon  which  they  rested  the  cause  were,  that  the  Com- 
"  mon  Council  had  petitioned  the  King  upon  a  prorogation  of  Par- 
"  liament,  that  it  might  meet  on  the  day  to  which  it  was  prorogued, 
"  and  had  taxed  the  prorogation  as  that  which  had  occasioned  a  delay 
"  of  justice:  this  was  construed  to  be  the  raising  of  sedition,  and 
"  the  possessing  the  people  with  an  ill  opinion  of  the  King." — 
"When  the  matter  was  brought  near  judgment,  Sanders,  who  had 
"  laid  the  whole  thing,  was  made  Chief  Justice;  Pembcrton,  who  was 
"  not  satisfied  on  the  point,  being  removed  to  the  Common  Pleas, 
"  on  North's  advancement.  Dolbin,  a  judge  of  the  King's  Bench,  was 
"  found  not  to  be  clear;  so  he  was  turned  out,  and  Wilkins  came  in 
"  his  room.  When  sentence  was  to  be  given,  Sanders  was  struck 
"  with  an  apoplexy,  upon  which  great  reflections  were  made;  but  he 
"  sent  his  judgment  in  writing,  and  died  a  few  days  after."  As  the 
only  precedent  which  the  books  present  to  us  of  forfeiture  of  char 
ter  for  sedition,  or  an  interference  with  political  power,  it  is  not  with 
out  instruction. 

Sir,  these  reasons  of  the  Secretary  being  one  and  all  insufficient 
to  justify  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  the  question  of  remedy  is  the 
only  one  that  remains.  The  state  of  the  country  requires  the  return; 
but  the  question  of  return  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  renewal  of  the 
charter.  If  renewal  were  the  object,  1  should  say,  do  not  put  them 
back,  leave  them  as  they  are;  make  no  provision  for  the  future,  and 
see,  at  the  end  of  two  years,  to  what  relief  the  people  will  fly.  But, 


56 

sir,  let  us  save  the  country  from  this  unnecessary  suffering.  Return 
them,  and  the  mists  will  clear  off  from  the  horizon,  and  the  face  of 
nature  smile  as  it  did  before.  Return  them,  and  make  some  provi 
sion  for  the  day  when  the  capital  of  this  Bank  is  to  be  withdrawn  from 
the  country,  if  it  is  to  be  withdrawn.  Provide  some  control,  some 
regulation  of  your  currency.  The  time  is  still  sufficient  for  it,  and 
the  country  requires  it.  If,  indeed,  this  Bank  is  not  to  be  continued, 
nor  another  to  be  supplied,  nor  a  control  devised  to  prevent  the  State 
Banks  from  shooting  out  of  their  orbits,  and  bringing  on  confusion 
and  ruin,  then,  I  confess  that  I  see  no  benefit  in  putting  off  the  evil 
for  two  years  longer.  The  storm  must  come,  in  which  every  one 
must  seize  such  plank  of  safety  as  he  may  out  of  the  common  wreck; 
and  it  is  not  the  part,  either  of  true  courage  or  of  provident  caution, 
to  wish  it  deferred  for  a  little  time  longer. 

Sir,  I  have  done.  I  have  now  closed  my  remarks  upon  the  ques 
tion  of  the  public  deposites,  second  in  importance  to  none  that  has 
occurred  in  the  course  of  the  present  administration,  whether  we  re 
gard  its  relations  to  the  public  faith,  to  the  currency,  or  to  the  equi 
poise  of  the  different  departments  of  our  Government.  It  is  with 
unfeigned  satisfaction  that  I  have  raised  my  feeble  voice  in  behalf  of 
the  amendment  offered  by  the  gentleman  from  South  Carolina,  whose 
enlightened  labors  in  this  great  cause,  through  a  course  of  years,  have 
inseparably  connected  his  name  with  those  principles  upon  which  the 
security,  the  value,  and  the  enjoyment  of  property  depend;  and  it 
will  be  sufficient  reward  for  me  if  1  shall  be  thought  not  to  have  im 
paired  the  effect  of  his  efforts,  nor  to  have  retarded  the  progress 
of  those  principles  to  their  ultimate  establishment.  For  myself,  I 
claim  the  advantage  of  saying,  that,  as  I  have  not  consciously  uttered 
a  sentiment  in  the  spirit  of  mere  party  politics,  so  I  trust  that  my 
answers  to  the  Secretary  will  not  be  encountered  in  that  spirit  If 
the  great  and  permanent  interests  of  the  country  should  be  above  the 
influence  of  party,  so  should  be  the  discussions  which  involve  them. 
It  ought  not  to  be,  it  cannot  be,  that  such  questions  shall  be  decided 
in  this  House  as  party  questions.  The  question  of  the  Bank  is  one 
of  public  faith;  that  of  the  currency  is  a  question  of  national  pros 
perity;  that  of  the  constitutional  control  of  the  Treasury  is  a  ques 
tion  of  national  existence.  It  is  impossible  that  such  momentous 
interests  shall  be  tried  and  determined  by  those  rules  and  standards 
which,  in  things  indifferent  in  themselves,  parties  usually  resort  to. 
They  concern  our  country  at  home  and  abroad,  now,  and  to  all  future 
time;  they  concern  the  cause  of  freedom  every  where;  and,  if  they 
shall  be  settled  under  the  influence  of  any  considerations  but  justice 
and  patriotism — sacred  justice  and  enlightened  patriotism — the  de 
jected  friends  of  freedom  dispersed  throughout  the  earth,  the  patriots 
of  this  land,  and  the  patriots  of  all  lands,  must  finally  surrender  their 
extinguished  hopes  to  the  bitter  conviction  that  the  SPIRIT  OF  PARTV 
is  a  more  deadly  foe  to  free  institutions  than  the  SPIRIT  OF  DES 
POTISM. 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  M'DUFFIE, 

ON    THE    SUBJECT   OF    THE 

REMOVAL      OF      THE     DEPOSITES. 


DECEMBER  19,  1833, 


THE  PUBLIC  DEPOSITES. 

The  amendment  proposed  by  Mr.  McDuFFiE 
to  the  proposition  of  Mr.  POLK,  to  refer  the  re 
port  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  the  Com 
mittee  of  Ways  and  Means,  being  under  con 
sideration,  Mr.  McDuFFiE  said — 

Mr.  SPEAKER — I  shall  now  proceed,  Sir,  to 
state  the  reasons  which  have  induced  me  to  sub- 
rait  the  resolution  just  read.  In  strict  justice,  I 
believe  that  it  is  due  to  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  that  the  public  money  taken  from  its 
vaults  should  be  restored;  but  as  this  would  now 
add  greatly  to  the  embarrassment  and  distress  of 
the  community,  I  have  confined  my  resolution 
to  the  revenue  hereafter  to  be  collected, leaving  it 
to  the  justice  of  Congress  to  indemnify  the  Bank 
for  any  loss  it  may  sustain  by  the  violation  of  its 
chartered  rights.  I  believe  that  we  are  under 
the  most  solemn  obligations  to  adopt  ihis  mea- 
aure — obligations  founded  in  the  highest  consi 
deration*  of  public  justice,  plighted  faith,  and  po 
litical  expediency. 

The  whole  public  treasure  of  the  United 
States  has  been  removed  from  the  depository  es 
tablished  by  law,  by  an  arbitrary  and  lawless 
exercise  of  Executive  power.  I  affirm  that  the 
act  has  been  done  by  the  President  of  the  Unit 
ed  States,  not  only  without  legal  authority,  but. 
I  might  almost  say,  in  contempt  of  the  authori 
ty  of  Congress. 

We  were  told  by  the  President,  in  his  annual 
message^-and  told  with  great  gravity — that  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had  deemed  it  expe 
dient  to  remove  the  deposites  from  the  Bank  of 
the  United  States,  and  that  he,  (the  President,) 
approving  of  the  reasons  of  the  Secretary,  ac 
quiesced  in  the  measure.  Now,  Sir,  I  do  not 
mean  t®  charge  the  President  of  the  United 
States  with  stating  to  Congress  what  is  not  the 
fact  according  to  his  view  of  the  subject, — but  I 
undertake  ito  assert  broadly,  that  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  did  not  remove  the  deposites, 
but  that  to  .all  legal  and  rational  intents  and 


purposes,  the  removal  was  made  by  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States,  against  the  opinion  and 
will  of  the  officer  to  whom  the  power  of  removal 
was  entrusted  by  law.  This,  then,  is  the  great 
legal  and  constitutional  question  which  we  are 
now  to  determine.  Who  is  it  that  has  removed 
the  public  treasure  from  the  depository  establish 
ed  by  law,  and  by  what  authority  has  the  act 
been  done? 

I  maintain  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States  is  the  author  of  this  whole  proceeding,and 
shall  proceed  to  show  1  hat,  notwithstanding  the 
devices  by  which  this  assumption  of  power  is 
covered  over  and  disguised,  he  has  *'  assumed 
the  responsibility,"  er  more  properly  speaking, 
usurped  the  power,  of  removing  the  deposites. 
I  presume  that,  on  this  point  at  least,  the  word 
of  the  President  will  be  regarded  by  all  parties 
as  conclusive  evidence  of  his  agency  in  the  bu 
siness.  Fortunately  the  author  and  the  reasons 
of  this  measnre  are  not  left  to  conjecture,  but 
are  openly  disclosed  to  the  world  in  a  printed 
manifesto;  and  from  what  has  occurred  in  the 
other  branch  of  the  legislature,  we  are  now  au» 
thorised  to  consider  that  manifesto  as  an  official 
document,  containing  the  reasons  on  which  the 
President  of  the  United  States— not  the  Secreta 
ry  of  the  Treasury— ordered  the  removal  of  the 
public  deposites.  Prom  that  document  I  pro 
pose  to  read  a  few  sentences,  which  are  perfectly 
co  iclusive  of  the  agency  of  the  President  in  thi» 
measure.  After  stating  the  various  reaaoe* 
which  rendered  it,  in  his  opinion,  expedient  to, 
remove  the  deposites,  the  President  proceed*  to. 
add,  '«  From  all  these  considerstions  the  frts4~ 
dent  thinks  that  the  State  banks  ought  to.  be  im 
mediately  employed  in  the  collection  and  dis 
bursement  of  the  public  revenue,  and  the  funds 
now  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  drawn  oat 
with  all  convenient  despatch."  Then»  towards 
the  conclusion  of  the  document,  he  says,  "Th* 
President  agaia,  repeats  that  he  begs  his  cabinet 
to  consider  thp  proposed  measure  as 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


rewme  of  Ynglande,  and  the  crown,   with  all 
the  membres,  and  the  appurtenances;  also  I  that 
m  descendit  by  right  line  of  the  blode,    com 
ing1  from  the   Gude  'King  Henry  therde,  and 
throge  that  right  that  God  of  his  grace  hath 
sent  me,  with  helpe  df  Kyn,  and  of  my  friende 
to  recover  itj  the  which  rewme  was  in  poynt  fc 
be  ondone  by  defaut  of  governance,  andondo}' 
ng  of  the  Glide  laws." 

Here,  sir,  is  the  title  of  Henry  the  IV.  to  th 
crown  of  England,  and  there  is  the  title  of  th 
President  to  the  power  L\  removing  the  deposites 
I  will  not  undertake  to  decide  which  is  the  mor 
perspicuous  document,  but  will  leave  it  to  be  de 
cided  by  those  who  have  more  skill  in  such  com 
sparisons  than  1  have. 

Nor  is  this  a  mere  matter  of  criticism.    I  am 
always  disposed  to  look  with  respect  even  upon 
unfounded   pretensions   to    power,    which    ar 
clearly  and  distinctly  set  forth.    But  I   confess 
that  my  alarm  is  greatly  increased,  when  powe 
is  usurped  under  such  glosses  and  disguises  as 
we  find  in  the  manifesto  oi  the 'President.     On 
reading  some  parts  of  this  document,  one  woulc 
suppose  that  no   man  in  the  world  coiild  have 
more  .deference  for  the  opinion  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  onwould  be  more  unwilling  to 
interfere  in  the  slightest  degree  with  the  discharge 
of  his  official  duties  than  the  President  himself. 
He  says  to  the  Secretary  in  substance,  this,  sir, 
-is  a  duty  which  the  law  has  assigned  to  you  ;  it 
is  your  business,  and  not  mine ;  I  have  a  great 
repugnance  to  the   exercise  of  doubtful  powers, 
and  etill  greater  to  interfering  with  you  ir?  the  ex 
ercise  of  a  power  expressly  conferred  upo.n  you 


by  the  law.  Yet  in  the  very  moment  of  making 
these  self  denying  declarations,  and  acknowledg 
ing  the  right  of  the  Secretary  to  decide  for  him- 
Belf  -without  the  least  constraint,  he  unceremo 
niously  dismisses  the  Secretary  from  office  be 
cause  he  will  not  sign  the  order  for  removing  the 
deposites,  .ajui  puts  into  his  place  a  man  who 
will.  He*e,  -im,  is  a  practical  interpretation 
the  President's  'understanding  of  the  right  of  a 
high  officer  to  the  free  exercise  of  big  judgment, 
in  the  performance  of  the  duties  specifically  a«- 
•igned  to  him  by  law.  I  never  have  read  or  heard 
of  any  thing  that  bore  any  resemblance  to  the 
tissue  of  incoherent  and  contradictory  declara 
tions,  contained  inthie  executive  manifesto,  ex- 
-the  instance  of  a  judicial  decision  made 


on  political  subjects,  and  it  was  strongly  argued 
at  the  bar  that  this  right  was  secured  by  the  Con 
stitution,  and  entitled  the  defendant  to  a  verdict. 
The  judge,  who  had  determined  to  decide  against 
the  defendant,  replied  to  this  argument  with  « 
most  gracious  and  complacent  air  :  "  O  yaw  I 
every  man  has  a  right,  by  de  law,  to  dink  for 
himself  in  dis  rebublican  country,  profided  he 
dinks  mid  de  cort"  And  in  like  manner,  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had  a  clear  right,  by 
the  law,  to  think  and  decide  for  himself,  provided 
he  would  only  be  so  pliable  as  to  think  with  the 
President.  But  not  being  possessed  of  that  con 
venient  pliability,  he  was  dismissed  from  office 
for  not  violating  his  conscience  and  betraying 
his  trust. 

Sir,  it  is  too  apparent  to  be  disguised  by  these 
bungling  devices,  that  the  President  of  the  Unitod 
States  is  the  .officer  by  whose  sole  and  despotic 
will  the  deposites  ha,ve  been  removed  from  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States.  He  alone  is  the  re 
sponsible  agent  in  f  his  transaction.  It  is  an  utter 
perversion  of  language  to  say  that  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  has  removed  the  deposites.  It 
s  absolutely  false;  (I  speak  in  a  legal  sense,)  he 
lad  no  more  agency,  moral  or  legal,  than  the 
ron  pen  by  which  the  order  of  removal  was 
written.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  remove 
he  deposites!  He  refused  to  remove  -them  !  and 
las  paid  the  penalty  of  his  honest  independence, 
>y  being  discarded  from  office. 

Is  this  to  be  gotten  over  and  evaded  by  pro- 
lucing  an  order  signed  by  the  present  Secretary 
)f  the  Treasury,  and  saying  "  here  is  proof  con- 
lusive  that  the  removal  of  the  deposites  is  &ot 
he  act  of  the  President."     Shall  we  close  <osur 
yes  to  the  true  origin  and  character  of  this  order  ? 
^Shall  we  not  look  back  beyond  it  to  the 
sta  nces  under  which  it  was  given,  and  _the,real 


by,  :a  Dutch  judge  in  some  of  the>  inferior  towns 
of  'New  York  —  Kinderhook,  perhaps  ;  of  which 
I  was  informed  by  a  traveller.  It  was  a  case  in- 
right  of  the  free  expression  of  opinion, 


which  it  was  produced. 

In  yvhat  manner,  and  for  what  purpose,  -wa« 
the  present  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  brought 
into  office  '  Sir,  he  came  into  office  through  a 
breach  in  t.be  Constitution;  and  his  very  appoint 
ment  was  th,e  means  of  violating  the  law  and  the 
public  faith.  He  was  brought  into  his  present 
station  to  be  t*He  instrument  of  Executive  usur- 
nation.  And  yi*t,  Sir,  because  his  name  is  aU 
ached  tp  the  ord  er,  we  are  gravely  told  that  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  removed  tb,e  crepe* 
ites!  It  is  #n  insult  to  the  common.  sense  o£tb# 
nation  to  say  so,  T^is  officer  was  ia&$e  to  <Jb> 
fcby  the  President,  wbo  had  no  mor©  right  to  re- 
nove  the  public  treasure  than  I  have 
Sir,,  shay  we  be  told  that  the  President,  from 


SPEECH  OP  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


the  bare  fact  of  his  appointing  men  to  office,  has 
a  right  to  assume  to  himself  all  the  powers  con 
ferred  upon  them  by  law?  He  appoints  the  Federal 
judges.  Let  us  suppose  that  these  judges  hold  their 
offices  bythe  tenure  of  Executive  pleasurejand  that 
when  some  State  prisoner  should  be  under  trial, 
the  President  should  say  to  the  presidingjudge  — 
the  chief  justice  for  example  —  "  condemn  that 
man,"  or  as  the  tyrant  Richard  said,  "  I  wish  the 
bastards  dead."  If  the  chief  justice  should  re 
fuse  to  obey  this  Executive  order,  and  claim  the 
right  of  judging  for  himself,  would  the  President 
be  authorized  to  dismiss  him  from  office?  Would 
he  have  a  right  to  tear  off  the  ermine  from  his 
shoulders,  and  place  it  upon  a  mere  instrument 
who  would  do  the  deed  of  blood?  Why  not, 
Sir?  It  would  be  perfectly  justifiable,  accord 
ing  to  the  logic  by  which  the  prcseut  usurpation 
is  attempted  to  be  justified. 

I  will  now  proceed,  Sir,  supposing  the  depo- 
sites  to  have  been  removed  by  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  to  examine  the  reasons  he  has 
submitted  to  Congress  in  justification  of  the  act. 
And  in  the  first  place,  without  stopping  to  weigh 
the  reasons  assigned,  I  affirm  that  however  true 
in  point  of  fact,  they  are  not  in  the  slightest  de 
gree  applicable  to  the  question  of  removing  the 
deposites.  They  no  more  touch  that  question 
than  if  they  related  exclusively  to  the  religious 
opinions  of  the  bank  directors.  I  allude  to  the 
governing  reasons,  not  to  those  that  are  thrown 
in  as  mere  make-weights  and  after-thoughts. 
The  fact  that  the  power  of  removing  the  depo 
sites  is  given  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
and  not  to  the  President,  evinces  that  it  was  the 
intention  of  Congress  that  the  removal  should  be 
made  only  for  reasons  connected  with  the  safety 
of  the  public  treasury,  or  the  facility  of  the  finan 
cial  operations  of  the  Government.  Since  the 
power  is  thus  vested  in  the  officer  charged  with 
the  administration  of  the  finances,  it  would  be 
obviously  transcending  his  power  to  exercise  it 
for  reasons  in  no  way  connected  with  the  opera 
tions  of  his  Department.  If  it  were  shown  that 
the  bank  is  not  a  safe  depository  of  the  public 
treasure,  that  would  be  a  conclusive  reason 
for  removing  them.  If  the  bank  had  failed  to 
comply  with  the  stipulations  of  the  charter,  in 
transmitting  the  public  moneys  from  one  point 
of  the  Union  to  another,  when  required  by  the 
Government  to  do  so,  that  would  be  a  satisfac 
tory  reason.  In  fact,  any  failure  on  the  part  of 


the  bank  to  comply  with  its  engagements  to  the 


weight.  Indeed,  if  it  could  be  shown  that  the 
Treasury  could  make  an  arrangement  with  the 
State  banks  more  favorable  to  the  Government, 
than  that  subsisting  with  the  bank,  even  that 
might  be  an  adequate  reason  if  the  bank  would 
not  serve  the  Government  on  the  same  terms. 
But  how  stands  the  fact?  Are  the  deposites  al- 
ledged  to  be  unsafe  in  the  bank?  Why,  Sir,  it 
is  now  admitted  by  all  parties,  even  by  the  gen 
tleman  from  New  York,  (Mr.  CAMBHELENG,) 
who  prophesied  so  dismally  of  coming  disasters 
at  the  session  before  the  last — and  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  himself — that  the  deposites  were 
perfectly  safe  in  that  institution.  Nat  only  so; 
but  it  seems  that  from  having  been  an  insolvent 
concern,  and  an  unsafe  depository  of  the  public 
funds,  as  the  Government  strenuously  endeavor 
ed  to  show  at  the  last  session — the  bank  now 
has  too  much  specie  in  its  vaults!  Yes,  Sir,  the 
charge  now  is,  that  this  horrible  monster  is  se 
unreasonably  voracious  of  specie,  as  to  have  ac 
cumulated  more  than  ten  millions  in  its  vaults. 
It  is,  then,  a  safe  depository.  Has  i(  failed  in 
any  of  its  engagements  with  the  Government? 
Has  it  refused  to  transmit  the  public  moneys, 
wherever  required  for  disbursement,  promptly 
and  without  charge?  Sir,  I  speak  considerately 
when  I  say  that  there  is  not  a  Government  on 
the  face  of  the  earth,  be  the  sphere  of  its  opera 
tions  large  or  small,  which  has  been  so  well 
served  in  its  financial  operations,as  this  Govern 
ment  has  been  by  the  bank.  Look,  Sir,  at  the 
astonishing  fact  that  in  the  collection  and  dis 
bursement  of  our  immens*  revenue  for  seven 
teen  years,  amounting  to  four  hundred  and  forty 
million  of  dollars,  not  a  dollar — no  Sir,  not  a  single 
dollar,  has  been  lost  in  the  operations  of  collect- 
ng  and  disbursing!  Nor  is  this  all.  No  credi 
tor  of  the  Government  has  had  to  wait  one  mo 
ment  for  his  dues  so  far  as  the  bank  has  been 
concerned  j  and  moreover,  when  he  received  his 
money,  it  was  MONET.  God  grant  that  I  may  be 
able  to  say  so  two  years  hence.  Thus,  Sir,  as  it 
regards  the  operations  of  the  bank,  we  are  "in 
the  full  tide  of  successful  experiment."  Our 
currency  from  unsoundness  and  derangement, 
las  attained  a  degree  of  purity  and  uniformity 
unequalled  by  that  of  any  country  in  the  known 
world  of  the  same  geapraphical  extent.  We 
lave  had  to  pay  a  mere  nominal  exchange  on 
he  most  distant  commercial  operations,  and  \be 
iscal  operations  of  the  Governmnnt  have  been 
carried  on  without  any  expense  at  all.  Thus, 


Government,  would  be  a  reasnn 


i  Sir,  with  a  solvent  bank— the  most  solvent  I 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


might  say  in  the  world — a  safe  depository  lor 
the  revenue,  and  a  perfectly  sound  and  uniform 
currency — in  a  word,  while  in  the  enjoyment  ol 
all  that  the  heart  could  desire  in  these  respects, 
what  do  we  now  witness?  After  two  years  of 
unremitting  and  unexampled  persecution  of  the 
bank  by  the  Executive  Government;  after  an  un 
successful  attempt  to  destroy  its  credit  by  all 
manner  of  calumnies  which  have  recoiled  upon 
their  authors;  notwithstanding  the  bank  has  ful 
filled  to  the  very  letter  every  stipulation  con 
tained  in  its  charter;  yet  have  the  public  funds  of 
the  country,  been  arbitrarily  removed  from  this 
safe  depository  where  the  law  had  placed  them 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  without  a 
shadow  of  legal  power,  and  that,  Sir,  for  no  le 
gal  offence,  but  for  OPINION'S  SAKE.  Yes,  Sir, 
in  this  land  of  liberty,  where  all  men  were  be 
lieved  to  enjoy  the  most  perfect  and  unrestricted 
freedom  of  opinion,  and  the  right  too  to  the  un 
restrained  exercise  of  all  the  influence  they  may 
choose  to  exert  in  political  affairs;  a  great  insti 
tution  has  been  assailed,  its  stockholders  and  of 
ficers  distranchised,  and  the  property  of  widows 
and  orphans  trampled  in  the  dust  by  the  foot  of 
a  tyrant;  and  all  this  for  no  other  crime  than 
the  free  exercise  of  political  opinion,  and  if  you 
please,  the  free  exertion  of  political  influence. 
Pray,  Sir,  what  right  has  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  say  that  the  stockholders  of  the 
bank  or  its  officers,  shall  not  interfere  in  his 
election?  I  believe  that  no  portion  of  our  fellow 
citizens  have  so  studiously  abstained  from  med 
dling  with  party  politics  as  the  officers  of  the 
bank.  But  supposing  they  had  taken  ever  so 
active  a  part  even  in  his  election,  has  he  any  right 
to  forbid  it?  Because  a  citizen  has  placed  his 
capital  in  a  bank,  is  he,  therefore,  disfranchised? 
Shall  he  not  dare  to  open  his  mouth  in  opposi 
tion  to  the  election  of  the  President,  without  in 
curring  the  guilt  and  the  penalty  of  violated  ma- 
jestyl  Are  we  already  in  the  reign  of  Tiberius? 
Even  in  his  time,  this  would  scarcely  have 
amounted  to  that  high  crime  against  majesty . 
Thisjreason  so  gravely  urged  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  following  the  lead  of  the  Presi 
dent,  so  far  from  having  any  weight  with  the 
House,  is  of  a  nature  to  produce  the  strongest 
indignation.  What  is  the  plain  English  of  it? 
What  does  the  President  mean  when  he  says 
that  the  bank  must  not  interfere  in  his  election, 
or  attempt  to  acquire  political  power?  Sir,  1 
will  tell  you  what  he  means .  Does  any  man 
suppose  that  if  the  bank  had  consented  to  be  an 
ecutive  partisan, and  do  whatever  the  adminis 


tration  ordered;  if  it  had  put  out  Jonathan  and 
put  in  John  when  commanded  to  do  so — that  we 
should  have  heard  any  objections  to  its  exercise 
of  political  power?  The  President's  meaning 
is  perfectly  plain.  When  he  says  the  bank 
agents  must  not  interfere  in  elections,  he  means 
that  they  must  not  oppese  his  election,  but  be 
come  the  mere  creatures  and  tools  of  the  admin 
istration. 

This,  Sir,  was  the  attempt  made  at  an  early 
period  of  this  administration;  I  do  not  say  by 
the  President,  or  by  any  person  then  in  the 
Cabinet,  but  by  those  who  were  very  near 
the  throne.  The  effort  was  to  induce  the  bank 
to  discard  the  president  of  one  of  its  branches 
who  was  confes  sedly  competent  to  the  discharge 
of  all  the  duties  of  his  station,  on  the  ground  of 
his  political  opinions.  The  bank  resisted  this 
attempt  as  it  ought  to  have  done,  and  a  vindic 
tive  war  has  been  urged  against  it  ever  since. 
So  far  as  the  present  board  is  concerned,  (and  I 
believe  those  of  most  of  the  branches,)  its  mem 
bers  have  carefully  abstained  from  mingling,  as 
partisans,  in  the  political  contentions  of  the  coun 
try,  because  it  was  their  interest  to  do  so.  They 
even  made  the  attempt — a  desperate  one  to  be 
sure — to  conciliate  this  administration,  by  scru 
pulously  performing  all  their  engagements  with 
the  Government,  and  eVen  going  beyond  them 
But  it  was  not  to  be  conciliated  by  such  means. 
The  plans  and  purposes  of  certain  individuals 
near  the  President,  had  been  thwarted,  and  the 
feelings  of  the  President  have  been  so  artfully 
wrought  upon,  that  the  destruction  of  the  bank 
has  become  his  ruling  passion,  and  he  seems 
now  to  believe  that  there  is  no  nuisance  in  the 
world  that  so  much  requires  to  be  exterminated 
as  the  Bank  of  the  United  States . 

If  I  were  to  decide  upon  principle, what  should 
be  the  course  of  a  National  Bank,  in  regard  to 
the  politics  of  the  country,  I  should  say  that  it  is 
desirable  that  the  present,  and  all  future  banks 
of  a  similar  kind,  should  be  habitually  opposed 
to  the  Executive  Government.  It  would  be  aa 
admirable  balance  in  our  sy»l»m,  and  would 
tend  to  check  the  fearful  tendency  to  Executive 
encroachment.  We  have  nothing  to  fear  from 
that  operation.  The  real  danger  lies  in  an  op 
posite  direction.  It  is  that  the  President  should 
convert  the  bank  into  a  mere  instrument  of  feis 
will,  and  should  wield  its  power,  which  has 
been  represented  as  so  tremendous,  in  addition 
to  the  still  more  tremendous  power  which  h« 
derives  from  the  patronage  of  such  a  Govern 
ment,  and  that  overwhelming  tide  of  popularity 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


which  will  generally  follows  the  man  who  distri 
butes  that  patronage. 

But,  Sir,  the  President  seems  to  be  fully 
aware  of  the  danger  arising  from  this  meretri 
cious  connexion  between  the  banking  and  the 
Executive  power  of  the  country.  In  the  mani 
festo  he  very  properly  and  wisely  expresses  him 
self  thus:  "  It  is  the  desire  of  the  President  that 
the  control  of  the  bank  and  the  currency  shall, 
as  far  as  possible,  be  entirely  separated  from  the 
political  power  of  the  country."  Never  was 
there  a  more  wise  and  patriotic  sentiment,  and 
the  man  who  should  act  up  to  it  would  be  richly 
entitled  to  be  President  of  the  United  States. 
There,  Sir,  is  the  precept.  Now  for  the  prac 
tice.  The  President,  it  seems,  is  anxiously  de 
sirous  that  the  control  of  the  banks  should  be 
separated,  as  far  as  possible,  from  the  political 
power  of  the  country.  And  what  has  he  done? 
He  has,  in  effect,  said  that  because  the  official 
agents  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  have 
dared  to  opposo  his  election,  the  faith  of  the  na 
tion  shall  not  for  a  moment  stand  as  an  impedi 
ment  in  the  way  of  their  condign  punishment. 
And  what  more  has  he  done?  He  has  not  only 
punished  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  for  opi- 
nion'd  sake,  by  removing  the  deposites,  but  he 
has  set  up  the  public  treasure  in  the  political  mar 
ket  to  the  highest  bidder/  Yes,  Sir,  I  sincerely 
believe  that  the  President  of  the  United  States 
is  doing  that  which,  if  not  speedily  arrested,  will 
create  a  system  of  Executive  control,  and  bank 
dependence,  that  will  subvert  the  liberties  of  the 
country.  By  way  of  separating  the  bank  and 
currency  from  the  political  power  of  the  country, 
and  avoiding  the  corruption  which  such  a  con 
nexion  must  engender,  we  are  to  give  to  the 
President  or  his  pliant  instrument,  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  (and  after  what  has  occurred 
he  will  never  want  such  an  instrument,)  some 
twenty  millions  of  public  money  to  be  distribut 
ed  among  the  various  local  banks  throughout  the 
country  according  to  the  complexion  of  their  po 
litical  opinions.  Sir,  the  danger  of  such  a  sys 
tem  admits  of  no  exaggeration;  and  I  speak  not 
the  language  of  exaggeration,  when  I  say  that, 
as  God  is  my  judge,  I  would  rather  trust  even 
Gen.  Jackson  wih  50,000  mercenary  soldier*,  with 
the  military  bill  of  the  last  session  asking  authori 
ty  for  using  them,  than  to  give  him  permanently 
this  power  of  purchasing  up  the  local  banks,  and 
through  them  controlling  the  whole  community. 
Sir,  we  might  resist  the  mercenaries,  but  it 
would  be  utterly  impossible  to  resist  such  an  in 
sidious  all-pervading  power  as  this.  With  twen 


ty  millions  of  public  money,  the  President  could 
get  absolute  control  over  some  forty  or  fifty  local 
banks  judiciously  selected  with  a  view,  not  to 
the  separation  of  the  political  and  banking  pow 
er — no,  Sir,  but  with  a  view  to  a  result  precisely 
opposite.  Every  man  in  the  least  acquainted 
with  the  principles  of  human  nature,  must  know 
that  the  banks  selected  would  be,  or  would  be 
come,  so  many  political  partisans  of  those  in 
power.  Sir,  we  have  some  light  thrown  upon 
this  subject  by  our  experience  already.  It  ia 
scarcely  two  months  since  certain  banks  were 
selected  to  receive  the  deposites  unlawfully  re 
moved  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and 
already  have  we  seen  two  of  their  officers  in 
the  political  arena. 

A  president  of  one  of  these  banks  in  Baltimore 
is  before  the  public,  in  the  newspapers,  vindi 
cating,  as  in  duty  bound,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury ;  and  I  understand  another  has  pursued 
a  similar  course  somewhere  in  Virginia.  But  we 
are  assured  by  the  President  that  the  moment 
the  officers  of  a  deposite  bank  interfere  with 
politics,  the  depesites  must  be  removed ;  yet 
have  heard  nothing  yet  of  any  such  movement 
against  these  banks.  But  I  have  no  doubt  that 
if  they  had  dared  to  say  a  word  against  the  Pre 
sident,  they  would  before  this  time  have  received 
such  a  hint  as  was  given  to  the  late  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury. 

Sir,  I  should  be  much  more  disposed  to  rely 
on  the  declaration  of  the  President  concerning 
his  anxious  desire  to  separate  the  banking  and 
executive  power,  were  it  not  for  the  experience 
we  have  already  had  of  the  woful  discrepancy  be 
tween  his  profession  and  his  practice.  I  do  not 
attribute  this  to  any  wilful  duplicity  in  the  Pr»>- 
sident.  I  believe  when  he  makes  professions  he 
feels,  for  the  moment,  as  he  speaks.  But  I  concur 
in  the  opinion  expressed  of  the  President,  by  a 
gentleman  who  lately  held  a  distinguished  place 
in  his  cabinet.  I  believe  with  him  that  the  Presi 
dent  "  has  no  fixed  principles ;  that  he  does  not 
arrive  at  conclusions  by  the  exercise  of  reason,' 
but  that  "impulses  and  passions  have  nded." 

What  has  been  the  difference*  then,  between 
the  professions  and  the  practices  of  the  Presi 
dent  ?  I  have  heard  a  great  deal  about  the  prin 
ciples  (I  beg  pardon  for  using  a  werd  which  I 
believe  is  nearly  out  of  the  fashion)  upon  which 
General  Jackson  came  into  power.  And  I  have 
a  right,  sir,  to  speak  of  these,  with  some  au 
thority,  for  I  stood  then  in  the  midst,  yes,  sir, 
in  the  very  brunt  of  the  then  unequal  contest, 
waged  against  "principalities  and  powers,"  when 


SPEECH  OP  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


the  miserable  sycophants— yes,  sir,  the  misera-' 
ble  reptiles,  who  have  literally  crawled  in  their 
Own  slime  to  the  footstool  of  executive  favor, 
stood  then  on  the  side  of  those  who  still  held  pa 
tronage  and  power.  What,  then,  were  the  prin- 
<Jir-.es  upon  which  the  present  chief  magistrate 
came  into  power  ?  Why,  sir,  we  had  taken  up 
the  notion  that  the  officers  of  the  federal  govern 
ment  had  become  a  little  too  pragmatical  in  in 
terfering  with  the  political  contests  of  the  coun 
try,  and  that,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  they  ought 
to  be  restrained  from  using  the  influence  of  their 
offices  in  this  way.  And,  accordingly,  the  Presi 
dent,  in  his  inaugural  address,  told  the  country 
that  one  of  the  crying  sins  of  his  predecessors 
had  been,  that  they  had  permitted  office  holders 
to  interfere  with  popular  elections. 

Now,  I  put  it  to  all  men  who  have  eyes  and 
e*rs  to  see  and  hear  what  has  passed,  and  is 
passing,  whether  there  ever  was  a  period  since 
the  formation  of  the  government,  when  all  the 
officers  of  the  executive  government,  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest,  approached  so  nearly  to 
the  likeness  of  an  army  of  trained  mercenaries, 
moving  at  the  nod  of  their  leader.  Why,  sir,  no 
man  can  now  breathe  the  air  that  surrounds  the 
palace,  who  does  not  think  precisely  as  the  Presi 
dent  thinks,  and  who  will  not  consent  to  be 
docked  or  stretched  until  he  fits  the  bed  of  Pro- 
craetes,  and  his  political  opinions  are  brought  to 
the  true  executive  dimensions.  Upon  this  prin 
ciple  officers  have  been  discarded,  and  offices 
filled ;  and  this  is  the  promised  REFORM  !  Yes, 
sir,  this  process  of  turning  out  officers  who  are 
opposed  to  the  administration,  and  putting  in  its 


I  appeal  to  every  man  who  has  any  knowledge 
of  the  events  which  are  passing,  whether,  if  we 
decide  that  the  local  banks  shall  be  the  deposito 
ries  of  the  public  revenue,  it  will  not  become  a 
matter  of  political  bargaining  between  the  ex 
ecutive  and  those  banks.  All  of  us  know  what 
is  now  going  on.  Indeed,  I  fear  the  time  will 
never  come  when  the  election  of  a  President  will 
not  be  the  all-engrossing  and  paramount  object 
of  the  leading  and  active  politicians  of  the 
country.  Do  we  not  all  know  that  the  great 
question  now  at  the  bottom  of  all  others  is,  who 
shall  fill  the  throne  when  the  present  incumbent 
shall  descend  from  it  ?  It  is  a  contest  for  the 
succession,  and  the  administration  party  is  now 
notoriously  organized,  as  completely  as  a  party 
ever  was  organized,  to  insure  the  election  of  the 
"heir  apparent."  Under  this  view  of  the  sub 
ject,  I  cannot  but  advert  to  one  of  the  reasons 
assigned  for  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  viz  . 
the  approaching  expiration  of  the  Bank  charter. 
Now,  if  I  am  capable  of  reasoning  at  all,  this  is 
one  of  the  very  strongest  reasons  why  the  Pre 
sident  should  have  abstained  from  depriving  the 
bank  of  its  chartered  rights,  by  an  arbitrary  ex 
ercise  of  power.  In  little  more  than  two  years, 
by  the  limitation  of  its  charter,  the  Bank  will 
cease  to  have  any  influence  or  power.  The 
principal  and  controlling  objections  urged  by 
the  President  against  the  bank,  are  completely 
answered  by  this  fact.  If,  as  we  are  told,  it  is 
a  dangerous  institution,  and  calculated  to  subvert 
the  liberties  of  the  country,  can  any  one  suppose 
that  it  will  do  this  in  two  years?  What,  then,  is 
it  that,  the  bank  could  accomplish  in  this  short 


partizans,  has  proceeded  so  far,   that  the  very  I  period,  which  has  produced  such  apprehensions  ? 


word  reform  has  become  synonymous  with  tuin- 
ing  out  an  officer  and  putting  in  a  partizan. 

The  rule  seems  to  be,to  turn  out  all  who  have 
no  other  merit  than  qualification  for  the  office, 
and  put  in  those  who  will  most  obsequiously 
adopt  the  opinions,  and  bow  to  the  will  of  the 
President,  or  of  those  who  control  him.  Sir,  it 
is  notorious,  it  is  known  to  the  whole  world,  that 
the  places  of  those  who  have  been  removed  from 
ofnce,  have  been  habitually  filled  by  noisy  and 
open-mouthed  partizans  of  the  administration, 
and  very  frequently  by  men  who  have  no  other 
went.  When,  therefore,  the  President  tells  us 
that  he  is  anxious  to  separate  the  control  of  the 
banks  from  the  political  power  of  the  country, 
1  must  understand  him  to  mean  that  he  is  anxious 
that  the  control  of  the  banks  shall  be  in  the  hands 
ot'those  who  will  not  dare  to  oppose  his  adminis 
tration . 


I  will  tell  you,  sir  ;  it  may  exert  an  influence  in 
the  nlection  of  the  next  President,  unfavorable  to 
the  executive  favorite.  Hence;  sir,  the  impor 
tance  of  selecting  new  depositories  of  the  public 
revenue,  and  of  organizing  a  system  of  political 
banking.  And  I  will  venture  to  predict,  that  in 
two  years  from  this  time,  if  we  do  not  arrest  the 
proceeding,  there  will  be  a  perfect  organization 
of  the  deposite  banks  from  Maine  to  Louisiana, 
ind  the  political  and  monied  power  of  the  coun 
try  will  be  concentrated  in  the  same  place,  and 
in  the  same  hands.  All  these  banks  (the  result 
is  inevitable)  will  be  actuated  by  the  same  po 
litical  spirit,  governed  by  the  same  influence  and 
wielded  by  ene  man.  Not  only  the  twenty  mil 
lions  of  public  revenue,  but  a  hundred  millions  of 
bank  capital  will  be  thus  wielded  for  political 
purposes,  to  the  corruption  of  the  public  morals, 
and  the  subversion  of  the  public  liberty. 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


In  every  respect  the  President  has  selected  the 
most  unfortunate  period  for  this  most  pernicious 
interference  with  the  banking  operations  and 
credit  of  the  country.  We  are  told,  however, 
that  the  measure  was  adopted  to  enahle  the  Se 
cretary  of  the  Treasury,  by  timely  arrangements 
with  the  State  banks,  to  prepare  a  substitute  for 
the  bills  of  the  United  States  Bank,  and  to  pre 
vent  the  derangement,  which  would  otherwise 
take  place  in  the  currency,  at  the  expiration  of 
its  charter.  Now,  it  is  obvious  that  the  removal 
of  the  deposites  at  this  time  will  not  at  all  de 
crease  the  embarrassment  which  must  take  place 
when  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  calls  in  its 
debts  and  winds  up  its  concerns.  The  directors 
of  the  bank  understand  their  duty  and  interest 
well  enough  to  know,  that  the  government  de 
posites  would  be  a  part  of  the  debt  of  the  insti 
tution,  for  which  they  would  make  the  same  pro. 
vision  as  for  their  other  debts.  The  effect,  there 
fore,  of  the  removal  now,  was  to  produce  all  the 
present  pecuniary  distress  gratuitously,  and  in 
addition  to  that  which  must  take  place  at  the  ex 
piration  of  the  bank  charter. 

Nor  is  there  any  just  foundation  for  the  belief 
that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  can  provide 
any  substitute  for  the  bills  of  the  United  States 
Bank,  that  will  have  a  general  circulation  and 
credit  throughout  the  union.  "While  that  bank 
exists,  as  a  check  upon  the  excessive  issues  of 
the  local  banks,  their  paper  will  be  good  in  their 
respective  spheres  of  circulation.  To  give  them 
a  credit  and  circulation  beyond  this  is  what  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  never  can  accom 
plish.  It  is  certain  that  the  arrangements  which 
he  has  made  with  the  new  deposite  banks  effect 
no  such  object.  Have  these  banks  stipulated 
reciprocally,  to  receive  the  bills  of  each  other  all 
over  the  Union,  in  payment  of  the  government 
dues  ?  No  such  promise  is  made,  sir.  On  the 
contrary  they  stipulate  to  receive  in  deposite  from 
the  government  only  such  bills  of  the  banks  in 
their  vicinity  as  are  in  good  credit,  and  usually 
received  by  them  in  the  transactions  of  com 
merce. 

Would  a  note  of  the  deposite  bank  at  Norfolk 
be  received  from  the  government  debtors  in 
Charleston  ?  Why,  sir,  if  you  were  to  go  with  a 
note  of  the  Metropolis  Bank  to  Richmond,  you 
could  not  make  it  available,  at  par,  to  pay  a  debt 
to  the  government 

Such  are  the  evils  to  which  the  community  is 
already  exposed,  and  if  the  Bankof  the  United 
States  were  destroyed,  we  should  soon  have  all 
the  blessings  of  a  depreciated  currency,  broken 


banks  and  a  rate  of  exchange  averaging  from 
five  to  ten  per  cent,  operating  as  a  tax  to  that 
extent  upon  all  the  distant  operations  of  com 
merce,  for  the  benefit  of  money  changers.  Nei 
ther  is  it  true,  sir,  that  the  removal  of  the  de 
posites  to  the  local  banks  has  strengthened  their 
credit,  and  enabled  them  to  make  a  correspond 
ing  enlargement  of  their  accommodations  to  the 
community.  Indeed,  it  may  be  well  doubted, 
whether  the  credit  even  of  the  deposite  banks 
has  not  been  impaired  by  this  proceeding.  There 
is  a  rumor  that  one  of  the  deposite  banks  has  re 
quested  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  restore 
the  deposites  to  the  United  States  Bank.  I  will 
not  vouch  for  the  fact,  but  it  so  well  corresponds 
with  what  I  believe  to  be  the  true  interest  of  the 
deposite  banks,  that  I  am  the  more  inclined  to 
give  it  credit.  I  am  well  assured,  that  for  the 
last  ten  years  there  has  been  nothing  like  the 
present  pecuniary  embarrassment ;  and  if  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States  were  to  do  what  it  has 
a  right  to  do,  and  what,  I  believe,  prudence  re 
quires  it  to  do — curtail  its  discounts  in  propor 
tion  to  the  amount  of  the  deposites  removed  from 
it,  it  is  impossible  to  estimate  the  extent  of  the 
pressure  upon  the  State  banks,  or  to  foresee  the 
consequences. 

While  on  this  branch  of  the  subject,  I  will  no 
tice  another  of  the  arguments  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury.  He  says,  in  the  profoundness 
of  his  financial  knowledge,  that  one  object  he  had 
in  view  in  removing  the  deposites  at  this  t>me, 
was  to  save  the  community  from  the  injurious 
effects  which  would  otherwise  result  from  the 
depreciation  of  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States,  at  the  expiration  of  its  charter ! 
Now,  Sir,  can  any  thing  surpass  the  extrava 
gance  of  this  notion,  and  is  it  not  amazing  that 
such  wretched  absurdities  should  be  gravely  pre 
sented  to  Congress  ?  Here,  Sir,  is  a  bank  not 
only  solvent  by  the  admission  of  the  Secretary, 
but  having  in  its  vaults  ten  millions  of  specie, 
and  a  capacity  of  realizing  in  sixty  days  a  suffi 
cient  fund  to  redeem  its  whole  circulation  ;  and 
yet  we  are  told  that  as  the  day  approaches  when 
these  notes  will  be  certainly  redeemed  by  specie 
if  demanded,  they  will  depreciate  in  value,  to  the 
great  loss  of  the  holders?  Why,  Sir,  a  common 
farmer  would  ridicule  the  nonsense  of  the  man 
who  should  tell  him  that  a  note  held  by  him  ort 
his  wealthy  neighbor,  and  which  wfluld  be  cer 
tainly  paid  when  due,  would  become  less  valua 
ble  at  the  moment  of  its  payment,  than  it  was 
when  it  had  two  years  to  run. 

Who,  Sir,  can  really  believe  that  the  notes  of 


10 


SPEECH  OP  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


the  bank  will  depreciate  to  the  extent  of  one 
fourth  of  one  per  cent?  And  yet,  this  miserable 
pretext  is  thrown  in  to  palliate  this  pernicious  and 
ruinous  measure,  which  must  greatly  depreciate 
the  value  of  every  species  of  property  throughout 
the  country. 

I  will  now  proceed  to  consider  the  only  sub 
stantial  ground  assigned  by  the  Secretary  for 
the  removal  of  the  deposites.  It  is  a  ground 
which,  if  it  were  true  in  point  of  fact,  would  be 
entitled  to  the  consideration  of  the  House.  It  is 
alledged  that  the  unusual  and  unnecessary  cur 
tailment  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  from 
the  1st  of  August  till  the  1st  of  October,  had 
produced  such  extensive  embarrassment  in  the 
commercial  community,  as  to  render  it  absolutely 
necessary  for  him  to  act  so  promptly  in  the  bu 
siness,  that  he  could  not  even  wait  until  Con 
gress  should  again  be  in  session.  If  this  were 
true — if  it  can  be  shewn  that  the  bank  has  pur 
sued  an  unusual  and  unjustifiable  course  in  cur 
tailing  its  discounts  to  oppress  the  community, 
this  would  certainly  be  a  reason  of  considerable 
weight,  justifying  the  course  pursued  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

But  what  are  the  facts?  We  are  told  that 
from  the  first  of  August,  to  the  1st  of  October,  the 
bank  reduced  its  loans  to  the  enormous  amount 
of  between  six  and  seven  millions  of  dollars, 
whereas,  in  truth,  the  bank  in  that  period,  reduc 
ed  its  discounts  only  one  million  ten  thousand 
dollars!  I  repeat,  Sir,  that  the  discounts  of  the 
bank — I  speak  technically —were  reduced  only 
to  this  extent;  and  the  whole  amount  of  the  re 
ductions  in  all  the  operations  of  the  bank,  in 
cluding  the  domestic  bills  purchased,  (which  are 
mot  loans,  (was  little  more  than  four  millions  of 
dollars,  and  yet  we  have  been  officially  informed 
by  the  Secretary  that  the  reductions  of  the  bank, 
or  to  use  his  peculiar  language,  its  "  collections 
from  the  community,"  have  amounted  in  two 
months,  to  upwards  of  six  millions  of  dollars.  It 
is  worth  while,  Sir,  to  look  a  little  more  minute 
ly  into  the  process  by  which  the  Secretary  reaches 
this  financial  result.  The  sum  of  $6, 334,000  set 
down  as  the  precise  amount  of  the  curtailment  is 
made  up  by  adding  to  the  discounts  proper  and 
domestic  bills  of  exchange  purchased,  the  in 
crease  of  the  public  deposites  amounting  to  up 
wards  of  two  millions.  Now,  Sir,  whether  we 
consider  the  Secretary  as  using  the  technical 
language  of  banking  or  the  language  of  com 
mon  sense,  I  cannot  but  regard  this  as  a  gross 
tempt  to  impose  upon  the  community.  What 


does  it  amount  to?  That  the  increase  of  the 
public  deposites  is  equivalent  to  a  reduction  of 
the  discounts  of  the  bank.  In  other  words,  the 
bank  is  condemned  for  not  extending  its  dis 
counts  by  lending  out  the  Government  depo 
sites,  when  the  Government  was  notoriously 
making  arrangements  to  remove  these  depo 
sites!  Yes,  Sir,  the  bank  that  has  been  de 
nounced  for  extending  its  discounts  at  a  period 
of  great  commercial  embarrassment — the  bank 
that  had  on  that  very  ground  been  charged  with 
using  its  funds  to  control  the  elections — that 
very  bank  is  now  denounced  from  the  same 
quarter,  because  when  the  public  deposites  were 
about  to  be  removed  by  a  lawless  exercise  of 
power,  it  did  not  extend  its  discounts  upon  the 
faith  of  those  deposites!  Can  any  thing  be 
more  characteristic  of  the  capricious  despotism 
exercised  over  the  bank?  The  directors  of  the 
bank  would  have  deserved  to  be  cashiered,  if 
they  had  not  provided  for  the  approaching  storm, 
by  preparing  to  deliver  up  the  public  deposites 
instead  of  lending  them  out  under  the  existing 
circumstances. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  goes  on  to 
give  a  most  dismal  account  of  the  public  distress 
produced  by  this  unreasonable  conduct  of  the 
bank,  alleging  that  the  removal  of  the  deposites 
became  an  imperious  duty  as  a  means  of  arrest 
ing  it.  I  grant,  Sir,  that  if  the  domestic  bills 
purchased  by  the  bank  are  fairly  to  be  regarded 
as  a  part  of  its  loans,  the  curtailment  from  Au 
gust  to  October,  amounted  in  the  aggregate  to  a 
little  more  than  four  millions.  But  the  exchange 
business  cannot  with  any  propriety  be  so  regard 
ed.  It  does  not  consist  of  loans,  but  as  the 
term  imports,  it  is  the  means  of  transferring 
funds  from  one  place  to  another.  When  a  north 
ern  merchant  or  manufacturer  purchases  cotton 
at  the  south,  he  sells  a  bill  to  the  bank  payable  at 
New  York  in  ninety  days,  and  by  the  time  it 
falls  due  the  cotton  is  there  and  sold  to  meet  it. 
The  object  of  this  transaction  is  to  save  the  risk 
and  trouble  of  transmitting  money  from  the  north 
to  purchase  the  cotton.  The  bill  is  paid  off  in 
full  at  its  maturity,  as  a  matter  of  course,  and 
upon  no  commercial  principle  could  it  be  re 
garded  as  analogous  to  demanding  the  payment 
of  a  discounted  note.  But  even  if  they  were  so 
regarded,  the  whole  amount  of  the  curtailment 
would  be  only  four  millions,  instead  of  six,  as 
the  Secretary  States.  That  is  to  say  the  Go 
vernment  had  evinced  a  determination  to  de 
prive  the  bank  of  eight  millions  of  the  capital 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


II 


upon  which  its  discounts  had  been  based,  and  pressive  to  the  whole  country,  to  be  sure  of  the 


the  bank  to  prepare  for  this  contingency  had  re 
duced  its  discounts  four  millions  of  dollars, 
about  one  half  of  the  extent  to  which  its  means 
were  about  to  be  diminished.  But  the  bank  had 
not  only  been  thus  curtailed  in  its  banking  capi 
tal,  but  it  has  been  subjected,  in  common  with 
the  State  banks,  to  all  the  panic  and  pressure 
ttroduced  by  this  rash  and  lawless  act  of  the  Go 
vernment.  Its  reductions,  therefore,  so  far  from 
being  excessive,  are  such  as  common  prudence 
rendered  indispensable  to  its  safety,  and  are  less 
than  the  act  ot  the  Government  would  seem  to 
require.  But  a  further  charge  is  brought  against 
the  bank  by  the  Secretary.  It  is  that  it  has 
adopted  the  heartless  and  monstrous  policy  of 
accumulating  specie  in  its  vaults  to  prepare  it- 


ground  on  which  it  acted.  It  can  never  be  jus 
tified  for  inflicting  a  public  injury,  (here  is  a 
nice  question  of  casuistry,)  by  allegingmistaken 
opinions  of  its  own,  when  the  means  of  obtain 
ing  information  absolutely  certain,  were  so  ob 
viously  within  its  reach.  The  change  was  o/- 
ways  designed  to  be  gradual." 

Now,  Sir,  did  the  Secretary  suppose  when  he 
made  these  assertions,  that  the  manifesto  of  the 
President  wa»  entirely  forgotten?  Did  not  the 
President  publish  his  decree  in  September,  that 
the  deposites  should  be  all  removed  on  the  1st 
of  October,  and  sooner  if  practicable?  Yet  in 
the  very  face  of  this  declaration  of  the  Presi 
dent,  we  are  told  that  it  was  always  designed 
to  remove  the  deposites  gradually,  and  that  the 


self  for  these  hostile  movements  of  the  Govern- 1  bank  ought  to  have  ascertained  this  by  asking 

the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.     Sir,  wh^  was 


ment!  It  seems  that  between  the  1st  of  August 
and  the  1st  of  October,  its  specie  had  increased 
$639,000,  and  the  Secretary  "  believes"  it  was 
drawn  from  the  State  Banks.  And  what  proof 
does  he  adduce  of  this  fact?  Why,  Sir,  strange 
as  it  may  appear,  that  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States  had  permitted  the  balances  due  to  it  by 
the  State  banks  to  increase  from  $368,000  to 
$2,268,000  during  the  two  months  in  which  this 
operation  is  alledged  to  have  taken  place!  Such, 
Sir,  are  the  proofs  that  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States  has  endeavored  to  drain  the  State  banks 
of  their  specie. 

But  even  if  the  bank  had  curtailed  its  dis 
counts  to  the  extent  alleged,  and  that  curtailment 
had  produced  all  the  suffering  experienced,  the 
Executive  Government,  and  not  the  bank,  is  re 
sponsible  to  the  country  for  the  calamity.  I  ne 
ver  have  read  a  more  unfair  and  Jesuitical  argu 
ment  than  the  one  used  by  the  Secretary  to 
throw  the  odium  of  his  own  conduct  on  the 
bank?  It  is  well  worth  perusal. 

"  The  capacities  of  the  bank,  therefore,  at  this 
time,  to  afford  facilities  to  commerce,  was  not 
only  equal,  but  greatly  superior  to  what  it  had 
been  for  some  time  before;  and  the  nature  of  the 
inquiry  made  of  the  State  banks,  confined  as  it 
was  to  the  four  principal  commercial  cities,show 
ed  that  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  entire 
deposites  from  that  bank,  so  as  to  distress  it, 
-was  not  contemplated.  And  if  any  apprehen 
sions  to  the  contrary  were  felt  by  the  bank,  an 
inquiry  at  this  Department,  would  no  doubt  have 
been  promptly  and  satisfactorily  answered.  (1 
wonder  WHO  would  have  answered  it.)  The 
Secretary  proceeds:  "  And  certainly  it  was  the 
•duty  of  the  bank,  before  it  adopted  a  course  op- 


the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury?  Was  it  not  Mi. 
Duane;  and  pray  what  information  could  he 
have  given  if  the  bank  had  applied?  Subsequent 
events  have  shown  that  he  was  quite  in  the  dark 
on  the  subject.  The  whole  spirit  of  the  pro 
ceedings  of  the  Government,  made  it  the  duty  of 
the  bank  to  consider  the  removal  of  the  depo 
sites  as  a  measure  decided  upen  and  prepared 
for  all  the  consequences  of  so  dangerous  and 
hostile  a  movement.  Yet  when  the  adminis 
tration  has  brought  this  great  calamity  upon  the 
country  without  the  shadow  of  a  cause,  and  the 
denunciations  of  the  community  begin  to  burst 
forth  in  all  quarters,  in  a  voice  of  thunder,  why, 
forsooth  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  exclaims — 
•''  Thou  canst  not  say  I  did  it.''  It  was  the 
bank,  that  monster  of  corruption,  that  heartless 
tyrant,  that  has  produced  all  this  suffering, with 
out  necessity,  andf  purely  to  gratify  its  vindictive 
feelings."  No,  Sir.  It  is  in  vain  that  the  ad 
ministration,  after  wantonly  producing  this  great 
calamity,  by  an  act  of  injustice  and  tyranny,  at 
tempts  to  throw  the  responsibility  and  the  odium 
upon  the  persecuted  victim  of  its  injustice. 

I  will  now  proceed  to  inquire  whether  the  speci 
fic  charges  brought  against  the  bank,  and  which 
have  been  made  the  grounds  of  removing  the  de 
posites,  have  any  foundation  in  fact.  It  is  al 
leged  that  the  bank  has  violated  its  charter,  in 
delegating  certain  Executive  functions  to  what  i» 
called  the  exchange  committee;  whereas  one  of 
the  fundamental  articles  of  that  charter  declares 
t(  that  not  less  than  seven  directors  shall  consti 
tute  a  board  to  do  business." 

Now,  if  it  were  true  that  the  charter  has  been 
violated,  the  President  might  have  ascertained  by 


12 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


consulting  that  charter,  that  it  was  his  duty  to 
direct  a  scire  facias  to  be  issued  against  the  bank 
in  order  to  have  this  question  decided  judicially 
by  trie  federal  court*  instead  of  condemning  and 
punishing  the  institution  in  tkis  summary  man 
ner  without  a  trial.  But  it  did  not  suit  the  tem 
per  df  the  President  or  the  purpose  of  his  ad 
visers  to  adopt  a  legal  course.  Indeed,  Sir,  I 
m«ch  question  whether  a  respectable  lawyer 
•could  be  found  in  the  United  States,  whe  would 
hazard  his  reputation  by  standing  up  before  the 
court  upon  such  an  issue. 

In  providing  that  not  less  than  seven  directors 
should  constitute  a  board,  the  charter  meant  no 
thing  more  tha*i  that  the  legislative  authority  of 
the  bank — the  power  of  prescribing  the  rules  and 
regulations  for  its  general  government,  shoulc 
not  be  exercised  by  less  than  seven]  directors. 
The  commitment  of  certain  executive  duties  to 
subordinate  committees,  is  no  violation  of  this 
article,  provided  these  committees  are  appointee 
with  the  approbation  of  the  board,  and  in  con 
formity  with  the  rules  prescribed  by  it.  Every 
person  acquainted  with  the  details  of  banking- 
knows  that  a  large  portion  of  the  business  of  al 
banks  istfiecessarily  done  by  its  officers,  withou 
the  presence  of  the  directors,  though  by  thei 
authority.  If  all  the  duties  of  a.  president  of  a 
bank,  were  required  to  be  performed  in  the  pre 
sence,  and  by  the  direction  of  the  whole  board 
it  would  be  impossible  to  carry  on  the  busines 
of  banking.  'It  would  be  like  forbidding  th 
President  of  the  United  States  to  perform  an} 
of  his  appropriate  duties,  without  the  presenc 
and  concurrence  of  the  members  of  the  legisla 
live  body — a  very  inconvenient  incumbrance 
Sir,  to  which  I  do  not  think  the  President  woul 
readily  submit. 

A  great  effort  has  been  made  to  create  the  im 
pression,  that  there  is  something  extraordinar 
and  unprecedented  in  the  operations  of  the  ex 
change  committee.  It  is  treated  as  a  dangerou 
and  recent  innovation.  Now,  as  early  as  th 
y«ar  1821,  when  Mr.  Cheves  was  at  the  head  < 
the  bank,  this  veiy  authority  to  purchase  bills 
exchange,  was  delegated  to  the  president  an 
cashier  ailone. 

But  it  is  alledged  that  this  arrangement  is  a 
invention  designed  for  the  purpose  of  excludin 
the  Government  directors,  not  only  from  a  du 
participation  in  the  operations  of  the  bank,  b 
from  a  knowledge  of  them.  Now,  Sir,  the  a 
surdity  of  this  suspicion  will  be  seen  at  once  b 
looking  into  the  machinery  and  details  of  this  sy 
tern,  and  by  ascertaining  the  circumstances  un 


er  which  the  power  delegated  to  the  Exchange 
ommittee  is  exercised.  The  President  and  his 
ecretary  seem  to  regard  it  as  an  independent 
ower,  exercised  without  any  effective  responsi- 
lity  to  the  directors;  whereas  the  proceed- 
ngsofthis  Exchange  Committee  are  regularly 
ntered  on  the  books  of  the  bank,  which  are  sub 
mitted  to  the  board  of  directors  at  every  regular 
leeting,  and  as  only  a  few  days  intervene  be- 
ween  these  meetings,  the  proceedings  of  the 
x-change  Committee  are  constantly  open  to  the 
nspection  and  review  of  the  Government  direc- 
ors.  Indeed,  it  may  be  almost  said  that  the 
roceedings  of  the  Exchange  Committee  are  car- 
ied  on  under  the  eye  of  the  board,  so  speedily 
s  every  act  laid  open  to  it  sinspection.  No  con- 
raiment  from  the  Government  directors  was 
>ossible  under  these  circumstances,  when  it  b 
notorious  that  the  books  of  the  bank  are  always 
pen  to  their  inspection,  if  they  thought  proper 
o  inspect  them. 

Another  charge  brought  against  the  bank 
which  I  was  surprised  to  see,  is  the  old  story  of 
he  three  per  cents  again!  This  dish,  it  seems, 
ve  are  to  have  cooked  and  served  up  in  all  the 
,'arious  modes  of  culinary  preparation,  so  as  to 
)<*  adapted  to  every  palate.  This  charge  was 
)rought  forward  at  the  last  session,  and  referred 
to  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means;  who 
reported  that  the  arrangement  made  by  the  bank 
with  the  holders  of  the  three  per  cent,  stock,  so 
far  from  delaying,  actually  hastened  its  payment. 
Why  was  that  arrangement  so  vehemently  de 
nounced?  I  will  briefly  explain  it.  The  Go 
vernment  had  determined  to  pay  off  the  three 
percents.  in  October,  1831,  at  a  period  of  great 
pecuniary  pressure  upon  the  commercial  com 
munity,  owing  to  the  large  importations  of  that 
year.  The  bank  took  that  liberal  and  compre 
hensive  view  of  the  effect  which  this  operation 
would  produce  upon  the  credit  of  the  country, 
which  it  would  have  been  well  if  the  Govern 
ment  had  taken,  and  stipulated  with  the  holders 
of  these  three  per  cents,  that  the  certificates 
should  be  delivered  up  to  the  bank,  and  the 
amount  bearing  a  specified  interest,  entered  to 
the  credit  of  the  holders  on  the  books  of  that  in 
stitution.  By  this  arrangement  the  Government 
ceased  to  be  responsible  for  the  stock,  and  ceas 
ed  to  pay  interest  on  it  sooner  than  if  the  ar 
rangement  had  not  been  made.  How,  then, 
were  the  views  of  the  Government  thwarted? 
By  the  relief  which  the  bank  thus  extended  to 
the  community  at  a  moment  of  great  pressure? 
Without  any  loss  to  the  Government,  or  any  de- 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE, 


lay  in  the  redemption  of  the  public  debt,  the  bank ' 
Was  by  this  means  enabled  to  avoid  curtailing 
flome  six  millions  of  its  accommodations  until 
the  crisis  of*  commercial  embarrassment  passed 
away.  The  arrangement,  Sir,  was  essentially 
benefical  to  all  parties  and  injurious  to  none, 
and  I  am  utterly  at  a  loss  to  conceive  why  the 
ghostly  form  of  these  extinguished  three  per 
rj£nts.  is  now  conjured  up  in  the  array  of 
Charges  against  the  bank.  It  serves  no  other 
purpose  than  to  evince  the  spirit  of  the  prosecu 
tion. 

Another  charge  gravely  urged  against  the 
bank,  and  of  which  the  administration  ought  to 
be  .ashamed,  is  .the  criminal  audacity  of  demand 
ing  from  the  Government,  on  a  protested  bill  of 
exchange,  the  same  damages  which  the  Govern 
ment  itself  has  universally  demanded  of  indivi- 
duajs  under  like  circumstances! 

The  Government  being  desirous  to  obtain 
funds  here  in  exchange  for  fucds  in  Paris,  the 
bank  in  the  spirit  of  kindness  aiad  aceomodation 
which  has  marked  all  its  transactions  with  the 
Government,  voluntarily  offered  ,to  purchase  a 
bill  of  exchange  from  the  Treasury  here  upon  the 
French  Government,  upon  better  terms  than 
could  be  obtained  any  where  else,  or  to  advance 
the  money  to  the  Government  here,  and  under 
take  the  collection  of  the  bill  as  its  agent.  The 
Treasury  declined  the  agency  of  the  bank,  and 
sold  it  the  bill  on  the  French  Government  as  a 
mere  commercial  transaction.  From  some  cause 
the  French  Government  refused  to  pay  the  bill 
and  it  was  protested  in  Paris.  The  agents  of 
the  Bank  there,  paid  it  for  the  honor  of  the  bank. 
But  the  President  of  the  United  States  alleges 
that  the  sum  paid  here  for  the  bill,  was  left  in 
the  bank  and  simply  added  to  the  amount  of  the 
public  deposites,  If  this  were  true,  it  would 
not  vary  the  case  as  to  the  legal  liability  of  the 
Government  for  damages.  But  it  is  not  true. 
On  the  contrary,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
under  the  authority  of  an  act  of  Congress,  gave 
public  notice  that  the  nine  hundred  thousand  dol 
lars  obtained  for  this  hill,  would  be  loaned  out 
for  the  benefit  of  the  claimants  for  French  spoli 
ations  to  whom  it  belonged.  It  was,  therefore, 
as  much  taken  from  the  available  fund  .-ef  the 
bank,  as  if  it  had  been  immediately  pa  i«?over  to 
the  claimants.  The  directors  would  have  been 
«tupjd  in  the  extreme,  it  they  had  regarded  this 
as  an  addition  to  the  Government  deposites,  and 
made  it  the  basis  of  discounts.  The  bank  hav 
ing  sold  the  bill  in  London,  would  have  been 
liable  to  the  full  amount  of  legal  damages  on  its 
being  protested,  but  for  the  good  fortune  of  hav 
ing  an  agent  in  Paris  who  paid  it.  And  now, 
Sir,  after  the  bank  has  saved  its  own  credit  and 
that  of  the  Government  by  this  payment,  the  ad 
ministration  comes  forward  with  a  charge  against 
the  bank  of  Assailing  the  credit  of  the  nation 
because  it  demands  its  legal  rights!  Sir,  the 
faith  of  the  nation  has  been  tarnished — deeply 
tarnished  —  by  the  utter  disregard  the  Govern 
ment  has  manifested,  in  a  mere  question  of  lega" 
right,  to  the  great  moral  and  religious  precep 
of  doing  unto  others  as  it  would  that  others 
do  unto  it  The  Government  has  inva 


iably  exacted  the  legal  damages  from  individu 
als  in  similar  cases.  In  the  case  of  Stephen  Gi- 
ard,  conclusive  proof  was  adduced  that  the  pro- 
ested  bill  was  immediately  paid— by  the  agent 
of  Girard,  and  not  by  the  agent  of  the  Govern 
ment — and  that  not  one  cent  of  damages  was 
sustained  by  the'Government.  Yet  the  twenty 
>er  cent,  damages  were  exacted  to  the  utter 
most  farthing.  Under  these  circumstances  it  is 
i  shame,  a  crying  shame,  that  the  administra- 
ion  should  thus  not  only  refuse  to  pay  its  just 
debts,  but  assuming  the  judicial  power  of  de 
ciding  in  its  own  case,  attempt  to  forestal  the 
opinion  of  the  tribunals  which  are  alone  compe 
tent  to  decide  the  question.  In  every  view  it 
was  the  duty  of  the  bank  to  make  this  claim, 
and  of  the  Government  to  pay  it.  It  was  the 
only  mode  of  obtaining  damages  from  the  French 
Government;  for  unless  our  Government  shall 
my  damages,  it  can  exact  none  from  Franee. 
To  say  nothing  of  the  other  stockholders,  the 
people  of  the  United  States  own  one-fifth  of  the 
stock  of  the  bank,  and  they  have  a  right  to  de 
mand  thai  the  administration  do  not  sacrifice  up 
wards  of  thirty  thousand  dollars  of  their  money, 
jy  its  arbitrary  and  faithless  conduct  towards 
the  bank.  In  every  respect,  this  is  one  of  the 
most  audacious  charges  ever  brought  by  the  ad 
ministration  against  the  bank,  to  justify  the  high- 
lianded  measures  by  which  they  have  attempted 
to  destroy  it. 

I  will  now  proceed,  sir,  to  consider  that  charge 
against  the  Bank,  which  is  the  real  moving1 
cause  of  this  persevering  and  relentless  perse 
cution.  It  is,  as  the  executive  expresses  it,  that 
the  bank  "has  attempted  to  acquire  political 
power,"  a  charge  unknown  to  any  code  qf  law, 
moral  or  political,  and  of  that  fearful  'vagueness 
which  indicates  the  arbitrary  spirit  in  which  it 
originates.  The  first  specification  under  this 
charge  is  founded  on  a  resolution  of  the  Board 
of  Directors,  authorizing  the  President  of  the 
Bank  to  have  certain  documents  printed  to  il 
lustrate  its  operations.  To  my  mind  this  seems 
to  be  a  very  harmless  resolution,  but  as  the  Pre 
sident  of  the  United  States  has  denounced  it  as 
a  dangerous  precedent,  clothing  the  President 
of  the  Bank  with  powers  subversive  of  the  liber* 
ties  of  the  country,  I  will  beg  leave  to  read  it 
for  the  information  of  the  House  :  " Resolved, 
that  the  President  be  authorized  to  cause  to  be 
prepared  and  circulated  such  documents  and 
papers  as  may  communicate  to  the  people  infor 
mation  in  regard  to  the  nature  and  operations  of  the 
bank."  Now,  I  pray  to  know,  sir,  what  appli 
cation  of  the  funds  of  the  stockholders  could  be 
more  useful  and  judicious,  when  the  institution 
and  its  credit  were  assailed  by  every  species  of 
misrepresentation  and  calumny  ?  But  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  seems  to  regard  it  as 
equivalent  to  clothing  the  President  of  the  Bank 
with  the  whole  fiscal  and  military  power  of  the 
country.  He  says : 

"Was  it  expected  when  the  moneys  of  the 
United  States  were  directed  to  be  placed  in  that 
bank,  that  they  would  be  put  under  the  control 
of  one  man,  empowered  to  spend  millions  with 
out  rendering  a  voucher  or  specifying  the  object? 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


Can  they  be  considered  safe  with  the  evidence 
before  us,  that  tens  of  thousands  have  beenspeni 
for  highly  improper,  if  not  corrupt  purposes,  tha 
the  same  motive  may  lead  to  the  expenditure  o: 
hundreds  of  thousands  and  even  millions  more 
And  can  we  ustify  jourselves  to  the  people  by 
longer  lending  to  it  the  money  and  power  of  the 
Government,  to  be  employed  for  such  purposes? 

It  seems  that  the  President  of  the  United  States 
has  an  instinctive  abhorrence  for  discretionary 
executive  power  delegated  to  any  one  but  him 
self.  What  is  this  power  vested  in  the  President 
of  the  Bank  ?  It  is  not  only  harmless  and  inno 
cent  in  its  object,  but  perfectly  safe  as  a  respon 
sible  exercise  ot  power.  The  President  acts  un 
der  the  authority  of  the  directors,  with  whom  he 
is  daily  associated,  who  have  daily  opportunities 
of  inspecting  his  proceedings,  and  to  whom  he 
is,  therefore,  under  a  constant  and  direct  respon 
sibility  for  the  exercise  of  the  disci  etion  vested 
in  him,  as  to  the  amount  he  may  spend  in  print 
ing  documents  explaining  the  operations  and  vin 
dicating  the  credit  and  the  character  of  the  bank. 
Yet  the  President  of  the  United  States  thinks 
this  very  insignificant  power  subversive  of  public 
libeity,  when  he  is  himself  clothed  with  a  discre 
tion  a  thousand  times  more  dangerous.  Sir, 
when  I  recur  to  what  was  done  here  at  the  last 
session — when  I  reflect  that  an  act  was  passed, 
I  will  not  call  it  a  law,  and  that  too  at  the  special 
instance  and  request  of  the  President,  clothing 
him  with  the  power  not  only  to  spend  the  whole 
revenue,  but  to  exhaust  the  credit  of  the  nation 


ments,  when  conferred  on  Mr.  Biddle,  is  all  a 
piece  of  cheatery,  but  when  a  discretionary  pow 
er  of  levying  war  and  spending  money  without 
any  limitation  is  conferred  upon  himself,  it  is  as 
fair  a  thing  as  ever  was. 
The  President  of  the  United  States  asks  if  a 


in  arraying  a 

State  of  this  Union, 


Cwer  against  a  sovereign 
onfess  I  cannot  but  fee 


surprise  and  disgust  to  hear  that  President  mag 
nifying  a  molehill  into  a  mountain,  and  talking 
about  the  danger  of  executive  discretion !  A  sim 
ple  resolution  authorizing  the  President  of  the 
Bank  to  print  explanatory  documents  is  a  mon 
strous  proceeding,  but  an  act  clothing  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  with  dictatorial  power, 
is  all  perfectly  fair  and  proper !  This  brings  very 
forcibly  to  my  recollection  another  Dutch  anec 
dote,  and  as  I  am  in  the  way  of  drawing  illustra 
tions  from  this  excellent  class  of  our  citizens,  from 
whose  very  eccentricities  lessons  of  wisdom  may 
be  deduced,  I  beg  leave  to  relate  it.  In  a  certain 
Dutch  vicinity,  I  will  not  say  Kinderhook  lest  a 
question  of  location  should  arise — a  lottery  was 
authorised,  and  on  a  certain  day  the  neighbors 
all  assembled  to  witness  the  turning  of  the  wheel. 
The  drawing  commenced,  and  blank  after  blank 
was  drawn  by  the  principal  per*ons  in  the  neigh 
borhood  until  a  general  suspicion  of  unfairness 
began  to  prevail.  A  large  bully  stepped  for 
ward  as  the  champion  of  his  neighbors,  threat 
ening  to  smash  the  wheel  to  atoms,  and  declaring 
that  it  was  all  a  "  wiiUdnous  piece  of  gheatery." 
In  the  midst  of  his  rage,  when  every  one  was 
trembling  for  the  safety  of  the  wheel,  a  friend 
stepped  up  to  him  with  great  exultation,  ex. 
claiming,  "my  dear  sir,  have  you  heard  the 
»ews  ?  You  have  drawn  the  highest  prize." 
'*  What,  (said  he)  the  highest  prize !  It's  as  fair 
a  ding  as  ever  wes.M 

And  so,  Sir,  in  the  estimation  of  General  Jack- 
ten,  the  discretionary  power  to  print  a  few  docu« 


bank  whose  directors  make  such  an  application 
of  the  public  funds  is  fit  to  be  the  depository  of 
the  public  treasure  ?  Sir,  I  wish  the  President  of 
the  United  States  had  been    as  faithful  to  tho 
trust  committed  to  him  as  the  agent  of  the  peo 
ple  of  the  United  States,  who  own  one  fifth  part 
of  the  stock  in  this  bank,  as  the  directors  and  of 
ficers  of  the  institution  have  been  to  their  trust, 
as  the  agents  of  the  stockholders  in    general. 
What,  then,  are  the  respective  duties  of  the  Pre 
sident  of  the  United  States  and  the  President  of 
the  Bank,  as  representatives  of  the  stockholders, 
and  how  have  those(  duties  been  performed    The 
contrast  is  striking.     It  is  equally  the  duty  of 
them  both  to  promote  the  prosperity  and  credit 
of  the  bank,  in  order  that  its  capital  may  yield  a 
arge  profit,  and  its  bills'  furnish  a  sound  cur 
rency.     But  what  has  been  their  conduct  ?  For 
several  years  past,  Mr.  Biddle  has  been  night 
and  day  exerting  talents   of  the  highest  order, 
with  a  singleness  and  devotion  never  surpassed, 
,o  promote  the  credit  and  usefulness  of  the  bank. 
And  what  has  the  President  of  the  United  States 
ieen  doing  in  the  same  period  ?  Has  he  exerted 
lis  influence  to  advance  the  credit  and  success 
of  the  bank,  as  the  relation  he  bears  to  the  stock 
holders  and  the  country  required  him   to  do  ? 
No,  Sir.     On  the  contrary,  he  has  been  strain 
ing  every  nerve,  and  attempting  to  move  heaven 
and  earth  to  accomplish  the  destruction  of  its 
credit,  and  consequently  of  its  prosperity.     At  a 
time  when  the  bank  was  as  solvent  as  any  bank 
in  the  world,  he  suggested  that  the  public  depo- 
sites  were  not  safe  in  its  vaults.     This  charge, 
which  in  any  other  country  would  have  shaken 
the  credit  of  any  other  bank,  coming  from  such  a 
source,  made  not  the  slightest  impression  upon 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States.     Nothing  can  be 
said  more  highly  creditable  to  the  bank  than  that 
it  was  able  to  stand  up  against  this  assault  upon 
its  credit  by  the  executive  government,  and  a 
confederacy  of  speculators    and  stock-jobbers, 
which  would  certainly  have  prostrated  the  Bank 
of  England. 

And  what  a  lesson  are  we  taught  at  this  very 
moment  of  the  danger  incurred  by  unskilful  per 
sons  who  venture  to  meddle  with  edged  tools. 
The  administration,  or  more  properly  the  Presi 
dent,  has  struck  a  blow  that  it  was  supposed 
would  shake  the  credit  of  the  bank  to  its  deepest 
foundations.  That  blow  has  recoiled.  And  while 
the  credit  of  all  the  other  banks  has  been  shaken 
•y  the  concussion,  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 
stands  alone  on  a  rock  of  adamant,  bidding  a 
3roud  defiance  to  the  storm,  and  generously  ex- 
:ending  the  hand  of  succor  to  other  institutions. 
Yes,  sir,  I  am  informed  that  within  a  few  days 
>astthis  bank  tendered  a  loan  of  $50,000  lo  one 
of  the  local  banks  to  relieve  it  from  the  pressure 
produced  by  this  reckless  and  vindictive  act  oj 
executive  madness.  Such,  Sir,  is  the  contrast 
between  these  two  Presidents. 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


15 


I  come  now  to  another  of  t  he  specifications 
under  the  charge  against  the  bank,  of  "attempt 
ing  to  acquire  political  power."  It  is  alleged  by 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  that  between  the 
1st  of  January,  1831,  and  the  1st  of  May,  1832, 
a  period  of  sixteen  months,  the  bank  increased 
its  loans  the  enormous  and  unprecedented  sum 
of  $28,000,000.  And  it  is  inferred  that  this  ex 
tension  of  its  loans  could  be  designed  for  no 
other  purpose  but  to  give  the  bank  a  political  in 
fiuenceto  be  used  in  opposition  to  the  election  ol 
General  Jackson.  I  will  first  examine  the  facts 
and  then  the  logic  of  this  specification.  The 
Secretary  states  that  "the  aggregate  debt  due  to 
the  bank''  on  the  1st  of  January,  1831,  amounted 
to  $42,402,304  only,  whereas  on  the  1st  of  May, 
1832,  its  loans  amounted  to  $FO,428,070.  Now, 
in  fact,  the  discounts  of  the  bank  amounted  to 
$33,575,403  at  the  former  date,  andhad  only  risen 
to  $47,375,078  at  the  latter  date,  making  a  dif 
ference  in  the  accommodations  to  the  community 
of  only  $13,799,675,  instead  of  twenty-eight  mil 
lions  as  the  Secretary's  statements  would  induce 
the  public  to  suppose.  But  this  is  not  all.  At 
the  former  period,  the  bank  had  a  debt  due  to  it 
by  the  Government  of  $8,674,681,  and  by  Baring 
&  Co.  $2,387,331,  making  a  sum  of  1 1,062,012, 
which  added  to  the  discounts,  raised  the  debt  due 
to  the  bank  in  January,  183],  exclusive  of  do 
mestic  bills,  to  $44,637,41 5vbeingonly  $2,737,663 
less  than  the  amount  of  discount  in  May,  1832. 
It  is  apparent  from  this  view,  that  the  aggregate 
debt  due  to  the  bank  in  January,  1831,  including 
$10,456,653  of  domestic  bills,  was  $55,094,068 
instead  of  $42,402,304,  as  represented  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  making  the  differ 
ence  between  the  debt  due  to  the  bank  at  the 
two  periods  selected  for  comparison,  even  if  we 
include  the  domestic  bills,  only  $15,334,002,  and 
if  we  exclude  these  bills  as  not  properly  classed 
with  bank  loans,  the  difference  will  be  only 
$4,877,349.  It  will  be  here  perceived  that  to 
make  out  his  charge  of  an  unprecedented  exten 
sion  of  its  loans  by  the  bank  in  the  sixteen 
months  artfully  selected,  the  Secretary  has  sup 
pressed  the  debts  due  to  the  bank  by  the  United 
States,  and  by  Baring  &  Co.  amounting  to 
$11,062,012,  in  stating  the  "  aggregate  debt  due 
to  the  bank"  in  January,  1831.  And  I  am  con 
strained,  Sir,  to  believe  that  this  suppression  was 
intentionally  made,  as  the  facts  wore  upon  the 
face  of  the  monthly  statements,  and  of  a  nature 
not  to  be  overlooked,  or  misunderstood.  When 
the  bank  converted  its  government  and  foreign 
debt  into  cash,  what  course  could  it  pursue  but 
make  a  corresponding  extension  of  its  discounts  ? 
This  was  not  extending  its  debt,  but  changing 
its  character,  by  lending  to  our  merchants  what 
it  had  collected  from  the  government  and  fo 
reigners.  To  censure  this,  argues  a  total  ig 
norance  of  the  duties  of  the  bank,  and  disregard 
of  the  pressing  wants  of  the  commercial  commu 
nity  at  the  period  under  review.  It  was  a  period 
of  unprecedenth  large  importations,  when  the 
heavy  commercial  debt  contracted,  and  the  unu 
sual  amount  of  bonds  due  to  the  government, 
required  that  the  bank  should  draw  in  all  its 
r *«ourc«0  from  other  quarters,  and  apply  them  to 


the  relief  of  the  commercial  community.  They 
were  so  applied,  Sir,  and  were  the  means  of  saving 
probably  hundreds  and  thousands  from  great 
distress,  if  not  from  bankruptcy. 

I  well  recollect  the  lugubrious  vaticinations  of 
a    gentleman  from  New  Fork,  (Mr.  CAMBRB- 
LENG,)  who  told  us  that  the  bank  had  seduced 
the  merchants  into  the  excessive  importations, 
and  it  could  not  save  the  country  from  general 
bankruptcy.     But  experience,  which  has  falsified 
this  prediction,  has  shewn  that  the  bank  under 
stood  its  own  duties  and  operations  much  better 
than  those  who  chose  to  step  out  of  their  appro 
priate  sphere,  however  enlightened  on  the  gene 
ral  subject  of  political  economy.     Thj  country 
not  only  passed  through  the  crisis,  by  means  of 
the   wise  and    liberal  course   pursued    by  the 
bank,  but  passed  through  it  without  a  struggle. 
The  merchants  would  not  fail,  even  to  accom 
modate  the  gentleman  from  New  York,  and  the 
country  was  brought  out  of  its  difficulties  so  na 
turally  and  smoothly,  that  it  was  hardly  aware  of 
the  crisis.    The  bank  is  certainly  entitled  to  the 
highest    commendation    instead    of   being  ob 
noxious  to  censure,  for  effecting  this  great  public 
benefit,  without  impairing  its  own  credit — a  re 
sult  which  the  gentleman  from  New  York  deem 
ed  utterly  impracticable.     If  I  were  to   select 
the  period,  or  the  incident  in  the  history  of  its 
iroceedings,  best  adapted  to  illustrate  its  use- 
ulness  it  would  be  precisely  this.     And  I  will 
only  remark  further  on  this  point,  that  the  intel- 
ect  of  that  man  must  be  wofully  perverted,  who 
:an  see  in  this   proceeding  no  other  motive  or 
>bject,  than  to  interfere  in  the  Presidential  elec- 
ion. 

I  have  gone  through  all  the  charges  brought 
against  the  bank  lhat  I  deem  worthy  of  notice, 
and  I  now  beg  the  attention  of  the  House  to  those 
urgent  considerations  which  impel  it  to  an  imme' 
liate  interposition  ef  its  authority.  I  need  not 
ell  those  who  hear  me  of  the  actual  and  impend- 
ng  distress  and  ruin  which  threaten  our  com 
mercial  cities,  and  finally  the  whole  country.  The 
evidences  of  this  are  every  where  to  be  seen. 
We  can  neither  turn  to  the  right  nor  to  the  left, 
without  perceiving  anxiety  and  dismay  in  every 
countenance.  Is  it  not,  then,  the  solemn  duty  of 
ongress  to  interpose  its  constitutional  power  to 
arrest  the  progress  of  this  desolating  torrent  ? 
We  are  called  upon,  Sir,  by  every  consideration 
which  can  grow  out  of  a  just  regard  for  our  own 
contemned  authority,  or  for  the  rights  and  liber- 
ies  of  the  people.  The  President  of  the  United 
States  has  unlawfully  seized  upon  the  public 
reasure.  Where,  Sir,  is  that  treasure  at  this 
noment?  No  man  here  can  tell  us.  By  what 
authority  has  the  President  taken  it  ?  Let  gen- 
lemen  produce  it  if  they  can. 

Sir,  Congress  is  peculiarly  called  upon  to 
vindicate  its  right  to  the  guardianship  of  th» 
>ublic  treasure,  because  the  President  has  at- 
empted  to  forestall  its  decision  and  places  it  ia 
a  situation  which  may  preclude  the  free  exercise 
>f  its  judgment.  Why,  Sir,  was  the  change  of 
he  deposites,  made  only  siKty  days  before 
meeting  of  Congress?  I  will  tell  you  the  rea 
son.  The  President  was  fearful  that  he  could 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  McDUFFIE. 


not  induce  even  a   drilled   majority   to   do   tha 
which  if  already  done  upon  his  responsibility,   i 
might  be  induced  to  sanction.     He  is  a  military 
man,  Sir,  and  he  knows  the  effect  produced  in 
desperate  emergencies,  when  the  General  throws 
himself  into  the  breach,  and  calls   upon  his  sol 
diers  to  rush  to  his  rescue,  or  witness  his   des 
truction.     There  could  not  have  been  selected  a 
time  for  performing  this  act  better  calculated  to 
show  the  President's  defiance  of  the  Legislative 
•authority.     And  yet,   Sir,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  has  come  here  with  the  miserable— I 
had  almost  said  impudent  pretence — that  he  was 
constrained  to  do  it  by   the;  necessities  of  the 
country.     It  is  not  true,   Sir.     The  President 
tad  only  to  announce  that  the  deposites  would 
not  be  removed  until  the  question  should  be  first 
submitted  to  Congress,    and  the    public  mind 
would  have  been  put  at   ease.     The  Secretary 
well  knew  this      But  the  Executive  Government 
has  thought  proper  to  thrust  itself  forward  and 
place  the  subject  in  such  a  position  as  almost  to 
•deprive  Congress  of  its   free  agency.     We  are 
now  told  by  a  gentiemaa  from  New  York,  (Mr. 
CAMBHELENG,)  thatthe  restoration  of  the  depo 
sites  to  the  Bank   of  the  United  States  was  an 
idea  that  struck  him  with  alarm;   thai  the  .joun- 
try  had  already  suffered  too  much  *rom  one   re 
moval  to  be  able  to  endure  tho  effects  of  another. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  have  made   my   reso 
lution  prospective.     I  am  not  so  reckless  of  the 
sufferings  of  .the  community,  as  to  take  away  the 
money  which  has  been  actually  deposited  in  the 
selected  banks.     I  know  we  shall  be   told   that 
the   picture  of  public   distress  is   exaggerated. 
One  g-entleman,  indeed,  <Mr,VANDERPoKL,)  told 
us  the  other  day,  that  it  was  all  a  humbug  to  as 
cribe -the  prevailing  distress  to  the  removal  of  the 
depositea.     If  this  be  a  humbug1,  it  is  a  very  me 
lancholy  one.     But    whatever  gentleme»  may 
have  thought  three  days  ago,  I  believe  there  is 
no  one  who  would  now  be   bold   enough   to  say 
that  the  removal  of  the   deposites   has  had  no 
agency  in  producing  the  public  distress.     The 
calamity  can  hardly  be   over  estimated.     Any 
idea  which  we  can  form  of  it  here,  will  fall  short 
of  the  sad  reality.     1  confess,  Sir,  I   have  been 
astonished  at    the  accounts   brought  by  every 
mail.     I  did  net  believe  that  a  scene  of  distress 
30  sudden  and  extensive,  ceuld  have  been   pro 
duced  by  the  miserable   tampering  of  the   Go 
vernment  with  the  system  of  commercial  credit. 
It  as  a  .mistake  to  suppose  that  it  is  confined  to 
the  merchants  or  to  the  commercial  cities.     It 
•will  extend  like  a  wave  until  it  affects  every  class 
and  reaches  the  furthest  limits  of  the  country. 
In  relation  to  one  of  the  great  national  interests, 
I  can  speak  with  positive  knowledge,  as  to  the 
depression  this  measure  has  produced  in  the  va 
lue  of  property.     I  confidently  believe  that  eve 
ry  cotton  planter,  who  did  not  sell   his  crop  at 
the  commencement  of  the  season,  has  lost  two 
-cents  on  every  pound  •of  his  cotton,  in  conse 
quence  of  this  measure.     It  is   a  fact  without 
precedent,  but  conclusively  shown,  by  a  compa 
rison  of  the  Liverpool  and  Charleston  prices  cur- 
reut,  that  the  price  of  cotton  has  been  habitually 
five  cents  lower  in  this  ^country,  at  any  given 


time,  than  the  European  prices  published  at  the 
same  time  here.  I  presume  all  other  descrip 
tions  of  property  have  experienced  a  similar  de 
pression,  and  can  well  imagine  that  all  property 
in  stocks,  public,  or  private,  must  have  suffered 
even  in  a  greater  degi  ee.  It  is  stated  on  good 
authority,  that  the  stock  of  the  Girard  Bank, 
the  one  selected  in  Philadelphia  to  receive  the 
Government  deposites,  has  fallen  from  70  to  54 
since  the  1st  fof  October. 

An  administration  that  will  thus  wantonly 
tamper  with  public  faith  and  private  property,  te 
promote  the  selfish  purposes  of  individuals — 
whatever  else  it  may  be  called— does  not  de 
serve  the  name  of  Government.  In  what,  J 
would  ask  is  all  this  to  result?  I  am  not  sure 
that  I  knew  precisely  what  is  its  object,  but  I 
can  tell  you  very  certainly  what  will  be  its  end, 
It  will  be,  Sir,  the  sacrifice  of  the  industrious 
and  enterprizing  classes  of  the  community,  to 
promote  the  interest  of  speculators  and  stock 
jobbers.  Hundreds  of  industrious  men,  whose 
credit  is  their  principal  capital,  will  be  ruined, 
while  the  money  lenders  and  money  changers 
will  realize  princely  fortunes,  making  a  rich  har 
vest  of  the  public  distresses.  If  there  be  any 
speculators  in  the  stocks — whether  connected 
with  the  administration  or  not — who  have  stipu 
lated  to  deliver  certificates  of  State  bank  stock 
on  a  given  day,  they  may  profit  by  this  act  of 
the  Government.  But  if  there  be  any  who  have 
calculated  to  make  this  measure  subservient  to 
their  speculations  in  the  stock  of  the  United 
States  Bank,  I  rejoice  that  they  will  be  disap 
pointed.  The  stock  of  that  bank  has  been  less 
affected  than  any  other. 

And  now,  Sir,  in  concluding  my  remarks,  I 
must  be  permitted  to  say,  that  if  we  ratify  this 
iroceeding  of  the  President'and  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  by  refusing  to  order  the  restoration  of 
the  deposites — in  addition  to  the  present  suffer- 
ng  and  distress  of  the  people,  we  shall  permit 
a  system  of  political  banking  to  be  entailed  upon 
the  country,  utterly  incompatible  with  public 
iberty.  If  we  intend  that  it  shall  ever  be  arrest 
ed  it  must  be  done  now.  For  if  we  give  time 
the  complete  establishment  of  this  confederacy 
)etween  the  Executive  Government  and  the 
State  banks  in  all  its  ramifications  of  dependant 
nterests,  I  will  defy  all  human  power  to  break 
he  league  or  resist  the  man  who  wields  its  pow- 
sr.  Is  it  not  apparent  that  it  will  convert  the 
deposits  banks  into  dependants  and  partisans  of 
he  President?  Is  it  not  equally  apparent  that 
he  politician  who  controls  these  banks,  will  indi 
rectly  control  all  those  who  are  indebted  to 
hem,  and  thus  obtain  an  absolute  control  over 
he  public  will?  If  this  House  shall  confirm  the 
act  of  the  President,  it  will  be,  in  my  humble 
•pinion,  establishing  in  perpetuity,  a  corrupting 
:onnexion  between  the  banking  capital  and  the 
)olitical  power  of  the  country,  and  placing  them 
joth  in  the  hands  of  one  man.  I  trust  in  God 
hat  the  country  will- not  be  destined  to  such  a 
Condition  by  the  vote  of  this  House.  If  it  should, 
can  only  pray  that  a  power  more  than  human 
may  be  interposed  for  its  rescue. 


REMARKS 


OF   THE 


HOJV.  JOHJV  C.  CALHOUJV, 


DELIVERED    IN   THE 


SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  JAlra*T,  ,3,  1834, 


ON    THE    SUBJECT    OF   THE 


REMOVAL    OP    THE    DEPOSITES 


FROM    THE 


BANK    OF    THE    U.    STATES. 


WASHINGTON 
1834. 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALHOUN. 


IN  SENATE.—  MONDAY,  JAXUARY  13,  1834, 

The  Special  Gi-der  now  came  up,  Theques-jly  untenable;  and  yet,  as  broad  a  a  his  assump 
tion  being  on  Mr.  "CLAY'S  resolutions  m  regard  tions  are,    there  is    an    important  part   of  the 


\o  the  removal  of  the  Public  Deposites — 

Mr.  CALHOUN  then  rose,  and  said,  that  the 


transaction   which  he  does    not  attempt  to  vin 
dicate,  and  to  wlvi-eh  lie  has  not  even  alluded     £ 


statement  ef  this  case  might  be  given  in  a  veryishaH,  saM  Mr.  CALHOVTST,  now  proceed  without 
few  words.  The  16th  section  of  the  act  mcorpora- (farther  remark  to  make  good  these  assertions, 
ting  the  bank,  provides  that  wherever  there  is  a  j  The  Secretary,  at  the  commencement  of  his 
bank  or  branch  of  the  U.  States  Bank,  the  pub-;  argument,  .assumes  the  position  th'.t,  in  <he  ab- 
Jlic  moneys  ehoalcl  be  deposited  therein,  unless  'sence  of  nil  !erjal  provision,  he,  as  the  haad  of 
otherwise  ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Trea-  j  the  financial  department,  har"  the  right,  in  virtue 
fjury,  and  that,  in  that  case,  he  efcouid  report  to!  of  his  office,  to  designate  the  ajrent  and  place 
Congress,  if  in  session,  immediately^  and  if  wot,  (for  the  safe  keeping  of  thj  public  depcsites.  •  He 
at  the  commencement  of  the  next  session.  The  then  contends  that  the  I6th  section  does  not  re- 
Secretary,  acting  ttnder  the  provision  of  this  -sec-  strict  his  power,  which  stands,  he  acy?,  on 
tion,  has  ordered  the  deposit.es  to  be  withheld  |  the  same  ground  that  it  had  before  the  passing  of 
from  the  bank,  and  has  reported  his  reasons,  in  j  the  act  incorporating  the  bank,  it  m  unnecessary 
conformity  with  'the  provisions  of  th«  section.! to  inquire  into  the  correctness  of  th«  position  as- 
The  Senate  is  now  called  tipon  to  consider  I  sumed  hy  the  Secretary;  hui,  if  it  were,  it  would 
his  reasons,  in  order  to  determine  whether  j  not  be  difficult  to  show  that  when  an  agent,  wilh 
the  Secretary  is  justified  or  <MOt.  I  have  exam-  j  general  powers,  assumes,  in  the  execution  of  his 
ined  them  with  care  and  deliberation  without  the  j  agency,  a.  power  not  delegated,  the  assumption 
slightest  bias,  as  far  as  I  am  conscious,  per- j  rests  on  the  necessity  of  the  case;  and  that  no 
sonal  or  political.  I  have  but  a  slight  acquain-  i  power  in  such  case,  can  be  lawfully  exercised, 
tance  wilh  the  Secretary,  and  that  little  is  not  j  which  was  not  necessary  to  effect  tho  ob- 
^infavorablc 'to  him.  I  stand  wholly  disconnected  ijcct  intended.  Nor  would  it  be  difficult  to  show 
•with  the  two  great  parties  now  contending  for  that,  •«  this  case,  the  power  a  a  surn  ad  by  the  Se- 
-uscendancy.  My  political  connexions  ara  with  that  i  cretary  would  belong,  not  to  him,  but  to  the  Trca- 
•sinaM  and  denounced  party  which  has  voluntarily']  surer,  who,  under  the  act  organizing  the  Trc«r 
whorly  retired  from  the  party  strifes  of  the  day,  'sury  Department,  is  expressly  chsrged  with  !&£•' 
with  a  view  of  saving1,  if  possible,  the  liberty  'safe  keeping  of  the  public  funds,  for  whiolvb/;.  fo. 


and  the  Constitution  of  the  country,  in  this  great 
crisis  of  our  affairs. 


responsible  under  bond,  in  heavy  pena.!ti'««,  Bul> 
as  strongly  and  directly  as  these   consiUierationB 


Having  maturely  considered,  with  these  iin-  |bear  on  the  question  of  the  power  «*^t!;«  S ecre- 
partial  feelings,  the  reasons  of  the  Secretary,  I'tary,  I  do  not  think  it  neccssa-By-  to  pursue 
am  constrained  to  say,  that  he  has  entirety  failed  jthem,  for  the  pkin  reason  that  iko  Sajosei-ary  hn& 
to  make  out  his  justification.  At  the  very  com-  jentircly  mistaken  the  case.  It  is.- iw^* oust!,  a.sh;o- 
mencement  he  has  placed  his  rig'ht  to  remove  the  |  supposes,  where  there  is  nokg.ftS  j»;«yision  W  »;fr- 
deposites  on  an  assumption  resting1  on  a  miscon-  jlatiois  to  the  safe  keeping- o»t  tfe>:.''pui&^3-fundai  Hut 
•ccption  of  the  case.  In  the  progress  of  his  argu- jona  of  precise!  v  the  t^posite  cha<!»acter.  The- 
ment  he  has  entirely  abandoned  the  first,  and  as- ;  16th  section  expressly  v^ovid'ef  that  i^he  deponiteR 
sumed  a  new  and  greatly  enlarged  ground,  |  shall  bf:  made  in  th&  kink  and  its  brantfees,  and 
utterly  inconsistent  with  the  fust,  und  equal- ! of  COM r8A  it  fa  p@t0>ct]y  clew  that  all 


or  MR, 


which  the  Secretary  has  derived  from  the  genfe-  grmll  report  his  reasons.    It  is  obvious,- under  this 


rftl  and  inherent  powers  of  his  office,  in  the  asb- 


the  sufejeet,' tha$   the  9ecrt!ary    has  no 


»«nce  of  such  provision,  are  wholly  in  applicable  to '(right  lo*  act  ft?  relation  to  the  cfcposke&btit  with  » 
this  case.  Nor  is  it  less  clear,  that  if  the  section  j  v?ew  to1  their  Mi^rt-a'sed  secufify.  That  be  has  no 
had  terminated  with  the  provision  directing  the |  right  to  of  (Jerthtern'to'bie  withiiold  from •£heban>ksar 
deposites  to  be  made  in  the  ba)  k,  the  Secretary  long  as  the  ftmdsr  a"re  in>  safety,  a»nd  She  bank  hay 
would  have  had  no  more  control  over  the  faithfully  performed  the  {ftjtfea-  imposed  in  rela* 
aabjcct,  than  myself,  or  any  other  Senator;  and  it'  tion  to  them  ',  «rid  not  even'  Siren,  unless  the  depo 
follows,  of  course,  that  he  must  derive  his  power,  j  sites  can  be  placed  m  sitfer  end  rnt>re  faithful 
not  from  any  general  reasons  connected  with  the|  hands.  That  such  was  the  opinion*  of  the 
nature  of  his  office,  but  from  some  express  pro-  tive,  in  the  first  instance* 
vision  contained  in  the  section,  or  some  other  part  proof,  in  the  message  of  the  FresMcnJ  to  Congress 
of  the  act.  It  has  not  been  attempted  to  be  shown,!  at  the  close  of  the  last  session1,  l*&»clv  placed  thfc 
that  there  is  any  such  provision  in  any  other  |  subject  of  the  removal  of  the  deposes  excloigfive- 
section  or  part  of  the  act.  The  only  control,  jly  on  the  question  of  their  safety ;  andi  that  such' 
then,  which  the  Secretary  can  rightfully  claim  j  was  also  the  opinion  of  the  H.  of  Represeififfa&ye« 
over  the  deposites,  is  contained  in  the  provision! then,  we  have  equally  conclusive  proof,  frorfl^he' 
which  directs  that  the  deposites  shall  be  made  in  |  vote  of  that  body,  that  the  public  funds  in  t&# 
the  bank,  unless  otherwise  ordered  bv  the  Secre-j bank  were  safe,  which  was  understood,  at  that 
tary  of  the  Treasury;  which  brings  the  wiiole  time,onjall  sides,  by  friends  and  foes,  as  deciding 
quesLion,  in  reference  to  the  depoeites,  to  the  the  question  of  the  removal  of  the  deposites. 


extent  of  tho  power  which  Congress  intended  to 
confer  upon  the  Secretary,  in  these  few  words — 
''unless  otherwise  ordered." 

In  ascertaining  the  intention  of  Congress, 
I  lay  it  down  as  a  rule,  which  I  suppose  will 
not  be  controverted,  that  all  political  powers  un 
der  our  free  institutions  are  trust  powers,  and  not 
rights,  liberties  or  immunities,  belonging  per- 


The  extent  of  the  power  intended  to  be  con 
ferred  being  established,  the  question  now  arisen, 
jhas  the  Secretary  transcended  its  limit?  It 
can  scarcely  be  necessary  to  argue  this  point- 
It  is  not  even  pretended  that  the  public  de 
posites  were  in  danger,  or  that  the  Bank  had 
not  faithfully  performed  all  the  duties  imposed 
on  it  in  relation  to  them;  nor  that  t'he  Secre- 


eonally  to  the  officer.     I  also  lay  it  down  as  a  tary  had  placed    the  money    in    a  safer    or  in 


rule,  not  less  incontrovertible,  that  trust  powers 
are  necessarily  l.rnited  (unless  there  be  some  ex 
press  provision  to  the  contrary,)  to  the  subject  mat 
ter  and  object  of  the  trust.  This  brings  us  to  the 
question  —what  is  the  subject  and  object  of  the 
trust,  in  this  case.  The  whole  section  relates  to 


more  faithful  hands.  So  far  otherwise,  there  is 
not  a  man  who  hears  me,  who  will  not  admit  that 
the  public  moneys  are  now  less  safe  than  they 
were  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  And  1 
will  venture  to  assert,  that  not  a  capitalist  car- 
be  found  who  would  not  ask  a  considerably  higher 


deposites — to  the  safe  and  faithful  keeping  of  the  per  ctmtage  to  insure    them  in  their  present. 


public  funds.  With  this  view  they  are  directed 
to  be  made  in  the  bank.  With  the  same  view, 
and  in  order  to  increase  the  security,  power  was 
conferred  on  the  Secretary  to  withhold  the  depo 
sites;  and,  with  the  same  view,  he  is  directed  to 
report  his  reasons,  for  the  removal,  to  Congress. 
All  have  one  common  object — the  security  of  the 
public  funds.  To  this  point  the  whole  section 
converges.  The  language  of  Congress,  fairly  un 
derstood,  is — we  have  selected  the  bank  because 
we  confide  in  it  as  a  safe  and  faithful  agent  to 


than  in  the  place  of  deposite  designated  by  law. 
If  these  views  are  correct,  and  I  hold  them  to  be 
unquestionable,  the  question  is  decided.     The 
Secretary  has  no  right  to  withhold  the  deposite* 
from  the  Bank.     There  has  been,  and  can  be,} 
but  one  argument  advanced  in  favour  of  his  right;! 
which  has  even  the  appearance  of  being  tenable  il 
that  the  power  to  withhold  is  given  in  genera 
terms,  and  without  qualification,  "unless  the  See 
retary  otherwise  direct.'1     Those  who  resort  to 
this  argument,  must  assume  the  position — that 


keep  the  public  money;  but  to  prfirent  the  abuse;  the  letter  ought  to  prevail  over  the  clear  and  ma 


of  so  important  a  trust,  we  invest  the  Secretory 
with  power  to  remove  the  deposited,  with  a  view- 
to  their  inetteased  security.  And  lestthr1  Secre 
tary,  on  his  p*rt,  should  abuse  so 


—  and  in  o&iw  still  further  to  increase  that 


nifest  intention  of  the  act.  They  must  regaa 
the  power  of  the  Scretary,  not  as  a  trust  power 
limited  by  the  subject  and  the  object  of  the  truat, 
but  as  a  chartered  right,  to  be  used  according  U: 
his  discretion  and  pleasure.  There  is  a  radicai 
defect  in  our  mode  of  construing  political  pow 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALTiOUN. 


•ers,  of  which  this  and  many  other  imstances  afford 
•striking  examples  ;  but  I  will  give  the  Secretary 
liis  choice;  either  the  intention  or  the  letter  must. 


ground,  that  he  had  a  right  to  make  such  dispo 
sition  of  them  as  the  public  interest,  or  the  con 
venience  of  the  people  might  require.  I  have  said 


prevail;  he  may  select  either,  hut  cannot  Uc  per- 1  that  the  transition  of  the  Secretary  was  asobscure 


jnitted  to  take  one  or  the  other  as  may  suit  his 
^purpose.     If  he  chooses  the  former,  he  has  tran- 


as  it  was  rapid;  feist  ebscure  as  it  is,  he  has  said 
enough  to  enable  ®s  4o  perceive  the  process  by 


scendcd  his  powers,  as  £  have  clearly  demon-  j  which  he  has  reached  s<3  extraordinary  a  position; 


atratcd.  If  he  selects  the  latter,  he  is  equally 
Condemned,  as  he  has  clearly  exercised  power 
not  comprehended  ia  the  letter  of  his  authority. 
He  has  not  co? fined  himself  simply' to  withhold 
ing  the  pablic  moneys  from  the  Sank  of  the  U. 
•States,  but  he  has  ordered  them  to  be  deposited 
^n  other  Banks,  though  there  is  »et  a  word  in 


and  we  may  safely  arErra,  that  his  arguments  are 
nut  less  extraordinary  than  the  conclusion  at 
which  he  arrives,.  His  first  proposition,  which, 
however,  he  has  not  ventured  to  lay  down  ex 
pressly,  is,  that  Congress  has  an  unlimited  con 
trol  over  th«  <ta£>«sites,  ami  that  it  may  dispose 
of  them  ia  whatever  manner  it  rsty  please,  in 


'the  section  t©  justify  it.     I  do-not  intend  to  argue  j  order  to  promote  the  genend  welfare  and  conve- 


the  question,  whether  he  Had  •&.  right  (to  order  the 
funds,  withheld  frora  the  United  States  Bant  to 
•be  placed  in  the  State  Banks  which  he  has  select- 
«ed ;  but  f  ask,  how  has  he  acquired  that  right  ? 
It  rests  wholly  ©n  construction — on  the  supposed 
intention  of  the  legisUUure,  which,  when  it  gives 
a  power,  intends  to  give  a&l  the  means  necessary 
to  render  it  available.  But,  as  clear  as  this  prin 
ciple  of  construction  is,  it  is  not  more  clear  than 


nience  of  the  people.  H-e  next  Asserts  that  Con 
gress  has  parted  with  this  power,  i«Rde.r  fcUe  six 
teenth  section,  which  directs  the  deposKes  to  be 
made  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  then 
concludes  with  affirming  that  it  has  invested  the 
Secretary  tsf  the  Treasury  with  it,  for  reasons 
which  he  professes  to  be  unable  to  «a4enit*fld. 

It  cannot  be  necessary,  before  so  enlightened 
a  body,  that  I  should  undertake  to  refute  an  ar- 


t  which  would  limit  the  right  of  the  Secretary  jgument  S<D  utterly  untrue  in   premises  and  con- 


nu>  the  question  of  the  safe  and  faithful  keeping 
iof  the  public  fun&s  ;  and  I  cannot  adnih,  that  the 
Secretary  shall  be  permitted  to  resort  to  the  letter 
or  to  construction,  as  may  best  be  calculated  to 
enlarge  his  power,  when  the  right  construction 
as  denied  to  those  who  would  limit  his  power  by 
the  clear  and  obvious  intention  of  Congress. 

I  might  here,  said  Mr.  CAI.HOUN,  r«stthe  ci«es- 
$ion  of  the  power  of  the  Secretary  over  the  de- 
sposites,  without  adding  another  word.  I  have 
placed  it  on  grounds  from  which  no  in-geouity, 
feowevcr  great,  or  subtlety,  however  rented,  oan 
remove  it;  but  suck  is  the  magnitude  of  the  case, 


clusioa — t®  show  that  Congress  never  possessed 
the  pwer  which  the  Secretary  dairriB  for  it — 
that  it  is  a  power, from  its  very  nature,  incapable 
of  such  enlargement,  being  limited  solely  to  the 
safe  keeping  of  the  public  funds — that  if  it  ex 
isted,  it  would  be  susceptible  of  the  most  danger 
ous  abuses — that  Congress  might  make  the  wild 
est  and  most  dangerous  association  the  depository 
of  the  public  funds — might  place  them  in  the 
hands  of  the  fanatics  and  the  madmoh  of  the 
North,  who  are  waging  war  against  the 
tic  institutions  ef  the  South,  under  the  plea  of 
promoting  the  ge»eral  welfare.  But  admitting 
and  such  my  desire  t©  give  the  reasons  of  the k-hat  Congress  possessed  the 'power  which  the 
Secretary  the  frailest  consideration,  that  I  shall  Secretary  attributes  to  it,  fey  what  process  of  rea- 


•follow  him  through  the  remainder  of  his  reasons. 
That  the  Secretary  was  conscious  that  the 
•first  position  which  he  assumed,  ansd  which  I 
'have  considered,  was  untenable,  we  have 
•ample  proof  in  the  precipitancy  with  which 


soning  can  he  eh®w  tha£  it  has  parted  with  this 


unlimited  power, 


by  directing  the 


moneys  t«  be  deposited  in  the  Bunk  of  tfee  United 
States  ?  or,  if  it  feas  {parted  witb  the  power,  by 
what  extraordinary  process  has  itlbeen  transfer- 


.he  retreated    frem  it.       He   had    scarcely  laid! rod  to  .the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  by  those 
it    down,    when,  without  iilustratiem   or  argu-  few  and  simple  words,  -"uaalcss  he  shall  other- 
mcnt,  he  passed  with  a  ra|>id  transition,  and  I!  wise  direct?"    in  saptpent  of  this  extraordinx 
must  say  a  transition  as  obscure  as  rapid,  to  an-larganaeat,  -the  Secretary  has  offered  not  a  singio 
-other  position  wholly  iiaceBsistent  with  the  first^  illustration,  n«r-&  aing-le  remark  bearing  the  sem- 


and  in  ass-eming1  whick  he  expressly  repudiates 
the  idea  that  the  safe  atid  faithful  keeping  of  the 
public  funds  had  any  necessary  conncxien  with 
fois  removal  of  the  dcposites ;  his  power  to  do 
wiaich  he  places  on  the  broad  and  .unlimited 


blance  of  rea©©^  baat  one,  which  I  shall  now  pro 


ceed 


He  asserts,  and  asserts  truly,  that  the  bank 
charter  is  a  contract  between  the  Government,  or 
rather  the  people  of  the  U.  B.  and  the  banJ^aad 


^  Mit  c 


then  i  ,sumes  that  it  co institutes  him  a  common 
agent  or  trustee,  to  superintend  the  execution  oi 
the  stipulations  contained  in  that  portion  of  the 
contract  comprehended  in  the  sixteenth  section. 
Let  us  now,  taking  these  assumptions  to  be  true, 
asoortain  what  those  stipulations  are,  the  super-' 
inlendeuce  of  the  execution  oi'  which,  as  lie  at'-* 
firms,  are  jointly  conn'ded  by  the  parties  to  the 
Secretary,  The  Government  stipulated-*  on  its 
part,  that  the  public-  money  should  be  depersiied 
in  the  Bank  of  the  U.  S. — a  jjreat  and  valuable 
privilege,  0:1  which  the  successful  operation  of  the 
i:istitutioa  muinly  depend s-  The  Bunk,  on  ita 
part,  stipulated  that  the  funds  should  be  safely 
kept  -that  the  duties  imposed  in  relatiwi  to  them 
8heuld  be  faithfully  discharged,  arid  that  for  this, 
with  other  privileges,  it  would  pay  to  the  Govern-' 
merit  the  sum  of  ome  million  five  hundred  thou 
sand  dollars.  These  are  the  stipulation?,  the  ex 
ecution  of  which,  according  to  the  Secretary'*  as 
sumption,  he  hatf  been  appointed  as  joint  agent  or 
trustee,  to  Superintend*  and  from  frhicbbc  would 
Resume  the  extraordinary  power  which  he  claims 
over  the  depositor  to  dispose  of  them  in  auch 
manner  as  he  may  think  the  public  interest  or  the 
convenience  of  the  people  may  require. 

Is  it  not  obvious  that  the  whole  extent  of  power 
conferred  upon  him,  admitting  his  assumption  to 
be  true,  i.s  to  withhold  the  deposites  in  case  that 


faithfully  observe  it.  How  has  the  Secretary  per 
formed  these  solemn  duties,  which,  according  to- 
his  representation,  havCjbeen  imposed  upon  him. 
Has  he  protected  the  bank  against  the  aggression 
of  the  government,  or  the  government  against  the 
unfaithful  conduct  of  the  bank  in  relation  to  thn 
dcfptohe*  1  Or  has  he,  forgetting  his  sacred'  ob1- 
ligaiion*,  disregarded  the  interests  of  IWrth  —  on 
one  side,-  divesting  the  bank  of  tlse  dcpottites,  and 
ori  the  oth'er,  defeating  the  government  in  the  in- 


tended  security  of  the  public  fua-ftey  by  seizing1  0:1 
them  as  ihe  property  of  the  Executive,  to  be 
disposed  at  pleasure,  te  f&vori'tc  &ud  p/artizart 
banks. 

But  I  #hall  relieve  the  Secretory  frem  this  awft- 
ward  and  disreputable  position  'in  which  hi;* 
own  arguments  have  placed  him.  He  is  not  the 
mutual  trustee,  as  he  has  represented,  of  the  gor- 
eminent  and  the  bank  ;  but  simply  the  agent  o£ 
tho  former,  vested  under  ths  contract,  with  power 
to  withhold  the  deposites  with  a  view,as  has-been; 
stated,  to  their  additional  security  —  to  Jht'iE  safo- 
keeping  :  and  if  he  had  but  for  a  momfiat  reflect 
ed  on  the  fact,  that  he  was  directed  to  report  his- 
reasons  to  Congress  only,  arid  not  ulso  to  the 
bank,  for  withholding  the  deposites,  he  could, 
scarcely  have  failed  to  perceive  that  he  was  sim 
ply  the  agent  •  c£  on«  of  the  parties,,  and  not>.  a»» 
lie  supposes-,  a  joint  agent  of  both* 


the  biink  shoifid  violate  its  stipulations  in  relation 
to  thc!rn  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other  to  prevent 
the  Govern  aren't  from  withholding  the  deposites, 
so  long-  as  the  bank  faithfully  performed  ii.s  part  |i  -  . 

of  the  contract.     This  is  the  full   extent  of  his 

.  oxerene  power 

power.   According  ta  his  own    smwnii'.r.,.    not  a 

particle  more  can  be  added.  But  there  is-  another 
aspect  ir>  which  the  position  in  which  the  Secre 
tary  has  placed  himself  may  be  viewed.  It  oibrs 
for  C9nsideration  not  only  a.  question  of  tha- extent 
of  his  power,  but  a  question  aw  to  the  nature  and 
extent  ofdut"  which  has  been  imposed  upon  him. 
If  the  position  be  sucbus  he  has  described,  there 
has  been  confided  tohim  a  trust  of  the  mos-t  sacred 
character,  acctjmpmiied  by  duties-  &f,  the  mos! 
«)lemn  oblig&iiftns.  He  s-'ands  by  the  nuvtua 
confidence  of  th-e  parties,  vested  v;ith  the  high 
judicial  power  tcx  determine  on  tine  infraction  o. 
of  a»  Contract  in  wluuh  g.overwnerit 


The  Secretary  having1  established,  as  he  sup 
poses,  his  right  to  dispose  of  She  depoeites,  as.  m« 
his  opiniiim  the  general  interest  and  conveuitnce 


aiuit  a  large  aotl  re»peetuble  port'uem.  of  the  citi 
icns  are  dooply  iirterestedf  und,  ln<  ihia-execution 
of  this  high  power,  ho  is  bound,  bv  honor  ant' 
con  science,,  so-  to  act  as  to  protsctouch  of  fche  par 
ties  in  'lie  fu-H  enjoyment  of  their  respective  por 
tion  oi'  benefit  in.  tlio  contract,  so  long  as  the\ 


with  a  boldness  comrn^n&urate- 
With  the  extravagance  of  t&e  rjght  v/hidi  he  has 
assumed.  Ho  commersces  v/ith  a  claim  to  deter 
mine  in  his  official  character,  that  the  Bank  o-f  the- 
United  Slates  is  u  ncorist.it  u1  brail  —  a  moncpcly-  — 
baneful  to-fche  welfere  ofi'She  eoawminiiy.  Having- 
determined  this  point,  he  e-jtrics  to  the  eooolaMMai 
that  the  charter  of  the  bank  oug-ht  not  t>u  be  re 
newed,  and1  therr  assumes  that  it  will'  not  be-  re" 
newed..  Having*  reached  this  point  he  tlieii-  deter 
mines  that  it  is  his  duty  to  remove  the  dvpoaites. 
No  one  can  ohjettt  th^t-  Mr.  'Faney,  ay  a.  citizen, 
in  his  incSvicilsal?  eharacfey,  should  entertain  a;3t 
opinion  as  tothe  lynconstitationaliJy  of  the  bank  ~r 
but  that  he-,  acting-  m  hia  oHacial  character,  and 


performing  official  acts  undcs  the  charter  of  the 
oank,  shoirld  urxlerta-ke  to-  -dfct-eriBine  tl>at  the  in- 
;titution  wa«  unconstitutional,  andthat  Shose  who 
granted  the  charter,  and  bestowed  upon  him  hia 
power  to  act  under  it,  had  violated  the  constitu 
tion,  is  art  assumption  off  power  of  a  nature  which- 


SPEECH  OP  MR.  CALHOUN. 


I  mil  not  undertake  to  characterize,  as  I  wish  no 
to  be  personal. 

But  he  is  not  content  with  the  power  simpl 
to  determine  on  the  unconstitutionality  of  th 
hank.  He  goes  far  beyond — he  claims  t 
be  the  organ  of  the  voice  of  the  people.  I 
t4iishigh  character  he  pronounces  that  the  qties 
lion  of  the  renewal  of  the  bank  charte 
was  put  in  issue  at  the  last  Presidential  elec 
tion,  and  that  the  people  had  de term! nee 
that  it  should  not  be  renewed.  I  do  not,  saic 
Mr. 


intend  to  enter  into  the  argumen 
whether,m  point  of  fact,the  renewal  of  the  char 
ter  was  put  at  issue  at  the  last  election.     Tha 
point  was  ably  and  fully  discussed  by  the  honor 
able  Senators  from  Kentucky,  (Mr.  CLAT,)  am 
New  Jersey,  (Mr.  SOUTHAHD,)  who  conclusive 
Jy  proved  that  no  such  question  was  involved  ii 
the  issue;  and,if  it  were,  the  issue  comprehendec 
so  many  others  that  it  was  impossible  to  conjec 
ture  on  which  the  election   turned.     I  look  to 
higher  objections.   I  would  inquire  by  what  au 
thority  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  consti 
tutes  himself  the  organ  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States .     He  has  the  reputation  of  being 
an  able  lawyer,  and  can  he  be  ignorant  that  SQ 
long   as  the    Constitution  of  the  United  States 
exists,  the  only  organs  of  the  people  of  these 
States,  as  far  us  the  action  of  the  General  Go 
vernment  is  concerned,  are  the  several  depart- 
mentSjlegislative,  executive,  and  judicial;  whic 
acting   within  the  respective  limits  assigned 
the  Constitution,  have  a  right  to  pronounce  a 
thoritatively,  the  voice  of  the  people.     A  clai 
on  the  part  of  the  Executive  to  interpret,  as  tl 
Secretary  has  don^,  the  voice  of  the  peopl 
through  any  other  channel,  is  to  shake  the  fou 
dation  of  our  sy  stem.  H  as  the  Sec'tary  forgottc 
that  the  last  step  to  absolute  power  is  this  ver 
assumption  which   he  has  claimed  for  that  d 
partment?     I  am  thus  brought,  said  Mr.  C.,  t 
allude  to  the  extraordinary  manifesto  read  b 
the  President  to  the  Cabinet,  and  which  is  s 
intimately    connected    with  the  point    imme 
diately  under  consideration.     That  document 
though  apparently  addressed  te  the  Cabinet 
was  clearly  and  manifestly  intended  as  an  ap 
peal  to  the   people  of  the  United  States,  and 
opens  a   new   and   direct  organ  of  commun' 
cation  between  the  President  and  them  un 
knawn  to  the  Constitution  and  the  laws.  Ther 
are  but  two  channels  known  to  either,  througl 


which   the 
he  people- 


President  can  communicate    wit) 
-by  messages  to  the  two  Houses  o 


Congress,  as  expressly  provided  for  in  the  Con- 
stilution,  or  by  proclamation,  setting  forth  the 
interpretations  which  he  places  upon  a  law  it 
has  become  his  official  duty  to  execute.     Going 
beyond, is  one  amongst  the  alarming  signs  of  the 
times  which  portend  the  overthrow  of  the  Con 
stitution  and  the  approach  of  despotic  power. 
The  Secretary,  having  determined  that  the 
Bank  was  unconstitutional,  and  that  the  people 
had  pronounced  against  the  recharter.concludes 
that  Congress  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  sub 
ject.     "With  a  provident  foresight,  he  perceives 
the  difficulty  and  embarrasment  into  which  the 
currency  of  the  country  would  be  thrown  on 
the  termination  o£the  Bank  charter^  to  prevent 
which,  he  proceeds  deliberately,  with  a  paren 
tal  care,  to  supply  a  new  currency,  « 'equal  to,  or  ' 
better,"  than  that  which  Congress  had  supplied. 
With  this  view,  he  determines  on  an  immediate 
removal  of  the  deposites;  he  puts  them  in  certain 
State  institutions*   intending   to  organize  them 
after  the  fashion  of  the  empire  state,  into  a  great 
afety-fund  system,but  which,  unfortunately,  un* 
loubtedly  for  the  projectors,  if  not  for  the  coun- 
ry,  the  limited  power  of  the  State  Banks  did  not 
permit  him  to  effect.  But  a  substitute  was  found 
?y  ansoeiating  them  in  certain  articles  of  agree 
ment,  and  appointing  an  inspector  general  of  all 
Ilia  league  of  banks!  and  all  this   without  law 
r  appropriation !     Is  it  not  amazing,  that  it  ne 
ver  occurred  to  the  Secretary,  that  the  subject 
of  currency  belonged  exclusively  to  Congress, 
and  that  to  assume  to  regulate  it  WHS  a   plain 
usurpation  of  tjie  powers  of  that  department  of 
the  government? 

Hayingthus  assumed  the  power  officially  to  de 
termine  on  the  constitutionality  of  the  Bank;  hav- 
ng  erected  himself  into  an  organ  of  the  people's 
voice,  and  settled  the  question  of  the  regulation 
of  the  currency,  he  next  proceeds  to  assume 
the  judicial  powers  over  the  Bank.   He  declares 
hat  the  Bank  has  transcended  its  powers,  and 
has  therefore  forfeited  its  charter,  for  which  he     ' 
nflicts  on  the  institution  the  severe   and  exem-   •  • 
>lary  punishment  of  withholding  the  deposites;  '"'':>l 
and  all  this  in  the  face  of  an  express  provision,'  :'"' 
nvesting  the  court  with  power  touching  the  in-'  "* 
raction  of  the  charter,  directing  in  what  manner 
le  trial  should  be  commenced  and  conducted,     " 
nd  securing  expressly  to  the  bank  the  sacred     ''*• 
right  of  trial  by  jury  in  finding  the  facts.     Alt   '•'•'• 
his  passed  for  nothing  in  the  eyes  of  the  Seen 
etary,  who  was  too  deeply  engrossed  in  provi 
ding  for  the  common  welfare  to  regard  either 


9 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALHOtW. 


hourly  meddling  in  politics,  and  that  he  is  one 


Congress  the  Court,  or  the  Constitution.  The 

Secretary   next     proceeds   to    supervise    the 

general  operations  of  the   bank,  pronouncing 

with  authority  that,  at  one  time,  it  has  discount 
ed  too  freely,    and  at  another,    too  sparingly, 

without  reflecting  that  all  the  control  which 

the  government  ean  rightfully  exercise  over  the 

operations  of  the  institution,  is  through  the  five 

directors  who  represent  the  Government  in  this 

respect.     Directors!      Mr.  CALHOUN   exclaim 
ed,   did  I  say,  (alluding  to  the  present,)    No, 

spies  is  their  proper  designation. 

I  cannot,  said  Mr.  C.,  proceed  with  the  re 
marks  which  I  intended,  on  the  remainder  of 

the  Secretary's  reasons;  I  have  not  patience  to 

dwell  on  assumptions  of  power  so  bold,  so  law 

less,  and  so  unconstitutional;  they  deserve  not 

the  name  of  argument,  and  I  cannot  waste  time 

in  treating  them  as  such.     There  a~e,  however, 

two  which  I  cannot  pass  over,  not  because  they 

are  more  extraordinary  or  audacious  than  the 

otherSjbut  for  another  quality, which  I  choose  not  nation  ? 

to  designate. 

The  Secretary  alleges  that  the  bank  has  in 
terfered  with  the  politics  of  the  country.  If  this 

be  true,  it  certainly  is  a  most  heinous  offence. 

The  bank  is  a  great  public  trust,  possessing,  for 

the  purpose  of  discharging  the  trust,  great  power 

and  influence,  which  it  could  not  pervert  from 

the  object  intended  to  that  of  influencing  the 

politics  of  the  country,  without  being  guilty  of 
a  great  political  crime.  In  making  these  re 
marks,  I  do  not  intend  to  give  any  counte- 
nance  to  the  trxith  of  the  charge  alleged  by 
the  Secretary,  nor  to  deny  to  the  officers  of 
be  bank  the  right  which  belongs  to  them, 
in  common  with  every  citizen,  freely  to  form 
political  principles,  and  act  on  them,  in  their 
private  capacity,  without  permitting  them  to 
influence  their  official  conduct.  But  it  is 
strange  it  did  not  occur  to  the  Secretary, 
while  he  was  accusing  and  punishing  the 
bank  on  the  charge  of  interfering  in  the 
politics  of  the  country,  that  the  Government 
also  was  a  great  trust,  vested  with  pow 
ers  still  more  extensive,  and  influence  im 
measurably  greater  than  that  of  the  bank,  given 
to  enable  it  to  discharge  the  object  for  which  it 
was  created;  and  that  it  has  no  more  right  to  per 
vert  its  power  and  influence  into  the  means  of  con 
trolling  the  politics  of  the  country,  than  the  bank 
itself.  Can  it  be  unknown  to  him  that  the  Fourth 
Auditor  of  the  Treasury — (an  officer  in  his  own 
Department,)  the  man  who  has  made  so  promi 
nent  a  figure  in  this  transaction.  w»a  daily  and  I  wasted  thousands  where  the  bank,  even  ac- 


of  the  principal  political  managers  of  the  Admin 
istration?  Can  he  be  ignorant  that  ths  whole 
power  of  the  Government  has  been  perverted 
into  a  great  political  machine^  with  a  view  of 
corrupting  and  controlling  the  Country?  Can  he 
be  ignorant  that  the  avowed  and  open  policy  of 
the  Government  is  to  reward  political  friends, 
and  punish  political  enemies  ?  and  that,  acting 
on  this  principle*  it  has  driven  from  office  hun 
dreds  of  honest  and  competent  officers  for  opin 
ion's  sake  only,  and  filled  their  places  with  devo 
ted  partisans?  Can  ho  be  ignorant  that  the  real 
offence  of  the  Bank,  is  not  that  it  has  intermed 
dled  in  politics,  but  because  it  would  not  inter 
meddle  on  the  side  of  power?  There  is  nothing 
more  dignified  than  reproof  from  the  lips  of  irmc- 
cence,  or  punishment  from  the  hands  of  justice; 
but  change  the  picture — let  the  guilty  reprove, 
and  the  criminal  punish,  and  what  more  odious, 
more  hateful,  can  be  presented  to  the  imagi- 


The  Secretary  next  tells  us,  in  the  same  spirit, 
that  the  bank  had  been  wasteful  of  the  public 
funds.  That  it  has  spent  some  thirty,  forty,  or 
fifty  thousand  dollars — I  do  not  remember  the 
exact  amount — (trifles  have  no  weight  in  the 
determination  of  so  great  a  question)  in  circu 
lating  essays  and  speeches  in  defence  of  the 
institution,  of  which  sum,  one-fifth  part — 
some  seven  thousand  dollars  —belonged  to  the 
Government.  Well,  sir,  if  the  bank  has  really 
wasted  this  amount  of  the  public  money,  it  is  a 
grave  charge.  It  has  not  a  right  to  waste  a 
single  centj  but  I  must  say,  in  defence  of  the 
bank,  that,  assailed  as  it  was  by  the  Ex 
ecutive,  it  would  have  been  unfaithful  to  its 
trust,  both  to  the  stockholders  and  to  the  pub 
lic,  had  it  not  resorted  to  every  proper  means 
in  its  power  to  defend  its  conduct,  and,  among- 
others,the  free  circulation  of  able  and  judicious 
publications. 

But  admit  that  the  bank  has  been  guilty  of 
wasting  the  public  funds,,to  the  full  extent  charg 
ed  by  the  Secretary,  I  would  ask  if  he,  the 
head  of  the  financial  department  of  the  Go 
vernment,  is  not  under  as  high  and  solemn  ob 
ligation  to  take  care  of  the  monied  interest 
of  the  public  as  the  bank  itself?  I  would 
ask  him  to  answer  me  a  few  simple  ques 
tions:  How  has  he  performed  this  duty  in  rela 
tion  to  the  interest  which  the  public  holds  in  the 
bank?  Has  he  befcn  less  wasteful  than  he  has 
charged  the  bank  to  have  been?  Has  he  not 


SPEECH  OF  MU.  CALHOUN. 


cording  to  his  o\Vn  statement,  has  hundreds ? 
Has  he  not,  by  withdrawing1  the  deposites 
and  placing  them  in  the  State  Banks,  where 
the  public  receives  not  a  cent  of  interest, 
greatly  affected  the  dividends  of  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States,in  which  the  Government, 
as  a  stockholder,  is  a  loser  to  the  amount  of 
one-fifth  of  the  diminution?— a  sum  which  I 
will  venture  to  predict  will  many  fold  exceed 
the  entire  amount  which  the  bank  has  expended 
iti  its  defence.  But  this  is  a  small,  a  very  small 
proportion  of  the  public  loss,  in  consequence 
of  the  course  Which  the  Executive  has  pursued 
in  relation  to  the  bank,  and  which  has  reduced 
the  value  of  the  shares,  from  130  to  108— (a 
Senator  near  me  says  much  more.  It  may 
be,  I  am  not  particular  in  such  things  ) — and  on 
which  the  public  sustains  a  corresponding  loss 
OH 'its  share  of  the  stock,  amounting  to  seven 
millions  of  dollars — a  sum  more  than  two  hun 
dred  fold  greater  than  the  waste  which  he  has 
charged  upon  the  bank.  Other  administra 
tions  may  exceed  this  in  talents,  patriotism, and 
honesty,  but  certainly  in  audacitjvn  effrontery, 
h  stands  without  a  parallel! 

The  Secretary  has  brought  forward  many  and 
grievous  charges  against  the  Bank.  I  will  not 
condescend  to  notice  them — it  is  the  conduct  of 
the  Secretary,  and  not  that  of  the  Bank,  which 
is  immediately  under  examination,  and  he  has  no 
right  to  drag  the  conduct  of  the  Bank  into  the 
issue,  beyond  its  operations  in  regard  to  the  de 
posites.  To  that  extent  I  am  prepared  to  ex 
amine  his  allegations  against  it;  but  beyond 
that  he  has  no  right— no,  not  the  least — to  ar 
raign  the  conduct  of  the  Bank  j  and  I,  for  one, 
will  not,  by  noticing  his  charges  beyond  that 
point,  sanction  his  authority  to  call  its  conduct  in 
question.  But  let  the  point  in  issue  be  deter 
mined,  and  I,  as  far  as  my  voice  extends,  will 
give  to  those  who  desire  it  the  means  of  the 
freest  and  most  unlimited  inquiry  into  its  conduct. 
I  am  no  partizan  of  the  Bank — I  am  connected 
with  it  in  no  way,  by  monied  or  political  tics.  I 
might  say,  with  truth,  that  the  Bank  owes  as 
much  to  mo  as  to  any  other  individual  in  the 
country ;  and  I  might  even  add  that,  had  it  not 
been  for  my  efforts,  it  would  not  have  been  char 
tered.  Standing  in  this  relation  to  the  institu 
tion,  a  high  sense  of  delicacy — a  regard  to  inde 
pendence  and  character,  has  restrained  me  from 
any  connexion  with  the  institution  whatever,  ex 
cept  some  trifling  accommodations,  in  the  way 
of  ordinary  business,  which  were  not  of  the 


slightest  importance  either  to  the  Bank  or  my 
self. 

But  whiie  I  shall  not  condescend  to  notice  the 
charges  of  the  Secretary  against  the  Bank,  be 
yond  the  extent  which  1  have  stated,  a  sense  of 
duty  to  the  institution,  and  regard  to  tha  part 
which  I  took  in  ita  creation,  compels  me  to  notice 
two  allegations  against  it  which  have  fallen 
from  another  quarter.  It  is  said  that  the  Bank 
had  no  agency,  or  at  least  efficient  agency,  in  the 
restoration  of  specie  payment  in  1817,  and  that 
it  had  failed  to  furnish  the  country  with  a  uniform 
and  Hound  currency,  as  had  been  promised  at  its 
creation.  Both  of  these  allegations  I  pronounce 
to  be  without  just  foundation.  To  enter  into  a 
minute  examination  of  them,  would  carry  me  too 
far  from  the  subject,  and  I  must  content  myself 
with  saying,  that  having  been  on  the  political 
stage  without  interruption,  from  that  day  to  this 
— having  been  an  attentive  observer  of  the  ques 
tion  of  the  currency  throughout  the  whole  period 
—that  the  Bank  has  been  an  indispensable  agent 
in  the  restoration  of  specie  payments ;  that,  with 
out  it,  the  restoration  could  not  have  been  effect 
ed  short  of  the  utter  prostration  of  all  the  monied 
institutions  of  the  country,  and  an  entire  depre 
ciation  of  Bank  paper;  and  that  it  has  not  only 
restored  specie  payment,  but  has  given  a  currency 
far  more  uniform,  between  the  extremes  of  the 
country,  than  was  anticipated  or  even  dreamed  of 
at  the  time  of  ita  creation.  I  will  say  for  myself, 
that  I  did  not  believe,  at  that  time,  that  the  ex,- 
change  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  West 
would  be  brought  lower  than  two  and  a  half  per 
cent.— the  estimated  expense  then,  including 'in* 
surance  and  loss  of  time,  of  transporting  specie 
between  the.two  points.  How  much  it  was  below 
the  anticipated  point,  I  need  not  state;  the  whole 
commercial  world  knows  that  it  was  not  a  fourth 
part  at  the  time  of  the  removal  of  the  deposites. 

But  to  return  from  this  digression.  Though  I 
will  not  notice  the  charges  of  the  Secretary  for  the 
reasons  already  stated,  I  will  take  the  liberty  of 
propounding  to  those  who  support  them  on 
this  floor,  a  few  plain  questions.  If  there  be 
in  banking  institutions  an  inherent  tendency  so 
strong  to  abuse  and  corruption  as  they  contend— 
if,  in  consequence  of  this  tendency,  the  bank  of 
the  United  States  be  guilty  ef  the  enormous 
charges  and  corruptions  alleged,  notwithstand 
ing  ita  responsibility  to  the  Government  and  our 
control  over  it,  what  is  to  be  expected  from  irres 
ponsible  league  banks,  as  caUed  by  the  Senator 
from  Kentucky,  (Mr  CLAY,)  over  which  we  can 
have  no  legal  control?  If  our  power  of  renewing 


10 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALHOUK. 


the  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States- 
it"  our  right  to  vacate  the  charter  by  scire  facias 
in  case  of  misconduct — if  the  influence  which  the 
appointment  of  five  Government  Directors  gives 
us;  and,  finally,  if -hi;  power  which  we  have  ofap 
pointing  committes  to  examine  into  its  condition 
are  not  sufficient  to  hold  the  institution  in  check; 
If,  in  spite  of  all  these,  n  lias,  from  the  innate  cor 
ruption  of  such  institutions,  been  guilty  of  the 
enormous  abuses  and  crimes  charged  against  it, 
what  may  we  not  expect  fr-m  the  associated 
banks,  the  favorites  of  the  Treasury,  over  the 
renewal  of  whose  charter  the  Government  has 
no  power;  against  which  it  can  issue  no  scirtfa- 
ctcri,  in  whose  direction  it  has  not  a  single  indi 
vidual  and  into  whose  conduct  Congress  can  ap 
point  no  committee  to  look?  With  t'nese  checks 
all  withdrawn,  what  will  be  the  condition  of 
the  public  funds. 

I,  said  Mr.  CALHOITN,  stated  in  the  outset 
of  my  remarks,  that,  as  broad  as  was  the  power 
which  the.  Secretary  had  assumed  in  relation 
to  the  deposited,  there  was  a  portion  of  the 
transaction  of  a  highly  important  character,  to 
which  he  has  not  alluded,  and  in  relation  to 
which  he  has  nei  even  attempted  a  justification. 
I  will  now  proceed  to  make  good  this  assertion  to 
the  letter. 


dcposites  from  one  place  to  another,  for  the  con 
venience  of  disbursements;  but  which,  by  a  strange 
perversion,  is  now  attempted  to  be  so  construed  aa 
to  confer  on  the  Secretary  the  power  to  withdraw 
the  money  from  the  deposite,  and  to  loan  it  to  fa 
vorite  State  banks. — I  express  myself  too  favora 
bly,  I  should  say  give — (they  pay  no  interest) 
with  a  view  to  sustain  their  credits,  or  en 
large  their  profits — a  power,  not  only  far  beyond 
the  Secretary,  but  which  Congress  itself  could 
not  exercise  without  a  flagrant  breach  of  the  Con 
stitution.  But,  it  is  said,  in  answer  to  these 
views,  that  money  paid  in  deposite  into  the  bank, 
as  directed  by  law,  is  not  in  the  Treasury.  I 
will  not  stop,  said  Mr.  C,,  to  reply  to  such  an 
objection.  If  it  be  not  in  the  treasury,  where  is  the 
Treasury  ?  If  it  be  not  money  in  the  Treasury, 
where  is  the  money  annually  reported  to  be  in 
:he  Treasury  ?  Where  the  eight  or  nine  millions 
which,  by  the  annual  report  of  the  Secretary,  is 
said  to  be  now  in  the  Treasury?  Are  we  to  under 
stand  that  none  of  this  money  is,  in  truth,  in  the 
Treasury  ?- -that  it  is  floating  about  at  large, 
subject  to  be  disposed  of— to  be  given  away,  at 
he  will  of  the  Executive,  to  favorites  and  parti- 
zans  ?  So  .it  would  seem  ;  for  it  appears,  by  u 
correspondence  between  the  Treasurer  and  the 
lashier  of  the  bank,  derived  through  the  bank, 


There  is  a  material  difference   between  with-  (the   Secretary  not  deeming  it  worth  while  to 

give  the  slightest  information  of  the  transaction, 
as  if  a  matter  of  course,)  that  he  has  drawn  out 
two  millions  and  a  quarter  of  the  public  money, 
without  appropriation,  and  distributed  it  at  plea 
sure  among  his  favorites ! 

But  it  is  attempted  to  vindicate  the  conduct 
of  the  Secretary  on  the  ground  of  precedent.  I 
will  not  stop  to  notice  whether  the  cases  cited 
are  in  point;  nor  will  I  avail  myself  of  the  great 
and  striking  advantage  that  I  might  have  on  the 
question  of  precedent:  this  case  stands  alone  and 
distinct  from  all  others.  There  is  none  similar  to 
it  in  magnitude  and  importance.  I  waive  all  that; 


money  from  going  into  the  bank,  and 
withdrawing  it  after  it  has  been  placed  there. 
The  former  is  authorized  in  the  manner  which  I 
have  stated,  under  the  sixteenth  section,  which  di 
rects,  as  has  been  frequently  stated,  that  the 
public  money  shall  be  deposited  in  the  bank, 
unless  otherwise  ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury.  But  neither  that  section,  nor  any  por 
tion  of  the  act  incorporating  the  bank,  nor,  in 
truth,  any  other  act,  gives  the  Secretary  any  au 
thority,  of  himself,  to  withdraw  public  money  de 
posited  in  the  bank.  There  is,  I  repeat,  a  mate 
rial  difference  between  withholding  public  money 


from  deposite  and  withdrawing  it.     When  paid  1 I  P^ce  myself  on  higher  grounds— I  stand  on 
into  the  plaee  designated  by  law  as  the  deposite  j^6  immovable  principle  that,  on  a  question  of 


of  the  public  money,  it  passes  to  the  credit  of  the 
Treasurer,  and  then  is  in  the  Treasury  of  the 
United  States,  whore  it  is  placed  under  the  pro 
tection  of  the  Constitution  itself,  and  from  which, 
by  an  express  provision  of  th<*  Constitution,  it 
can  only  be  withdrawn  by  an  appropriation  made 
by  law.  So  careful  were  the  framers  of  the  act 
of  1816  to  leave  nothing  to  implication,  that  ex 
press  authority  is  given  to  the  Secretary  of  the 


law  and  Constitution,!!!  a  deliberative  assembly, 
there  is  no  room — no  place  for  precedents.  To 
admit  them  would  be  to  make  the  violation  of 
to-day  the  law  and  Constitution  of  to-morrow, 
and  to  substitute  in  the  place  of  the  written  and 
sacred  will  of  the  people  and  the  legislature,  the 
'nfraction  of  those  charged  with  the  execution  of 
the  law.  Such,  in  my  opinion,  is  the  relative 
force  of  law  and  constitution  on  one  side,  as 


Treasury,  in  the  fifteenth  section,  to  transfer  tho!  compared  with  precedents  on  the  other.  View- 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALHOUN. 


11 


ed  in  a  different  light,  not  in  reference  to  the 
]a\v  or  constitution,  hut  to  the  conduct  of  the  of 
ficer,  1  am  disposed  to  give  rather  more  weight 
to  precedents,  when  the  question  relates  to  an 
excuse  or  apology  for  the  officer,  in  case  of 
infraction.  If  the  infraction  be  a  trivial  one,  in 
a  case  not  calculated  to  excite  attention,  an  of 
ficer  might  fairly  excuse  himself  on  the  ground 
of  precedent;  hut  in  one  like  this,  of  the  ut 
most  magnitude,  invoking  the  highest  interests 
and  most  important  principles,  where  the  at 
tention  of  the  officer  must  be  aroused  to  a  most 
careful  examination,  he  cannot  avail  himself  of 
the  plea  of  precedent  to  excuse  his  conduct. — 
It  in  a  case  where  false  precedents  are  to  be 
corrected  and  not  followed.  An  officer  ought  to 
be  ashamed  in  such  a  case,  to  attempt  to  vindi 
cate  his  conduct  on  a  charge  of  violating  law  or 
constitution  by  pleading*  precedent.  The  prin 
ciple  in  such  case  is  obvious.  If  the  Secretary's 
right  to  withdraw  public  money  from  the  Trea 
sury  be  clear,  he  has  no  nerd  of  precedent  to 
vindicate  him.  If  not,he  ought  not,  in  a  case  of 
so  much  magnitude,  to  have  acted. 

I  have  not,  said  Mr.  CALHOCX,  touched  a 
question  which  has  had  so  prominent  a  part  in 
the  debate,  whether  the  withholding  the  i-lepo- 
sitcs  was  the  act  of  the  Secretary  or  the  Presi 
dent.  Under  my  view  of  the  subject,  the  ques 
tion  is  not  of  the  slightest  importance.  It  is 
equally  unauthorized  and  illegal,  whetherdone 
by  President  or  Secretary;  ,but,  as  the  question 
lias  been  agitated,  uud  as  rny  views  do  not  en 
tirely  correspond  on  thiv»  point  with  those  advo- 
c.iting  the  side  which  I  do,  I  deem  it  due  to 
frank  tie- s  to  express  my  sentiments. 

I  have  no  doubt  that  the  President  removed 
the  former  Sectetary,  a«d  placed  the  present  in 
his  place,  expressly  with  a  view  to  the  removal 
of  the  deposites.  I  am  equally  clear,  under  all 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  that  the  Presi 
dent's  conduct  is  wholly  indefensible;  and, 
among  other  objections,  I  fear  he  had  in  view, 
in  the  removal,  an  object  eminently  dangerous 
and  unconstitutional— to  give  an  advantage  to 
his  veta,  never  intended  by  the  Constitution — 
a  power  intended  as  a  shield,  to  proti  ct  the 
Executive  against  the  encroachment  of  the  Le 
gislative  department — to  maintain  the  present 
state,  of  things  against  dangerous  or  hasty  inno 
vation,  but  which,  I  fear,  is,  in  this  case,  in 
tended  as  a  sword,  to  defend  the  usurpation  of 
the  Executive.  I  say  1  fear,  for  although  the 
circumstance  of  this  cose  leads  to  a  just  appre 


hension  that  such  is  the  intention,  I  will  not  per 
mit  myself  to  assert  that  such  is  the  fact — that 
so  lawless  and  unconstitutional  an  object  is  con 
templated  by  the  President,  till  his  act  shall 
compel  me  to  believe  to  the  contrary.  But 
while  I  thus  severely  condemn  the  conduct  of 
the  President  in  removing1  the  former  Secreta 
ry  and  appointing  the  present,  I  must  say,  that 
in  rny  opinion,  it  is  a  case  of  the  abu^e  and  not 
of  the  usurpation  of  power.  I  cannot  doubt  that 
the  President  has,  under  the  Constitution,  the 
right  of  removal  from  office:  nor  can  I  doubt 
that  the  power  of  removal,  wherever  it  exists, 
does,  from  necessity,  involve  the  power  of 
general  supervision;  nor  can  I  doubt  that  it 
might  be  constitutionally  exercised  in  reference 
to  the  deposites.  Reverse  the  present  case — 
suppose  the  late  Secretary,  instead  of  being' 
against,  had  been  in  favor  of  the  removal,  and 
that  the  President,  instead  of  for,  had  been 
against  it,  deeming  the  removal  not  only  inex 
pedient,  but,  under  circumstances,  illegal; 
would  any  man  doubt,  that  under  such  circum 
stances,  he  had  a  right  to  remove  his  Secreta 
ry,  if  it  were  the  only  means  of  preventing  the 
removal  of  the  deposites?  Nay,  would  it  not 
be  his  indispensable  duty  to  have  removed  him* 
and,  had  he  not,  would  not  he  have  been  uni 
versally  and  justly  held  responsible? 

I  have  now  (said  Mr.  C.)  offered  all  the  re 
marks  1  intended  in  reference  to  the  deposite 
question;  and,  on  reviewing  the  whole  ground, 
I  must  say,  that  the  Secretary,  in  removing  the 
deposites,  has  clearly  transcended  his  power; 
that  he  has  violated  the  contract  between  the 
Bank  and  the  United  States;  thatsfr'in  so  doing, 
he  has  deeply  injured  that  large  and  respecta 
ble  portion  of  our  citizens  who  have  been  invi 
ted,  on  the  faith  of  the  Government,  to  invest 
their  property  in  the  institution;  while,  at  the 
same  time,  he  has  dee  ply  injured  the  public,  in 
its  'feharacter  of  stockholder;  and,  finally,  that 
he  has  indicted  a  deep  wound  on  the  public 
faith.  To  this  last,  I  attribute  the  present  em 
barrassment  in  the  currency,  which  has  so  inju 
riously  affected  all  the  great  interests  of  the 
country.  The  currency  of  the  country  is  the 
credit  of  the  country— credit  in  every  shape, 
public  and  private;  credit,  not  only  in  the 
shape  of  paper,  but  that  of  faith  &ncl  confi* 
dence  between  man  and  man;  through  the  agen 
cy  of  which,  in  all  its  forms,  the  great  and 
mighty  exchanges  of  this  commercial  country, 
at  home  and  abroad,  are  effected.  To  inflict  * 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALHOUN. 


wound  any  where,  particularly  on  the  public 
faith,  is  to  embarrass  all  the  channels  of  cur 
rency  and  exchange;  and  it  is  to  this,,  and  not 
*o  the  withdrawing  the  few  millions  of  dollars 
from  circulation,  that  I  attribute  the  present 
monied  embarrassment.  Did  I  believe  to  the 
contrary — if  I  thought  that  any  great  and  per 
manent  distress  would  of  itself  result  from 
winding  up  in  a  regular  and  legal  manner  the 
present  or  any  other  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
I  would  deem  it  an  evidence  of  the  dangerous 
power  of  the  institution,  and,  to  that  extent,  an 
argument  against  its  existence;  but,  as  it  is,  I 
regard  the  present  embarrassment  not  as  an  ar 
gument  against  the  Hank,  but  an  argument 
against  the  lawless  and  wanton  exercise  of  pow 
er  on  the  part  of  the  Executive,  -an  embar 
rassment  which  is  likely  to  continue  long,  if  the 
cleposites  be  not  restored.  The  Bonks  which 
nave  received  them,  at  the  expense  of  the  pub 
lic  faith,  and  in  violation  of  law,  will  never  be 
permitted  to  enjoy  iheir  spoils  in  quiet.  No 
one  who  regards  the  subject  in  the  light  in 
which  I  do,  can  ever  give  his  sanction  to  any 
Jaw  intended  to  protect  or  carry  through  the 
present  illegal  arrangement;:  en.  the  contrary, 
all  such  must  feel  bound  to  wage  perpetual  war 
against  an  usurpation  of  power  so  flagrant  as 
that  which  controls  the  present  deposited  of  the 
public  money.  If  I  stand  alone,  (said  MIT.CAL- 
HOUJT,)  I  at  least  will  continue  to  maintain  the 
contest,  so  long  as  I  remain  in  public  life. 

As  important  (said  Mr.  C.)  as  1  consider  the 
question  of  the  deposites,  in  all  its  bearings, 
public  and  private,  it  is  one  on  the  surface — a 
mere  pretext  to  another,  and  one  greatly  more 
important,  which  lies  beneath,  and  which  must 
be  taken  into  consideration,  to  understand  cor 
rectly  all  the  circumstances  attending  this  ex 
traordinary  transaction.  It  ig  felt  and  acknowl 
edged  on  all  sides,  that  there  U  another  and  a 
deeper  question,  which  lias  excited  the  profound 
sensation  aod  alarm  which  pervades  the  coun 
try, 

If  we  are  to  believe  what  we  hear  from  the 
advocates  of  the  administration,  we  would  be 
lieve  at  one  time  that  the  real  question  was 
Bank  or  no  Bank;  at  another,  that  the  question 
was  between  the  United  States  Bank  and  the 
State  Banks;  and,  finally,  that  it  was  a  struggl 
en  the  part  of  the  administration  to  guard  anc 
defend  the  rights  of  the  States  against  the  en. 
croachments  of  the  General  Government.  The 
the  guardians  and  defenders  of 


the  rights  of  the  States!     What  shall  I  call  itf 
audacity   or  hypocrisy?     The  authors  of  the 
reclamation  the  guardians  and  defenders    o 
he  rights  of  the  States!     The  authors  of  the 
rVar  Message  against  a  member  of  this  con- 
ederacy — the  authors  of  the  "bloody  bill"  the 
guardians  and  defenders  of  the  rights  of  the 
States!     This  a  struggle  for  State  rights!     No, 
ir,  State  rights  are  no  more.     The  struggle  is 
>ver  for  the  present.     The  bill  of  the  last  scs- 
,ion  which  vested  in  the  Government  the  right 
>f  judging  of  the  extent  of  its  powers,   finally 
and  conclusively,  and  gave  it  the  right  of  en- 
brcing  its  judgments  by  the  sword,   destroy 
ed  all  distinction  between  delegated  and  reser- 
ed  rights;  concentrated  in  the  Government  the 
entire  power  of  the  system,  and  prostrated  the 
•tates  as  poor  and  helpless  corporations  at  the 
>ot  of  this  sovereignty. 

Nor  is  it  more  true  that  the  real  question  is— 
3ank  or  no  Bank.  Taking  the  deposite  question 
n  the  broadest  sense;  suppose,  as  it  is  contended 
y  the  friends  of  the  administration,  that  it  in- 
olvcs  the  question  of  the  renewal  of  the 
charter,  and  consequently  the  existence 
of  the  Bank  itself,  still  the  banking  sys 
tem-  NvcuM  stand,  almost  untouched  and  unim 
paired.  Four  hundred  banks  would  still  remain 
scattered  over  this  wide  republic,  and  on  the 
ruins  of  the  United  States  Bank,  many  would 
rise  to  be  added  to  the  present  list.  Uiuk-r  this 
aspect  of  the  subject,  the  only  possible  ques- 
ion  that  could  be  presented  for  consideration 
vould  be,  whether  the  banking  system  was 
nore  safe,  more  beneficial,  or  more  constitu 
tional  with  or  witkout  the  U.  States  Bank  ? 
If,  said  Mr.  C,,  this  was  a  question  of  Bank  or  no 
if  it  involved  the  existence  of  the  bank- 
rug  system,  it  would  indeed  be  a  great  question 
—one  of  the  first  magnitude,  and,  with  my 
present  impression,  long  entertained  and  daily 
ncreasing — I  would  hesitate — long  hesitate,  be 
fore  I  would  be  found  under  the  banner  of  the 
system.  I  have  great  doubts,  if  doubts  they 
may  be  called,  as  to  the  soundness  and  tenden 
cy  of  the  whole  system,  in  all  its  modification* 
I  have  great  fears  that  it  will  be  found  hostile 
to  liberty  and  the  advance  of  civilization— fa 
tally  hostile  to  liberty  in  our  country,  where  the 
system  exists  in  its  worst  and  most  dangerous 
form.  Of  all  institutions  affecting  the  great 
question  of  the  distribution  of  wealth— a  ques 
tion  least  explored  and  the  most  important  of 
any  in  the  whole  range  of  political  economy, 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALHOUN. 


13 


the  banking1  institution  has,  if  not  the  greatest, 
among  the  greatest  influence,  and  I  fear,  most 
pernicious  influence  on  the  mode  of  distribu 
tion.  Were  the  question  really  before  us,  I 
would  not  shun  the  responsibility,  as  great  as  it 
might  be,  of  freely  and  fully  offering  my  senti- 


the  vaults  of  dependant  banks,  have  extended 
their  cupidity  to  the  public  lands,  particularly 
in  the  south-west,  and  that  to  this  we  muj»t 
attribute  the  recent  phenomena  in  that  quarter; 
immense  and  valuable  tracts  of  land  sold  at 
short  notice — sales  fraudulently  postponed  to 


ments  on  these   deeply   important  points;  but, j aid  the  speculators,    with  which,  if  I  am  not 


as  it  is}  I  must  content  myself  with  the  few  re 
marks  which  I  have  thrown  out 

What,  then,  is  the  real  question  which  now 
agitates  the  country'  I  answer,  it  is  a  struggle 
between  the  Executive  and  Legislative  depart 
ments  of  the  Government— a  struggle,  not  in 
relation  to  the  existence  of  the  bank,  but  which, 
Congress  or  the  President,  should  have  the 
power  to  create  a  bank,  and  the  conse 
quent  control  over  the  currency  of  the 
country.  This  is  the  real  question.  Let  us 
not  deceive  ourselves — this  league — this  as 
sociation  of  banks— created  by  the  Execu 
tive  ;  bound  together  by  its  influence;  united 
in  common  articles  of  association  ^  vivified  and 
sustained  by  receiving  the  deposites  of  the 
public  money,  and  having  their  notes  converted, 


misinformed,  a  name  not  unknown  to  this  body 
(Gwin)  has  performed  a  prominent  part.  But 
I  leave  this  to  my  vigilant  and  able  friend  from 
Mississippi,  (Mr.  POIXDEXTEH,)  at  the  head  of 
the  Committee  on  Public  Lands,  who,  I  doubt 
not,  will  see  justice  done  to  the  public.  As  to 
stock-jobbing,  this  new  arrangement  will  open 
a  field  which  Rothschild  himself  may  envy.  It 
has  been  found  hard  work-  .very  hard,  no  doubt 
—  by  the  jobbers  in  stock,  who  have  been  en 
gaged  in  attempts  to  raise  or  depress  the  price 
of  U.  S.  Bank  stock ;  but  no  work  will  be  more 
easy  than  to  raise  or  depress  the  price  of  tho 
stock  of  the  selected  banks,  at  the  pleasure  of 
the  Executive.  Nothing  more  will  be  required 
than  to  give  or  withhold  deposites— to  draw,  or 
abstain  from  drawing  warrants — to  pamper  them 


by  being1  received  every  where  by  the  Trea-  at  one  time,  and  starve  them   at  another. 


sury,  into  the  commen  currency  of  the  country, 
is,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  a  bank  of  the 
United  States—the  Executive  bank  of  the  U. 
States,  as  distinguished  from  that  of  Congress. 
However  it  might  fail  to  perform  satisfactorily 
stke  useful  functions  of  the  Bank  of  the  U.  States, 
:ftg  incorporated  by  law,  it  would  outstrip  it— 
ifar  owU&ip  it — in  all  its  dangerous  qualities,  in 
vexten$»»g  the  power,  the  influence-,  and  the 
.corruption  of  the  Government,  It  was  impos- 
aible  to  conceive  any  institution  more  admirably 
-calculated «to  advance  these  objects.  Not  only 
*he  selected  banks.,  but  the  whole  banking 
institutions  of 'the  e«mii£ry,and  with  it  the  entire 
jnoncy  power,.,  for  the  purpose  of  speculation, 
^peculation,  and  corruption  would  be  placed 
winder  the  ^ontrtfl  of  the  Executive.  A  system 
•of  menaces  and  promises  will  be  established  -  of 
snenace  te  the  banks  in  possession  of  the  depo 
sites,  but  which  might  not  be  eBtirely  subser- 
viest  to  Executive  views-;  and  of  promise  of 
future  favors  to  those  who  may  not  AS  yet  enjoy 
ks  favors.  'Between  the  two,  the  banks  would 
be  left  without  influence,  honor,  or  feewesty; 
and  a  system  of  speculation  and  stock  -jobbing 
would  commence,  unequalled  in  the  annals  of 
^Kir  country.  I  fear  they  have  already  com 
menced— I  fear  the  means  which  have  been  iput 
•into  the  hands  of  the  minions  of  power  by  the 
of  the  deposites,  and  placing  them  in 


Those  who  would  be  in  the  secret,  and  who 
would  know  when  to  buy  and  when  to  sell, 
would  have  the  means  of  realizing,  by  deal- 
ng  in  the  stocks,  whatever  fortune  they  might 
please. 

So  long1  as  the  question  is  one  between  a 
Bank  of  the  United  Slates  incorporated  by  Con 
gress  and  that  system  of  banks  which  has  been 
created  by  the  will  of  the  Executive,  it  is  an 
nsult  to  the  understanding  to  discourse  on  the 
pernicious  tendency  and  constitutionality  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States.  To  bring  up  that 
question  fairly  and  legitimately,  you  must  g« 
one  step  further— you  must  divorce  the  Govern 
ment  and  the  banking  system.  You  must  refu* 
all  connexion  with  Banks.  You  must  neither  re 
ceive  »or  pay  away  bank  notes;  you  must  go  back 
to  the  old  system  of  the  strong  box,  and  of  gold 
and  silver.  If  you  have  a  right  to  receive  bank 
notes  at  all  —to  treat  them  as  money  by  receir- 
ng  them  in  your  dues,  or  paying  them  away  to 
creditors,  you  have  a  right  to  create  a  bank. 
Whatever  the  Government  receives  and  treats 
as  money,  is  money;  and,  if  it  be  money,  them 
they  have  the  right,  tinder  the  Constitution,  te 
regulate  It,  Nay,  they  are  bound  by  a  higfc 
obligation  to  adopt  the  most  efficiert  means,  ac 
cording  to  the  nature  of  that  which  they  har« 
recognized  as  money,  to  give  it  the  utmost  sta 
bility  and  uniformity  of  value.  Aad  if  it  be 


14 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALHOUN. 


the  shape  of  bank  notes,  the  most  efficient 
means  of  giving  those  qualities,  is  a  Bank  of  the 
U.  States,  incorporated  by  Congress.  Unless 
you  give  the  highest  practical  uniformity  to  the 
value  of  bank  notes — so  long  »s  you  receive 
them  in  your  dues,  and  treat  them  as  money, 
you  violate  that  provision  of  the  Constitution 
which  provides  that  taxation  shall  be  uniform 
throughout  the  United  States.  There  is  no 
other  alternative,  I  repeat,  you  must  divorce 
the  Government  entirely  from  the  banking  sys 
tem,  or,  if  not,  you  are  bound  to  incorporate  a 
bank  as  the  only  safe  and  efficient  means  of 
giving  stability  and  uniformity  to  the  currency. 
And  should  the  deposltes  not  be  restored,  and 
the  present  illegal  and  unconstitutional  connex 
ion  between  the  Executive  and  the  league  of 
banks  continue,  I  shall  feel  it  my  duty,  if  no  one 
else  moves,  to  introduce  a  measure  to  prohibit 
Government  from  receiving  or  touching  bank 
notes  in  any  shape  whatever,  as  the  only  means 
left  of  giving  safety  and  stability  to  the  curren 
cy ,  and  saving  the  country  from  corruption  and 
ruin. 

Viewing  the  question  in  its  true  light,  as  a 
struggle  on  the  part  of  the  Executive  to  seize 
on  the  power  of  Congress,  and  to  unite  in  the 
President  the  power  of  the  sword  and  the 
purse,  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  CLAY) 
said,  truly,  and  let  me  add,  philosophically,  that 
we  are  in  the  midst  of  a  revolution.  Yes,  the  verv 
existence  of  free  governments  rests  on  the 
proper  distribution  and  organization  of  power-, 
and  to  destroy  this  distribution,  and  thereby 
concentrate  power  in  any  one  of  the  depart 
ments,  is  to  effect  a  revolution;  but,  while  I 
agree  with  the  Senator,  that  we  are  in 
the  midst  of  revolution,  I  cannot  agree  with 
I  him  as  to  the  time  at  which  it  commenced, 
or  the  point  to  which  it  has  progressed.  Look 
ing  to  the  distribution  of  the  powers  of  the  Ge 
neral  Government — into  the  Legislative,  Exe 
cutive,  and  Judicial  Departments — and  con 
fining1  his  views  to  the  encroachment  of  the 
Executive  upon  the  Legislative,  he  dates  the 
commencement  of  the  revolution  but  sixty  days 
previous  to  the  meeting  of  the  present  Con 
gress.  I,  said  Mr.  C.,  take  a  wider  range,  and 
date  it  from  an  earlier  period.  Besides  the  dis 
tribution  among  the  Departments  of  the  Gene 
ral  Government,  there  belongs  to  our  system 
Another,  and  a  far  more  importan'  division  or 
distribution  of  power,  that  between  the  States 
undthe  General  Government— the  reserved  and 
delegated  rights,  the  maintenance  of  which  is 


still  more  essential  to  the  preservation  of  our 
institutions.  Takiwg  this  wide  review  of  our 
political  system,  the  revolution-  in  the  midst  of 
which  we  are,  began,  not  as  supposed  by  the 
Senator  from  Kentucky,  shortly  before  the  com 
mencement  of  the  present  session,  but  many 
years  ago,  with  the  commencement  of  the- re 
strictive  system,  an  1  terminated  its  first  stage 
with  the  passage  of  the  force  bill  of  the  last  ses 
sion,  which  absorbed  all  the  rights  ntid  sove 
reignty  of  the  States,  and  consolidated  thera- 
in  this  Government.  Whilst  this  process  was 
going  oil,  of  absorbing  the  reserved  p-owers-of 
the  States,  on  the  part  of  the  General  Govern 
ment,  another  commenced,  of  concentrating,  m 
the  Executive,  the  powers  of  the  other  two,  th* 
Legislative  and  Judicial'  Departments  of  the 
Government,  which  constitutes,  the  second 
stage  of  the  revolution,  in  which  we  have  ad 
vanced  almost  to  the  termination. 

The  Senator  from  Kentucky,  in  connexion 
with  this  part  of  his  argument,  read'  a  striking1 
passage  from  one  of  the  most  pleasing  and  in 
structive  writers  in-  atty  language,  (Plu 
tarch,)  the  description  of  Ctesar  forcing  him 
self,  sword  iiT  hand,  into  the  treasury  of  the 
Roman  Commonwealth.  We  are  at  the  same 
stage  of  o<ur  political  revolution,  and  the  analo 
gy  between  the  two  cases  is  complete,  varied 
only  by  the  character  of  the  actors  and  the  cir 
cumstances  of  the  times.  That  was  a  case  of 
an  intrepid  and  bold1  warrior,  as  ani  open  plun 
derer,  seizing  forcibly  the  treasury  of  the  coun* 
try,  which,  in  that  Republic,  as  well  as  ours, 
was  confided  to  the  custody  of  the  legislative 
department  of  the  Government  The-  actors  in 
our  case  are  of  a  different  character— artful, 
cunning,  and  corrupt  politicians,  and  not  fear 
less  warriors.  They"  have  entered  the  treasu 
ry,  not  sword  in  hand,  as  public  plunder- 
ersj  but  witlv  the  false  keys  of  sophistry,  as  pU 
ferers,  under  the  silence  of  midnight.  The 
motive  and  object  are  the  same,  varied  in  like 
manner,  by  character  and  circumstances'.  "With 
money  I  will  get  men,,  and  with  men,  money ,"" 
was  the  maxim  of  the  Romao  plunderer.  With* 
money  we  will  get  partizans,  with"  partizans 
votes,  and  with  votes  money,  is  the  maxim  of 
our  public  ptilfcrers.  With  men  and1  money,  C;e~ 
sar  struck  down  l&mvan  liberty,  at  the  fatal' bat 
tle  of  Phillippi,  never  to  rise  again  v  from  whiclt 
disastrous  hour,  all  the  powers  of  the  Romai* 
Republic  were  consolidated1  in?  the  person  of 
Csesar,  and  perpetuated  in  his  line.  With  mo 
ney  and  corrupt  partisans,,  a  great  effort  is 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALHOUN. 


15 


deservedly  is,  would  have  been  wholly 
incompetent,  if  he  had  even  thought  proper 
to  exert  it,  to  adjust  the  question.  The 
attempt  would  have  prostrated  him,  and  those 
who  acted  with  him,  and  not  the  system, 
...  _  It  was  the  separate  action  of  the  State  tltat 

national  convention,  which,  counterfeiting  the  I  gave  him  the  place  to  st»nd  upon;  created 
voice  of  the  people,  will,  if  not  resisted,  in  their  I  the  necessity  for  the  adjustment,  and  dis- 
name  dictate  the  succession,-  when  the  deed  'posed  the  minds  of  all  u>  compromise  Now,  I 


making  to  choke  and  stifle  the  voice  of  Amer 
ican  liberty,  through  all  its  natural  organs;  by 
corrupting  the  press;  by  overawing  the  other 
departments;  and,  finally,  by  setting  up  a  new 
and  polluted  organ,  composed  of  office  hold 
ers  and  corrupt  partizans,  under  the  name  of  a 


will  be  done — the   revolution   be  completed — 
and  all  the  powers  of  our  Republic,  in  like 


put  the  solemn  question  to  all  who  hear  me,  if 
the  tariff  had  not  then  tieen  adjusted — if  it  was 


manner,  be  consolidated  in  the  President,  and!  now  an  open  question  —  what  hope  of  successful 
perpetuated  by  his  dictation.  resistance   against  the  usurpations  of  the  Ex. 

The  Senator  from  Kentucky,  (Mr.  C.)  antici    ecutive,    on    the    part  of  tnis    or    any    other 


pates  with  confidence  that  the  small  party  who 
were  denounced  at  the  last  session  as  traitors 
and  disunionists,  will  be  found,  on  this  trying 
occasion,  standing  in  the  front  rank,  and  man 
fully  resisting  the  advance  of  despotic  power. 
I,  said  Mr.  CALHOU^T,  heard  the  anticipation 
with  pleasure,  not  on  account  of  the  compliment 
which  it  implied,  but  the  evidence  which  it  af 
fords  that  the  cloud  which  has  been  so  Indus- 
triously  thrown  over  the  character  and  motive 
of  that  small,  but  patriotic  party,  begins  to  be 
dissipated.  The  Senator  hazarded  nothing  in 
the  prediction.  That  party  is  the  determined, 
the  fixed,  and  sworn  enemy  to  usurpation,  come 
from  what  quarter  and  under  what  form  it  may 
.-whether  from  the  Executive,  upon  the  other 
departments  of  this  Government,  or  from  this 
Government,  on  the  sovereignty  and  rights  of 
the  States.  The  resolution  and  fortitude  with 
which  it  maintained  its  position  at  the  last  ses 
sion,  under  so  many  difficulties  and  dangers,  in 
defence  of  the  States  against  the  encroach 
ments  of  the  General  Government,  furnished 
evidence,  not  to  be  mistaken,  that  that  party  in 
the  present  momentous  struggle,  would  be 
found  arrayed  in  defence  of  the  rights  of  Con 
gress  against  the  encroachments  of  the  Pres 
ident.  And  let  me  tell  the  Senator  from  Ken 
tucky,  said  Mr.  C.,  that,  if  the  present  strug 
gle  against  Executive  usurpation  be  successful, 
it  will  be  owing  to  the  success,  with  which  we, 
the  nullifiers — I  am  not  afraid  of  the  word — 
maintained  the  rights  of  the  States  against  the 
encroachment  of  the  General  Government  at 
the  last  session. 

A  very  few  words  will  place  this  point  be 
yond  controversy.  To  the  interposition  of  the 
State  of  South  Carolina,  we  are  indebted  for 
the  adjustment  bf  the  tariff  question;  without  it, 
all  the  influence  of  the  Senator  from  Kentucky, 
over  tho  manufacturing  interest,  great  as  it 


Branch  of  the  Government,  could  be  enter 
tained?  Let  it  not  be  .said,  that  this  is  the  re 
sult  of  accident — of  an  unforeseen  contingency. 
It  was  clearly  perceived,  and  openly  stated, 
that  no  successful  resistance  could  be  made  to 
the  corruption  and  encroachments  of  the  Exec- 
itive,  while  the  tariff  question  remained  open — 
while  it  separated  the  north  from  the  south,  and 
wasted  the  energy  of  the  honest  and  patriotic 
portions  of  the  community  against  each  other, 
the  joint  effort  of  which  is  indispensably  ne 
cessary  to  expel  those  from  authority,  who  are 
converting  the  entire  powers  r.f  Government 
into  a  corrupt  electioneeimg  mar.hme;  and  that, 
without  separate  Statr.  interposition,  the  ad 
justment  was  impossible.  The  truth  of  this 
position  rests  not  upon  the  accidental  state  of 
things,  but  on  a  profound  principle  growing  out 
of  the  nature  of  Government  and  party  strug 
gles  in  a  free  State.  History  and  reflection  teach 
us,  that  when  great  interests  come  into  conflict 
and  the  passions  and  the  prejudices  of  men  are 
roused,  such  struggles  can  never  be  composed 
by  the  influence  of  any  individuals,  however 
great;  and  if  there  be  not,  somewhere  in  the 
system,  some  high  constitutional  power  to  ar 
rest  their  progress,  and  compel  the  parties  to 
adjust  the  difference,  they  go  on  till  the  State 
falls  by  corruption  or  violence, 

I  will,  said  Mr.  C.,  venture  to  add  to  these 
remarks  another,  in  connexion  with  the  point 
under  consideration,  not  less  true  We  are  not 
only  indebted  to  the  cause  which  I  have  stated, 
for  our  present  strength  in  this  body  against  the 
present  usurpation  of  the  Executive,  but 
if  the  adjustment  of  the  tarift  had  stood  alone, 
as  it  ought  to  have  done,  without  the  odious  bill 
which  accompanied  it, — if  those  who  led  in  the 
comprom?  ,e  had  joined  the  State  Right  party  in 
their  resistance  to  that  unconstitutional  measure, 
and  thrown  the  responsibility  on  it*  real  authors, 


16 


SPEECH  OF  MR.  CALHOUN. 


*he  administration,  their  party  would  have  been 
so  prostrated  throughout  the  entire  South,  and 
their  power,  in  consequence,  so  reduced,  that 
they  would  not  have  dared  to  attempt  the  present 
measure  ;  or,  if  they  had,  they  would  have  been 
broke  and  defeated. 


By  the  magic  construction  of  a  few  simple 
words — "unless  otherwise  ordered," — intended 
to  confer  on  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  a  lim* 
ited  power — to  give  additional  security  to  the 
public  deposites,  he  has,  in  like  manner,  pervert 
ed  this  power,  and  made  it  the  instrument,  by 


Were  I,  said  Mr.  C.,  to  select  the   case  best  i  similar  sophistry,  of  drawing  the  money  from  the 


calculated  to  illustrate  the  necessity  of  resisting 
usurpation  at  the  very  commencement,  and  to 
prove  how  difficult  it  is  to  resist  it  in  any  sub- 
aequentstage,  if  not  mt;t  at  first,  I  would  select  this 
very  case.  What,  he  asked,  is  the  cause  of  the 
present  usurpation  of  power  on  the  part  of  the 
Executive?- -What  the  motive?— the  tempation, 
which  has  induced  them  to  seize  on  the  depo- 
sites?  What,  but  the  large  surplus  revenue  ? 
the  eight  or  ten  millions  in  the  public  Treasury 
beyond  the  wants  of  the  Government?  And  what 
has  put  BO  large  an  amount  of  money  in  the 
Treasury,  when  not  needed?  I  answer,  the  pro 
tective  system- -that  system  which  graduated 
duties,  not  in  reference  to  the  wants  of  the  Go 
vernment,  but  in  reference  to  the  importunities  and 
demands  of  the  manufacturers,  and  which  poured 
millions  of  dollars  into  the  Treasury  beyond  the 
most  profuse  demands  and  even  the  extravagance 
of  the  Government- -taken— unlawfully  taken, 


Treasury,  and  bestowing  it,  as  I  have  stated,  on 
favorite  and  partizan  banks.  Would  to  God, 
said  Mr.  C.,  would  to  God  I  could  reverse  the 
whole  of  this  nelarious  operation,  and  terminate 
the  controversy  by  returning"  the  money  to  the 
pockets  of  the  honest  and  industrious  citizens, 
by  the  sweat  of  whose  brows  it  was  made, 
with  whom  only  it  can  be  rightfully  deposited. 
But  as  this  cannot  be  done,  I  must  content  my 
self  by  giving  a  vote  to  return  it  to  the  public 
Treasury,  where  it  was  ordered  to  be  deposited 
by  an  act  of  the  legislature. 

There  is  another  aspect,  said  Mr.  C.,  in  which 
this  subject  may  be  viewed.  We  all  remember 
how  early  the  question  of  the  surplus  revenue 
began  to  agitate  the  country.  At  a  very  early 
period,  a  Senator  from  New  Jersey,  (Mr.  DICK- 
ERSON,)  presented  his  scheme  for  disposing  of  it 
by  distributing  it  among  the  States.  The  first 
message  of  the  President  recommended  a  similar 


from  the  pockets  of  those  who  honestly  made  it.  I  project,  which  was  followed  up  by  a  movement 


I  hold  that  those  who  make,  are  entitled  to  what 
they  make  against  all  the  world,  except  the  Go 


vernment}  and  against  it,  except  to  the  extent  of  lie    attention   was   aroused — the   scheme   scru 


its  legitimate  and  constitutional  wants;  and  that, 
for  the  Government  to  take  one  cent  more  is  rob 
bery.  In  violation  of  this  sacred  principle  Con 
gress  firtt  removed  the  deposites  into  the  public 
Treasury,  from  the  pockets  of  those  who  made  it, 
where  they  were  rightfuiy  placed  by  all  laws, 
human  and  divine.  The  Executive,  in  his  turn,fol 
lowing  the  example,  has  taken  them  from  that 
deposite,  and  distributed  them  among  favorite 
and  partisan  banks.  The  means  used  have  been 
the  same  in  both  cases.  The  constitution  gives  to 
Congress  the  power  to  lay  duties  with  a  view  to 
revenue.  This  power,  without  regarding  the 
object  for  which  it  was  intended,  forgetting  that 
it  was  a  great  trust  power,  necessarily  limited, 
by  the  very  nature  of  such  powers,  to  the  subject 
and  the  object  o<  the  trust,  was  perverted  to  a  use 
never  intended,  that  of  protecting  the  industry 
•f  one  portion  of  the  country  at  the  expense  ol 
another;  and,  under  this  false  interpretation,  the 
money  was  transferred  from  its  natural  and  just 
deposite,  the  pockets  of  those  who  made  it,  into 
the  public  Treasury,  as  I  have  stated.  In  this 
too,  the  executive  followed  the  example  of  Con 
gress. 


on  the  part  of  the  Legislature  of  New  York,   and 
I  believe  some  of  the  other  States .     The  pub- 


tinized, — its  gross  unconstitutionally  and  injus 
tice,  and  its  dangerous  tendency, — its  tendency 
to  absorb  the  power  and  existence  of  the  State*, 
were  clearly  perceived  and  denounced.  The  de- 
nunciatio;i  was  too  deep  to  be  resisted,  and  the 
scheme  was  abandoned.  What  have  we  now  in 
lieu  of  it?  What  is  the  present  scheme  but  a 
distribution  of  the  surplus  revenue  ?  A  distribu 
tion  at  the  sole  will  and  pleasure  of  the  Executive^ 
a  distribution  to  favorite  banks,  and  through 
them,  in  the  shape  of  discounts  and  loans,  to  cor 
rupt  partizans,  as  the  means  of  increasing  politi 
cal  influence? 

We  have,  said  Mr.  C.,  arrived  at  a  fearful  crisi* 
Things  cannot  long  remain  as  they  are.  It  be 
hoves  all  who  love  their  country —who  have  affec 
tion  for  their  offspring,  or  who  have  any  stake  in 
our  institutions,  to  pause  and  reflect.  Confi 
dence  is  daily  withdrawing  from  the  General  Go 
vernment.  Alienation  is  hourly  going  on.  These 
will  necessarily  create  a  state  of  things  inimical 
to  the  existence  of  our  institution*,  and,  if  not 
speedily  arrested,  convulsions  must  fo'low,  and 
then  comes  dissolution  or  despotism,  when 
a  thick  cloud  will  be  thrown  over  the  cause  of  li 
berty  and  the  future  prospects  of  our  country. 


REMARKS 


OF 


MR.  WEBSTER, 


THE   REMOVAL  OF  THE   DEPOSITES, 


ON  THE  SUBJECT  OF 


A  NATXOKTAl  BANK: 


DELIVERED 


In  the  Senate  of  the  United  States, 


JANUARY,  1834. 


WASHINGTON: 

PRINTED    BY    GALES    &    SEATON, 
1834. 


-  * 


REMARKS. 

On  the  20th  of  January,  Mr.  WEBSTER  presented  the  following  resolu 
tions  passed  at  a  meeting  in  Boston: 

1 .  Resolved,  As  the  sense  of  this  meeting,  that  the  business  community  of  this  city, 
vicinity,  and  Commonwealth,  are  in  a  high  state  of  prosperity,  independently  of  those 
embarrassments  in  the  money  market,  consequent  upon  the  deranged  state  of  the  finan 
cial  and  banking1  operations  of  the  country. 

2.  Resolved,  That  all  the  great  branches  of  industry   throughout   the  Union  have, 
for  three  years  past,  been  in  a  highly  prosperous  condition,  till  within  the  period  of  a 
few  months. 

3.  liesolved,  That  the  products  of  agriculture  have  been  unusually  abundant  the  past 
year;   that  prices   at  home  and  abroad  are  higher  than  usual,  and  likely  to  be  main 
tained  under  the  ordinary  circumstances  of  the  money  market. 

4.  Resolved,  That  the  currency,  issued  by  the  banks  of  this  State,  inasmuch  as  their 
notes  in  circulation  are  not  more  than  one-fourth  of  their  capitals,  and  the  securities 
for  their  loans  being  deemed  good,  is  in  sound  condition. 

5.  Resolved,   That  the  currency  of  the  Union  at  large  is  also  in  a  safe  and  sound 
state,  and  that  any  sudden  and  undue  contraction  of  bank  issues,  which  may  have  been 
lately  made,  has  principally  arisen,  not  from  over-issues  of  paper,  but  from  the  disturb 
ed  state  of  our  financial  and  money  concerns,  incident  to  the  altered  condition  of  the 
National  Bank. 

6.  Resolved,  That  there  is  the  usual  quantity  of  specie  in  the  country,  and  that  fo 
reign  exchanges  being  greatly  in  our  favor,  there  is  no  reason  to  apprehend  any  drain 
of  the  precious  metals;  but,  on  the  contrary,  we  may  naturally  look  for  an  influx  of 
them. 

7.  Resolved,  That  the  local  banks  now  employed  by  Government,  however  well  dis 
posed  to  accommodate  the  public,  cannot,  with  their  small  capitals,  limited  credit,  and 
scattered  resources,  and,  above  all,  their  entire  want  of  concert  and  unity  of  action, 
afford  that  aid  to  the  agricultural  classes  in  the  transmission  of  their  products,  from  the 
places  of  growth  to  the  places  of  export  and  distribution,  which  they  have  heretofore 
received  from  the  National  Bank,  but  which  is  now,  in  part,   necessarily  withdrawn 
from  them  by  that  institution,  in  consequence  of  its  change  of  position  in  regard  to  the 
Government. 

8.  Resolved,  That  the  evils  arising  from  the  scarcity  and  high  price  in  money  fall 
with  most  severity  on  the  industrious  and  middling  classes  of  society,  who  are  compel 
led  to  make  sacrifices  of  property  to  provide  for  their  daily  payments,  while  the  retired 
capitalists  are  not  only  exempt  from  such  a  loss,  but  derive  a  benefit  from  the  increased 
value  of  money. 

9.  Resolved,  That  a  continuance  of  the  existing  embarrassments  in  business,  arising- 
from  the  deranged  state  of  our  money  concerns,  will  not  only  check  the  future  opera 
tions  of  the  farmer,  merchant,  manufacturer,  and  mechanic,  and  consequently  lessen 
the  employment  and  wages  of  the  laborer,  but  will  also  prove  extremely  injurious  to 
those  great  and  useful  internal  improvements,  which  must  soon  be  arrested  in  their 
progress,  if  the  pressure  on  the  money  market  is  not  relieved;  and  that  all  property 
now  in  existence  will  become  depreciated  to  a  degree  that  may  prove  utterly  ruinous 
to  a  portion  of  the  most  enterprising  and  useful  members  of  the  community. 

10.  Resolved,  That  the  amount  of  currency  necessary  to  effect  the  ordinary  payments 


must  be  considered  of  immense  importance;  and  that  any  sudden  and  undue  expansion 
or  contraction  of  the  amount  required  for  the  ordinary  wants  of  the  country,  from 


whatever  causes  it  may  proceed,  will   necessarily  tend   to  the  most  calamitous  re 
sults. 

11.  Resolved,  That  the  existing  embarrassments  and  panic  among  all  classes  of  the 
business  community,  and  which  threaten,  if  not  soon  remedied,  the  most  serious  evils, 
may  be  attributed,    first,  to  a  spirit  of  speculation  and  over-trading — the  usual  effects 
of  long  continued  prosperity;  and  secondly,  to  the  transferring  the  collection  of  the 
national  revenue  from  the  National  Bank  to  the  State  banks,  and  thereby  paralyzing, 
in  some  degree,  the  action  of  that  institution,  by  whose  large  capital,  solid  credit,  and 
•extensive  resources,  the  business  operations  of  the  whole  country  have  been  sustained 
and  promoted.  * 

12.  Resolved,  That,  in  the  opinion  of  this  meeting,  a  restoration  of  the  National  Bank 
to  the  relation  in  which  it  stood  to  the  Government  prior  to  the  removal  of  the  depo- 
sites,  and  allowing  the  public  moneys  already  in  possession  of  the  local  banks  to  re 
main  there,  till  required  by  the  Government,  would,   in  a  great  measure,  relieve  the 
country  from  the  embarrassments,  arising  from  a  scarcity  and  derangement  of  curren 
cy;  and,  above  all,  allay  that  distrust,  agitation,  and  alarm,  which  is  more  difficult  to 
overcome,  and  more  dangerous  in  its  tendencies  if  not  overcome,  than  the  actual  in 
conveniences  and  losses  usually  incident  to  an  insufficient  or  deranged  currency. 

13.  Resolved,  That,   whatever  course  may  be  adopted  by  Congress,  in  relation  to 
matters  now  in  dispute  between  the  Government  and  the  National  Bank,   it  is  of  vital 
importance  to  the  great  interests  of  the  nation  that  there  should  be  a  prompt  decision, 
«o  necessary  for  there-establishment  of  that  confidence,  throughout  the  whole  country, 
•which  has  been  greatly  impaired  by  the  uncertain  and  unsettled  state  of  our  financial 
and  money  concerns. 

14.  Resolved,  That  the  foregoing  resolutions  have  no  relation  to  any  party  or  politi- 
'Cal  purposes,  beyond  the  direct  object  manifest  on  the  face  of  them;  that  the  meeting 
comprises  persons  of  all  classes  and  professions,  entertaining  various  and  opposite  opin 
ions  upon  the  question  of  re-chartering  the  existing  National  Bank,  or  of  chartering  a 
new  one  in  lieu  of  it;  that  few  of  them  have  any  pecuniary  interest  involved  in  the  fate 
of  that  institution;  that  they  have  met  together,  on  this  occasion,  as  citizens,  having  one 
common  end  in  view,  and  with  no  other  purpose  or  desire  than  to  aid  in  the  re-estab 
lishment  of  that  credit  and  confidence  among  all  classes,  so  essential  to  our  present  safe 
ly  and  our  future  prosperity. 

15.  Resolved,  That  a  copy  of  the  foregoing  resolutions  be  transmitted,  by  the  Chair 
man  of  this  meeting,  to  each  of  the  Senators  and  Representatives  of  this  State  in  Con 
gress,  as  expressive  of  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  a  portion  of  their  constituents  upon 
the  important  matters  therein  referred  to;  and  earnestly  requesting  them  to  use  their 
best  exertions  to  effect  the  objects  which  this  meeting  has  in  view;  and  that  they  also- 
be  requested  to  lay  a  copy  of  the  same  before  both  branches  of  our  National  Legis 
lature. 

16.  Resolved,  That  a  committee,  consisting  of  Henry  Lee,  George  Bond,  Jonas  B. 
Brown,  Henry  F.  Baker,  James  T.  Austin,  George  Darracott,  and  Charles  Wells,  be 
appointed  to  take  such  other  measures,  in  furtherance  of  the  objects  of  this  meeting, 
as  they  shall  deem  proper  and  expedient. 

CHARLES  WELLS,   Chairman. 
HKXRY  F.  BAKKR,      1  Secretaries 
BENJAMIX  T.  REED,  <>  ^ 

The  resolutions  having  been  read   by  the   Secretary  of  the  Senate, 

Mr.  WEBSTER  said,  he  wished  to  bear  unequivocal  and  decided  testi 
mony  to  the  respectability,  intelligence,  and  disinterestedness  of  the  long  list 
of  gentlemen,  at  whose  instance  this  meeting  was  assembled.  The  meeting, 
said  Mr.  W.,  was  connectedfwith  no  party  purpose  whatever.  It  had  an  ob 
ject  more  sober,  more  cogent,  more  interesting  to  the  whole  community,  than 
mere  party  questions.  The  Senate  will  perceive,  in  the  tone  of  these  reso 
lutions,  no  intent  to  exaggerate  or  inflame;  no  disposition  to  get  up  excitement 
or  to  spread  alarm.  I  hope  the  restrained  and  serious  manner,  the  modera 
tion  of  temper,  and  the  exemplary  candor,  of  these  resolutions,  in  connexion 
with  the  plain  truths  which  they  contain,  will  give  them  just  weight  with  the 
Senate.  I  assure  you,  sir,  the  members  composing  this  meeting  were  neither 


5 

capitalists,  nor  speculators,  nor  alarmists.  They  are  merchants,  traders, 
mechanics,  artisans,  and  others  engaged  in  the  active  business  of  life.  They 
are  of  the  muscular  portion  of  society;  and  they  desire  to  lay  before  Congress 
an  evil,  which  they  ieel  to  press  sorely  on  their  occupations,  their  earnings, 
their  labor,  and  their  property;  and  to  express  their  conscientious  conviction 
of  the  causes  of  that  evil.  If  intelligence,  if  pure  intention,  if  deep  and  wide 
spread  connexion  with  business  in  its  various  branches,  if  thorough  practical 
knowledge  and  experience,  if  inseparable  union  between  their  own  prosperity 
and  the  prosperity  of  the  whole  country,  authorize  men  to  speak,  and  give 
them  a  right  to  be  heard,  the  sentiments  of  this  meeting  ought  to  make  an 
impression.  For  one,  sir,  I  entirely  concur  in  all  their  opinions.  I  adopt 
their  first  fourteen  resolutions,  without  alteration  or  qualification,  as  setting 
forth  truly  the  present  state  of  things,  stating  truly  its  causes,  and  pointing  to 
the  true  remedy. 

Mr.  President,  now  that  I  am  speaking,  I  will  use  the  opportunity  to  say 
a  few  words  which  I  intended  to  say  in  the  course  of  the  morning,  on  the 
coming  up  of  the  resolution  which  now  lies  on  the  table;  but  which  are  as 
applicable  to  this  occasion  as  to  that. 

An  opportunity  may,  perhaps,  be  hereafter  afforded  me  of  discussing  the 
reasons  given  by  the  Secretary  for  the  very  important  measure  adopted  by 
him,  in  removing  the  deposites.  But  as  I  know  not  how  near  that  time  may 
be,  I  desire,  in  the  mean  while,  to  make  my  opinions  known,  without  reserve, 
on  the  present  state  of  the  country.  Without  intending  to  discuss  any  thing 
at  present,  I  feel  it  my  duty,  nevertheless,  to  let  my  sentiments  and  my  con 
victions  be  understood.  In  the  first  place,  then,  sir,  I  agree  with  those  who 
think  that  there  is  a  severe  pressure  in  the  money  market,  and  very  serious 
embarrassment  felt  in  all  branches  of  the  national  industry.  I  think  this  is  not 
local,  but  general — general,  at  least,  over  every  part  of  the  country  where  the 
cause  has  yet  begun  to  operate,  and  sure  to  become  not  only  general,  but 
universal,  as  the  operation  of  the  cause  shall  spread.  If  evidence  be  wanted, 
in  addition  to  all  that  is  told  us  by  those  who  know,  the  high  rate  of  interest, 
now  at  12  per  cent,  or  higher,  where  it  was  hardly  6  last  September;  the 
depression  of  all  stocks,  some  ten,  some  twenty,  some  thirty  per  cent.;  and 
the  low  prices  of  commodities,  are  proofs  abundantly  sufficient  to  show  the 
existence  of  the  pressure.  But,  sir,  labor,  that  most  extensive  of  all  interests — 
American  manual  labor — feels,  or  will  feel,  the  shock  more  sensibly,  far  more 
sensibly,  than  capital  or  property  of  any  kind.  Public  works  have  stopped, 
or  must  stop;  great  private  undertakings,  employing  many  hands,  have  ceased, 
and  others  must  cease.  A  great  lowering  of  the  rates  of  wages,  as  well  as  a 
depreciation  of  property,  is  the  inevitable  consequence  of  causes  now  in  ful! 
operation.  Serious  embarrassments  in  all  branches  of  business  do  certainly 
exist. 

I  am  of  opinion,  therefore,  that  there  is,  undoubtedly,  a  very  severe  pres 
sure  on  the  community,  which  Congress  ought  to  relieve  if  it  can;  and  that 
this  pressure  is  not  an  instance  of  the  ordinary  re-action,  or  the  ebbing  and 
flowing  of  commercial  affairs;  but  is  an  extraordinary  case,  produced  by  an 
extraordinary  cause. 

In  the  next  place,  sir,  I  agree  entirely  with  the  llth  Boston  resolution,  as 
to  the  causes  of  this  embarrassment.  We  were  in  a  state  of  high  prosper 
ity,  commercial  and  agricultural.  Every  branch  of  business,  was  pushed 
far,  and  the  credit  as  well  as  the  capital  of  the  country  employed  to 
near  its  utmost  limits.  In  this  state  of  things,  some  degree  of  overtrading 


doubtless  took  place,  which,  however,  if  nothing  else  had  occurred,  would 
have  been  seasonably  corrected  by  the  ordinary  and  necessary  operation  of 
things.  But,  on  this  palmy  state  of  things,  the  late  measure  of  the  Secretary 
fell,  and  has  acted  on  it  with  powerful  and  lamentable  effect. 

And  I  think,  sir,  that  such  a  cause  is  entirely  adequate  to  produce  the 
effect,  that  it  is  wholly  natural,  and  that  it  ought  to  have  been  foreseen  that 
it  would  produce  exactly  such  consequences.  Those  must  have  looked  at 
the  surface  of  things  only,  as-  it  seems  to  me,  who  thought  otherwise,  and 
who  expected  that  such  an  operation  could  be  gone  through  with,  without 
producing  a  very  serious  shock. 

The  Treasury,  in  a  very  short  time,  has  withdrawn  from  the  Bank  8,000,000 
dollars,  within  a  fraction.  This  call,  of  course,  the  Bank  has  been  obliged 
to  provide  for,  and  could  not  provide  for  without  more  or  less  inconvenience 
to  the  public.  The  mere  withdrawing  of  so  large  a  sum  from  hands  actually 
holding  and  using  it,  and  the  transferring  of  it,  through  the  bank  collecting,  and 
through  another  bank  loaning  it,  if  it  can  loan  it,  into  other  hands,  is  itself  an 
operation  which,  if  conducted  suddenly,  must  produce  considerable  inconve 
nience.  And  this  is  all  that  the  Secretary  seems  to  have  anticipated.  But  this  is 
not  the  one-hundredth  part  of  the  whole  evil.  The  great  evil  arises  from  the 
new  attitude  in  which  the  Government  places  itself  towards  the  Bank.  Every 
thing  is  now  in  a  false  position.  The  Government,  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  the  State  banks,  are  all  out  of  place.  They  are  deranged  and  separated, 
and  jostling  against  each  other.  Instead  of  amity,  reliance,  and  mutual  suc 
cor,  relations  of  jealousy,  of  distrust,  of  hostility  even,  are  springing  up  be 
tween  these  parties.  All  act  on  the  defensive;  each  looks  out  for  itself;  and 
the  public  interest  is  crushed  between  the  upper  and  the  nether  millstone. 
All  this  should  have  been  foreseen.  It  is  idle  to  say  that  these  evils  might 
have  been  prevented  by  the  Bank,  if  it  had  exerted  itself  to  prevent  them. 
That  is  a  mere  matter  of  opinion;  it  may  be  true,  or  it  may  not;  but  it  was 
the  business  of  those  who  proposed  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  to  ask  them 
selves  how  it  was  probable  the  Bank  would  act,  when  they  should  attack  it, 
assail  its  credit,  and  allege  the  violation  by  it  of  its  charter;  and  thus  compel 
it  to  take  an  attitude,  at  least,  of  stern  defence.  The  community  have  cer 
tainly  a  right  to  hold  those  answerable,  who  have  unnecessarily  got  into  this 
quarrel  with  the  Bank,  and  thereby  occasioned  the  evil,  let  tie  conduct  of 
the  Bank,  in  the  course  of  the  controversy,  be  what  it  may. 

In  my  opinion,  sir,  the  great  source  of  the  evil  is  the  shock  which  the 
measure  has  given  to  confidence  in  the  commercial  world.  The  credit  of 
the  whole  system  of  the  currency  of  the  country  seems  shaken,  The  State 
banks  have  lost  credit,  and  lost  confidence.  They  have  suffered  vastly 
more  than  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  itself,  at  which  the  blow  was 
aimed. 

The  derangement  of  internal  exchanges  is  one  of  the  most  disastrous  con 
sequences  of  the  measure.  By  the  origin  of  its  charter,  by  its  unquestioned 
solidity,  by  the  fact  that  it  was  at  home  every  icliere,  and  in  perfect  credit 
every  where,  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  accomplished  the  internal  ex 
changes  of  the  country  with  vast  facility,  and  at  an  unprecedented  cheap 
rate.  The  State  banks  can  never  perform  this  equally  well;  for  the  reason 
given  in  the  Boston  resolutions,  they  cannot  act  with  the  same  concert,  the 
same  identity  of  purpose.  Look  at  the  prices  current,  and  see  the  change 
in  the  value  of  the  notes  of  distant  banks  in  the  great  cities.  Look  at  the 
depression  of  the  stocks  of  the  State  banks,  deposite  banks  and  all.  Look 


7 

at  what  must  happen  the  moment  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  in  its 
process  of  winding  up,  or  to  meet  any  other  crisis,  shall  cease  to  buy  do 
mestic  bills,  especially  in  the  Southern,  Southwestern,  and  Western  markets. 
Can  any  man  doubt  what  will  be  the  state  of  exchange  when  that  takes 
place?  Or  can  any  one  doubt  its  necessary  effect  on  the  price  of  produce? 
The  Bank  has  purchased  bills  to  the  amount  of  sixty  millions  a  year,  as  ap 
pears  by  documents  heretofore  laid  before  the  Senate.  A  great  portion  of 
these,  no  doubt,  was  purchased  in  the  South  and  West,  against  shipments  of 
the  great  staples  of  those  quarters  of  the  country.  Such  is  the  course  of 
trade.  The  produce  of  the  Southwest  and  the  South  is  shipped  to  the 
North  and  the  East  for  sale;  and  those  who  ship  it  draw  bills  on  those  to 
whom  it  is  shipped;  and  these  bills  are  bought  and  discounted,  or  cashed  by 
the  Bank.  When  the  Bank  shall  cease  to  buy,  as  it  must  cease,  conse 
quences  cannot  but  be  felt,  much  severer  even  than  those  now  experienced. 
This  is  inevitable.  Bui,  sir,  I  go  no  further  into  particular  statements.  My 
opinion,  I  repeat,  is,  that  the  present  distress  is  immediately  occasioned, 
beyond  all  doubt,  by  the  removal  of  the  deposites;  and  that  just  such  con 
sequences  might  have  been,  and  ought  to  have  been,  foreseen  frpm  that 
measure,  as  we  do  now  perceive  and  feel  around  us. 

Sir,  I  do  not  believe,  nevertheless,  that  these  consequences  were  foreseen. 
With  such  foresight,  the  deposites,  I  think,  would  not  have  been  touched. 
The  measure  has  operated  more  deeply  and  more  widely  than  was  expect 
ed.  We  all  may  find  proof  of  this,  in  the  conversations  of  every  hour.  No 
one,  who  seeks  to  acquaint  himself  with  the  opinions  of  men,  in  and  out  of 
Congress,  can  doubt  that,  if  the  act  were  now  to  be  done,  it  would  receive 
very  little  encouragement  or  support. 

Being  of 'opinion  that  the  removal  of  the  deposites  has  produced  the 
pressure,  as  its  immediate  effect,  not  so  much  by  withdrawing  a  large  sum 
of  money  from  circulation,  as  by  alarming  the  confidence  of  the  community, 
by  breaking  in  on  the  well-adjusted  relations  of  the  Government  and  the 
Bank,  I  agree  again  with  the  Boston  resolutions,  that  the  natural  remedy  is 
a  restoration  of  the  relation  in  which  the  Bank  has  heretofore  stood  to  Gov 
ernment. 

I  agree,  sir,  that  this  question  ought  to  be  settled,  and  to  be  settled  soon. 
And  yet,  if  it  be  decided  that  the  present  state  of  things  shall  exist — if  it  be 
the  determination  of  Congress  to  do  nothing  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  the 
unnatural,  distrustful,  half  belligerent,  present  condition  of  the  Government 
and  the  Bank,  I  do  not  look  for  any  great  relief  to  the  community,  or  any 
early  quieting  of  the  public  agitation.  On  the  contrary,  I  expect  increased 
difficulty  and  increased  disquiet. 

The  public  moneys  are  now  out  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  There 
is  no  law  regulating  their  custody,  or  fixing  their  place.  They  are  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  to  be  kept  where  he  pleases,  as 
he  pleases,  and  the  places  of  their  custody  to  be  changed  as  often  as  he 
pleases. 

Now,  sir,  I  do  not  think  this  is  a  state  of  things  in  which  the  country  is 
likely  to  acquiesce. 

Mr.  President,  the  restoration  of  the  deposites  is  a  question  distinct  and 
by  itself.  It  does  not  necessarily  involve  any  other  question.  It  stands 
clear  of  all  controversy  and  all  opinion  about  re-chartering  the  Bank,  or 
creating  any  new  Bank. 


8 

But  I  wish,  nevertheless,  sir,  to  say  a  few  words  of  a  bearing  somewhat 
beyond  that  question.  Being  of  opinion  that  the  country  is  not  likely  to  be 
satisfied  with  the  present  state  of  things,  I  have  looked  earnestly  for  the 
suggestion  of  some  prospective  measure — some  system  to  be  adopted  as  the 
future  policy  of  the  country.  Where  are  the  public  moneys  hereafter  to 
be  kept?  In  what  currency  is  the  revenue  hereafter  to  be  collected1?  What 
is  to  take  the  place  of  the  Bank  in  our  general  system?  How  are  we 
to  preserve  a  uniform  currency,  a  uniform  measure  of  the  value  of  pro 
perty  and  the  value  of  labor,  a  uniform  medium  of  exchange  and  of  pay 
ments?  How  are  we  to  exercise  that  salutary  control  over  the  national 
currency,  which  it  was  the  unquestionable  purpose  of  the  constitution  to 
devolve  on  Congress? 

These,  sir,  appear  to  me  to  be  the  momentous  questions  before  us,  and 
which  we  cannot  long  keep  out  of  view.  In  these  questions  every  man  in 
the  community,  who  either  has  a  dollar,  or  expects  to  earn  one,  has  a  direct 
interest. 

Now,  sir,  I  have  heard  but  four  suggestions,  or  opinions,  as  to  what  may 
hereafter  be  expected  or  attempted. 

The  first  is,  that  things  will  remain  as  they  are — the  Bank  be  suffered  to 
expire,  no  new  Bank  created,  and  the  whole  subject  left  under  the  control  of 
the  Executive  Department. 

I  have  already  said  that  I  do  not  believe  the  country  will  ever  acquiesce 
in  this. 

The  second  suggestion  is  that  which  was  made  by  the  honorable  member 
from  Virginia,  [Mr.  RIVES.]  That  honorable  member  pledges  himself  to 
bring  forward  a  proposition,  having  for  its  object  to  do  away  with  the  paper 
system  altogether,  and  to  return  to  an  entire  metallic  currency. 

I  do  not  expect,  sir,  that  the  honorable  member  will  find  much  support  in 
such  an  undertaking.  A  mere  gold  and  silver  currency,  and  the  entire 
abolition  of  paper,  is  not  suited  to  the  times.  The  idea  has  something  a 
little  too  antique,  too  Spartan  in  it;  we  might  as  well  think  of  going  to  iron 
at  once.  If  such  a  result  as  the  gentleman  hopes  for  were  even  desirable,  I 
regard  its  attainment  as  utterly  impracticable  and  hopeless.  I  lay  that 
scheme,  therefore,  out  of  my  contemplation. 

There  is,  then,  sir,  the  rechartering  of  the  present  Bank;  and,  lastly, 
there  is  the  establishment  of  a  new  Bank.  The  first  of  these  received  the 
sanction  of  the  last  Congress,  but  the  measure  was  negatived  by  the  Presi 
dent.  The  other,  the  creation  of  a  new  bank,  has  not  been  brought  forward 
in  Congress,  but  it  has  excited  attention  out  of  doors,  and  has  been  proposed 
in  some  of  the  State  Legislatures.  I  observe,  sir,  that  a  proposition  has 
been  submitted  for  consideration,  by  a  very  intelligent  gentleman  in  the 
Legislature  of  Massachusetts,  recommending  the  establishment  of  a  new 
bank,  with  the  following  provisions: 

"  1.  The  capital  stock  to  be  fifty  millions  of  dollars. 

"2.  The  stockholders  of  the  present  United  States  Bank  to  be  permitted 
**  to  subscribe  an  amount  equal  to  the  stock  they  now  hold. 

"  3.  The  United  States  to  be  stockholders  to  the  same  extent  they  now 
"  are,  and  to  appoint  the  same  number  of  directors. 

"  4.  The  subscription  to  the  remaining  fifteen  millions  to  be  distributed 
"to  the  several  States  in  proportion  to  federal  numbers,  or  in  some  other 
"  just  and  equal  ratio;  the  instalments  payable  either  in  cash  or  in  fundedl 
'*  stock  of  the  State,  bearing  interest  at  five  per  cent. 


"  5.  No  branch  of  the  bank  to  be  established  in  any  State,  unless  by  per- 
"  mission  of  its  Legislature. 

"  6.  The  branches  of  the  bank  established  in  the  several  States  to  be 
"liable  to  taxation  by  those  States,  respectively,  in  the  same  manner,  and  to 
"  the  same  extent  only  with  their  own  banks. 

"  7.  Such  States  as  may  become  subscribers  to  the  stock,  to  have  the  right 
"  of  appointing  a  certain  number,  not  exceeding  one-third,  of  the  directors 
"  in  the  branch  of  their  own  State. 

"  8.  Stock  not  subscribed  for  under  the  foregoing  provisions,  to  be  open 
"  to  subscription  by  individual  citizens." 

A  project,  not  altogether  dissimilar,  has  been  started  in  the  Legislature  of 
Pennsylvania.  These  proceedings  show,  at  least,  a  conviction  of  the  ne- 
cessky  of  some  bank  created  by  Congress.  Mr.  President,  on  this  subject 
I  have  no  doubt  whatever.  I  think  a  national  bank  proper  and  necessary. 
I  believe  it  to  be  the  only  practicable  remedy  for  the  evils  we  feel,  and  the 
only  effectual  security  against  the  greater  evils  which  we  fear.  Not,  sir,  that 
there  is  any  magic  in  the  name  of  a  bank;  nor  that  a  national  bank  works 
by  any  miracle  or  mystery.  But  looking  to  the  state  of  things  actually 
existing  around  us — looking  to  the  great  number  of  State  banks  already 
created,  not  less  than  three  hundred  and  fifty,  or  four  hundred — looking  to 
the  vast  amount  of  paper  issued  by  those  banks,  and  considering  that,  in  the 
very  nature  of  things,  this  paper  must  be 'limited  and  local  in  its  credit  and 
in  its  circulation,  I  confess  I  see  nothing  but  a  well-conducted  national  in 
stitution  which  is  likely  to  afford  any  guard  against  excessive  paper  issues,  or 
which  can  furnish  a  sound  and  uniform  currency  to  every  part  of  the  United 
States.  This,  sir,  is  not  only  a  question  of  finance,  it  not  only  respects  the 
operations  of  the  Treasury,  but  it  rises  to  the  character  of  a  high  political 
question.  It  respects  the  currency,  the  actual  money,  the  measure  of  value 
of  all  property  and  all  labor  in  the  United  States.  If  we  needed  not  a 
dollar  of  money  in  the  Treasury,  it  would  still  be  our  solemn  and  bounden 
duty  to  protect  this  great  interest.  It  respects  the  exercise  of  one  of  the 
greatest  powers,  beyond  all  doubt,  conferred  on  Congress  by  the  constitution. 
And  I  hardly  know  any  thing  less  consistent  with  our  public  duty,  and  our 
high  trust,  nor  any  thing  more  likely  to  disturb  the  harmonious  relations  of 
the  States,  in  all  affairs  of  business  and  life,  than  for  Congress  to  abandon 
all  care  and  control  over  the  currency,  and  to  throw  the  whole  money 
system  of  the  country  into  the  hands  of  four-and-twenty  State  Legis 
latures. 

I  am,  then,  sir,  for  a  bank;  and  am  fully  persuaded  that  to  that  measure 
the  country  must  come  at  last. 

The  question,  then,  is  between  the  creation  of  a  new  Bank,  and  the  re- 
chartering  of  the  present  Bank,  with  modifications.  I  have  already  refer 
red  to  the  scheme  for  a  new  bank,  proposed  to  the  Legislature  of  Massachu 
setts,  by  Mr.  White,  Between  such  a  new  bank  as  his  propositions  would 
create,  and  a  rechartering  of  the  present  Bank,  with  modifications,  there  is 
no  very  wide,  certainly  no  irreconcilable  difference.  We  cannot,  however, 
create  another  Bank  before  March,  1836.  This  is  one  reason  for  preferring 
a  continuance  of  the  present.  And,  treating  the  subject  as  a  practical  ques 
tion,  and  looking  to  the  state  of  opinion,  and  to  the  probability  of  success,  in 
either  attempt,  I  incline  to  the  opinion  that  the  true  course  of  policy  is  to 
propose  a  rccharter  of  the  present  Bank,  with  modifications. 

As  to  what  these  modifications  should  be,  I  would  only  now  observe,  that 


10 

while  it  may  well  be  inferred,  from  my  known  sentiments,  that  I  should  not 
myself  deem  any  alterations  in  the  charter,  beyond  those  proposed  by  the 
bill  of  1832,  highly  essential,  yet  it  is-  a  case  in  which,  I  am  aware,  nothing 
can  be  effected  for  the  good  of  the  country,  without  making  some  approaches 
to  unity  of  opinion.  I  think,  therefore,  that,  in  the  hope  of  accomplishing 
an  object  of  so  much  importance,  liberal  concessions  should  be  made.  I  lay 
out  of  the  case  all  consideration  of  any  especial  claim,  or  any  legal  right,  of 
the  present  stockholders  to  a  renewal  of  their  charter.  No  such  right  can 
be  pretended;  doubtless  none  such  is  pretended.  The  stockholders  must 
stand  like  other  individuals,  and  their  interest  regarded  so  far,  and  so  far 
only,  as  may  be  judged  for  the  public  good.  Modifications  of  the  present 
charter  should,  I  think,  be  proposed,  such  as  may  remove  all  reasonable 
grounds  of  jealousy,  in  all  quarters,  whether  in  States,  in  other  institutions, 
or  in  individuals;  such,  too,  as  may  tend  to  reconcile  the  interests  of  the 
great  city  where  the  Bank  is,  with  those  of  another  great  city;  and,  in  short, 
the  question  should  be  met  with  a  sincere  disposition  to  accomplish,  by  united 
and  friendly  counsels,  a  measure  which  shall  allay  fears,  and  promote  confi 
dence,  at  the  same  time  that  it  secures  to  the  country  a  sound,  creditable, 
uniform  currency,  and  to  the  Government  a  safe  deposite  for  the  public  trea 
sure,  and  an  important  auxiliary  in  its  financial  operations. 

I  repeat,  then,  sir,  that  I  am  in  favor  of  renewing  the  charter  of  the  pre 
sent  Bank,  with  such  alterations  as  may  be  expected  to  meet  the  general 
sense  of  the  country. 

And  now,  Mr.  President,  to  avoid  all  unfounded  inferences,  I  wish  to  say, 
that  these  suggestions  are  to  be  regarded  as  wholly  my  own.  They  are  made 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  Bank,  and  with  no  understanding  or  concert 
with  any  of  its  friends.  I  have  not  understood,  indeed,  that  the  Bank  itself 
proposes  to  apply,  at  present,  for  a  renewal  of  its  charter.  Whether  it  does  so 
or  not,  my  suggestions  are  connected  with  no  such  or  any  other  purpose  of 
the  Bank.  I  take  up  the  subject  on  public  grounds,  purely  and  exclusively. 

And,  sir,  in  order  to  repel  all  inferences  of  another  sort,  I  wish  to  state, 
with  equal  distinctness,  that  I  do  not  undertake  to  speak  the  sentiments  of 
any  individual,  heretofore  opposed  to  the  Bank,  or  belonging  to  that  class  of 
public  men  who  have  generally  opposed  it.  I  state  my  own  opinion;  if  others 
should  concur  in  them,  it  will  be  only  because  they  approve  them,  and  will 
not  be  the  result  of  any  previous  concert  or  understanding  whatever. 

Finally,  Mr.  President,  having  stated  my  own  opinions,  I  respectfully  ask 
thoss  who  propose  to  continue  the  discussion  now  going  on,  relative  to  the 
deposites,  to  let  the  country  see  their  plan  for  the  faial  settlement  of  the  pre 
sent  difficulties.  If  they  are  against  the  Bank,  and  against  all  banks,  what 
do  they  propose?  That  the  country  will  not  be  satisfied  with  the  present 
state  of  things,  seems  to  me  certain.  What  state  of  things  is  to  succeed  it? 
To  these  questions,  I  desire  to  call,  earnestly,  the  attention  of  the  Senate 
and  of  the  country.  The  occasion  is  critical,  the  interests  at  stake  momen 
tous,  and,  in  my  judgment,  Congress  ought  not  to  adjourn  till  it  shall  have 
passed  some  law  suitable  to  the  exigency,  and  satisfactory  to  the  country. 


On  the  30th  day  of  January,  Mr.  WRIGHT,  of  New  York,  presented  to  the 
Senate  sundry  resolutions,  passed  by  the  Legislature  of  New  York,  approv 
ing  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  and  disapproving  of  any  Bank  of  the 
United  States. 


11 

In  presenting  these  resolutions,  Mr.  WRIGHT,  among  other  observations, 
expressed  his  decided  hostility  to  the  renewal  of  the  charter  of  the  present 
Bank,  or  the  creation  of  any  other;  that  he  would  oppose  this  Bank  upon  the 
ground  of  its  flagrant  violations  of  the  high  trusts  confided  to  it,  but  that  his 
objections  were  of  a  still  deeper  and  graver  character;  that  he  went  against 
this  Bank,  and  against  any  and  every  bank  to  be  incorporated  by  Congress, 
to  be  located  any  where  within  the  twenty-four  States. 

He  expressed  a  strong  opinion,  too,  that  the  existing  distress  arose  from 
the  conduct  of  the  Bank  in  curtailing  its  loans;  and  that  this  curtailment 
had  been  made  with  a  view  to  extort  a  renewal  of  its  charter  from  the  fears 
of  the  people. 

As  to  what  was  to  be  done  under  present  circumstances,  in  order  to  relieve 
the  public  pressure,  Mr.  WRIGHT  said,  that,  speaking  for  himself  only,  he 
would  sustain  the  executive  branch  of  the  Government,  by  all  the  legal 
means  in  his  power,  in  the  effort  now  making  to  substitute  the  State  banks, 
instead  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  as  the  fiscal  agent  of  the  Govern 
ment. 

When  Mr.  WRIGHT  had  concluded  his  remarks,  Mr.  WEBSTER  said, 

Mr.  PRESIDENT:  I  cannot  consent  to  let  the  opportunity  pass,  without  a 
few  observations  upon  what  we  have  now  heard.  Sir,  the  remarks  of  the 
honorable  member  from  New  York  are  full  of  the  most  portentous  import. 
They  are  words,  not  of  cheering  or  consolation,  but  of  ill-boding  significa 
tion;  and,  as  they  spread  far  and  wide,  in  their  progress  from  the  capital 
through  the  country,  they  will  carry  with  them,  if  I  mistake  not,  gloom, 
apprehension,  and  dismay.  I  consider  the  declarations  which  the  honorable 
member  has  now  made  as  expressing  the  settled  purpose  of  the  administra 
tion  on  the  great  question  which  so  much  agitates  the  country. 

[Here  Mr.  WRIGHT  rose,  and  said  that  he  had  given  his  opinion  as  an  indi 
vidual,  and  that  he  had  no  authority  to  speak  for  the  administration.] 

Mr.  WEBSTER  continued.  I  perfectly  well  understand,  sir,  all  the  gentle 
man's  disclaimers  and  demurrers.  He  speaks,  to  be  sure,  in  his  own  name 
only;  but,  from  his  political  connexions,  his  station,  and  his  relations,  I  know 
full  well  that  he  has  not,  on  this  occasion,  spoken  one  word  which  has  not 
been  deliberately  weighed  and  considered,  by  others  as  well  as  himself. 

He  has  announced,  therefore,  to  the  country  two  things  clearly  and  intelli 
gibly: 

First,  that  the  present  system  (if  system  it  is  to  be  called)  is  to  remain 
unaltered.  The  public  moneys  are  to  remain  as  they  now  are,  in  the  State 
banks,  and  the  whole  public  revenue  is  hereafter  to  be  collected  through  the 
agency  of  such  banks.  This  is  the  first  point.  The  gentleman  has  declared 
his  full  and  fixed  intention  to  support  the  administration  in  this  course,  and 
therefore  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  course  has  been  determined  on  by 
the  administration.  No  plan  is  to  be  laid  before  Congress;  no  system  is  to 
be  adopted  by  authority  of  law.  The  eilect  of  a  law  would  be  to  place  the 
public  deposites  beyond  the  power  of  daily  change,  and  beyond  the  absolute 
control  of  the  Executive.  But  no  such  fixed  arrangement  is  to  take  place. 
The  whole  is  to  be  left  completely  at  the  pleasure  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  who  may  change  the  public  moneys  from  place  to  place,  and  from 
bank  to  bank,  as  often  as  he  pleases. 

The  second  thing  now  clearly  made  known,  and  of  which,  indeed,  there  have 
been  many  previous  intimations,  is,  sir,  that  a  great  effort  is  to  be  made,  or 


12 

rather  an  effort  already  made  is  to  be  vigorously  renewed  and  continued,  to  turn 
the  public  complaints  against  the  Bank  instead  of  the  Government,  and  to  per 
suade  the  people  that  all  their  sufferings  arise,  not  from  the  act  of  the  admin 
istration  in  interfering  with  the  public  deposites,  but  from  the  conduct  of  the 
Bank  since  that  was  done.  It  is  to  be  asserted  here,  and  will  be  the  topic 
of  declamation  every  where,  that,  notwithstanding  the  removal  of  the  depo 
sites,  if  the  Bank  had  not  acted  wrong,  there  would  have  been  no  pressure  or 
distress  on  the  country.  The  object,  it  is  evident,  will  now  be  to  divert 
public  attention  from  the  conduct  of  the  Secretary,  and  fix  it  on  that  of  the 
Bank.  This  is  the  second  thing  which  is  to  be  learned  from  the  speech  of 
the  member  from  New  York. 

The  honorable  member  has  said  that  new  honors  are  to  be  gained  by  the 
President,  from  the  act  which  he  is  about  to  accomplish;  that  he  is  to  bring 
back  legislation  to  its  original  limits,  and  to  establish  the  great  truth  that 
Congress  has  no  power  to  create  a  national  bank. 

I  shall  not  stop  to  argue  whether  Congress  can  charter  a  bank  in  this  little 
District,  which  shall  operate  every  where  throughout  the  Union,  and  yet 
cannot  establish  one  in  any  of  the  States.  The  gentleman  seemed  to  leave 
that  point,  as  if  Congress  had  such  a  power.  But  all  must  see  that  if  Congress 
cannot  establish  a  bank  in  one  of  the  States,  with  branches  in  the  rest,  it 
would  be  mere  evasion  to  say  that  it  might  establish  a  bank  here,  with 
branches  in  the  several  States. 

Congress,  it  is  alleged,  has  not  the  constitutional  power  to  create  a  bank! 
Sir,  on  what  does  this  power  rest,  in  the  opinion  of  those  of  us  who  maintain  it1? 
Simply  on  this:  that  it  is  a  power  which  is  necessary  and  proper  for  the  pur 
pose  of  carrying  other  powers  into  effect.  A  fiscal  agent — an  auxiliary  to 
the  Treasury — a  machine — a  something,  is  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the 
Government;  and  Congress,  under  the  general  authority  conferred  upon  it, 
can  create  that  fiscal  agent — that  machine — that  something — and  call  it  a 
bank.  This  is  what  I  contend  for;  but  this  the  gentleman  denies,  and  says 
that  it  is  not  competent  to  Congress  to  create  a  fiscal  agent  for  itself,  but  that 
it  may  employ,  as  such  agents,  institutions  not  created  by  itself,  but  by  others, 
and  which  are  beyond  the  control  of  Congress.  It  is  admitted  that  the  agent 
is  necessary,  and  that  Congress  has  the  power  to  employ  it;  but  it  is  insisted, 
nevertheless,  that  Congress  cannot  create  it,  but  must  take  such  as  is  or  may 
be  already  created.  I  do  not  agree  to  the  soundness  of  this  reasoning.  Sup 
pose  there  were  no  State  banks;  in  that  case,  as  the  gentleman  admits  the 
necessity  of  a  bank,  how  can  he  hold  such  discordant  opinions  as  to  assert 
that  Congress  could  not,  in  that  case,  create  one?  The  agency  of  a  bank  is 
necessary;  and,  because  it  is  necessary,  we  may  use  it,  provided  others  will 
make  a  bank  for  us;  but,  if  they  will  not,  we  cannot  make  one  for  ourselves, 
however  necessary.  This  is  the  proposition. 

For  myself,  I  must  confess  that  I  am  too  obtuse  to  see  the  distinction  be 
tween  the  power  of  creating  a  bank  for  the  use  of  the  Government,  and  the 
power  of  taking  into  its  use  banks  already  created.  To  make  and  to  use,  or  to 
make  and  to  hire,  must  require  the  same  power,  in  this  case,  and  be  either 
both  constitutional,  or  both  equally  unconstitutional;  except  that  every  con 
sideration  of  propriety,  and  expediency,  and  convenience,  requires  that  Con 
gress  should  make  a  bank  which  will  suit  its  own  purposes,  answer  its  own 
ends,  and  be  subject  to  its  own  control,  rather  than  use  other  banks,  which 
were  not  created  for  any  such  purpose,  are  not  suited  to  it,  and  over  which 
Congress  can  exercise  no  supervision. 


13 

On  one  or  two  other  points,  sir,  I  wish  to  say  a  word.  The  gentleman  differs 
from  me  as  to  the  degree  of  pressure  on  the  country.  He  admits  that  in 
some  parts  there  is  some  degree  of  pressure;  in  large  cities  he  supposes  there 
may  be  distress;  but  asserts  that  every  where  else  the  pressure  is  limited; 
that  every  where  it  is  greatly  exaggerated;  and  that  it  will  soon  be  over. 
This  is  mere  matter  of  opinion.  It  is  capable  of  no  precise  and  absolute 
proof  or  disproof.  The  avenues  of  knowledge  are  equally  open  to  all.  But 
I  can  truly  say  that  I  differ  from  the  gentleman  on  this  point  most  materially 
and  most  widely.  From  the  information  I  have  received  during  the  last  few 
weeks,  I  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  pressure  is  very  severe,  has 
become  very  general,  and  is  fast  increasing;  and  I  see  no  chance  of  its  dimi 
nution,  unless  measures  of  relief  shall  be  adopted  by  the  Government. 

But  the  gentleman  has  discovered,  or  thinks  he  has  discovered,  motives 
for  the  complaints  which  arise  on  all  sides.  It  is  all  but  an  attempt  to  bring 
the  administration  into  disfavor.  This  alone  is  the  cause  that  the  removal 
of  the  deposites  is  so  strongly  censured !  Sir,  the  gentleman  is  mistaken. 
He  does  not — at  least  I  think  he  does  not — rightly  interpret  the  signs  of  the 
times.  The  cause  of  complaint  is  much  deeper  and  stronger  than  any  mere 
desire  to  produce  political  effect.  The  gentleman  must  be  aware  that,  not 
withstanding  the  great  vote  by  which  the  New  York  resolutions  were  carried, 
and  the  support  given  by  other  proceedings  to  the  removal  of  the  deposites, 
there  are  many  as  ardent  friends  of  the  President  as  are  to  be  found  any 
where,  who  exceedingly  regret  and  deplore  the  measure.  Sir,  on  this  floor 
there  has  been  going  on,  for  many  weeks,  as  interesting  a  debate  as  has  been 
witnessed  for  twenty  years;  and  yet  I  have  not  heard,  among  all  who  have 
supported  the  administration,  a  single  Senator  say  that  he  approved  the 
removal  of  the  deposites,  or  was  glad  it  had  taken  place,  until  the  gentleman 
from  New  York  spoke.  I  saw  the  gentleman  from  Georgia  approach  that 
point,  but  he  shunned  direct  contact.  He  complained  much  of  the  Bank;  he 
insisted,  too,  on  the  power  of  removal;  but  I  did  not  hear  him  say  he  thought 
it  a  wise  act.  The  gentleman  from  Virginia,  [Mr.  RIVES,]  not  now  in  his 
seat,  also  defended  the  power,  and  has  arraigned  the  Bank;  but  has  he  said 
that  he  approved  the  measure  of  removal?  I  have  not  met  with  twenty  in 
dividuals,  in  or  out  of  Congress,  who  have  expressed  an  approval  of  it, 
among  the  many  hundreds  whose  opinions  I  have  heard — not  twenty  who 
have  maintained  that  it  was  a  wise  proceeding;  but  I  have  heard  individuals 
of  ample  fortune  declare,  nevertheless,  that  since  it  was  done,  they  would 
sacrifice  all  they  possessed  rather  than  not  support  it,  although  they  wholly 
disapproved  of  it.  Such  is  the  warmth  of  party  zeal. 

Sir,  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  present  agitation  of  the  country 
springs  from  mere  party  motives.  It  is  a  great  mistake.  Every  body  is  not 
a  politician.  The  mind  of  every  man  in  the  country  is  not  occupied  with  the 
project  of  subverting  one  administration,  and  setting  up  another.  The  gen 
tleman  has  done  great  injustice  to  the  people.  I  know,  sir,  that  great  injustice 
has  been  done  to  the  memorialists  from  Boston,  whose  resolutions  I  presented 
some  days  since,  some  of  whom  are  very  ardent  friends  of  the  President, 
and  can  have  been  influenced  by  no  such  motive  as  has  been  attributed  to 
them. 

But,  Mr.  President,  I  think  I  heard  yesterday  something  from  the  gentle 
man  from  Pennsylvania,  indicative  of  an  intention  to  direct  the  hostility  of 
the  country  against  the  Bank,  and  to  ascribe  to  the  Bank,  and  the  Bank 
alone,  the  public  distress.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  have  fore- 


14 

seen  the  consequences  of  the  removal  of  the  deposites;  and  gentlemen  have 
no  right  first  to  attack  the  Bank,  charge  it  with  great  offences,  and  thus 
attempt  to  shake  its  credit,  and  then  complain,  when  the  Bank  undertakes 
to  defend  itself,  and  to  avoid  the  great  risk  which  must  threaten  it  from  the 
hostility  of  the  Government  to  its  properly  and  character.  The  Govern 
ment  has  placed  itself  in  an  extraordinary  position,  both  to  the  Bank  and  to 
the  country,  by  the  removal  of  the  deposites:  and  also  to  the  currency  of  the 
country.  The  bills  of  the  Bank  are  lawful  currency  in  all  payments  to 
Government;  yet  we  see  the  Executive  warring  on  the  credit  of  this  national 
currency.  We  have  seen  the  institution  assailed,  which,  by  law,  was  pro 
vided  to  supply  the  revenue.  Is  not  this  a  new  course"?  Does  the  recollection 
of  the  gentleman  furnish  any  such  instance]  What  other  institution  could 
stand  against  such  hostility?  The  Bank  of  England  could  not  stand  against 
it  a  single  hour.  The  Bank  of  France  would  perish  at  the  first  breath  of 
such  hostility.  But  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  has  sustained  its  credit 
under  every  disadvantage,  and  has  ample  means  to  sustain  it  to  the  end.  Its 
credit  is  in  no  degree  shaken,  though  its  operations  are  necessarily  curtailed. 
What  has  the  Bank  done?  The  gentleman  from  New  York  and  the  gentle 
man  from  Pennsylvania  have  alleged  that  it  is  not  because  of  the  removal  of 
the  deposites  that  there  is  pressure  in  the  country,  but  because  of  the  conduct 
of  the  Bank.  The  latter  gentleman,  especially,  alleges  that  the  Bank  began 
to  curtail  its  discounts  before  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  and  at  a  time 
when  it  was  only  expected  that  they  would  be  removed.  Indeed !  and  did 
not  the  Bank,  by  taking  this  course,  prove  that  it  foresaw  correctly  what  was 
to  take  place?  and,  because  it  adopted  a  course  of  preparation,  in  order  to 
break  the  blow  which  was  about  to  fall  upon  it,  this  also  is  to  be  added  to 
the  grave  catalogue  of  its  offences.  The  Bank,  it  seems,  has  curtailed  to 
the  amount  of  nine  millions.  •  Has  she,  indeed?  And  is  not  that  exactly 
the  amount  of  deposites  which  the  Government  has  withdrawn?  The  Bank, 
then,  has  curtailed  precisely  so  much  as  the  Government  has  drawn  away 
from  it.  No  other  Bank  in  the  world  could  have  gone  on  with  so  small  a 
curtailment.  While  public  confidence  was  diminishing  all  around  the^Bank, 
it  only  curtailed  just  as  much  as  it  lost  by  the  act  of  the  Government.  The 
Bank  would  be  justified,  even  without  the  withdrawal  of  the  deposites,  in  cur 
tailing  its  discounts  gradually,  and  continuing  to  do  so  to  the  end  of  its 
charter,  considering  the  hostility  manifested  to  its  further  continuance.  The 
Government  has  refused  to  recharter  it.  Its  term  of  existence  is  approachiiig; 
one  of  the  duties  which  it  has  to  perform  is  to  make  its  collections;  and  the 
process  of  collection,  since  it  must  be  slow,  ought  to  be  commenced  in  season. 
It  is,  therefore,  its  duty  to  begin  its  curtailments,  so  as  that  the  process  may 
be  gradual. 

I  hope  that  I  have  not  been  misunderstood  in  my  remarks  the  other  morn 
ing.  The  gentleman  from  New  York  has  represented  me  as  saying  that  it 
is  not  the  removal  of  the  deposites  which  has  caused  the  public  distress. 
What  I  said  was,  that,  if  the  Government  had  required  twice  nine  millions 
for  its  service,  the  withdrawal  of  that  amount  from  the  Bank,  without  any 
interruption  of  the  good  understanding  between  the  Government  and  the 
Bank,  would  not  have  caused  this  pressure  and  distrust.  Every  thing  turns 
on  the  circumstances  under  which  the  withdrawal  is  made.  If  public  confi~ 
dence  is  not  shaken,  all  is  well;  but,  if  it  is,  all — all  is  difficulty  and  distress. 
And  this  confidence  is  shaken. 

It  has  been  said  by  the  gentleman  from  New  York,  that  Government  has 


15 

no  design  against  the  Bank;  that  it  only  desires  to  withdraw  the  public  depo- 
sites.  Yet,  in  the  very  paper  submitted  to  Congress  by  the  Executive  De 
partment,  the  Bank  is  arraigned  as  unconstitutional  in  its  very  origin,  and  also 
as  having  broken  its  charter,  and  violated  its  obligations — and  its  very  existence 
is  said  to  be  dangerous  to  the  country!  Is  not  all  this  calculated  to  injure  the 
character  of  the  Bank  and  to  shake  confidence]  The  Bank  has  its  foreign  con 
nexions,  and  is  much  engaged  in  the  business  of  foreign  exchanges;  and  what 
will  be  thought  at  Paris  and  London,  when  the  community  there  shall  see  all 
these  charges  made  by  the  Government  against  a  Bank,  in  which  they  have 
always  reposed  the  highest  trust]  Does  not  this  injure  its  reputation?  Does  it 
not  compel  it  to  take  a  defensive  attitude]  The  gentleman  from  New  York 
spoke  of  the  power  in  the  country  to  put  down  the  Bank,  and  of  doing  as 
our  fathers  did  in  the  time  of  the  revolution;  and  has  called  on  the  people  to 
rise  and  put  down  this  money  power,  as  our  ancestors  put  down  the  oppres 
sive  rule  of  Great  Britain!  All  this  is  well  calculated  to  produce  the  effect 
which  is  intended;  and  all  this,  too,  helps  further  to  shake  confidence — it  all 
injures  the  Bank — it  all  compels  it  to  curtail  more  and  more. 

Sir,  I  venture  to  predict  that  the  longer  gentlemen  pursue  the  experiment 
which  they  have  devised,  of  collecting  the  public  revenue  by  State  banks,  the 
more  perfectly  will  they  be  satisfied  that  it  cannot  succeed.     The  gentleman 
has  suffered  himself  to  be  led  away  by  false  analogies.     He  says,  that  when 
the   present  Bank  expires,  there  will  be  the  same  laws   as  existed  when  the 
old  Bank  expired.     Now,  would  it  not  be  the  inference  of  every  wise  man, 
that  there  will  also  be  the  same  inconveniences  as  were  then  felt]  It  would  be 
useful  to  remember  the  state  of  things  which  existed  when  the  first  Bank  was 
created,  in  1791;  and  that  a  high  degree  of  convenience,  which  amounted  to 
political  necessity,  compelled  Congress  thus  early  to  create  a  national  bank. 
Its  charter  expired  in  1811,  and  the  war  came  on  the  next  year.    The  State 
banks   immediately  stopped   payment;   and,  before  the   war  had   continued 
twelve  months,  there  was  a  proposition  for  another  United  States  Bank;  and 
this  proposal  was  renewed  from  year  to  year,  and  from  session  to  session. 
Who  supported  this  proposition]    The  very  individuals  who  had  opposed  the 
former  Bank,  and  who  had  now  become  convinced  of  the  indispensable  neces 
sity  of  such  an  institution.  It  has  been  verified,  by  experience,  that  the  Bank  is 
as  necessary  in  time  of  peace  as  in  time  of  war;  and  perhaps  more  necessary, 
for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  the  commercial  operations  of  the  country,  and 
collecting  the  revenue,  and  sustaining  the  currency.  It  has  been  alleged,  that 
we  are  to  be  left  in  the  same  condition  as  when  the   old  Bank  expired,  and, 
of  course,  we  are  to  be  subjected  to  the  same  inconveniences.  Sir,  why  should 
we  thus  suffer  all  experience  to  be  lost  upon  us]     For  the  convenience  of 
the  Government  and  of  the  country  there  must  be  some  bank,  (at  least  I  think 
so;)  and  I  should  wish  to  hear  the  views  of  the  administration  as  to  this  point.    1 
The  notes  and  bills  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  have  heretofore  been    * 
circulated  every  where — they  meet  the  wants  of  every  one — they  have  furnished 
a  safe  and  most  convenient  currency.    It  is  impossible  for  Congress  to  enact 
a  certain  value  on  the  paper  of  the  State  banks.  They  may  say  that  these  banks 
are  entitled  to  credit;  but  they  cannot  legislate  them  into  the  good  opinion  and 
faith  of  the  public.     Credit  is   a  thing  which  must  take  its  own  course.     It 
can  never  happen  that  the  New  York  notes  will  be  at  par  value  in  Louisiana, 
or  that  the  notes  of  the   Louisiana  banks  will  be  at  par  value  in  New  York. 
In  the  notes  of  the  United  States  Bank  we  have  a  currency  of  equal  value 
every  where;  and  I  say  that  there  is  not  to  be  found,  in  the  whole  world, 


16 

another  institution  whose  nctes  spread  so  far  and  wide,  with  perfect  credit 
in  all  places.  There  is  no  instance  of  a  bank,  whose  paper  is  spread  over  so 
vast  a  surface  of  country,  and  is  every  where  of  such  equal  value.  How  can 
it  be,  that  a  number  of  State  banks,  scattered  over  two  thousand  miles  of 
country,  subject  to  twenty-four  different  State  Legislatures  and  State  tribu 
nals,  without  the  possibility  of  any  general  concert  of  action,  can  supply  the 
place  of  one  general  bank?  It  cannot  be.  I  see,  sir,  in  the  doctrines  which  have 
been  advanced  to-day,  only  new  distress  and  disaster,  new  insecurity,  and 
more  danger  to  property  than  the  country  has  experienced  for  many  years; 
because  it  is  in  vain  to  attempt  to  uphold  the  occupations  of  industry,  unless 
property  is  made  secure;  or  of  the  value  of  labor,  unless  its  recompense  is 
safe.  But  an  opportunity  will  occur  for  resuming  this  subject  hereafter.  I 
forbear  from  it  for  the  present. 

A  word  or  two  on  one  other  point.  It  was  said  by  me,  on  a  former  day, 
that  this  immediate  question  of  the  deposites  does  not  necessarily  draw  after 
it  the  question  of  rechartering  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  It  leaves  that 
question  for  future  adjustment.  But  the  present  question  involves  high  poli 
tical  considerations,  which  I  am  not  now  about  to  discuss.  If  the  question 
of  the  removal  of  the  deposites  be  not  now  taken  into  view,  gentlemen  will 
be  bound  to  vote  on  the  resolutions  of  the  Senator  from  Kentucky,  as  to  the 
power  which  has  been  claimed  and  exercised.  The  question,  then,  is  not  as 
to  the  renewing  of  the  charter  of  the  Bank.  But  I  repeat,  that,  however 
gentlemen  may  flatter  themselves,  if  it  be  not  settled  that  the  deposites  are  to 
be  restored,  nothing  will  be  settled;  negative  resolutions  will  not  tranquillize 
the  country  and  give  it  repose.  The  question  is  before  the  country — all  agree 
that  it  must  be  settled  by  that  country.  I  very  much  regret  that  topics  are 
mixed  up  with  the  question,  which  may  prevent  it  from  being  submitted  to  the 
calm  judgment  of  the  people.  Yet,  I  have  not  lost  faith  in  public  sentiment. 
Events  are  occurring,  daily,  which  will  make  the  people  think  for  themselves. 
The  industrious,  the  enterprising,  will  see  the  danger  which  surrounds  them, 
and  will  awake.  If  the  majority  of  the  people  shall  then  say  there  is  no  ne 
cessity  for  a  continuance  of  this  sound  and  universal  currency,  I  will  acqui 
esce  in  their  judgment,  because  I  can  do  no  otherwise  than  to  acquiesce.  If 
the  gentleman  from.  New  York  is  right  in  his  reading  of  the  prognostics,  and 
public  opinion  shall  settle  down  in  the  way  which  he  desires;  and  if  it  be  de 
termined  here  that  the  public  money  is  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Exe 
cutive,  with  absolute  power  over  the  whole  subject  of  its  custody  and  guardi 
anship;  and  that  the  general  currency  is  to  be  left  to  the  control  of  banks 
created  by  twenty-four  States;  then,  I  say,  that  in  my  judgment,  one  strong 
bond  of  our  social  and  political  Union  is  severed,  and  one  great  pillar  of  our 
prosperity  is  broken  and  prostrate. 

Mr.  TALLMADGE,  of  New  York,  spoke  in  reply  to  Mr.  WEBSTER,  and  de 
nied  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  create  a  bank,  although  he  main 
tained  the  power  of  the  Secretary  to  make  use  of  the  State  banks. 

The  subject  being  resumed  the  next  day,  January  31 — 

Mr.  WEBSTER  said:  It  is  not  to  be  denied,  sir,  that  the  financial  affairs 
of  the  country  have  come,  at  last,  to  such  a  state,  that  every  man  can  see 
plainly  the  question  which  is  presented  for  the  decision  of  Congress.  We 
have,  unquestionably,  before  us,  now,  the  views  of  the  Executive,  as  to  the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  evils  alleged  to  exist;  and  its  notions,  also,  as  to  the 


proper  remedy  for  such  evils.  That  remedy  is  short.  It  is,  simply,  the  sys 
tem  of  administration  already  adopted  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and 
which  is  nothing  hut  this — that  whenever  he  shall  think  proper  to  remove  the 
public  moneys  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  place  them  wherever 
else  he  pleases,  this  act  shall  stand  as  the  settled  policy  and  system  of  the 
country;  and  this  system  shall  rest  upon  the  authority  of  the  Executive  alone. 
This  is  now  to  be  our  future  policy,  as  I  understand  the  grave  significant 
import  of  the  remarks  made  yesterday  by  the  gentleman  from  New  York, 
and  as  I  perceive  they  are  generally  understood,  and  as  they  are  evidently  un 
derstood  by  the  gentleman  from  Mississippi,  [Mr.  POINDEXTER,]  who  has  alluded 
to  them  on  presenting  his  resolutions  this  morning.  I  wish,  sir,  to  take  this,  the 
earliest  opportunity,  of  stating  my  opinions  upon  this  subject;  and  that  opinion 
is,  that  the  remedy  proposed  by  the  administration  for  the  evils  under  which 
the  country  is  at  this  time  suffering,  cannot  bring  relief,  will  not  give  satis 
faction,  and  cannot  be  acquiesced  in.  I  think  the  country,  on  the  other  hand, 
will  show  much  dissatisfaction;  and  that,  from  no  motive  of  hostility  to  the. 
Government,  from  no  disposition  to  make  the  currency  of  the  country  turn 
upon  political  events,  or  to  make  political  events  turn  upon  the  question  of 
the  currency;  but  simply  because,  in  my  judgment,  the  system  is  radically 
defective — totally  insufficient — carrying  with  it  little  confidence  of  the  public, 
and  none  at  all  more  than  it  acquires  merely  by  the  influence  of  the  name 
which  recommends  it. 

I  do  not  intend  now,  Mr.  President,  to  go  into  a  regular  and  formal  argu 
ment  to  prove  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  establish  a  national 
bank.  That  question  has  been  argued  a  hundred  times,  and  always  settled 
the  same  way.  The  whole  history  of  the  country,  for  almost  forty  years, 
proves  that  such  a  power  has  been  believed  to  exist.  All  previous  Con 
gresses,  or  nearly  all,  have  admitted  or  sanctioned  it;  the  judicial  tribunals, 
Federal  and  State,  have  sanctioned  it.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  has  declared  the  constitutionality  of  the  present  Bank,  after  the  most 
solemn  argument,  without  a  dissenting  voice  on  the  bench. 

Every  successive  President  has,  tacitly  or  expressedly,  admitted  the  power. 
The  present  President  has  done  this;  he  has  informed  Congress  that  he  could 
furnish  the  plan  of  a  bank  which  should  conform  to  the  constitution.  In 
objecting  to  the  recharter  of  the  present  Bank,  he  objected  for  particular 
reasons;  and  he  has  said  that  a  Bank  of  the  United  States  would  be  useful 
and  convenient  for  the  people. 

All  this  authority,  I  think,  ought  to  settle  the  question.  Both  the  members 
from  New  York,  however,  are  still  unsatisfied;  they  both  deny  the  power  of 
Congress  to  establish  a  bank.  Now,  sir,  I  shall  not  argue  the  question  at 
this  time;  but  I  will  repeat  what  I  said  yesterday.  It  does  appear  to  me, 
that  the  late  measures  of  the  administration  prove,  incontestably,  and  by  a* 
very  short  course  of  reasoning,  the  constitutionality  of  a  bank.  What  I  said* 
yesterday,  and  what  I  say  to  day,  is,  that  since  the  Secretary,  and  all  who 
agree  with  the  Secretary,  admit  the  necessity  of  the  agency  of  some  bank  to 
carry  on  the  affairs  of  Government,  I  was  at  a  loss  to  see  where  they  could 
find  power  to  use  a  State  bank,  and  yet  find  no  power  to  create  a  Bank  of 
the  United  States.  The  gentleman's  perception  may  be  sharp  enough  to  see 
a  distinction  between  these  two  cases,  but  it  is  too  minute  for  my  grasp.  It 
is  not  said,  in  terms,  in  the  constitution,  that  Congress  may  create  a  bank; 
nor  is  it  said,  in  terms,  that  Congress  may  use  a  bank  created  by  a  State. 
How,  then,  does  it  get  authority  to  do  either?  No  otherwise,  certainly,  than 


18 

that  it  possesses  power  to  pass  all  laws  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  its 
enumerated  powers  into  effect.  If  a  law  were  now  before  us  for  confirming 
the  arrangement  of  the  Secretary,  and  adopting  twenty  State  banks  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  as  fiscal  agents  of  the  Government,  where  would- 
the  honorable  gentleman  find  authority  for  passing  such  a  law?  No  where 
but  in  that  clause  of  the  constitution  to  which  I  have  referred;  that  is  to  sayr 
the  clause  which  authorizes  Congress  to  pass  all  laws  necessary  and  proper 
for  carrying  its  granted  powers  into  effect.  If  such  a  law  were  before  us,  and 
the  honorable  member  proposed  to  vote  for  it,  he  would  be  obliged  to  prove 
that  the  agency  of  a  bank  is  a  thing  both  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying 
on  the  Government.  If  he  could  not  make  this  out,  the  law  would  be  un 
constitutional.  We  see  the  Secretary  admits  the  necessity  of  this  bank  agency;, 
the  gentleman  himself  admits  it — nay,  contends  for  it.  A  bank  agency  is  his 
main  reliance.  All  the  hopes  expressed  by  himself  or  his  colleague,  of  being 
able  to  get  on  with  the  present  state  of  things,  rest  on  the  expected  efficiency 
of  a  bank  agency. 

A  bank,  then,  or  some  bank,  being  admitted  to  be  both  necessary  and 
proper  for  carrying  on  the  Government,  and  the  Secretary  proposing,  on  that 
very  ground,  and  no  other,  to  employ  the  State  banks,  how  does  he  make 
out  a  distinction  between  passing  a  law  for  using  a  necessary  agent,  already 
created,  and  a  law  for  creating  a  similar  agent,  to  be  used,  when  created,  for 
the  same  purpose?  If  there  be  any  distinction,  as  it  seems  to  me,  it  is  rather 
in  favor  of  creating  a  bank  by  the  authority  of  Congress,  with  such  powers, 
and  no  others,  as  the  service  expected  from  it  requires,  answerable  to  Con 
gress,  and  always  under  the  control  of  Congress,  than  of  employing  as  our 
agents  banks  created  by  other  Governments,  for  other  purposes,  and  over 
which  this  Government  has  no  control. 

But,  sir,  whichever  power  is  exercised,  both  spring  from  the  same  source^ 
and  the  power  to  establish  a  bank,  on  the  ground  that  its  agency  is  necessary 
and  proper  for  the  ends  and  uses  of  Government,  is  at  least  as  plainly  con 
stitutional  as  the  power  to  adopt  banks  for  the  same  uses  and  objects,  which 
are  already  made  by  other  Governments.  Indeed,  the  legal  act  is,  in  both 
cases,  the  same.  When  Congress  makes  a  bank,  it  creates  an  agency;  when 
it  adopts  a  State  bank,  it  creates  an  agency.  If  there  be  power  for  one, 
therefore,  there  is  power  for  the  other. 

The  honorable  member,  sir,  quoted  me  as  having  said  that  I  regarded  the 
Bank  as  one  of  the  greatest  bonds  of  the  union  of  the  States.  That  is  not 
exactly  what  I  said.  What  I  did  say  was,  that  the  constitutional  power 
vested  in  Congress  over  the  legal  currency  of  the  country  was  one  of  its 
very  highest  powers,  and  that  the  exercise  of  this  high  power  was  one  of  the 
strongest  bonds  of  the  union  of  the  States.  And  this  I  say  still.  Sir,  the 
gentleman  did  not  go  to  the  constitution.  He  did  not  tell  us  how  he  under 
stands  it,  or  how  he  proposes  to  execute  the  great  trust  which  it  devolves  on 
Congress,  in  respect  to  the  circulating  medium.  I  can  only  say,  sir,  how  I 
understand  it. 

The  constitution  declares  that  Congress  shall  have  power  "  to  coin  money, 
regulate  the  value  thereof ,  and  of  foreign  coin."  And  it  also  declares  that 
"no  State  shall  coin  money,  emit  bills  of  credit,  or  make  any  thing  but  gold 
and  silver  coin  a  tender  in  payment  of  debts."  Congress,  then,  and  Con 
gress  only,  can  coin  money,  and  regulate  the  value  thereof.  Now,  sir,  I  take 
it  to  be  a  truth,  which  has  grown  into  an  admitted  maxim  with  all  the  best 
writers,  and  the  best  informed  public  men,  that  those  whose  duty  it  is  to  pro- 


tect  the  community  against  the  evils  of  a  debased  coin,  are  bound  also  to  pro 
tect  it  against  the  still  greater  evils  of  excessive  issues  of  paper. 

If  the  public  require  protection,  says  Mr.  Ricardo,  against  bad  money,  which 
might  be  imposed  on  them  by  an  undue  mixture  of  alloy,  how  much  more 
necessary  is  such  protection,  when  paper  money  forms  almost  the  whole  of 
the  circulating  medium  of  the  country. 

It  is  not  to  be  doubted,  sir,  that  the  constitution  intended  that  Congress 
should  exercise  a  regulating  power — a  power  both  necessary  a»nd  salutary, 
over  that  which  should  constitute  the  actual  money  of  the  country,  whether 
that  money  were  coin,  or  the  representative  of  coin.  So  it  has  always  been 
considered — so  Mr.  Madison  considered  it,  as  may  be  seen  in  his  message, 
December,  1816.  He  there  says: 

"  Upon  this  general  view  of  the  subject,  it  is  obvious  that  there  is  only 
"  wanting  to  the  fiscal  prosperity  of  the  Government  the  restoration  of  a 
*'  uniform  medium  of  exchange.  The  resources  and  the  faith  of  the  nation, 
"  displayed  in  the  system  which  Congress  has  established,  insure  respect  and 
"confidence  both  at  home  and  abroad.  The  local  accumulations  of  the  re- 
*'  venue  have  already  enabled  the  Treasury  to  meet  the  public  engagements 
"  in  the  local  currency  of  most  of  the  States;  and  it  is  expected  that  the  same 
"  cause  will  produce  the  same  effect  throughout  the  Union.  But  for  the 
**  interests  of  the  community  at  large,  as  well  as  for  the  purposes  of  the  Trea- 
"  sury,  it  is  essential  that  the  nation  should  possess  a  currency  of  equal  value, 
"  credit,  and  use,  wherever  it  may  circulate.  The  constitution  has  intrusted 
*'  Congress  exclusively  with  the  power  of  creating  and  regulating  a  currency 
"  of  that  description;  and  the  measures  which  were  taken  during  the  last 
"  session,  in  execution  of  the  power,  give  every  promise  of  success.  The  Bank 
•"  of  the  United  States  has  been  organized  under  auspices  the  most  favorable, 
**  and  cannot  fail  to  be  an  important  auxiliary  to  those  measures" 

The  State  banks  put  forth  paper  as  representing  coin.  As  such  represen 
tative,  it  obtains  circulation — it  becomes  the  money  of  the  country — but  its 
amount  depends  on  the  will  of  four  hundred  different  State  banks,  each 
acting  on  its  own  discretion;  and  in  the  absence  of  every  thing  preventive 
or  corrective,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  what  security  is  there  against 
excessive  issues,  and,  consequently,  against  depreciation?  The  public  feels 
that  there  is  no  security  against  these  evils — it  has  learned  this  from  expe 
rience;  and  this  very  feeling,  this  distrust  of  the  paper  of  State  banks,  is 
the  very  evil  which  they  themselves  have  to  encounter;  and  it  is  a  very 
serious  evil.  They  know  that  confidence  in  them  is  far  greater  when 
there  exists  a  power  elsewhere  to  prevent  excess  and  depreciation.  Such  a 
power,  therefore,  is  friendly  to  their  best  interests.  It  gives  confidence  and 
credit  to  them,  one  and  all.  Hence  a  vast  majority  of  the  State  banks — 
nearly  all,  perhaps,  except  those  who  expect  to  be  objects  of  particular  favor — 
desire  the  continuance  of  a  national  bank,  as  an  institution  highly  useful  to 
themselves. 

The  mode  in  which  the  operations  of  a  national  institution  afford  security 
against  excessive  issues  by  local  banks  is  not  violent,  coercive,  or  injurious. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  gentle,  salutary,  and  friendly.  The  result  is  brought 
about  by  the  natural  and  easy  operation  of  things.  The  money  of  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States,  having  a  more  wide-spread  credit  and  character,  is 
constantly  wanted  for  purposes  of  remittance.  It  is  purchased,  therefore, 
for  this  purpose,  and  paid  for  in  the  bills  of  local  banks;  and  it  may  be  pur 
chased^  of  course,  at  par,  or  near  it,  if  these  local  bills  are  offered  in  the 


20 

neighborhood  of  their  own  banks,  and  these  banks  arc  in  good  credit.  These 
local  bills  then  return  to  the  bank  that  issued  them.  The  result  is,  that 
while  the  local  bills  will  or  may  supply,  in  great  part,  the  local  circulation, 
(not  being  capable,  for  want  of  more  extended  credit,  of  being  remitted  to 
great  distances,)  their  amount  is  thus  limited  to  the  purposes  of  local  circula 
tion;  and  any  considerable  excess,  beyond  this,  finds  in  due  season  a  salutary 
corrective. 

This  is  'one  of  the  known  benefits  of  the  Bank.  Every  man  of  business 
understands  it,  and  the  whole  country  has  realized  the  security  which  this 
course  of  things  has  produced. 

But,  sir,  as  to  the  question  of  the  deposites,  the  honorable  gentleman 
thinks  he  sees,  at  last,  the  curtain  raised — he  sees  the  object  of  the  whole 
debate.  He  insists  that  the  question  of  the  restoration  of  the  deposites,  and 
the  question  of  rechartering  the  Bank,  are  the  same  question.  It  strikes  me, 
sir,  as  being  strange,  that  the  gentleman  did  not  draw  an  exactly  opposite 
inference  from  his  own  premises.  He  says  he  sees  the  Northern  friends  of 
the  Bank,  and  the  Southern  opposers  of  the  Bank,  agreeing  for  the  restora 
tion  of  the  deposites.  This  is  true;  and  does  not  this  prove  that  the  question 
is  a  separate  one?  On  the  one  question,  the  North  and  the  South  are 
together;  on  the  other,  they  separate:  either  their  apprehensions  are  obtuse, 
or  else  this  very  statement  shows  the  questions  to  be  distinct. 

Sir,  since  the  gentleman  has  referred  to  the  North  and  the  South,  I  will 
venture  to  ask  him  if  he  sees  nothing  important  in  the  aspect  which  the 
South  presents'?  On  this  question  of  the  deposites,  does  he  not  behold 
almost  an  entire  unanimity  in  the  South'?  How  many,  from  the  Potomac  to 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  defend  the  removal?  For  myself,  I  declare  that  I  have 
not  heard  a  member  of  Congress  from  beyond  the  Potomac  say,  either  in  or 
out  of  his  seat,  that  he  approved  the  measure.  Can  the  gentleman  see* 
nothing  in  this  but  proof  that  the  deposite  question  and  the  question  of  re- 
charter  are  the  same?  Sir,  gentlemen  must  judge  for  themselves;  but  it 
appears  plain  enough  to  me,  that  the  President  has  lost  more  friends  at  the 
South  by  this  interference  with  the  public  deposites,  than  by  any  or  all  other 
measures. 

I  must  be  allowed  now,  sir,  to  advert  to  a  remark,  in  the  speech  of  the 
honorable  member  from  New  York,  on  the  left  of  the  Chair,  [Mr.WincHT,] 
as  I  find  it  in  a  morning  paper.  It  is  this: 

"  Be  assured,  sir,  whatever  nice  distinctions  may  be  drawn  here  as  to  the 
"  show  of  influence  which  expressions  of  the  popular  will  upon  such  a 
"  subject  are  entitled  to  from  us,  it  is  possible  for  that  will  to  assume  a  con- 
"  stitutional  shape,  which  the  Senate  cannot  misunderstand,  and,  understand- 
**  ing,  will  not  unwisely  resist." 

[Mr.  WRIGHT  said,  it  should  have  been  share  of  influence.] 

Mr.  WEBSTER  continued.  That  does  not  alter  the  sense.  Mr.  Presi 
dent,  I  wish  to  keep  the  avenues  of  public  opinion,  from  the  whole  country 
to  the  Capitol,  all  open,  broad  and  wide.  I  desire  always  to  know  the  state 
of  that  opinion,  on  great  and  important  subjects.  From  me,  that  opinion 
always  has  received,  and  always  will  receive,  the  most  respectful  attention 
and  consideration.  And  whether  it  be  expressed  by  State  Legisla 
tures,  or  by  public  meetings,  or  be  collected  from  individual  expressions,  in 
whatever  form  it  comes,  it  is  always  welcome.  But,  sir,  the  legislation  for 
the  United  States  must  be  conducted  here.  The  law  of  Congress  must  be 
the  will  of  Congress,  and  the  proceedings  of  Congress  its  own  proceedings. 


21 

I  hope  nothing  intimidating  was  intended  by  this  expression.  [Mr.  WRIGHT 
intimated  it  was  not.]  Then,  sir,  I  forbear  further  remark. 

Sir,  there  is  one  other  subject  on  which  I  wish  to  raise  my  voice.  There 
is  a  topic,  which  I  perceive  is  become  the  general  war  cry  of  party,  on  which 
I  take  the  liberty  to  warn  the  country  against  delusion.  Sir,  the  cry  is  to  be 
raised,  that  this  is  a  question  between  the  poor  and  the  rich.  I  know,  sir, 
it  has  been  proclaimed,  that  one  thing  was  certain — that  there  was  always  a 
hatred  from  the  poor  to  the  rich;  and  that  this  hatred  would  support  the  late 
measures,  and  the  putting  down  of  the  Bank.  Sir,  I  will  not  be  silent  at  the 
threatening  of  such  a  detestable  fraud  on  public  opinion.  If  but  one  man,  or 
ten  men,  in  the  nation  will  hear  my  voice,  I  would  still  warn  them  against  this 
attempted  imposition. 

Mr.  President,  this  is  an  eventful  moment.  On  the  great  questions  which 
occupy  us,  we  all  look  for  some  decisive  movement  of  public  opinion.  As  I 
wish  that  movement  to  be  free,  intelligent,  and  unbiassed — the  true  mani 
festation  of  the  public  will — I  desire  to  prepare  the  country  for  another 
assault,  which  I  perceive  is  about  to  be  made  on  popular  prejudice — another 
attempt  to  obscure  all  distinct  views  of  the  public  good — to  overwhelm  all 
patriotism,  and  all  enlightened  self-interest,  by  loud  cries  against  false 
danger,  and  by  exciting  the  passions  of  one  class  against  another.  I  am  not 
mistaken  in  the  omen — I  see  the  magazine  whence  the  weapons  of  this 
warfare  are  to  be  drawn.  I  already  hear  the  din  of  the  hammering  of  arms, 
preparatory  to  the  combat.  They  may  be  such  arms,  perhaps,  as  reason, 
and  justice,  and  honest  patriotism  cannot  resist.  Every  effort  at  resistance, 
it  is  possible,  may  be  feeble  and  powerless;  but,  for  one,  I  shall  make  an 
effort — an  effort  to  be  begun  now,  and  to  be  carried  on  and  continued,  with 
untiring  zeal,  till  the  end  of  the  contest  comes. 

Sir,  I  see  in  those  vehicles  which  carry  to  the  people  sentiments  from 
high  places,  plain  declarations  that  the  present  controversy  is  but  a  strife 
between  one  part  of  the  community  and  another.  I  hear  it  boasted  as  the 
unfailing  security,  the  solid  ground,  never  to  be  shaken,  on  which  recent 
measures  rest,  that  the  poor  naturally  hate  the  rich.  I  know,  that  under 
the  shade  of  the  roofs  of  the  Capitol,  within  the  last  twenty-four  hours — 
among  men  sent  here  to  devise  means  for  the  public  safety  and  the  public 
good — it  has  been  vaunted  forth,  as  matter  of  boast  and  triumph,  that  one 
cause  existed,  powerful  enough  to  support  every  thing,  and  to  defend  every 
thing,  and  that  was — the  natural  hatred  of  the  poor  to  the  rich. 

Sir,  I  pronounce  the  author  of  such  sentiments  to  be  guilty  of  attempting 
a  detestable  fraud  on  the  community;  a  double  fraud;  a  fraud  which  is  to 
cheat  men  out  of  their  properly,  and  out  of  the  earnings  of  their  labor,  by 
first  cheating  them  out  of  their  understandings. 

"  The  natural  hatred  of  the  poor  to  the  rich!  "  Sir,  it  shall  not  be  till 
the  last  moment  of  my  existence — it  shall  be  only  when  I  am  drawn  to  the 
verge  of  oblivion — when  I  shall  cease  to  have  respect  or  affection  for  any 
thing  on  earth — that  I  will  believe  the  people  of  the  United  States  capable  of 
being  effectually  deluded,  cajoled,  and  driven  about  in  herds,  by  such  abom 
inable  frauds  as  this.  If  they  shall  sink  to  that  point — if  they  so  far  cease  to 
be  men — thinking  men,  intelligent  men — as  to  yield  to  such  pretences  and 
such  clamor,  they  will  be  slaves  already;  slaves  to  their  own  passions — slaves 
to  the  fraud  and  knavery  of  pretended  friends.  They  will  deserve  to  be 
blotted  out  of  all  the  records  of  freedom;  they  ought  not  to  dishonor  the 
cause  of  self-government,  by  attempting  any  longer  to  exercise  it;  they  ought 


m  22 

to  keep  their  unworthy  hands  entirely  off  from  the  cause  of  republican  liberty, 
if  they  are  capable  of  being  the  victims  of  artifices  so  shallow — of  tricks  so 
stale,  so  threadbare,  so  often  practised,  so  much  worn  out,  on  serfs  and 
slaves. 

"  The  natural  hatred  of  the  poor  against  the  rich!  "  "The  danger  of 
a  moneyed  aristocracy! "  "  A  power  as  great  and  dangerous  as  that  resisted 
by  the  Revolution!  "  "  A  call  to  a  new  Declaration  of  Independence!  " 

Sir,  I  admonish  the  people  against  the  objects  of  outcries  like  these.  I 
admonish  every  industrious  laborer  in  the  country  to  be  on  his  guard  against 
such  delusion.  I  tell  him  the  attempt  is  to  play  off  his  passions  against  his 
interests,  and  to  prevail  on  him,  in  the  name  of  liberty,  to  destroy  all  the 
fruits  of  liberty;  in  the  name  of  patriotism,  to  injure  and  afflict  his  country; 
and,  in  the  name  of  his  own  independence,  to  destroy  that  very  independence, 
and  make  him  a  beggar  and  a  slave.  Has  he  a  dollar?  He  is  advised  to  do 
that  which  will  destroy  half  its  value.  Has  he  hands  to  labor?  Let  him  ra 
ther  fold  them  and  sit  still,  than  be  pushed  on,  by  fraud  and  artifice,  to  sup 
port  measures  which  will  render  his  labor  useless  and  hopeless. 

Sir,  the  very  man,  of  all  others,  who  has  the  deepest  interest  in  a  sound 
currency,  and  who  suffers  most  by  mischievous  legislation  in  money  matters, 
is  the  man  who  earns  his  daily  bread  by  his  daily  toil.  A  depreciated  cur 
rency — sudden  change  of  prices — paper  money,  falling  between  morning  and 
noon,  and  falling  still  lower  between  noon  and  night — these  things  constitute 
the  very  harvest-time  of  speculators,  and  of  the  whole  race  of  those  who  are 
at  once  idle  and  crafty;  and  of  that  other  race,  too,  the  Catilines  of  all 
times,  marked,  so  as  to  be  known  forever  by  one  stroke  of  the  historian's  pen — 
men  greedy  of  other  men's  property,  and  prodigal  of  their  own.  Capitalists, 
too,  may  outlive  such  times.  They  may  either  prey  on  the  earnings  of  labor,  by 
their  cent  per  cent.,  or  they  may  hoard.  But  the  laboring  man — what  can 
he  hoard?  Preying  on  nobody,  he  becomes  the  prey  of  all.  His  property 
is  in  his  hands.  His  reliance,  his  fund,  his  productive  freehold,  his  all,  is  his 
labor.  Whether  he  work  on  his  own  small  capital,  or  on  another's,  his  living- 
is  still  earned  by  his  industry;  and  when  the  money  of  the  country  becomes 
depreciated  and  debased,  whether  it  be  adulterated  coin  or  paper  without 
credit,  that  industry  is  robbed  of  its  reward.  He  then  labors  for  a  country 
whose  laws  cheat  him  out  of  his  bread.  I  would  say  to  every  owner  of  every 
quarter  section  of  land  in  the  West — I  would  say  to  every  man  in  the  East, 
who  follows  his  own  plough,  and  to  every  mechanic,  artisan,  and  laborer,  in 
every  city  in  the  country — I  would  say  to  every  man,  every  where,  who 
wishes,  by  honest  means,  to  gain  an  honest  living,  "  Beware  of  wolves  in 
"  sheep's  clothing.  Whoever  attempts,  under  whatever  popular  cry,  to  shake 
'*  the  stability  of  the  public  currency,  bring  on  distress  in  money  matters, 
"  and  drive  the  country  into  paper  money,  stabs  your  interest  and  your  hap- 
"  piness  to  the  heart." 

The  herd  of  hungry  wolves,  who  live  on  other  men's  earnings,  will  rejoice  in 
such  a  state  of  things.  A  system  which  absorbs  into  their  pockets  the  fruits 
of  other  men's  industry,  is  the  very  system  for  them.  A  Government  that 
produces  or  countenances  uncertainty,  fluctuations,  violent  risings  and  fallings 
in  prices,  and,  finally,  paper  money,  is  a  Government  exactly  after  their  own 
heart.  Hence,  these  men  are  always  for  change.  They  will  never  let  well 
enough  alone.  A  condition  of  public  affairs,  in  which  property  is  safe, 
industry  certain  of  its  reward,  and  every  man  secure  in  his  own  hard-earned 
gains,  is  no  paradise  for  them.  Give  them  just  the  reverse  of  this  state  of 


23 

things:  bring  on  change,  and  change  after  change;  let  it  not  be  known  to-day 
what  will  be  the  value  of  property  to-morrow;  let  no  man  be  able  to  say 
whether  the  money  in  his  pockets  at  night  will  be  money  or  worthless  rags  in 
the  morning;  and  depress  labor  till  double  work  shall  earn  but  half  a  living — 
give  them  this  state  of  things,  and  you  give  them  the  consummation  of  their 
earthly  bliss. 

Sir,  the  great  interest  of  this  great  country,  the  producing  cause  of  all  its 
prosperity,  is  labor!  labor!  labor!  We  are  a  laboring  community.  A  vast 
majority  of  us  all  live  by  industry  and  actual  occupation,  in  some  of  their 
forms. 

The  constitution  was  made  to  protect  this  industry,  to  give  it  both  en 
couragement  and  security;  but,  above  all,  security.  To  that  very  end,  with 
that  precise  object  in  view,  power  was  given  to  Congress  over  the  currency, 
and  over  the  money  system  of  the  country.  In  forty  years'  experience,  we 
have  found  nothing  at  all  adequate  to  the  beneficial  execution  of  this  trust 
but  a  well-conducted  national  bank.  That  has  been  tried,  returned  to,  tried 
again,  and  always  found  successful.  If  it  be  not  the  proper  thing  for  us,  let 
it  be  soberly  argued  against;  let  something  better  be  proposed;  let  the  country 
examine  the  matter  coolly,  and  decide  for  itself.  But  whoever  shall  attempt 
to  carry  a  question  of  this  kind  by  clamor,  and  violence,  and  prejudice;  who 
ever  would  rouse  the  people  by  appeals,  false  and  fraudulent  appeals,  to  their 
love  of  independence,  to  resist  the  establishment  of  a  useful  institution  because 
it  is  a  bank,  and  deals  in  money;  and  who  artfully  urges  these  appeals 
wherever  he  thinks  there  is  more  of  honest  feeling  than  of  enlightened  judg 
ment,  means  nothing  but  deception.  And  whoever  has  the  wickedness  to 
conceive,  and  the  hardihood  to  avow,  a  purpose  to  break  down  what  has  been 
found,  in  forty  years'  experience,  essential  to  the  protection  of  all  interests, 
by  arraying  one  class  against  another,  and  by  acting  on  such  a  principle  as 
that  the  poor  always  hate  the  rich,  shows  himself  the  reckless  enemy  of  all. 
An  enemy  to  his  whole  country,  to  all  classes,  and  to  every  man  in  it,  he 
deserves  to  be  marked  especially  as  the  poor  man's  curse! 

Mr.  President,  I  feel  that  it  becomes  me  to  bring  to  the  present  crisis  all 
of  intellect,  all  of  diligence,  all  of  devotion  to  the  public  good,  that  I  possess. 
I  act,  sir,  in  opposition  to  nobody.  I  desire  rather  to  follow  the  administra 
tion,  in  a  proper  remedy  for  the  present  distress,  than  to  lead.  I  have  felt 
so  from  the  beginning,  and  I  have  felt  so  until  the  declaration  of  yesterday 
made  it  certain  that  there  is  no  further  measure  to  be  proposed.  The  ex 
pectation  is,  that  the  country  will  get  on  under  the  present  state  of  things. 
Being  myself  entirely  of  a  different  opinion,  and  looking  for  no  effectual  relief 
until  some  other  measure  is  adopted,  I  shall,  nevertheless,  be  most  happy  to 
be  disappointed.  But  if  I  shall  not  be  mistaken,  if  the  pressure  shall  con 
tinue,  and  if  the  indications  of  general  public  sentiment  shall  point  in  that 
direction,  I  shall  feel  it  my  duty,  let  the  consequences  be  what  they  may,  to 
propose  a  law  for  altering  and  continuing  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States. 


THE  HON.  HENRY  CL.AY, 


OX    THE    8CH/BCT    OF 


THE  REMOVAL  OF  THE  DEPOSITES; 


DELIVERED 


IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 


December  26,  30,  1833. 


WASHINGTON : 

PRINTED    BY    GALES    &    SEATON. 
1834. 


•P 


*  (IT  '    V* 


SPEECH 

oy 

THE  HON.  HENRY  CLAY, 

DK11VKUED 

IN  THE   SENATE   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES, 

DECEMBER  26,  30,  1833. 


The  Chair  having  announced  the  special  order  of  the  day,  being 
the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  on  the  subject  of  the 
removal  of  the  deposites — 

Mr.  CLAY  rose,  and  offered  the  following  resolutions : 

1.  Resolved,  That,  by  dismissing1  the  late  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  because  he 
would  not,  contrary  to  his  sense  of  his  own  duty,  remove  the  money  of  the  United 
States  in  deposite  with  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  and  its  branches,  in  conformity 
with  the  President's  opinion  ;   and  by  appointing-  his  successor  to  effect  such  removal, 
which  has  been  done,  the  President  has  assumed  the  exercise  of  a  power  over  the 
Treasury  of  the  United  States,  not  granted  to  him  by  the  constitution  and  laws,  and 
dangerous  to  the  liberties  of  the  people. 

2.  Resolved, .  That  the  reasons  assigned  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  the  re 
moval  of  the  money  of  the  United  States,  deposited  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  State* 
and  its  brunches,   communicated  to  Congress  on  the  3d  day  of  December,  1333,  are 
unsatisfactory  and  insufficient. 

The  resolutions  having  been  read — 

Mr.  CLAY  rose,  and  addressed  the  Senate  to  the  following  effect  : 
We  are,  said  he,  in  the  midst  of  a  revolution,  hitherto  bloodless,  but 
rapidly  tending  towards  a  total  change  of  the  pure  republican  cha 
racter  of  the  Government,  and  to  the  concentration  of  all  power  in 
the  hands  of  one  man.  The  powers  of  Congress  are  paralyzed,  ex 
cept  when  exerted  in  conformity  with  his  will,  by  frequent  and 
an  extraordinary  exercise  of  the  Executive  veto,  not  anticipated  by 
the  founders  of  the  constitution,  and  not  practised  by  any  of  the 
predecessors  of  the  present  Chief  Magistrate.  And,  to  cramp  them 
still  more,  a  new  expedient  is  springing  into  use,  of  withholding  al 
together  bills  which  have  received  the  sanction  of  both  Houses  of 


Congress,  thereby  cutting  off  all  opportunity  of  passing  them,  even 
if,  after  their  return,  the  members  should  be  unanimous  in  their 
favor.  The  constitutional  participation  of  the  Senate  in  the  appoint 
ing  power  is  virtually  abolished  by  the  constant  use  of  the  power  of 
removal  from  office,  without  any  known  cause,  and  by  the  appoint 
ment  of  the  same  individual  to  the  same  office,  after  his  rejection  by 
the  Senate.  Howr  often  have  we,  Senators,  felt  that  the  check  of 
the  Senate,  instead  of  being,  as  the  constitution  intended,  a  salutary 
control,  was  an  idle  ceremony?  How  often,  when  acting  on  the 
case  of  the  nominated  successor,  have  we  felt  the  injustice  of  the 
removal  ?  How  often  have  we  said  to  each  other,  well,  what  can 
we  do  ?  the  office  cannot  remain  vacant  without  prejudice  to  the 
public  interests;  and,  if  we  reject  the  proposed  substitute,  we  can 
not  restore  the  displaced,  and  perhaps  some  more  unworthy  man.  jnay 
be  nominated  ?  *  1o 

The  Judiciary  has  not  been  exempted  from  the  prevailing  rage 
for  innovation.  Decisions  of  the  tribunals,  deliberately  pronounced, 
have  been  contemptuously  disregarded,  and  the  sanctity  of  nume 
rous  treaties  openly  violated.  Our  Indian  relations,  coeval  with  the 
existence  of  the  Government,  and  recognised  and  established  by 
numerous  laws  and  treaties,  have  been  subverted ;  the  rights  of  the 
helpless  and  unfortunate  aborigines  trampled  in  the  dust,  and  they 
brought  under  subjection  to  unknown  laws,  in  which  they  have  no 
voice,  promulgated  in  an  unknown  language.  The  most  extensive 
and  most  valuable  public  domain  that  ever  fell  to  the  lot  of  one  nation, 
is  threatened  with  a  total  sacrifice.  The  general  currency  of  the  coun 
try — the  life-blood  of  all  its  business — is  in  the  most  imminent  dan 
ger  of  universal  disorder  and  confusion.  The  power  of  internal 
improvement  lies  crushed  beneath  the  veto.  The  system  of  protec 
tion  of  American  industry  wras  snatched  from  impending  destruction 
at  the  last  session  ;  but  we  are  now  coolly  told  by  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  without  ablush,  "  that  it  is  understood  to  be  conceded 
on  all  hands  that  a  tariff  for  protection  merely  is  to  be  finally  aban 
doned."  By  the  3d  of  March,  1837,  if  the  progress  of  innovation  con 
tinue,  there  will  be  scarcely  a  vestige  remaining  of  the  Government 
and  its  policy,  as  they  existed  prior  to  the  3d  of  March,  1829.  In  a 
term  of  years,  a  little  more  than  equal  to  that  which  was  required  to 
establish  our  liberties,  the  Government  will  have  been  transformed 
into  an  elective  monarchy,  the  worst  of  all  forms  of  Government. 

Such  is  a  melancholy  but  faithful  picture  of  the  present  condition 
of  our  public  affairs.  It  is  not  sketched  or  exhibited  to  excite,  here 
or  elsewhere,  irritated  feeling :  I  have  no  such  purpose.  I  would,  on 
the  contrary,  implore  the  Senate  and  the  people  to  discard  all  pas 
sion  and  prejudice, 'and  to  look  calmly  but  resolutely  upon  the  actual 
state  of  the  constitution  and  the  country.  Although  I  bring  into 
the  Senate  the  same  unabated  spirit,  and  the  same  firm  determina 
tion,  which  have  ever  guided  me  in  the  support  of  civil  liberty,  and 
the  defence  of  our  constitution,  I  contemplate  the  prospect  before 
us  with  feelings  of  deep  humiliation  and  profound  mortification. 


It  is  not  among  the  least  unfortunate  symptoms  of  the  times,  that 
a  large  proportion  of  the  good  and  enlightened  men  of  the  Union, 
of  all  parties,  are  yielding  to  sentiments  of  despondency.  There  is, 
unhappily,  a  feeling  of  distrust  and  insecurity  pervading  the  com 
munity.  Many  of  our  best  citizens  entertain  serious  apprehensions 
that  our  Union  and  our  institutions  are  destined  to  a  speedy  over 
throw.  Sir,  I  trust  that  the  hopes  and  confidence  of  the  country 
will  revive.  There  is  much  occasion  for  manly  independence  and 
patriotic  vigor,  but  none  for  despair.  Thank  God,  we  are  yet  free  ; 
and,  if  we  put  on  the  chains  which  are  forging  for  us,  it  will  be  be 
cause  we  deserve  to  wear  them.  We  should  never  despair  of  the 
Republic.  If  our  ancestors  had  been  capable  of  surrendering  them 
selves  to  such  ignoble  sentiments,  our  independence  and  our  liberties 
Wuld  never  have  been  achieved;  The  winter  of  1776-'7  was  one 
of  the  gloomiest  periods  of  our  revolution ;  but  on  this  day,  fifty- 
seven  years  ago,  the  Father  of  his  country  achieved  a  glorious  vic 
tory,  which  diffused  joy  and  gladness  and  animation  throughout  the 
States.  Let  us  cherish  the  hope  that,  since  he  has  gone  from 
among  us,  Providence,  in  the  dispensation  of  his  mercies,  has  near 
at  hand,  in  reserve  for  us,  though  yet  unseen  by  us,  some  sure  and 
happy  deliverance  from  all  impending  dangers. 

When  we  assembled  here  last  year,  we  were  full  of  dreadful  fore 
bodings.  On  the  one  hand,  we  were  menaced  with  a  civil  war, 
which,  lighting  up  in  a  single  State,  might  spread  its  flames  through 
out  one  of  the  largest  sections  of  the  Union.  On  the  other,  a  che 
rished  system  of  policy,  essential  to  the  successful  prosecution  of  the 
industry  of  our  countrymen,  was  exposed  to  imminent  danger  of 
destruction.  Means  were  happily  applied  by  Congress  to  avert  both 
calamities.  The  country  reconciled,  and  our  Union  once  more  be 
come  a  band  of  friends  and  brothers.  And  I  shall  be  greatly  disap 
pointed,  if  we  do  not  find  those  who  were  denounced  as  being 
unfriendly  to  the  continuance  of  our  confederacy,  among  the  fore 
most  to  fly  to  its  preservation,  and  to  resist  all  Executive  encroach 
ments. 

Mr.  President,  when  Congress  adjourned  at  the  termination  of  the 
last  session,  there  was  one  remnant  of  its  powers,  that  over  the 
purse,  left  untouched.  The  two  most  important  powers  of  civil 
Government  are  those  of  the  sword  and  purse  ;  the  first,  with  some 
restrictions,  is  confided  by  the  constitution  to  the  Executive,  and 
the  last  to  the  Legislative  Department.  If  they  are  separate,  and 
exercised  by  different  responsible  departments,  civil  liberty  is  safe  ; 
but  if  they  are  united  in  the  hands  of  the  same  individual,  it  is  gone. 
That  clear-sighted  and  revolutionary  orator  and  patriot  (  PATRICK 
HENRY)  justly  said,  in  the  Virginia  convention,  in  reply  to  one  of 
his  opponents,  "  Let  him  candidly  tell  me  where  and  when  did  free- 
"  dom  exist,  when  the  sword  and  purse  were  given  up  from  the 
"  people  ?  Unless  a  miracle  in  human  affairs  interposed,  no  nation 
"  ever  retained  its  liberty  after  the  loss  of  the  sword  and  the  purse. 
"  Can  you  prove,  by  any  argumentative  deduction,  that  it  is  possible 
"  to  be  safe  without  one  of  them  ?  If  you  give  them  up,  you  are  gone." 


6 

Up  to  the  period  of  the  termination  of  the  last  session  of  Con 
gress,  the  exclusive  constitutional  power  of  Congress  over  the  Trea 
sury  of  the  United  States  had  never  been  contested.  Among  its 
earliest  acts  was  one  to  establish  the  Treasury  Department,  which 
provided  for  the  appointment  of  a  Treasurer,  who  was  required  to  give 
bond  and  security  in  a  very  large  amount,  "  to  receive  and  keep  the 
moneys  of  the  United  States,  and  to  disburse  the  same  upon  warrants 
drawn  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  countersigned  by  the 
Comptroller,  recorded  by  the  Register,  and  not  otherwise."  Prior 
to  the  establishment  of  the  present  Bank  of  the  United  States,  no 
Treasury  or  place  had  been  provided  or  designated  by  law  for  the 
safe  keeping  of  the  public  moneys,  but  the  Treasurer  was  left  to  his 
own  discretion  and  responsibility.  When  the  existing  Bank  was 
established,  it  was  provided  that  the  public  moneys  should  be  depo 
sited  with  it,  and  consequently  that  Bank  became  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States:  for,  whatever  place  is  designated  by  law  for  the 
keeping  of  the  public  money  of  the  United  States,  under  the  care 
of  the  Treasurer  of  the  United  States,  is,  for  the  time  being,  the 
Treasury.  Its  safety  was  drawn  in  question  by  the  Chief  Magis 
trate,  and  an  agent  was  appointed  a  little  more  than  a  year  ago  to 
investigate  its  ability.  He  reported  to  the  Executive  that  it  was 
perfectly  safe.  His  apprehensions  of  its  solidity  were  communicated 
by  the  President  to  Congress,  and  a  committee  was  appointed  to  ex 
amine  the  subject:  they,  also,  reported  in  favor  of  its  security.  And, 
finally,  among  the  last  acts  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  prior 
to  the  close  of  the  last  session,  was  the  adoption  of  a  resolution,  mani 
festing  its  entire  confidence  in  the  ability  and  solidity  of  the  Bank- 
After  all  these  testimonies  to  the  perfect  safety  of  the  public  mo 
neys  in  the  place  appointed  by  Congress,  who  could  have  supposed 
that  the  place  would  have  been  changed  ?  Who  could  have  imagined 
that,  within  sixty  days  of  the  meeting  of  Congress,  and,  as  it  were, 
in  utter  contempt  of  its  authority,  the  change  should  have  been  or 
dered  ?  Who  would  have  dreamt  that  the  Treasurer  should  have 
thrown  away  the  single  key  to  the  Treasury,  over  which  Congress 
held  ample  control,  and  accepted,  in  lieu  of  it,  some  dozens  of  keys, 
over  which  neither  Congress  nor  he  has  any  adequate  control  ?  Yet, 
sir,  all  this  has  been  done,  and  it  is  now  our  solemn  duty  to  inquire, 
1st,  By  whose  authority  it  has  been  ordered ;  and,  2d,  Whether  the 
order  has  been  given  in  conformity  with  the  constitution  and  laws  of 
the  United  States. 

I  agree,  sir,  and  I  am  very  happy  whenever  I  can  agree  with  the 
President,  as  to  the  immense  importance  of  these  questions.  He  says, 
in  the  paper  which  I  hold  in  my  hand,  that  lie  looks  upon  the  pend 
ing  question  as  involving  higher  considerations  than  the  "  mere  trans- 
"  fer  of  a  sum  of  money  from  one  bank  to  another.  Its  decision  may 
"  affect  the  character  of  our  Government  for  ages  to  come."  And, 
with  him,  I  view  it  as  "  of  transcendent  importance,  both  in  the  princi- 
"  pies  and  the  consequences  it  involves."  It  is  a  question  of  all  time, 
for  posterity  as  well  as  for  us — of  constitutional  government  or 


monarchy — of  liberty  or  slavery.  As  I  regard  it,  1  hold  the  Bank  as 
nothing,  as  perfectly  insignificant,  faithful  as  it  has  been  in  the  per 
formance  of  all  its  duties.  I  hold  a  sound  currency  as  nothing,  es 
sential  as  it  is  to  the  prosperity  of  every  branch  of  business,  and  to 
all  conditions  of  society,  and  efficient  as  the  agency  of  the  Bank  has 
been  in  providing  the  country  with  a  currency  as  sound  as  ever  ex 
isted,  and  unsurpassed  by  any  in  Christendom.  1  consider  even  the 
public  faith,  sacred  and  inviolable  as  it  ever  should  be,  as  compara 
tively  nothing.  All  these  questions  are  merged  in  the  greater  and 
mightier  question  of  the  constitutional  distribution  of  the  powers  of 
the  Government,  as  affected  by  the  recent  Executive  innovation. 
The  real  inquiry  is,  shall  all  the  barriers  which  have  been  erected 
by  the  caution  and  wisdom  of  our  ancestors,  for  the  preservation  of 

f'vil  liberty,  be  prostrated  and  trodden  under  foot,  and  the  sword  and 
e'purse be  at  once  united  in  the  Jiaads  of  one  man ?  Shall  the  power 
of  Congress  over  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  hitherto  never 
contested,  be  wrested  from  its  possession,  and  be  henceforward  wield 
ed  by  the  Chief  Magistrate  ?  Entertaining  these  views  of  the  magni 
tude  of  the  question  before  us,  I  shall  not,  at  least  to-day,  examine 
the  reasons  which  the  President  has  assigned  for  his  act.  If  he  has 
no  power  to  perform  it,  no  reasons,  however  cogent,  can  justify  the 
deed.  None  can  sanctify  an  illegal  or  unconstitutional  act. 

The  first  question  which  I  have  intimated  it  to  be  my  purpose  to 
consider  is,  by  whose  authority,  power,  or  direction  was  the  change  of 
the  deposites  made  ?  Now,  is  there  any  Senator  who  hears  me  that  re 
quires  proof  onjthis  point  ?  Is  there  an  intelligent  man  in  the  Union  who 
does  not  know  wTho  it  was  that  decided  the  removal  of  the  deposites  ?  Is 
it  not  a  matter  of  universal  notoriety?  Does  any  one,  and  who,  doubt 
that  it  was  the  act  of  the  President?  That  it  was  done  by  his  express 
command  ?  The  President,  on  this  subject,  has  himself  furnished  per 
fectly  conclusive  evidence  in  the  paper  read  by  him  to  his  cabinet.  It 
is,  indeed,  a  most  extraordinary  document,  without  precedent  in  the 
Executive  annals  of  this  or  any  other  civilized  country.  If  the  pro 
ceeding  were  not  unconstitutional^  it  was  certainly  such  as  was  not 
contemplated  by  the  constitution.  That  instrument  confers  on  the 
President  the  right  to  require  the  opinion,  in  writing,  of  the  principal 
officers  of  the  Executive  Departments,  separately,  on  subjects  apper 
taining  to  their  respective  offices.  Instead  of  conforming  to  this  pro 
vision,  the  President  reads  to  those  officers,  collectively,  his  opinion 
and  decision,  in  writing,  upon  an  important  matter  Avhich  related  only 
to  one  of  them,  and  to  him  exclusively.  This  paper  is  afterwards 
formally  promulgated  to  the  world,  with  the  President's  authority. 
And  wrhy  ?  Can  it  be  doubted  that  it  was  done  under  the  vain  expec 
tation  that  a  name  would  quash  all  inquiry,  and  secure  the  general 
approbation  of  the  people  ?  Those  who  now  exercise  power  in  this 
country  appear  to  regard  all  the  practices  and  usages  of  their  prede 
cessors  as  wrong.  They  look  upon  all  precedents  with  contempt,  and, 
casting  them  scornfully  aside,  appear  to  be  resolved  upon  a  new  era 
in  administration.  Yet,  wrhen  hard  pressed,  they  display  a  readiness 


8 

to  take  shelter  under  any  precedent,  however  ill  adapted  it  may  be  to 
their  condition.  Although  the  President  has  denied  to  the  Senate 
an  official  copy  of  that  singular  paper,  as  a  part  of  the  people  of  the 
'United  States,  for  whose  special  benefit  it  was  published,  we  have 
a  right  to  use  it. 

The  question  is,  by  virtue  of  whose  will,  power,  dictation,  was 
the  removal  of  the  deposites  effected  ?  By  whose  authority  and  de 
termination  were  they  transferred  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
where  they  were  required  by  the  law  to  be  placed,  and  put  in  banks 
\vhich  the  law  had  never  designated  ?  And  I  tell  gentlemen  opposed 
to  me  that  I  am  not  to  be  answered  by  the  exhibition  of  &  formal  or 
der  bearing  the  signature  of  R.  B.  Taney,  or  any  one  else.  I  want  to 
know,  not  the  amanuensis  or  clerk  who  prepared  or  signed  the  official 
form,  but  the  authority  or  the  individual  who  dictated  or  commanded 
it — not  the  hangman  who  executes  the  culprit,  but  the  tribunal  which 
pronounced  the  sentence.  I  want  to  know  that  power  in  the  Go 
vernment,  that  original  and  controlling  authority,  which  required  and 
commanded  the  removal  of  the  deposites.  And,  1  repeat  the  question, 
is  there  a  Senator,  or  intelligent  man  in  the  whole  country,  who  en 
tertains  a  solitary  doubt  ? 

Hear  what  the  President  himself  says  in  his  manifesto  read  to  his 
cabinet :  "  The  President  deems  it  HIS  duty  to  communicate  in  this 
"  manner  to  his  cabinet  the  final  conclusions  of  HIS  OWN  MIND, 
*"  and  the  reasons  on  which  they  are  founded."  And,  at  the  conclusion 
of  this  paper,  what  does  he  say  ?  "  The  President  again  repeats  that 
*'  he  begs  his  cabinet  to  consider  the  proposed  measure  as  HIS  OWN, 
*'  in  the  support  of  which  he  shall  require  no  one  of  them  to  make  a 
<c  sacrifice  of  opinion  or  principle.  ITS  RESPONSIBILITY  HAS  BEEN 
<c  ASSUMED,  after  the  most  mature  deliberation  and  reflection,  as  ne- 
u  cessary  to  preserve  the  morals  of  the  people,  the  freedom  of  the 
*c  press,  and  the  purity  of  the  elective  franchise,  without  which  all 
<c  will  unite  in  saying  that  the  blood  and  treasure  expended  by  our 
"  forefathers,  in  the  establishment  of  our  happy  system  of  Government, 
*'  will  have  been  vain  and  fruitless.  Under  these  convictions,  he  feels 
"  that  a  measure  so  important  to  the  American  people  cannot  be  com- 
*'  menced  too  soon  ;  and  HE  therefore  names  the  first  day  of  October 
"  next  as  a  period  proper  for  the  change  of  the  deposites,  or  sooner, 
"  provided  the  necessary  arrangements  with  the  State  banks  can  be 
"  made."  Sir,  is  there  a  Senator  here  who  will  now  tell  me  that  the 
removal  was  not  the  measure,  and  the  act,  of  the  President  ?  I  know, 
indeed,  that  there  are  in  this  document  many  of  those  most  mild,  most 
gracious,  most  condescending  expressions,  in  which  power  so  well 
knows  how  to  clothe  its  mandates.  The  President  flatters,  and  coaxes, 
and  soothes  Secretary  Duarie,  in  the  most  gentle,  bland,  and  concili 
ating  language.  "  In  the  remarks,"  says  the  President,  "  he  has 
•"  made  on  this  all-important  question,  he  trusts  the  Secretary  of  the 
•"  Treasury  will  see  only  the  frank  and  respectful  declaration  of  the 
xc  opinions  which  the  President  has  formed  on  a  measure  of  great  na- 
"  tional  interest,  deeply  affecting  the  character  and  usefulness  of  his 


9 

"  administration  ;  and  not  a  spirit  of  dictation,  which  the  President 
"  would  be  as  careful  to  avoid,  as  ready  to  resist.  Happy  will  he 
"  be  if  the  facts  now  disclosed  produce  uniformity  of  opinion  and 
u  unity  of  action  among  the  members  of  the  administration."  How 
kind  !  how  gentle  !  and  how  very  gracious  all  these  civil  and  loving 
expressions  must  have  sounded  in  the  gratified  ear  of  Mr.  Duane  ? 
They  remind  me  of  an  historical  anecdote  related  of  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  characters  which  our  species  has  produced.  When  Oliver 
Cromwrell  was  contending  for  the  mastery  in  Great  Britain  or  Ireland, 
(I  do  not  remember  which,)  he  besieged  a  certain  Catholic  town. 
The  place  made  a  brave  and  stout  resistance  ;  but,  at  length,  being 
likely  to  be  taken,  the  poor  Catholics  proposed  terms  of  capitulation, 
among  which  was  one  stipulating  for  the  toleration  of  their  religion. 
The  paper  containing  the  conditions  being  presented  to  Oliver,  he 
put  on  his  spectacles,  and,  after  deliberately  examining  them,  cried 
out,  "  Oh,  yes,  granted,  granted,  certainly  ;"  but  he  added,  with  stern 
determination,  if  one  of  them  shall  dare  to  be  found  attending  mass, 
he  shall  be  instantly  hanged,  (under  what  section — whether  the  se 
cond  or  some  other,  I  believe  the  historian  does  not  relate.) 

Thus  the  Secretary  was  told  by  the  President  that  he  had  not  the 
slightest  wish  to  dictate — Oh  !  no ;  nothing  was  further  from  his  inten 
tion  ;  that  he  would  carefully  avoid ;  the  President  desired  only  to 
convince  his  judgment,  but  not  at  all  to  interfere  with  his  free  exer 
cise  of  an  authority  exclusively  confided  to  him.  But  wrhat  was  the 
refractory  Duane  told  in  the  sequel  ?  "  If  you  do  not  conform  to  my 
"  wishes ;  if  you  do  not  surrender  your  own  judgment,  and  act  upon 
ct  mine ;  if  you  do  not  effect  the  removal  of  these  deposites  writhin 
"  the  short  period  prescribed  by  me,  you  shall  quit  your  office."  And 
what  was  the  fact?  This  cabinet  paper  bears  date  the  18th  Sep 
tember  last.  In  the  official  paper,  published  at  the  seat  of  Govern 
ment,  through  which  the  Executive  promulgates  its  acts,  intentions, 
and  wishes  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  on  the  20th  of  the  same 
month,  two  days  only  after  the  cabinet  had  been  indoctrinated,  it  was 
stated,  "  We  are  authorized  to  state" — "  authorized" — this  is  the 
term  which  gave  credit  to  the  annunciation — "We  are  authorized  to 
u  state  that  the  deposites  of  the  public  money  will  be  changed  from 
"  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  to  the  State  banks  as  soon  as  ne- 
"  cessary  arrangements  can  be  made  for  that  purpose,  and  that  it  is 
"  believed  they  can  be  completed  in  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  New 
"  York,  and  Boston,  in  time  to  make  the  change  by  the  first  of  Oc- 
"  tober,  and  perhaps  sooner,  if  circumstances  should  render  an  earlier 
u  action  necessary  on  the  part  of  the  Government."  We  see,  be 
tween  the  cabinet  paper  and  this  official  article,  not  merely  a  coinci 
dence  of  time,  but  of  language,  as  if  the  same  head  had  dictated,  and 
the  same  pen  had  written  both.  The  President  names  the  first  day  of 
October,  or  sooner  if  the  necessary  arrangements  can  be  made  ;  and 
the  gazette  announces  the  same  first  day  of  October,  and  perhaps 
sooner,  if  circumstances  should  render  it  necessary.  Mr.  Duane  re 
mained  in  office  until  the  23d  of  September,  on  which  day  he  was 
2 


10 

dismissed.  Is  this  not  conclusive  testimony  that  the  measure  was 
the  President's ;  that  he,  not  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  decided 
upon  it;  that  it  was  resolved  on  whilst  Mr.  Duane  was  yet  in  office  ; 
and  that  it  was  formally  announced  to  the  world  before  his  dismission? 
As  to  the  day  of  his  dismission,  we  have  incontestable  evidence  in 
the  letter  addressed  to  him  on  the  23d  of  September  by  the  Presi 
dent,  in  which,  notwithstanding  all  the  amicable,  gracious,  and  affec 
tionate  language  of  the  cabinet  paper,  the  President  says,  "  I  feel 
"constrained  to  notify  you  that  your  further  services  as  Secretary  of 
"  the  Treasury  are  no  longer  required."  On  that  same  day,  the  23d, 
Mr.  Taney  was  appointed,  and  on  the  26th,  in  conformity  with  the 
will  of  the  President,  he  performed  the  clerical  act  of  affixing  his 
signature  to  the  order  for  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  and  thus 
made  himself  a  willing  instrument  to  consummate  what  the  sterner 
integrity  of  his  predecessor  disdaiaied  to  execute.  Such  is  the  tes 
timony,  on  one  side,  to  sustain  the  proposition  that  the  removal  of 
the  deposites  was  the  President's  own  measure,  determined  on  whilst 
the  late  Secretary  was  still  in  office,  and  against  his  will;  and  esta 
blishing,  beyond  contradiction,  that  the  subsequent  act  of  the  present 
Secretary  was  in  form  ministerial,  in  substance  the  work  of  another. 
Can  more  satisfactory  testimony  be  ever  needed  ?  Yet  it  is  even  still 
more  complete.  We  have  that  of  Mr.  Duane,  as  if  no  single  link  in  the 
chain  should  be  left  unsupplied.  In  a  late  publication  from  that  gentle 
man,  addressed  to  the  American  people,  after  giving  a  history  of  the 
circumstances  which  preceded  and  accompanied  his  appointment,  and 
those  which  attended  his  expulsion  from  office,  he  says  :  u  Thus  was 
"  I  thrust  from  office — not  because  I  had  neglected  any  duty — not  be- 
"  cause  I  had  differed  with  the  President  on  any  other  point  of  pub- 
"  lie  policy — not  because  1  had  differed  with  him  about  the  Bank  of 
u  the  United  States — but  because  I  refused,  without  further  inquiry 
"  for  action  by  Congress,  to  remove  the  deposites." 

Is  it  possible  that  evidence  can  be  more  complete  ?  Will  any  one, 
after  this  exhibition  of  concurring  proof,  derived  directly  from  the 
President  on  one  side,  and  from  the  late  Secretary  on  the  other, 
that  the  removal  of  the  deposites  was  not  only  the  President's  own 
act,  but  was  contrary  to  the  will  and  judgment  of  the  Secretary,  who 
was  himself  removed  because  he  would  not  remove  them,  for  a  single 
instant  doubt  on  the  subject?  Can  any  one  rise  here,  in  his  place, 
and  assert  that  the  removal  was  not  accomplished  by  the  President's 
authority  or  command  ? 

And  now,  sir,  having  distinctly  seen  whose  measure  this  is,  I  shall 
proceed  to  inquire  whether  it  has  been  adopted  in  conformity  with 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States.  I  repeat  that  it  is 
not  my  purpose  now  to  examine  the  reasons  assigned  for  the  act, 
further  than  as  they  may  tend  to  show  a  right  in  the  President  to 
perform  it.  For,  if  the  President  had  no  power  over  the  subject ; 
if  the  constitution  and  laws,  instead  of  conveying  to  him  an  authority 
to  act  as  he  has  done,  required  him  to  keep  his  hands  off  the  public 
Treasury,  and  confided  its  care  and  custody  to  other  hands,  no  rea- 


ii 

sons  can  justify  the  usurpation.  What  power  has  the  President 
over  the  public  Treasury  ?  Is  it  in  the  Bank  charter  ?  That  gives 
him  but  two  clearly  defined  powers :  one  to  appoint,  with  the  con 
currence  of  the  Senate,  and  to  remove  the  Government  directors ; 
and  the  other,  to  order  a  scire  facias  when  the  charter  shall  be 
violated  by  the  Bank.  There  is  no  other  power  conferred  on  him 
by  it.  The  clause  of  the  charter  relating  fo  the  public  deposites 
declares,  "that  the  deposites  of  the  money  of  the  United  States,  in 
"  places  in  which  the  said  Bank  and  the  branches  thereof  may  be 
"  established,  shall  be  made  in  said  Bank  or  branches  thereof,  unless 
"  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  shall,  at  any  time,  otherwise  order 
"and  direct;  in  which  case  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  shall 
"  immediately  lay  before  Congress,  if  in  session,  and  if  not,  imme- 
;  "  diately  after  the  commencement  of  the  next  session,  the  reasons 
"of  such  order  or  direction."  "CJan  language,  as  to  the  officer  who 
is  charged  with  the  duty  of  removing  the  deposites,  be  more  explicit? 
The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  alone  is  designated.  The  President 
is  not,  by  the  remotest  allusion,  referred  to.  And,  to  put  the  matter 
beyond  all  controversy,  whenever  the  Secretary  gives  an  order  or 
direction  for  the  removal,  he  is  to  report  his  reasons — to  whom?  To 
the  President?  No!  directly  to  Congress.  Nor  is  the  Bank  itself 
required  to  report  its  periodical  condition  to  the  President,  but  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  or  to  Congress,  through  the  organ  of  a 
committee.  The  whole  scheme  of  the  charter  seems  to  have  been 
cautiously  framed  with  the  deliberate  purpose  of  excluding  all  inter 
vention  of  the  President,  except  in  the  two  cases  which  have  been 
specified.  And  this  power,  given  exclusively  to  the  Secretary,  and 
these  relations  maintained  between  him  and  Congress,  are  in  strict 
conformity  with  the  act  of  September,  1789,  creating  and  establishing 
the  Treasury  Department.  Congress  reserved  to  itself  the  control 
over  that  department.  It  refused  to  make  it. an  Executive  department. 
Its  whole  structure  manifests  cautious  jealousy  and  experienced 
wisdom.  The  constitution  had  ordained  that  no  money  should  be 
drawn  from  the  Treasury  but  in  consequence  of  appropriations  made 
by  law.  It  remained  for  Congress  to  provide  how  it  should  be  drawn. 
And  that  duty  is  performed  by  the  act  constituting  the  Treasury 
Department.  According  to  that  act,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
is  to  prepare  and  sign,  the  Comptroller  to  countersign,  the  Register 
to  record,  and,  finally,  the  Treasurer  to  pay  a  warrant,  issued,  and 
only  issued,  in  virtue  of  a  prior  act  of  appropriation.  Each  is 
referred  to  the  law  as  the  guide  of  his  duty.  Each  acts  on  his  own 
separate  responsibility.  Each  is  a  check  upon  every  other.  And 
all  are  placed  under  the  control  of  Congress.  The  Secretary  is  to 
report  to  Congress,  and  to  each  branch  of  Congress.  The  great 
principle  of  division  of  duty,  and  of  control  and  responsibility — that 
principle  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of  all  free  government — that 
principle,  without  which  there  can  be  no  free  government,  is  upheld 
throughout.  So,  in  the  Bank  charter,  Congress  did  not  choose  to 
refer  the  reasons  of  the  Secretary  to  the  President ;  but,  whenever 


12 

he  changed  the  deposites,  the  Secretary  was  commanded  to  report 
his  reasons  directly  to  Congress,  that  they  might  weigh,  judge,  and 
pronounce  upon  their  validity. 

Thus  is  it  evident  that  the  President,  neither  by  the  act  creating 
the  Treasury  Department,  nor  by  the  Bank  charter,  has  any  power 
over  the  public  Treasury.  Has  he  any  by  the  constitution  ?  None, 
none.  We  have  already  seen  that  the 'constitution  positively  forbids 
any  money  from  being  drawn  from  the  Treasury  but  in  virtue  of  a 
previous  act  of  appropriation.  But  the  President  himself  says  that 
"  upon  him  has  been  devolved,  by  the  constitution,  and  the  suffrages 
"  of  the  American  people,  the  duty  of  superintending  the  operation 
"  of  the  Executive  Departments  of  the  Government,  and  seeing  that 
"  the  laws  are  faithfully  executed."  If  there  existed  any  such  double 
source  of  Executive  power,  it  has'  been  seen  that  the  Treasury 
Department  is  not  an  Executive  department;  but  that,  in  all  that 
concerns  the  public  Treasury,  the  Secretary  is  the  agent  or  repre 
sentative  of  Congress,  acting  in  obedience  to  their  will,  and  main 
taining  a  direct  intercourse  writh  them.  By  what  authority  does  the 
President  derive  power  from  the  mere  result  of  an  election?  In 
another  part  of  this  same  cabinet  paper  he  refers  to  the  suffrages  of 
the  people  as  a  source  of  power  independent  of  the  constitution,  if 
not  overruling  it.  At  all  events,  he  seems  to  regard  the  issue  of  the 
election  as  an  approbation  of  all  constitutional  opinions  previously 
expressed  by  him,  no  matter  in  wrhat  ambiguous  language.  I  differ, 
sir,  entirely  from  the  President.  No  such  conclusions  can  be  legiti 
mately  drawn  from  his  re-election.  He  was  re-elected  from  his 
presumed  merits  generally,  and  from1  the  attachment  and  confidence 
of  the  people,  and  also  from  the  imworthiness  of  his  competitor. 
The  people  had  no  idea,  by  that  exercise  of  their  suffrage,  of 
expressing  their  approbation  of  all  the  opinions  which  the  President 
held.  Can  it  be  believed  that  Pennsylvania,  so  justly  denominated 
the  key-stone  of  our  federal  arch,  which  has  been  so  steadfast  in  her 
adherence  to  certain  great  national  interests,  and,  among  others,  to 
that  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  intended,  by  supporting  the 
re-election  of  the  President,  to  reverse  all  her  own  judgments,  and 
to  demolish  all  that  she  had  built  up  ?  The  truth  is,  that  the  re-elec 
tion  of  the  President  no  more  proves  that  the  people  had  sanctioned 
all  the  opinions  previously  expressed  by  him  than,  if  he  had  had  the 
king's  evil  or  a  carbuncle,  it  would  demonstrate  that  they  intended 
to  sanction  his  physical  infirmity. 

But  the  President  infers  his  duty  to  remove  the  deposites  from 
the  constitution  and  the  suffrages  of  the  American  people.  As  to 
the  latter  source  of  authority,  I  think  it  confers  none.  The  election 
of  a  President,  in  itself,  gives  no  power,  but  merely  designates  the 
person  who,  as  an  officer  of  the  Government,  is  to  exercise  power 
granted  by  the  constitution  and  laws.  In  this  sense,  and  in  this 
sense  only,  does  an  election  confer  power.  The  President  alleges 
a  right  in  himself  to  superintend  the  operations  of  the  Executive 
Departments  from  the  constitution  and  the  suffrages  of  the  people. 


18 

Now,  neither  grants  any  such  right.  The  constitution  gives  him  the 
power,  and  no  other  power  than  to  call  upon  the  heads  of  each  of 
the  Executive  Departments  to  give  his  opinion,  in  writing,  as  to  any 
matter  connected  with  his  department.  The  issue  of  the  election 
simply  puts  him  in  a  condition  to  exercise  that  right.  By  the  laws, 
not  by  the  constitution,  all  the  departments,  with  the  exception  of 
that  of  the  Treasury,  are  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  President. 
And,  by  various  laws,  specific  duties  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Trea 
sury  ( such  as  contracting  for  loans,  &c. )  are  required  to  be  performed 
under  the  direction  of  the  President.  This  is  done  from  greater 
precaution ;  but  his  power,  in  these  respects,  is  derived  from  the  laws, 
and  not  from  the  constitution.  Even  in  regard  to  those  departments 
other  than  that  of  the  Treasury,  in  relation  to  which  by  law,  and  not 
by  the  constitution,  a  control  is  assigned  to  the  Chief  Magistrate, 
duties  may  be  required  of  them j  by  the  law,  beyond  his  control,  and 
for  the  performance  of  which  their  heads  are  responsible.  This  is 
true  of  the  State  Department,  that  \vhich,  above  ail  others,  is  most 
under  the  immediate  direction  of  the  President.  And  this  principle, 
more  than  thirty  years  ago,  was  established  in  the  case  of  Marbury 
against  Madison.  The  Supreme  Court,  in  that  case,  expressed  itself 
in  the  following  language  : 

"  By  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  the  President  is  invested 
with  certain  important  political  powers,  in  the  exercise  of  which  he 
is  to  use  his  own  discretion,  and  is  accountable  only  to  his  country 
in  his  political  character,  and  to  his  own  conscience.  To  aid  him  in 
the  performance  of  these  duties,  he  is  authorized  to  appoint  certain 
officers,  who  act  by  his  authority,  and  in  conformity  with  his  orders. 
"  In  such  cases  their  acts  .are  his  acts ;  and  whatever  opinion  may 
be  entertained  of  the  manner  in  which  Executive  discretion  may  be 
used,  still  there  exists,  and  can  exist,  no  power  to  control  that  dis 
cretion.  The  subjects  are  political.  They  respect  the  nation,  not 
individual  rights,  and,  being  entrusted  to  the  Executive,  the  decision 
of  the  Executive  is  conclusive.  The  application  of  this  remark  will 
be  perceived  by  adverting  to  the  act  of  Congress  for  establishing 
the  department  of  Foreign  Affairs.  This  officer,  as  his  duties  were 
prescribed  by  that  act,  is  to  conform  precisely  to  the  wTill  of  the 
President.  He  is  the  mere  organ  by  whom  that  will  is  communi 
cated.  The  acts  of  such  an  officer,  as  an  officer,  can  never  be 
examinable  by  the  courts. 

"  But  when  the  Legislature  proceeds  to  impose  on  that  officer 
other  duties,  when  he  is  directed  peremptorily  to  perform  certain 
acts,  [that  is,  when  he  is  not  placed  under  the  direction  of  the 
President,]  when  the  rights  of  individuals  are  dependent  on  the 
performance  of  those  acts,  he  is  so  far  the  officer  of  the  law,  is 
amenable  to  the  laws  for  his  conduct,  and  cannot,  at  his  discretion, 
sport  away  the  vested  rights  of  others. 

"The  conclusion,  from  this  reasoning,  is,  that  where  the  heads  of 
departments  are  the  political  or  confidential  agents  of  the  Executive, 
merely  to  execute  the  will  of  the  President,  or  rather  to  act  in  cases 


14 

in  which  the  Executive  possesses  a  constitutional  or  legal  discretion, 
nothing  can  be  more  perfectly  clear  than  that  their  acts  are  only 
politically  examinable.  But  where  a  specific  duty  is  assigned  by 
law,  and  individual  rights  depend  upon  the  performance  of  that  duty, 
it  seems  equally  clear  that  the  individual  who  considers  himself 
injured,  has  a  right  to  resort  to  the  laws  of  his  country  for  a  remedy." 
Although  I  am  constrained  to  believe  that  the  President  has  been 
mistaken  in  asserting  that  the  duty  has  been  devolved  upon  him  by 
the  constitution  and  by  the  suffrages  of  the  American  people,  to 
superintend  the  operation  of  the  Executive  Departments,  and  conse 
quently  to  order  the  removal  of  the  public  deposites,  if  he  deemed 
such  removal  was  expedient,  he  is  charged  by  the  constitution  to 
"  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed."  And  the  question 
is,  what  does  this  injunction  realty  import?  It  has  been  contended}* 
under  it,  that  the  Executive  aid  ov  \  co-operation  ought  not,  in  'a"ffft 
case,  to  be  given,  but  when  the  Chief  Magistrate  himself  is  per 
suaded  that  it  is  to  be  lent  to  the  execution  of  a  law  of  the  United 
States;  and  that,  in  all  instances  where  he  believes  that  the  law  is 
otherwise  than  it  has  been  settled  or  adjudicated,  he  may  withhold 
the  means  of  execution  with  which  he  is  invested.  In  other  words, 
this  enormous  pretension  of  the  Executive  claims,  that  if  a  treaty 
or  law  exists,  contrary  to  the  constitution,  in  the  President's  opinion; 
or  if  a  judicial  opinion  be  pronounced,  in  his  opinion  repugnant  to 
the  constitution,  to  a  treaty,  or  to  a  law,  he  is  not  bound  to  afford 
the  Executive  aid  in  the  execution  of  any  such  treaty,  law,  or  deci 
sion.  If  this  be  sound  doctrine,  it  is  evident  that  everything  resolves 
itself  into  the  President's  opinion.  There  is  an  end  to  all  constitu 
tional  government,  and  a  sole  functionary  engrosses  the  whole  powrer 
supposed  hitherto  to  have  been  assigned  to  various  responsible 
officers,  checking  and  checked  by  each  other.  Can  this  be  true  ? 
Is  it  possible  that  there  is  any  one  so  insensible  to  the  guaranties 
of  civil  liberty  as  to  subscribe  to  this  monstrous  pretension?  In 
respect  even  to  affairs  of  ordinary  administration,  how  enormous 
would  it  be  ?  Various  officers  of  Government  are  charged  with  the 
liquidation  of  most  important  accounts  of  contractors  and  others, 
concerned  in  the  disbursement,  annually,  of  large  sums  of  the  public 
revenue.  The  rejection  or  allowance  of  a  single  item  of  these 
accounts  may  fix  the  fate  of  the  contractor  or  disbursing  agent. 
Hitherto  this  matter  was  supposed  to  be  judicial  in  its  nature,  and 
beyond  Executive  control;  but  let  this  new  heresy  be  sanctioned, 
and  the  President  may  say  to  an  Auditor  or  Comptroller,  pass  this, 
or  reject  that  item  in  the  account,  ( such  is  my  opinion  of  the  law, ) 
and  if  you  do  not,  1  will  remove  you  from  office.  Let  this  doctrine 
be  once  established,  and  there  is  an  end  to  all  regulated  government, 
to  all  civil  liberty.  It  will  become  a  machine,  simple  enough. 
There  will  be  but  one  will  in  the  State ;  but  one  bed,  and  that  will 
be  the  bed  of  Procrustes !  All  the  departments,  legislative,  judicial, 
and  executive,  and  all  subordinate  functionaries,  must  lie  quietly  on 
it,  but  it  will  be  the  repose  of  despotism  and  death. 


15 

Sir,  such  an  enormous  and  extravagant  pretension  cannot  be 
sanctioned.  It  must  be  put  alongside  of  its  exploded  compeer,  the 
power  once  asserted  for  Congress  to  pass  any  and  all  laws  called  for 
by  "the  general  welfare." 

Allow  me,  in  a  few  words,  to  present  to  the  Senate  my  ideas  of 
the  structure  of  our  Federal  Government.  It  has  no  power  but 
granted  power  ;  and  the  power  granted  must  be  found  in  the  consti 
tution,  the  instrument  granting  it.  If  the  question  arise,  is  a  specific 
powrer  granted  ?  the  grant  must  be  shown,  or  the  power  must  be  prov 
en  to  be  necessary  and  proper  to  carry  into  effect  a  granted  power. 
Our  executive  power,  such  as  it  is,  must  be  looked  for  in  the  consti 
tution  which  has  created  and  modified  it,  and  not  in  the  forms  in 
which  Executive  power  practically  exists  in  other  countries,  nor  in 
the  nature  which  is  supposed  to  belong  to  it  in  the  writings  of  Mon 
tesquieu,  or  any  other  speculative  author.  And  so  of  our  legisla 
tive  and  judicial  powers.  With  respect  to  each  of  the  three 
great  departments  into  which  Government  is  divided,  we  are  to  look 
for  their  respective  powers  into  the  constitution  itself,  and  not  into 
the  theories  of  abstract  or  speculative  philosophers.  They  have 
neither  more  nor  less  power  than  what  is  given.  As  to  each,  the 
constitution  uses  general  language,  which  is  to  be  interpreted  not  so 
much  by  its  terms,  as  by  the  specific  delineations  of  authority  which 
are  subsequently  made.  In  reference  to  the  general  duty  assigned 
to  the  President  to  "  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed," 
what  does  that  mean  ?  According  to  the  exposition*  which  I  am 
considering,  the  President  would  absorb  all  the  powers  of  Govern 
ment.  For  in  each  particular  case  of  the  execution  of  a  law,  if 
his  judgment  was  not  satisfied  that  it  IMS  law,  he  might  withhold 
the  requisite  Executive  agency.  If  a  treaty  were  to  be  carried  into 
effect;  if  a  law  to  be  executed  ;  or  a  judicial  decision  to  be  enforc 
ed,  denying  that  the  treaty  was  valid,  the  law  constitutional,  or  the 
decision  agreeable  to  law,  he  might  refuse  the  necessary  means  to  en 
force  the  execution  of  them  respectively  :  and  the  practical  result  of 
the  whole  would  be,  that  nothing  under  Government  could  be  done 
but  what  was  agreeable  to  the  President.  Such  a  view  of  our  Go 
vernment  must  be  rejected.  In  my  opinion,  when  the  constitution 
enjoined  the  President  "  to  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  ex 
ecuted,"  it  required  nothing  mpre  than  this,  to  employ  the  means 
entrusted  to  him  to  overcome  resistance  whenever  it  might  be  offer 
ed  to  the  laws.  Congress,  by  the  fourteenth  clause  of  the  eighth 
section  of  the  first  article  of  the  constitution,  is  invested  with  power 
to  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the 
Union,  suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions.  It  might  as  well 
be  contended  that  Congress,  under  this  power,  deciding  what  was 
and  what  was  not  law,  could  direct,  by  the  militia,  that  only  to  be 
executed  which  Congress  deemed  to  be  law.  By  the  second  sec 
tion  of  the  second  article  of  the  constitution,  the  President  is  made 
commander  in  chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and 
of  the  militia  when  called  into  actual  service  ;  and,  by  a  subsequent 


16 

clause,  the  injunction  in  question  is  given  to  him.  Thus  invested 
with  the  command  and  employment  of  the  physical  force  ot  the 
Union,  can  a  doubt  remain  that  the  purpose  of  the  direction  which 
the  constitution  gives  to  him  to  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully 
executed,  was  that  he  should,  when  properly  called  on  by  the  civil 
authority,  employ  that  force  to  subdue  unlawful  resistance  ?  Under 
stood  in  any  other  sense,  those  few  words  become  a  vortex,  into 
which  the  whole  powers  of  Government  are  irresistibly  drawn.  We 
have  established  a  system,  in  which  power  has  been  most  carefully 
separated  and  distributed  between  three  separate  and  independent 
departments.  We  have  been  told  a  thousand  times,  and  all  expe 
rience  assures  us,  that  such  a  division  is  indispensable  to  the  existence 
and  preservation  of  freedom.  We  have  establishpd  and  designated 
offices,  and  appointed  officers  in  each  of  those  departments,  to  exe 
cute  the  duties  respectively  allotted  to  them.  The  President,  it  is 
true,  presides  over  the  whole  ;  specific  duties  are  often  assigned  by 
particular  laws  to  him  alone,  or  to  other  officers  under  his  superin 
tendence.  His  parental  eye  is  presumed  to  survey  the  whole  ex 
tent  of  the  system  in  all  its  movements  :  but  has  he  power  to  come 
into  Congress,  and  to  say  such  laws  only  shall  you  pass  ;  to  go  into 
the  courts  and  prescribe  the  decisions  which  they  may  pronounce  ; 
or  even  to  enter  the  offices  of  administration,  and,  where  duties  are 
specifically  confided  to  those  officers,  to  substitute  his  will  to  their 
duty  ?  Or  has  he  a  right,  when  those  functionaries,  deliberating 
upon  their  own  solemn  obligations  to  the  people,  have  moved  for 
ward  in  their  assigned  spheres,  to  arrest  their  lawful  progress,  be 
cause  they  have  dared  to  act  contrary  to  his  pleasure  ?  No,  sir ;  no, 
sir.  His  is  a  high  and  glorious  station,  but  it  is  one  of  observation 
and  superintendence.  It  is  to  see  that  obstructions  in  the  forward 
movement  of  Government,  unlawfully  interposed,  shall  be  abated  by 
legitimate  and  competent  means. 

That  this  is  the  true  interpretation  of  the  constitutional  clause  on 
which  I  am  commenting,  is  fairly  to  be  inferred  from  the  total  silence 
as  to  any  opposite  construction  of  all  cotemporaneous  expositions. 
If  the  clause  were  susceptible  of  the  construction  which  I  am  now 
combating,  if  it  had  been  deemed  possible  that  it  could  have  been 
interpreted  to  embrace  in  the  Chief  Magistrate  all  the  powers  of 
Government,  would  no  one  of  the  thousand  wise  and  patriotic  men, 
to  whom  the  constitution  was  submitted,  have  detected  and  exposed 
the  lurking  danger  ?  I  have  myself  made,  or,  when  I  could  not,  I 
have  got  others  to  make  researches  in  the  Federalist,  the  Debates  of 
Conventions,  and  other  cotemporaneous  publications,  and  not  the 
slightest  countenance  has  been  discovered  in  any  of  them  for  this 
sweeping  Executive  pretension.  If  the  pretension  be  well  founded, 
then  it  is  most  evident  that  there  is  no  longer  any  control  over  our 
public  affairs  than  that  exerted  by  the  President.  If  it  be  true  that 
when  a  duty,  by  law,  is  specifically  assigned  to  a  particular  officer, 
the  President  may  go  into  his  office  and  control  him  in  the  perform 
ance  of  it,  then  it  is  most  manifest  that  the  will  of  the  President  is 


17 

the  supreme  law,  and  every  barrier  between  him  and  the  public 
Treasury  is  annihilated ;  and  that  union  of  the  purse  and  the  sword  in 
one  man's  hands,  which  the  patriotic  Henry  so  much  denounced, 
and  which  constitutes  the  best  description  of  despotism,  is  complete 
ly  realized. 

The  charter  of  the  Bank  requires  that  the  public  deposites  be  made 
in  its  vaults.  It  gives  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  power  to 
remove  them,  and  why  ?  Because  he  is  placed  by  Congress  at  the 
head  of  the  finances  of  the  Government.  Weekly  reports  of  the 
condition  of  the  Bank  are  made  to  him  ;  he  is  the  sentinel  of  Con 
gress,  the  agent  of  Congress,  the  representative  of  Congress,  creat 
ed  by  Congress  ;  his  duties  are  prescribed  and  defined  by  Congress, 
To  them  and  not  to  the  President  foe  is  to  report.  His  vigilance  is 
presumed  to  anticipate  or  promptly  to  perceive  the  existence  of  dan 
ger,  and,  when  he  discovers  it,  his  duty  is  to  provide  for  the  safety  of 
the  public  treasure,  and  forthwith  to  report  to  his  principal.  Stand 
ing  in  this  responsible  attitude  to  Congress,  and  to  Congress  alone,  if 
the  President  may  go  to  that  officer,  and  tell  him  to  do  as  he  bids  or 
he  shall  be  removed  from  office,  what  security  remains  to  the  people 
of  this  country  ? 

But  let  me  suppose  that  1  am  totally  mistaken  in  this  construction 
of  the  constitutional  injunction,  and  that  its  trjue  meaning  is  that  the 
President  has  the  power  to  superintend  the  execution  of  every  parti 
cular  law  exactly  as  Congress  intended  it,  what  was  it  his  duty  to  do 
in  this  case,  under  that  interpretation  of  the  constitution  ?  The  law 
authorized  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  on  his  own  responsibility,., 
to  remove  the  deposites.  It  commanded  him,  if  he  removed  them,, 
to  report  his  reasons  to  Congress.  The  duty  was  confided  to  his 
judgment  and  discretion  exclusively,  and  his  judgment  was  to  be 
guided  by  his  own  reasons,  not  those  of  any  other,  and  they  and  no 
other  were  to  be  reported  to  Congress.  Now,  if  the  President  were 
bound  to  take  care  that  that  law  should  be  faithfully  executed,  then  his 
duty  exacted  of  him  to  see  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was. 
allowed  the  exercise  of  his  free,  unbiassed,  and  uncontrolled  judg 
ment  in  removing  or  not  removing  the  deposites.  That  was  the; 
faithful  execution  of  the  law.  Congress  had  not  said  that  the  Secre 
tary  of  State,  the  Secretary  of  War,  or  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
should  remove  them,  but  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  The  Presi 
dent  had  no  right,  either  by  the  constitution  or  the  law,  to  go  to 
the  other  Secretaries,  and  ask  them  how  a  service  should  be  perform 
ed,  which  was  confided  exclusively  to  the  judgment  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury.  He  might  as  well  have  asked  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  how  a  movement  of  the  army  should  be  made  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  as  to  have  consulted  this  latter  officer  how  a 
financial  operation  should  be  executed,  not  only  not  committed  to 
him,  but  assigned  exclusively  to  another.  It  was  not  to  the  Presi 
dent  and  all  the  Secretaries  combined,  that  the  power  was  given  to 
change  the  disposition  of  the  public  deposites.  If  the  change  were 
made,  it  was  not  their  reasons  for  it  which  were  to  be  reported  to 
3 


18 

Congress.  It  was  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  alone,  exclusive 
of  every  other  functionary  of  the  Government,  that  the  duty  was 
specifically  confined,  and  the  measure  was  to  be  judged  by  Congress 
upon  his  and  not  their  reasons.  Can  it  be  said,  then,  in  the  language 
of  the  constitution,  that  the  President "  took  care  that  the  law  was 
faithfully  executed,"  when  he  took  it  altogether  out  of  hands  to  which 
the  law  had  confided  it,  and  substituted  another's  will  for  the  will  of 
*liim  who  was  expressly  charged  with  the  execution  of  the  law? 

[1  will  thank  the  Secretary  of  the  Senate  to  get  me  the  sedition 
'law.  It,  is  not  very  certain,  since  the  Executive  is  resolved  to  act  in 
its  spirit,  how  soon  we  shall  be  called  upon  to  re-enact  its  provi 
sions.] 

J\"ow,  sir,  said  Mr.  CLAY,  let  us  examine  some  of  the  other  sources 
or  motives  for  the  exercise  of  $ns  power  assumed  by  the  President 
.over  the  public  Treasury,  as  described  by  himself.  He  says  in  the 
cabinet  paper  :  cc  The  President  repeats  that  he  begs  the  cabinet  to 
u  consider  the  proposed  measure  as  his  own,  in  the  support  of  which 
'u  he  shall  require  no  one  of  them  to  make  a  sacrifice  of  opinion  or 
ic  principle.  Its  responsibility  has  been  assumed,  after  the  most  ma- 
<c  ture  deliberation  and  reflection,  as  necessary  to  preserve  the 
"  MORALS  of  the  people,  the  FREEDOM  of  the  PRESS,  and  the 
u  PURITY  of  the  elective  franchise."  The  morals  of  the  people  ! 
What  part  of  the  constitution  has  given  to  the  President  any  au 
thority  over  the  morals  of  the  people  ?  None.  It  grants  no  such 
power,  but  expressly  denies  all  power  over  religion,  the  genial  and 
presiding  influence  which  prevails  in  every  true  system  of  morals. 
Tolerate  to-day  an  assumption  of  authority  in  regard  to  morals,  and 
what  is  the  next  step  in  the  progress  of  usurpation  ?  It  will  be  to 
exercise  a  control  over  religion  !  And  then  to  cherish  some  particu 
lar  sect,  as  the  only  one  that  is  orthodox,  to  the  exclusion  of  all 
-others.  And  the  President  might  as  well,  in  this  case,  have  gone 
into  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  controlled  him 
In  the  performance  of  a  service,  exclusively  confided  to  his  care  and 
judgment,  because  it  was  necessary  to  preserve  the  religion  of  the 
people  !  I  ask  for  the  authority.  Will  any  one  of  the  gentlemen 
here,  who  consider  themselves  as  the  vindicators  of  the  President, 
point  to  any  clause  of  the  constitution  which  gives  to  the  present 
President,  or  any  other,  power  to  preserve  the  morals  of  the  people  ? 

But  "  the  freedom  of  the  press"  constituted  another  object  with 
the  President.  I  am  not  surprised  that  the  present  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  should  bo  desirous  of  reviving  a  power  and  control  over 
the  press.  lie  was  a  member  of  that  party  which  passed  the  famous 
sedition  law  under  pretexts  precisely  similar  to  those  which  are  now 
put  forward.  I  recollect  that  it  was  then  said  that  the  purpose  of  the 
sedition  law  was,  not  to  repress  the  freedom  of  the  press,  but  to  pre 
sent  its  abuses;  to  preserve,  not  to  destroy  it;  to  punish  its  ex 
cesses  and  calumnies ;  and  to  aid  the  cause  of  truth  and  virtue.  It 
was  to  introduce  salutary  restraints,  and  to  discountenance  grossness 
and  indecency.  It  is  sometimes  useful  to  refer  back  to  these  old 


19 

things — to  the  motives — the  pleas  of  State  necessity,  which  induced 
arbitrary  power,  in  former  times,  to  surround  itself  writh  a  shield 
against  all  impertinent  investigation  and  searching  inquiry.  That 
memorable  act  was  passed  in  1798,  and,  among  other  provisions,  it 
contained  the  following  section  : 

Sisc.  2.  "  That  if  any  person  shall  write,  print,  utter,  or  publish, 
u  or  shall  cause  or  procure  to  be  written,  printed,  uttered,  or  pub- 
"  lished,  or  shall,  knowingly  and  willingly,  assist  or  aid  in  writing, 
"  printing,  uttering,  or  publishing,  any  false,  scandalous,  and  mali- 
"  cious  writing,  or  writings,  against  the  Government  of  the  United 
"States,  or  either  House  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  or  the 
"  President  of  the  United  States,  with  intent  to  defame  the  said 
cc  Government,  or  either  House  of  the  said  Congress,  or  the  said  Pre- 
'^sident,  or  to  bring  them,  or  either  of  them,  into  contempt  or  disre- 
*^pute  ;  or  to  excite  against  them,  or  either  or  any  of  them,  the 
"  hatred  of  the  good  people  of  the  United  States,  or  to  stir  up  sedi- 
ation  within  the  United  States;  or  to  excite  any  unlawful  combina- 
"  tions  therein,  for  opposing  or  resisting  any  law  of  the  United  States, 
"  or  any  act  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  done  in  pursuance 
"  of  any  such  law,  or  of  the  powers  in  him  vested  by  the  constitution 
"  of  the  United  States  ;  or  to  resist,  oppose,  or  defeat,  any  such  law 
Xi  or  act ;  or  to  aid,  encourage,  or  abet,  any  hostile  designs  of  any 
"  foreign  nation  against  the  United  States,  their  people,  or  Govern- 
"  ment ;  then  such  person,  being  thereof  convicted  before  any  court 
"  of  the  United  States  having  jurisdiction  thereof,  shall  be  punished 
"  by  a  fine  not  exceeding  two  thousand  dollars,  and  by  imprisonment 
•"  not  exceeding  two  years." 

We  perceive  that  the  law  was  only  directed  against  false,  scanda 
lous,  and  malicious  writings  against  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  or  either  House  of  Congress,  or  the  PRESIDENT  of  the  U. 
States ;  and  then  only  when  the  publication  was  intended  to  defame 
them,  and  to  bring  them  into  contempt  or  disrepute  !  It  was  only 
when  the  libeller  intended  to  deprive  high  functionaries  of  public  con 
fidence,  and  to  excite  against  them  the  hatred  of  the  GOOD  people  of 
the  United  States,  that  he  was  subjected  to  punishment,  ft  was  only 
for  the  sake  of  truth,  and  of  justice,  that  the  sedition  law  was  passed. 
That  was  all,  sir.  We  now  find  the  same  motives  avowed ;  the 
same  purpose  of  protecting  the  abused  President,  and  injured  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury.  How  uniform  in  all  ages  are  the  workings  of 
tyranny !  How  plausible  its  pretexts  !  How  detestable  its  real  aims  ! 

By  the  sedition  law,  abominable  and  unconstitutional  as  it  was,  the 
semblance  of  justice  at  least  was  preserved.  Its  victims  were  allow 
ed  the  benefit  of  witnesses  and  of  counsel  to  prove  the  truth  of  the  al 
leged  libel,  and,  above  all,  the  inestimable  privilege  of  trial  by  jury. 
It  expressly  declared,  "  That  if  any  person  shall  be  prosecuted  under 
"  this  act  for  the  writing  or  publishing  any  libel  aforesaid,  it  shall  be 
"  lawful  for  the  defendant,  upon  the  trial  of  the  cause,  to  give  in  evi- 
"  dence  in  his  defence  the  truth  of  the  matter  contained  in  the  publica- 
"  tion  charged  as  a  libel.  And  the  jury  who  shall  try  the  cause  shall 


20 

"  have  a  right  to  determine  the  law  and  the  fact,  under  the  direction* 
"  of  the  court,  as  in  other  cases." 

But  under  this  new  sedition  law,  which  the  President  revives  and 
promulgates  in  his  cabinet  paper,  the  offender  is  stript  of  all  privi 
leges.  The  tribunals  are  dispensed  with,  as  useless  ceremonies;  and 
he  stands  condemned,  unheard  and  untried.  The  impartial  Presi 
dent  takes  the  whole  matter  into  his  own  hands,  and,  constituting 
himself  the  law,  the  judge,  the  jury,  and  the  executioner,  pronoun 
ces  absolutely  the  guilt  of  the  accused. 

The  President  has  also  very  much  at  heart  u  the  purity  of  the 
elective  franchise."     And  here  again  I  ask,  what  part  of  the  consti 
tution  of  this  country  confers  on   him  any  power  over  that  subject  ? 
Look  at  the  nature  and  the  consequences  of  the  Executive  exercise 
of  this  power  !  If  it  were  really  necessary  that  steps  should  be  taken 
to  preserve  the  freedom  of  the  press  and  the  purity  of  elections,  wnat 
ought  the  President  to  have  done  ?  Taken  the  matter  into  his  own 
hands  ?  No,  no.    It  was  his  duty  to  recommend  to  Congress  the  pas 
sage   of  laws  which  the   courts  of  the  United  States  could  execute. 
Congress  could  have  re-examined  the  constitution,  reviewed  the  ex 
isting  state  of  legislation,  and,  if  they  possessed  the  requisite  power, 
passed  suitable  laws,  with  appropriate  sanctions.     By  undertaking 
himself  to  do  that  for  which  he  has  not  the  shadow  of  authority  in 
the  constitution  or  laws,  his  acts  must  necessarily  be  inefficient,  and 
altogether  incompetent  to  the  purposes  he  professes.     Suppose  this 
contumacious  institution,  which  committed,  in  the  year  1829,  the 
unpardonable  sin  of  not  appointing,  in  conformity  with  the  President's 
wishes,  a  new  president  to  one  of  its  eastern  branches,  should  dare 
to  go  on  and  vindicate  itself  against  the  calumnies  constantly  pour 
ed  out  upon  it ;  that  it  should  audaciously  continue  to  stand  upon  its 
defence,  how  impotent  will  the  power  of  the  President  be  to  restrain 
it !  How  inadequate  will  his  authority  prove,  to  prevent  the  Bank 
from  resorting  to  the   public  press  !  Why,  sir,  if  Congress  possessed 
the  power,  and  the  President  had   come  to  us,  we  could  have  laid 
Mr.  Nicholas  Biddle  by  the  heels,  if  he  should  be  again  guilty  of  the 
presumption   of  publishing  another  report  of  Gen.  Smith  or  Mr. 
McDuffie,  another  speech  of  the  eloquent  gentleman  (  Mr.  Webster) 
near  me,  or  any  other  such  libels ,  tending  to  bring  the  President, 
his  administration,  or  his  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  into  disrepute. 
But  the  President  of  the   United  States,  who  thought  he   had  the 
Bank  in  his  power ;  who  thought  he  could  destroy  it ;  who  was  in 
duced  to  believe,  by  that  "  influence  behind  the  throne  greater  than 
the  throne   itself,"  that  he  could  bankrupt  the  institution  by  his  fiat, 
has  only  demonstrated  his  total  incompetency  to  regulate  the  press, 
and  preserve  it  from  contamination.     The  Bank  has  openly  avowed, 
and  yet  avows,  its  settled  purpose  to  defend  itself  on  all  proper  oc 
casions.     And,  what  is  still  more  provoking,  instead  of  becoming 
bankrupt,  with  its  doors  closed,  and  its  vaults  inaccessible,  it  has,  it 
seems,  got  more  specie  than  it  knows  what  to  do  with,  and  cruelly 
and  unfeelingly  hoarding  it,  miser-like,  refuses  to  let  one  dollar  of  its 


21 

millions  pass  out  to  the  relief  of  the  local  banks  to  which  the 
public  deposites  have  been  transferred  ! 

The  President  of  the  United  States  had  officially  nothing  to  do 
with  the  morals  of  the  community.  No,  sir,  for  the  preservation  of 
our  morals,  and  the  free  enjoyment  of  our  religion,  wre  are  responsi 
ble  to  no  earthly  tribunal.  We  are  responsible  to  God  only,  and  I 
trust  that  this  responsibility  will  ever  remain  to  Him,  and  to  his  mer 
cy  alone.  Neither  had  he  any  thing  to  do  with  the  freedom  of  the 
press.  Any  power  over  it  is  expressly  denied  even  to  Congress. 
It  was  justly  said  by  one  of  those  few  able  men  and  bright  lumina 
ries  whom  Providence  has  yet  spared  to  us,  in  answer  to  complaints 
about  its  alleged  abuses,  from  the  French  Government,  during  the 
French  revolution,  that  the  press,  was  one  of  those  delicate  concerns 
which  admitted  of  no  regulation  by  Government ;  and  that  its  abuses 
must  be  tolerated,  lest  its  freedom  should  be  abridged,  and  its  utility 
be  destroyed.  Such  is  the  condition  of  the  American  press,  as  se 
cured  and  recognised  by  the  constitution  ;  and  so  it  has  been  regard 
ed  ever  since  the  expiration  of  the  odious  sedition  law,  until  the 
detestable  principles  of  that  law  have  been  reasserted  in  the  cabinet 
paper  to  which  I  have  so  often  referred. 

Such  are  the  powers  on  which  the  President  relies  to  justify  his 
seizure  of  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States.  I  have  examined 
them,  one  by  one,  and  they  all  fail,  utterly  fail,  to  bear  out  the  act. 
We  are  brought  irresistibly  to  the  conclusions,  1st.  That  the  inva 
sion  of  the  public  Treasury  has  been  perpetrated  by  the  removal  of 
one  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  who  would  not  violate  his  conscien 
tious  obligations,  and  by  the  appointment  of  another,  who  stood 
ready  to  subscribe  his  name  to  the  orders  of  the  President ;  and,  2dly. 
That  the  President  has  no  color  of  authority  in  the  constitution  or 
laws  for  the  act  which  he  has  thus  caused  to  be  performed. 

And  now  let  us  glance  at  some  of  the  tremendous  consequences 
which  may  ensue  from  this  high-handed  measure.  If  the  President 
may,  in  a  case  in  which  the  law  has  assigned  a  specific  duty  exclu 
sively  to  a  designated  officer,  command  it  to  be  executed,  contrary 
to  his  own  judgment,  under  the  penalty  of  an  expulsion  from  office, 
and,  upon  his  refusal,  may  appoint  some  obsequious  tool  to  perform 
the  required  act,  where  is  the  limit  to  his  authority  ?  Has  he  not  the 
same  right  to  interfere  in  every  other  case,  and  remove  from  office 
all  that  he  can  remove,  who  hesitate  or  refuse  to  do  his  bidding, 
contrary  to  their  own  solemn  convictions  of  their  duty  ?  There  is  no 
resisting  this  inevitable  conclusion.  Well,  then,  how  stands  the 
matter  of  the  public  Treasury  ?  It  has  been  seen  that  the  issue  of 
warrants  upon  the  Treasury  is  guarded  by  four  independent  and 
hitherto  responsible  checks,  each  controlling  every  other,  and  all 
bound  by  the  law,  but  all  holding  their  offices,  according  to  the  ex 
isting  practice  of  the  Government,  at  the  pleasure  of  the  President. 
The  Secretary  signs,  the  Comptroller  countersigns,  the  Register  re 
cords,  and  the  Treasurer  pays  the  warrant.  We  have  seen  that  the 
President  has  gone  to  the  first  and  highest  link  in  the  chain,  and 


22 

coerced  a  conformity  to  his  will.  What  is  to  prevent,  whenever  he 
desires  to  draw  money  from  the  public  Treasury,  his  applying  the 
same  penalty  of  expulsion,  under  which  Mr.  Duane  suffered,  to  every 
link  of  the  chain,  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  down,  and 
thus  to  obtain  whatever  he  demands  ?  What  is  to  prevent  a  more 
compendious  accomplishment  of  his  object,  by  the  agency  of  transfer 
drafts,  drawn  on  the  sole  authority  of  the  Secretary,  and  placing 
the  money  at  once  wherever,  or  in  whatsoever  hands  the  President 
pleases  ? 

What  security  have  the  people  against  the  lawless  conduct  of  any 
President  ?  Where  is  the  boundary  to  the  tremendous  power  which 
he  has  assumed  ?  Sir,  every  barrier  around  the  public  Treasury  is 
broken  down  and  annihilated.  From  the  moment  that  the  President 
pronounced  the  words,  "  this  measure  is  my  own  ;  I  take  upon  my 
self  the  responsibility  of  it,"  evei'y  safeguard  around  the  Treasury 
was  prostrated,  and  henceforward  it  might  as  well  be  at  the  Hermi 
tage.  The  measure  adopted  by  the  President  is  without  precedent. 
I  beg  pardon,  there  is  one,  but  we  must  go  down  for  it  to  the  com 
mencement  of  the  Christian  era.  It  will  be  recollected,  by  those 
who  are  conversant  with  Roman  history,  that,  after  Pompey  was 
compelled  to  retire  to  Brundusium,  Caesar,  who  had  been  anxious 
to  give  him  battle,  returned  to  Rome,  "having  reduced  Italy  (says 
the  venerable  biographer)  in  sixty  days,  (the  exact  period  between 
the  day  of  the  removal  of  the  deposites  and  that  of  the  commence 
ment  of  the  present  session  of  Congress,  without  the  usual  allowance 
of  any  days  of  grace) — in  sixty  days,  without  bloodshed."  The  bi 
ographer  proceeds : 

44  Finding  the  city  in  a  more  settled  condition  than  he  expected, 
44  and  many  Senators  there,  he  addressed  them  in  a  mild  and  gra- 
44  cious  manner,  [as  the  President  addressed  his  late  Secretary  of 
44  the  Treasury,]  and  desired  them  to  send  deputies  to  Pompey  with 
44  an  offer  of  honorable  terms  of  peace,  &c.  As  Metellus,  the  tri- 
44  bune,  opposed  his  taking  money  out  of  the  public  Treasury,  and 
"  cited  some  laws  against  it — [such,  sir,  I  suppose,  as  I  have  en- 
"  deavored  to  cite  on  this  occasion] — Caesar  said,  4  Arms  and  laws 
44  do  not  flourish  together.  If  you  are  not  pleased  at  what  I  am  about, 
44  you  have  only  to  withdraw.  [Leave  the  office,  Mr.  Duane  !]  War, 
44  indeed,  will  not  tolerate  much  liberty  of  speech.  When  I  say 
44  this,  I  am  renouncing  my  own  right ;  for  you,  and  all  those  whom 
44  I  have  found  exciting  a  spirit  of  faction  against  me,  are  at  my  dis- 
44  posal.'  Having  said  this,  he  approached  the  doors  of  the  Trea- 
44  sury,  and,  as  the  keys  were  not  produced,  he  sent  for  workmen  to 
44  break  them  open.  Metellus  again  opposed  him,  and  gained  credit 
44  with  some  for  his  firmness ;  but  Caesar,  with  an  elevated  voice, 
44  threatened  to  put  him  to  death  if  he  gave  him  any  further  trouble. 
44  4  And  you  know  very  well,  young  man,'  said  he, 4  that  this  is  harder 
44  for  me  to  say  than  to  do.'  Metellus,  terrified  by  the  menace,  re- 
44  tired;  and  Caesar  was  afterwards  easily  and  readily  supplied  with 
44  every  thing  necessary  for  the  war." 


23 

And  where  now  is  the  public  Treasury  ?  Who  can  tell  ?  It  is  cer 
tainly  without  a  local  habitation,  if  it  has  a  name.  Where  is  the 
money  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  ?  Floating  about  on  Trea 
sury  drafts  or  checks,  to  the  amount  of  millions,  placed  in  the  hands 
of  tottering  banks  to  enable  them  to  pay  their  own  just  debts,  in 
stead  of  being  applied  to  the  service  of  the  people.  These  checks 
are  scattered  to  the  winds  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in 
defiance  of  a  positive  law  by  which  the  Treasurer  is  forbidden 
expressly  to  pay  any  money  out  of  the  Treasury  but  under  the  au 
thority  of  warrants,  legally  issued  and  authenticated,  in  virtue  of 
previous  appropriations  by  law.  [Mr.  C.  here  read  parts  of  a  pub 
lished  correspondence  between  the  Treasurer  and  the  Cashier  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  in  wj^i^1  the  latter  complained  of  these 
checks,  as  being  issued  without  any  notice  to  the  Bank,  and  contrary 
to  an  express  arrangement,  and  in  which  the  Treasurer  says  they 
were  only  to  be  used  in  the  event  of  certain  contingencies.]  Thus, 
sir,  the  people's  money  is  put  into  a  bank  here,  and  a  bank  there, 
in  regard  to  the  solvency  of  which  we  have  no  satisfactory  know 
ledge,  to  be  employed  by  them  in  the  event  of  certain  contingen 
cies.  The  event  of  certain  contingencies !  And  we  know  nothing 
of  the  event,  nor  of  the  contingencies ! 

Where  was  the  oath  of  office  of  the  Treasurer  when  he  thus  dared 
to  suffer  the  people's  money  to  be  sported  with  ?  Where  was  the 
constitution,  which  expressly  prohibits  money  to  be  drawn  from  the 
Treasury,  but  in  consequence  of  previous  appropriation  by  law  ? 
Where  was  the  law  establishing  the  Treasury  Department,  which 
enjoins  that  no  money  be  paid  out  of  the  Treasury  but  upon  valid 
warrants  legally  issued  ?  Where  was  the  Treasurer's  bond  and  surety 
when  he  thus  cast  about  tlie  public  money  ?  I  do  not  pretend  to 
any  great  knowledge  of  the  law,  but  give  me  an  intelligent  and  un 
packed  jury,  and  I  undertake  to  prove  to  them  that  he  has  forfeited 
the  penalty  of  his  bond. 

Mr.  President,  said  Mr.  C.,  the  people  of  the  United  States  are 
indebted  to  the  President  for  the  boldness  of  this  movement ;  and 
as  one  among  the  humblest  of  them,  I  profess  my  obligations  to 
him.  He  has  told  the  Senate,  in  his  message  refusing  an  official 
copy  of  his  cabinet  paper,  that  it  has  been  published  for  the  inform 
ation  of  the  people.  As  a  part  of  the  people,  the  Senate,  if  not  in 
their  official  character,  have  a  right  to  its  use.  In  that  extraordi 
nary  paper  he  has  proclaimed  that  the  measure  is  his  own  ;  and  that 
he  has  taken  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  it.  In  plain  English  3, 
he  has  proclaimed  an  open,  palpable,  and  daring  usurpation  ! 

For  more  than  fifteen  years,  Mr.  President,  I  have  been  strug 
gling  to  avoid  the  present  state  of  things.  I  thought  I  perceived,  in 
some  proceedings  during  the  conduct  of  the  Seminole  war,  a  spirit 
of  defiance  to  the  constitution  and  to  all  law.  With  what  sincerity 
and  truth,  with  what  earnestness  and  devotion  to  civil  liberty,  I  have 
struggled,  the  Searcher  of  all  human  hearts  best  knows.  With  what 
fortune,  the  bleeding  constitution  of  my  country  now  fatally  attests. 


24 

I  have,  nevertheless,  persevered  ;  and,  under  every  discourage 
ment,  during  the  short  time  that  I  expect  to  remain  in  the  public 
councils,  I  will  persevere.  And  if  a  bountiful  Providence  would  al 
low7  an  unworthy  sinner  to  approach  the  throne  of  grace,  I  would 
beseech  him,  as  the  greatest  favor  he  could  grant  to  me  here  below, 
to  spare  me  until  I  live  to  behold  the  people  rising  in  their  majesty, 
with  a  peaceful  and  constitutional  exercise  of  their  power,  to  expel 
the  Goths  from  Rome  ;  to  rescfue  the  public  Treasury  from  pillage  ; 
to  preserve  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  ;  to  uphold  the 
Union  against  the  danger  of  the  concentration  and  consolidation  of 
all  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Executive  ;  and  to  sustain  the  liber 
ties  of  the  people  of  this  country  against  the  imminent  perils  to 
which  they  now  stand  exposed. 

DECEMBER  30,  1833. 

Mr.  CLAY  resumed  his  speech. 

Before  I  proceed,  said  Mr.  CLAY,  to  a  consideration  of  the  re 
port  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  the  second  resolution,  I 
wish  to  anticipate  and  answer  an  objection  which  may  be  made  to 
the  adoption  of  the  first.  It  may  be  urged  that  the  Senate,  being, 
in  a  certain  contingency,  a  court  of  impeachment,  ought  not  to  pre 
judge  a  question  whidb  it  may  be  called  upon  to  decide  judicially. 
But,  by  the  constitution,  the  Senate  has  three  characters,  legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial.  Its  ordinary,  and  by  far  its  most  important 
character,  is  that  of  its  being  a  component  part  of  the  Legislative 
Department.  Only  three  or  four  cases  since  the  establishment  of 
the  Government,  ( that  is,  during  a  period  of  near  half  a  century, ) 
have  occurred,  in  which  it  was  necessary  that  the  Senate  should  act 
as  a  judicial  tribunal,  the  least  important  of  all  its  characters.  Now, 
it  would  be  most  strange,  if,  when  its  constitutional  powers  were  as 
sailed,  it  could  not  assert  and  vindicate  them,  because,  by  possibility, 
it  might  be  required  to  act  as  a  court  of  justice.  The  first  resolution 
asserts,  only,  that  the  President  has  assumed  the  exercise  of  a  power 
over  the  public  Treasury  not  granted  by  the  constitution  and  laws. 
It  is  silent. as  to  motive  ;  and,  without  the  quo  animo — the  delibe 
rate  purpose  of  usurpation — the  President  would  not  be  liable  to 
impeachment.  But  if  a  concurrence  of  all  the  elements  be  neces 
sary  to  make  out  a  charge  of  wilful  violation  of  the  constitution, 
does  any  one  believe  that  the  President  will  now  be  impeached  ? 
And  shall  we  silently  sit  by,  and  see  ourselves  stript  of  one  of  the 
most  essential  of  our  legislative  powers,  and  the  exercise  of  it  assum 
ed  by  the  President,  to  whom  it  is  not  delegated,  without  effort  to 
maintain  it,  because,  against  all  human  probability,  he  may  be  here 
after  impeached  ? 

The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in  the  first  para 
graph,  commences  with  a  misstatement  of  the  fact.  He  says  :  "  / 
have  directed"  that  the  deposites  of  the  money  of  the  United  States 


25 

shall  not  be  made  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  If  this  asser 
tion  is  regarded  in  any  other  than  a  mere  formal  sense,  it  is  not  true. 
The  Secretary  may  have  been  the  instrument,  the  clerk,  the  automa 
ton,  in  whose  name  the  order  was  issued ;  but  the  measure  was  that 
of  the  President,  by  whose  authority  or  command  the  order  was 
given  ;  and  of  this  we  have  the  highest  and  most  authentic  evidence. 
The  President  has  told  the  world  that  the  measure  was  his  own  ;  and 
that  he  took  it  upon  his  own  responsibility.  And  he  has  exonerated 
his  cabinet  from  all  responsibility  about  it.  The  Secretary  ought  to 
have  frankly  disclosed  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and  told  the 
truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth.  If  he  had  done  so, 
he  would  have  informed  Congress  that  the  removal  had  been  decided 
by  the  President  on  the  18th  of  September  last;  that  it  had  been 
announced  to  the  public  on  the  20th ;  and  that  Mr.  Duane  remained 
in  office  until  the  23d.  He  would  have  informed  Congress  that  this 
important  measure  was  decided  before  he  entered  into  his  new  office, 
and  was  the  cause  of  his  appointment.  Yes,  sir ;  the  present  Secre 
tary  stood  by,  a  witness  to  the  struggle  in  the  mind  of  his  predeces 
sor,  between  his  attachment  to  the  President  and  his  duty  to  the 
country;  saw  him  dismissed  from  office  because  he  would  not  violate 
his  conscientious  obligations,  and  came  into  Mr.  Duane's  place,  to  do 
what  he  could  not  honorably,  and  would  not  perform.  A  son  of  one 
of  the  fathers  of  democracy,  by  an  administration  professing  to  be 
democratic,  was  expelled  from  office,  and  his  place  supplied  by  a 
gentleman  who,  throughout  his  whole  career,  has  been  uniformly 
opposed  to  democracy  !  A  gentleman  who,  at  another  epoch  of  the 
republic,  when  it  was  threatened  with  civil  war,  and  a  dissolution  of 
the  Union,  voted,  (although  a  resident  of  a  slave  State,)  in  the  Le 
gislature  of  Maryland,  against  the  admission  of  Missouri  into  the 
Union,  without  a  restriction  incompatible  with  her  rights  as  a  member 
of  the  confederacy.*  Mr.  Duane  was  dismissed  because  the  solemn 
convictions  of  his  duty  would  not  allow  him  to  conform  to  the  Presi 
dent's  will ;  because  his  logic  did  not  bring  his  mind  to  the  same 
conclusions  with  those  of  the  logic  of  a  venerable  old  gentleman, 
inhabiting  a  white  house  not  distant  from  the  Capitol ;  because  his 
watch  [Here  Mr.  C.  held  up  his  own.]  did  not  keep  time  with  that 
of  the  President.  He  was  dismissed  under  that  detestable  system 
of  proscription  for  opinion's  sake,  which  has  finally  dared  to  intrude 
itself  into  the  Halls  of  Congress — a  system  under  which  three  unof 
fending  clerks,  the  fathers  of  families,  the  husbands  of  wives,  de 
pendent  on  them  for  support,  without  the  slightest  imputation  of 
delinquency,  have  been  recently  unceremoniously  discharged,  and 

*  The  following  is  the  proceeding1  to  which  Mr.  CLAY  referred: 
"  Resolved  by  the  General  Assembly  of  Maryland,  That  the  Senators  and  Represen- 
"  tatives  from  this  State  in  Congress  be    requested  to  use  their  utmost  endeavors,  in 
"  the  admission  of  the  State  of  Missouri  into  the  Union,  to  prevent  the  prohibition  of 
"  slavery  from  being  required  of  that  State  as  a  condition  of  its  admission." 

It  passed  January,  1820,  in  the  affirmative.     Among  the  names  of  those  in  the  nega 
tive  is  that  of  Mr.  TAXEY.—  See  Niles's  Register,  Vol.  XVIT.  p.  394,  395. 

4 


26 

driven  out  to  beggary,  by  a  man,  himself  the  substitute  of  a  merito 
rious  officer,  who  has  not  been  in  this  city  a  period  equal  to  one 
monthly  revolution  of  the  moon!  I  tell  our  Secretary,  (said  Mr.  C., 
raising  his  voice,)  that,  if  he  touch  a  single  hair  of  the  head  of  any 
one  of  the  clerks  of  the  Senate,  (I  am  sure  he  is  not  disposed  to  do 
it, )  on  account  of  his  opinions,  political  or  religious,  if  no  other  mem 
ber  of  the  Senate  does  it,  I  will  instantly  submit  a  resolution  for  his 
own  dismission.  [Loud  applause  in  the  gallery.] 

The  Secretary  ought  to  have  communicated  all  these  things ;  he 
ought  to  have  stated  that  the  cabinet  was  divided  two  and  two,  and 
one  of  the  members,  equally  divided  with  himself  on  the  question^ 
willing  to  be  put  into  either  scale.  He  ought  to  have  given  a  full 
account  of  this  the  most  importanf  apt  of  Executive  authority  since 
the  origin  of  the  Government ;  he  should  have  stated  with  what  un 
sullied  honor  his  predecessor  retired  from  office,  and  on  what  de 
grading  conditions  he  accepted  his  vacant  place.  When  a  momen 
tous  proceeding  like  this,  varying  the  constitutional  distribution  of 
the  powers  of  the  Legislative  and  Executive  Departments,  was  re 
solved  on,  the  ministers,  against  whose  advice  it  was  determined^ 
should  have  resigned  their  stations.  No  ministers  of  any  monarch 
in  Europe,  under  similar  circumstances,  would  have  retained  the 
seals  of  office.  And  if,  as  nobody  doubts,  there  is  a  cabal  behind  the 
curtain,  without  character  and  without  responsibility,  feeding  the 
passions,  stimulating  the  prejudices,  and  moulding  the  actions  of  the 
incumbent  of  the  Presidential  office,  it  was  an  additional  reason  for 
their  resignations.  There  is  not  a  Maitre  d'Hotel  in  Christendom, 
who,  if  the  scullions  were  put  into  command  in  the  parlor  and  dining 
room,  would  not  scorn  to  hold  his  place,  and  fling  it  up  in  disgust 
with  indignant  pride ! 

I  shall  examine  the  report  before  us,  1st.  As  to  the  power  of  the 
Secretary  over  the  deposites ;  2dly.  His  reasons  for  the  exercise  of 
it;  and,  3dly.  The  manner  of  its  exercise. 

First.  The  Secretary  asserts  that  the  power  of  removal  is  exclusively 
reserved  to  him ;  that  it  is  absolute  and  unconditional,  so  far  as  the 
interests  of  the  Bank  are  concerned ;  that  it  is  not  restricted  to  any 
particular  contingencies;  that  the  reservation  of  the  power  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  exclusively  is  a  part  of  the  compact;  that 
he  may  exercise  it,  if  the  public  convenience  or  interest  would,  in 
any  degree,  be  promoted;  that  this  exclusive  power  thus  reserved 
is  so  absolute,  that  the  Secretary  is  not  restrained  by  the  considera 
tions  that  the  public  deposites  in  the  Bank  are  perfectly  safe ;  that 
the  Bank  promptly  meets  all  demands  upon  it ;  and  that  it  faithfully 
performs  all  its  duties ;  and  that  the  power  of  Congress,  on  the  con 
trary,  is  so  totally  excluded  that  it  could  not,  without  a  breach  of  the 
compact,  order  the  deposites  to  be  changed,  even  if  Congress  were 
satisfied  that  they  were  not  safe,  or  should  be  convinced  that  the  in 
terests  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  imperiously  demanded 
the  removal. 

Such  is  the  statement  which  this  unassuming  Secretary  makes  of 


27 

his  own  authority !  He  expands  his  own  power  to  the  most  extrava 
gant  dimensions;  and  he  undertakes  to  circumscribe  that  of  Con 
gress  in  the  narrowest  and  most  restricted  limits !  Who  would  have 
expected  that,  after  having  so  confidently  maintained  for  himself  such 
absolute,  exclusive,  unqualified,  and  uncontrollable  power,  he  would 
have  let  in  any  body  else  to  share  with  him  its  exercise  ?  Yet  he  says, 
"  As  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  presides  over  one  of  the  Executive 
"  Departments  of  the  Government,  and  his  power  over  this  subject 
"  forms  a  part  of  the  Executive  duties  of  his  office,  the  manner  in 
"  which  it  is  exercised  must  be  subject  to  the  supervision  of  the 
"  officer"  [meaning  the  President,  whose  official  name  his  modesty 
would  not  allow  him  to  pronounce]  "  to  whom  the  constitution  has 
"  confided  the  whole  Executive  power,  and  has  required  to  take 
"  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed."  If  the  clause  in  the 
compact  exclusively  vests  the  power  of  removal  in  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  what  has  the  President  to  do  with  it  ?  What  part  of 
the  charter  conveys  to  him  any  power  ?  If,  as  the  Secretary  con 
tends,  the  clause  of  removal,  being  part  of  the  compact,  restricts 
its  exercise  to  the  Secretary,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  Congress, 
how  does  it  embrace  the  President,  especially  since  both  the  Pre 
sident  and  Secretary  conceive  that  "  the  power  over  the  place  of 
"  deposite  for  the  public  money  would  seem  properly  to  belong  to 
"  the  Legislative  Department  of  the  Government?"  If  the  Secretary 
be  correct  in  asserting  that  the  power  of  removal  is  confined  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  then  Mr.  Duane,  w:hile  in  office,  pos 
sessed  it ;  and  his  dismission,  because  he  would  not  exercise  a  power 
which  belonged  to  him  exclusively,  was  itself  a  violation  of  the 
charter. 

But  by  what  authority  does  the  Secretary  assert  that  the  Treasury 
Department  is  one  of  the  Executive  Departments  of  the  Government? 
He  has  none  in  the  act  which  creates  the  department ;  he  has  none 
in  the  constitution.  The  Treasury  Department  is  placed  by  law  on 
a  different  footing  from  all  the  other  departments,  which  are,  in  the 
acts  creating  them,  denominated  Executive,  and  placed  under  the  di 
rection  of  the  President.  The  Treasury  Department,  on  the  contra 
ry,  is  organized  on  totally  different  principles.  Except  the  appoint 
ment  of  the  officers,  with  the  co-operation  of  the  Senate,  and  the 
powrer  which  is  exercised  of  removing  them,  the  President  has  neither, 
by  the  constitution  nor  the  law  creating  the  department,  any  thing  to 
do  with  it.  The  Secretary's  reports  and  responsibility  are  directly 
to  Congress.  The  whole  scheme  of  the  department  is  one  of  checks, 
each  officer  acting  as  a  control  upon  his  associates.  The  Secretary  is 
required  by  the  law  to  report,  not  to  the  President,  but  directly  to 
Congress.  Either  House  may  require  any  report  from  him,  or  com 
mand  his  personal  attendance  before  it.  It  is  not,  therefore,  true  that 
the  Treasury  is  one  of  the  Executive  Departments,  subject  to  the  su 
pervision  of  the  President.  And  the  inference  drawn  from  that  er 
roneous  assumption  entirely  fails.  The  Secretary  appears  to  have  no 
precise  ideas  either  of  the  constitution  or  duties  of  the  department 


28 

over  which  he  presides.  He  says,  "the  Treasury  Department  being 
"  entrusted  with  the  administration  of  the  finances  of  the  country,  it 
"  was  always  the  duty  of  the  Secretary,  in  the  absence  of  any  legis- 
"  lative  provision  on  the  subject,  to  take  care  that  the  public  money 
"  was  deposited  in  safe  keeping,  in  the  hands  of  faithful  agents,"  &c. 
The  premises  of  the  Secretary  are  only  partially  correct,  and  his  con 
clusion  is  directly  repugnant  to  law.  It  never  was  the  duty  of  the 
Secretary  to  take  care  that  the  public  money  was  deposited  in  safe 
keeping,  in  the  hands  of  faithful  agents,  &c.  That  duty  is  expressly, 
by  the  act  organizing  the  department,  assigned  to  the  Treasurer  of 
the  United  States,  who  is  placed  under  oath,  and  under  bond,  with  a 
large  penalty,  not  to  issue  a  dollar  out  of  the  public  Treasury,  but  in 
virtue  of  warrants  granted  in  pursuan.c.e of  acts  of  appropriation,  "and 
not  otherwise."  When  the  Secretary  treats  of  the  power  of  the  Pre 
sident,  he  puts  on  corsets,  and  contracts  and  prostrates  himself  be 
fore  the  Executive,  in  the  most  graceful,  courteous,  and  lady-like 
form  ;  but,  when  he  treats  of  that  of  Congress,  and  of  the  Treasurer, 
he  swells  and  expands  himself,  and  flirts  about  with  all  the  airs  of 
high  authority. 

But  I  cannot  assent  to  the  Secretary's  interpretation  of  his  power 
of  removal,  contained  in  the  charter.  Congress  has  not  given  up  its 
control  over  the  Treasury,  or  the  public  deposites,  to  either  the  Se 
cretary  or  the  Executive.  Congress  could  not  have  done  so  without 
a  treacherous  renunciation  of  its  constitutional  powers,  and  a  faithless 
abandonment  of  its  duties.  And  now  let  us  see  what  is  the  true  state 
of  the  matter.  Congress  has  reserved  to  itself,  exclusively,  the  right 
to  judge  of  the  reasons  for  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  by  requiring 
the  report  of  them  to  be  made  to  it ;  and,  consequently,  the  power  to 
ratify  or  invalidate  the  act.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is  the 
fiscal  sentinel  of  Congress,  to  whom  the  Bank  makes  weekly  reports, 
and  who  is  presumed  constantly  to  be  well  acquainted  with  its  actual 
condition.  He  may,  consequently,  discover  the  urgent  necessity  of 
prompt  action,  to  save  the  public  treasure,  before  it  is  known  to  Con 
gress,  and  when  it  is  not  in  session.  But  he  is  immediately  to  re 
port — to  whom  ?  To  the  Executive  ?  No,  to  Congress.  For  what 
purpose  ?  That  Congress  may  sanction  or  disapprove  the  act. 

The  powrer  of  removal  is  a  reservation  for  the  benefit  of  the  peo 
ple,  not  of  the  Bank.  It  may  be  waived.  Congress,  being  a  legisla 
tive  party  to  the  compact,  did  not  thereby  deprive  itself  of  ordinary 
powers  of  legislation.  It  cannot,  without  a  breach  of  the  national 
faith,  repeal  privileges  or  stipulations  intended  for  the  benefit  of  the 
Bank.  But  it  may  repeal,  modify,  or  waive  the  exercise  altogether 
of  those  parts  of  the  charter  which  were  intended  exclusively  for  the 
public.  Could  not  Congress  repeal  altogether  the  clause  of  removal  ? 
Such  a  repeal  would  not  injure,  but  add  to  the  security  of  the  Bank. 
Could  not  Congress  modify  the  clause,  by  revoking  the  agency  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  substituting  that  of  the  Treasu 
rer,  or  any  other  officer  of  Government  ?  Could  not  Congress,  at 
any  time  during  the  twenty  years'  duration  of  the  charter,  abolish  the 


29 

office  altogether  of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  assign  all  his  pre 
sent  duties  to  some  newly  constituted  department?  The  right  and 
the  security  of  the  Bank  do  not  consist  in  the  form  of  the  agency,  nor 
in  the  name  of  the  agent,  but  in  this — that,  whatever  may  be  its  form 
or  his  denomination,  the  removal  shall  only  be  made  upon  urgent  and 
satisfactory  reasons.  The  power  of  supplemental  legislation  was  ex 
ercised  by  Congress  both  under  the  old  and  new  Bank.  Three  years 
after  the  establishment  of  the  existing  Bank,  an  act  passed,  better  to 
regulate  the  election  of  directors,  and  to  punish  any  one  who  should 
attempt,  by  bribes  or  presents  in  any  form,  to  influence  the  operations 
of  the  institution. 

The  denial  of  the  Secretary  to  Congress  of  the  power  to  remove 
the  deposites,  under  any  circumstances,  is  most  extraordinary.  Why, 
sir;  suppose  a  corrupt  collusion  between  the  Secretary  and  the  Bank 
to  divide  the  spoils  of  the  Treasury  ?  Suppose  a,  total  non-fulfilment 
of  all  the  stipulations  on  the  part  of  the  Bank  ?  Is  Congress  to  remain 
bound  and  tied,  whilst  »the  Bank  should  be  free  from  all  the  obliga 
tions  of  the  charter  ?  The  obligation  of  one  party  to  observe  faith 
fully  his  stipulations  in  a  contract,  rests  upon  the  corresponding  obli 
gation  of  the  other  party  to  observe  his  stipulations.  If  one  party  is 
released,  both  are  free.  If  one  party  fail  to  comply  with  his  contract, 
that  releases  the  other.  This  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  all 
contracts,  applicable  to  treaties,  charters,  and  private  agreements.  If 
it  were  a  mere  private  agreement,  and  one  party,  wrho  had  bound  him 
self  to  deposite,  from  time  to  time,  his  money  with  the  other,  to  be 
redrawn  at  his  pleasure,  saw  that  it  was  wasting  and  squandered  away, 
he  would  have  a  clear  right  to  discontinue  the  deposites.  It  is  true 
that  a  party  has  no  right  to  excuse  himself  from  the  fulfilment  of  his 
contract,  by  imputing  a  breach  to  the  other  which  has  never  been 
made.  And  it  is  fortunate  for  the  peace  and  justice  of  society,  that 
neither  party  to  any  contract,  whether  public  or  private,  can  decide 
conclusively  the  question  of  fulfilment  by  the  other,  but  must  always 
act  under  subjection  to  the  ultimate  decision,  in  case  of  controversy, 
of  an  impartial  arbiter,  provided  in  the  judicial  tribunals  of  civilized 
communities. 

As  to  the  absolute,  unconditional,  and  exclusive  power  which  the 
Secretary  claims  to  be  vested  in  himself,  it  is  in  direct  hostility  with 
the  principles  of  our  Government,  and  adverse  to  the  genius  of  all 
free  institutions.  The  Secretary  was  made,  by  the  charter,  the  mere 
representative  or  agent  of  Congress ;  its  temporary  substitute,  act 
ing  in  subordination  to  it,  and  bound,  whenever  he  did  act,  to  report 
to  his  principal  his  reasons,  that  they  might  be  judged  of  and  sanc 
tioned,  or  overruled.  Is  it  not  absurd  to  say  that  the  agent  can  pos 
sess  more  power  than  the  principal  ?  The  power  of  revocation  is 
incident  to  all  agency,  unless,  in  express  terms,  by  the  instrument 
creating  it,  a  different  provision  is  made.  The  powers,  whether  of 
the  principal  or  the  agent,  in  relation  to  any  contract,  must  be  ex 
pounded  by  the  principles  which  govern  all  contracts.  It  is  true  that 
the  language  of  the  clause  of  removal,  in  the  charter,  is  general,  but 


30 

it  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  torn  from  the  context.  It  is  a  part  only  (*. 
an  entire  compact,  and  is  to  he  interpreted  in  connexion  with  every 
part  and  with  the  whole.  Upon  surveying  the  entire  compact,  we 
perceive  that  the  Bank  has  come  under  various  duties  to  the  public ; 
has  undertaken  to  perform  important  financial  operations  for  the  Go 
vernment  ;  and  has  paid  a  bonus  into  the  public  Treasury  of  a  million 
and  a  half  of  dollars.  We  perceive  that,  in  consideration  of  the  as 
sumption  of  these  heavy  engagements,  and  the  payment  of  that  large 
sum  of  money,  on  the  part  of  the  Bank,  the  public  has  stipulated  that 
the  public  deposites  shall  remain  with  the  Bank  during  the  continua 
tion  of  the  charter,  and  that  its  notes  shall  be  received  by  the  Govern 
ment  in  payment  of  all  debts,  dues,  and  taxes.  Except  the  corpo 
rate  character  conferred, there  is  none  but  those  two  stipulations  of  any 
great  importance  to  the  Bank.  Each  of  the  two  parties  to  the  com- 
pact  must  stand  bound  to  the  performance  of  his  engagements,  whilsl 
the  other  is  honestly  and  faithfully  fulfilling  his.  It  is  not  to  be  con 
ceived,  in  the  formation  of  the  compact,  that  either  party  could  have 
anticipated  that,  whilst  he  was  fairly  and  honestly  executing  every 
obligation  which  he  had  contracted,  the  other  party  might  arbitrarily 
or  capriciously  exonerate  himself  from  the  discharge  of  his  obligations. 
Suppose,  when  citizens  of  the  United  States  were  invited  by  the  Go 
vernment  to  subscribe  to  the  stock  of  this  Bank,  that  they  had  been 
told  that,  although  the  Bank  performs  all  its  covenants  with  perfect 
fidelity,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  may,  arbitrarily  or  capricious 
ly,  upon  his  speculative  notions  of  any  degree  of  public  interest  or 
convenience  to  be  advanced,  withdraw  the  public  deposites,  would 
they  have  ever  subscribed?  Would  they  have  been  guilty  of  the  fol 
ly  of  binding  themselves  to  the  performance  of  burdensome  duties, 
whilst  the  Government  \vas  left  at  liberty  to  violate  at  pleasure  that 
stipulation  of  the  compact  which  by  far  was  the  most  essential  to 
them  ? 

On  this  part  of  the  subject,  I  conclude  that  Congress  has  not  part 
ed  from,  but  retains,  its  legitimate  power  over  the  deposites  ;  that  it 
might  modify  or  repeal  altogether  the  clause  of  removal  in  the  char 
ter";  that  a  breach  of  material  stipulations  on  the  part  of  the  Bank 
would  authorize  Congress  to  change  the  place  of  the  deposites  ;  that  a 
corrupt  collusion  to  defraud  the  public,  between  the  Bank  and  a  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury,  would  be  a  clear  justification  to  Congress  to 
direct  a  transfer  of  the  public  deposites ;  that  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  is  the  mere  agent  of  Congress,  in  respect  to  the  deposites, 
acting  in  subordination  to  his  principal ;  that  it  results  from  the  nature 
of  all  agency  that  it  may  be  revoked,  unless  otherwise  expressly  pro 
vided  ;  and,  finally,  that  the  principal,  and  much  less  the  agent,  of  one 
party  cannot  justly  or  lawfully  violate  the  compact,  or  any  of  its  essen 
tial  provisions,  w7hilst  the  other  party  is  in  the  progressive  and  faithful 
performance  of  all  his  engagements. 

If  I  am  right  in  this  view7  of  the  subject,  there  is  an  end  of  the  ar 
gument.  There  was  perfect  equality  and  reciprocity  between  the 
two  parties  to  the  compact.  Neither  could  exonerate  himself  from 


31 

he  performance  of  his  obligations,  whilst  the  other  was  honestly 
proceeding  fairly  to  fulfil  all  his  engagements.  But  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  concedes  that  the  public  deposites  were  perfectly  safe 
in  the  hands  of  the  Bank  ;  that  the  Bank  promptly  met  every  demand 
upon  it ;  and  that  it  faithfully  performed  all  its  duties.  By  these  con 
cessions,  he  surrenders  the  whole  argument,  admits  the  complete 
obligation  of  the  public  to  perform  its  part  of  the  compact,  and  demon- 
strafes  that  no  reasons,  however  plausible  or  strong,  can  justify  an 
open  breach  of  a  solemn  national  compact. 

Second.  But  he  has  brought  forward  various  reasons  to  palliate  or  jus 
tify  his  violation'of  the  national  faith  ;  and  it  is  now  my  purpose  to 
proceed,  in  the  second  place,  to  examine  and  consider  them.  Before  I 
proceed  to  do  this,  I  hope  to  be  allowed  again  to  call  the  attention 
uf  the  Senate  to  the  nature  of  the  office  of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
It  is  altogether  financial  and  administrative.  His  duties  relate  to  the 
finances,  their  condition  and  improvement,  and  to  them  exclusively. 
The  act  creating  the  Treasury  Department,  and  defining  the  duties 
of  the  Secretary,  demonstrates  this.  He  lias  no  legislative  powers; 
and  Congress  neither  has  nor  could  delegate  any  to  him.  His  pow 
ers,  wherever  given,  and  in  whatever  language  expressed,  must  be 
interpreted  by  his  defined  duties.  Neither  is  the  Treasury  Depart 
ment  an  Executive  department.  It  was  expressly  created  not  to  be 
an  Executive  department.  It  is  administrative,  but  not  Executive. 
His  relations  are  positive  and  direct  to  Congress,  by  the  act  of  his 
creation,  and  not  to  the  President.  Whenever  he  is  put  under  the 
direction  of  the  President,  (as  he  is  by  various  subsequent  acts,  espe 
cially  those  relating  to  public  loans,)  it  is  done  by  express  provision 
of  law,  and  for  specified  purposes. 

With  this  key  to  the  nature  of  the  office  and  the  duties  of  the  offi 
cer,  I  will  now  briefly  examine  the  various  reasons  which  he  assigns 
for  the  removal  of  the  public  deposites.  The  first  is  the  near  approach 
of  the  expiration  of  the  charter.  But  the  charter  had  yet  to  run 
about  two  and  a  half  of  the  twenty  years  to  which  it  was  limited. 
During  the  whole  term,  the  public  deposites  were  to  continue  to  be 
made  with  the  Bank.  It  was  clearly  foreseen,  at  the  commencement 
of  the  term,  as  now,  that  it  would  expire,  and  yet  Congress  did  not 
then,  and  has  never  since  r  thought  proper  to  provide  for  the  with 
drawal  of  the  deposites  prior  to  the  expiration  of  the  charter.  Whence 
does  the  Secretary  derive  an  authority  to  do  what  Congress  had  ne 
ver  done  ?  Whence  his  power  to  abridge  in  effect  the  period  of  the 
charter,  and  to  limit  it  to  seventeen  and  a  half  years,  instead  of  twenty  ? 
Was  the  urgency  for  the  removal  of  the  deposites  so  great  that  he 
could  not  wait  sixty  days,  until  the  assembling  of  Congress  ?  He 
admits  that  they  were  perfectly  safe  in  the  Bank  ;  that  it  promptly  met 
every  demand  upon  it ;  and  that  it  faithfully  performed  all  its  duties. 
Why  not,  then,  await  the  arrival  of  Congress  ?  The  last  time  the 
House  of  Representatives  had  spoken,  among  the  very  last  acts  of  the 
last  session,  that  House  had  declared  its  full  confidence  in  the  safetv 
of  the  deposites.  Why  not  wait  until  it  could  review  the  subject, 


32 

with  all  the  new  light  which  the  Secretary  could  throw  upon  it,  and 
again  proclaim  its  opinion  ?  He  comes  into  office  on  the  23d  Sep 
tember,  1833,  and,  in  three  days,  with  intuitive  celerity,  he  compre 
hends  the  whole  of  the  operations  of  the  complex  department  of  the 
Treasury,  perceives  that  the  Government,  from  its  origin,  had  been 
in  uniform  error,  and  denounces  the  opinions  of  all  his  predecessors  ! 
And,  hastening  to  rectify  universal  wrong,  in  defiance  and  in  con 
tempt  of  the  resolution  of  the  House,  he  signs  an  order  for  the  removal 
of  the  deposites  !  It  was  of  no  consequence  to  him  whether  places  of 
safety,  in  substitution  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  could  be  ob 
tained  or  not;  without  making  essential  precautionary  arrangements, 
he  commands  the  removal  almost  instantly  to  be  made. 

Why,  sir,  if  the  Secretary  were,  right  in  contending  that  he  alrm** 
could  order  the  removal,  even  he  admits  that  Congress  has  power 
to  provide  for  the  security  of  the  public  money  in  the  new  places  to 
which  it  might  be  transferred.  If  he  did  not  deign  to  consult  the 
representatives  of  the  people  as  to  the  propriety  of  the  first  step,  did 
not  a  decent  respect  to  their  authority  and  judgment  exact  from  him 
a  delay,  for  the  brief  term  of  sixty  days,  that  they  might  consider 
what  was  fitting,  to  be  done  ?  The  truth  is,  that  the  Secretary,  by 
law,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  care  and  safe  keeping  of  the  public 
money.  As  has  been  already  shown,  that  duty  is  specifically  assign 
ee!  by  law  to  the  Treasurer  of  the  United  States.  And,  in  assuming 
upon  himself  the  authority  to  provide  other  depositories  thau  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  he  alike  trampled  upon  the  duties  of  the 
Treasurer,  and  what  was  due  to  Congress.  Can  any  one  doubt  the 
motive  of  this  precipitancy  ?  Does  any  body  doubt  that  it  was  to 
preclude  the  action  of  Congress,  or  to  bring  it  under  the  influence  of 
the  Executive  veto  ?  Let  the  two  Houses,  or  either  of  them,  per 
form  their  duty  to  the  country,  and  we  shall  hereafter  see  whether, 
in  that  respect,  at  least,  Mr.  Secretary  will  not  fail  to  consummate 
his  purpose. 

3.  The  next  reason  assigned  for  this  offensive  proceeding,  is  the 
re-election  of  the  present  Chief  Magistrate.  "  I  have  always  (says 
"  the  Secretary )  regarded  the  result  of  the  last  election  of  President 
"  of  the  United  States  as  the  declaration  of  a  majority  of  the  people 
"  that  the  charter  ought  not  to  be  renewed."  "  Its  voluntary  appli- 
"  cation  to  Congress  for  the  renewal  of  its  charter  four  years  before 
"  it  expired,  and  upon  the  eve  of  the  election  of  President,  was 
"  understood  on  all  sides  as  bringing  forward  that  question  for  inci 
dental  decision  at  the  then  approaching  election.  It  was  accord- 
"  ingly  argued  ou  both  sides  before  the  tribunal  of  the  people,  and 
"  their  verdict  pronounced  against  the  Bank,"  &c.  What  has  the 
Secretary  to  do  with  elections  ?  Do  they  belong  to  the  financial  con 
cerns  of  his  department  ?  Why  this  constant  reference  to  the  result 
of  the  last  Presidential  election  ?  Ought  not  the  President  to  be  con 
tent  with  the  triumphant  issue  of  it  ?  Did  he  want  still  more  votes  ? 
The  winners  ought  to  forbear  making  any  complaints,  and  be  satisfied, 
whatever  the  losers  may  be.  After  an  election  is  fairly  terminated,, 


33 

I  have  always  thought  that  the  best  way  was  to  forget  all  the  incidents 
of  the  preceding  canvass,  and  especially  the  manner  in  which  votes 
had  been  cast.  If  one  has  been  successful,  that  ought  to  be  sufficient 
for  him ;  if  defeated,  regrets  are  unavailing.  Our  fellow-citizens 
have  a  right  freely  to  exercise  their  elective  franchise  as  they  please, 
a/id  no  one,  certainly  no  candidate,  has  any  right  to  complain  about  it. 

But  the  argument  of  the  Secretary  is,  that  the  question  of  the  Bank 
was  fairly  submitted  to  the  people,  by  the  consent  of  all  parties,  fully 
discussed  before  them,  and  their  verdict  pronounced  against  the  in 
stitution,  in  the  re-election  of  the  President.  His  statement  of  the 
case  requires  that  wre  should  examine  carefully  the  various  messa 
ges  of  the  President  to  ascertain  whether  the  Bank  question  was 
fairly  and  frankly  (to  use  a  favWite  expression  of  the  President) 
submitted  by  him  to  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

In  his  message  of  1829,  the  President  says :  "  The  charter  of  the 
"  Bank  of  the  United  States  expires  in  1836,  and  its  stockholders 
"  will  most  probably  apply  for  a  renewal  of  their  privileges.  In  or- 
''"  der  to  avoid  the  evils  resulting  from  precipitancy  in  a  measure 
. "  involving  such  important  principles,  and  such  deep  pecuniary  in- 
"  terests,  I  feel  that  I  cannot,  in  justice  to  the  parties  interested,  too 
"  soon  present  it  to  the  deliberate  consideration  of  the  Legislature  and 
•"  the  people."  The  charter  had  then  upwards  of  six  years  to  run. 
Upon  this  solemn  invitation  of  the  Chief  Magistrate,  two  years  after 
wards,  the  Bank  came  forward  with  an  application  for  renewal. 
Then  it  was  discovered  that  the  application  was  premature.  And 
the  Bank  was  denounced  for  accepting  the  very  invitation  which  had 
been  formally  given.  The  President  proceeds:  "Both  the  consti- 
"  tutionality  and  the  expediency  of  the  Bank  are  well  questioned 
"  by  a  large  portion  of  our  fellow -citizens"  This  message  was  a 
non-committal.  The  President  does  not  announce  clearly  his  own 
opinion,  but  states  that  of  a  large  portion  of  our  fellow-citizens. 
Now  we  all  know  that  a  large  and  highly  respectable  number  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  have  always  entertained  an  opinion  ad 
verse  to  the  Bank  on  both  grounds.  The  President  continues  :  "  If 
"  such  an  institution  is  deemed  essential  to  the  fiscal  operations  of 
"the  Government,  I  submit  to  the  wisdom  of  the  Legislature  whether 
<c  a  national  one,  founded  upon  the  credit  of  the  Government  and 
"  its  resources,  might  not  be  devised."  Here  again  the  President, 
so  far  from  expressing  an  explicit  opinion  against  all  national  banks, 
makes  a  hypothetical  admission  of  the  utility  of  a  bank,  and  distinctly 
intimates  the  practicability  of  devising  one  on  the  basis  of  the  credit 
and  resources  of  the  Government. 

In  his  message  of  1830,  speaking  of  the  Bank,  the  President 
says  :  "  Nothing  has  occurred  to  lessen,  in  any  degree,  the  dangers 
"  which  many  of  our  citizens  apprehend  from  that  institution,  as  at 
"present  organized.  In  the  spirit  of  improvement  and  compromise 
"  which  distinguishes  our  country  and  its  institutions,  it  becomes  us 
"to  inquire  whether  it  be  not  possible  to  secure  the  advantages 
u  afforded  by  the  present  Bank  through  the  agency  of  a  Bank  of  the 
5 


"  United  States,  so  modified  in  its  principles  and  structure  as  to  ob~ 
"viate  constitutional  and  other  objections."  Here,  again,  the  Presi 
dent  recites  the  apprehensions  of  "  many  of  our  citizens,"  rather  than 
avows  his  own  opinion.  Again  his  message  is  a  non-committal.  He 
admits  indeed  "  the  advantages  afforded  by  the  present  Bank,"  but 
suggests  an  inquiry  whether  it  be  possible  (of  course  doubting)  to. 
secure  them  by  a  bank  differently  constructed.  And  towards  the 
conclusion  of  that  part  of  the  message,  his  language  fully  justifies 
the  implication  that  it  was  not  to  the  Bank  itself, but  to  "  its  present 
form,"  that  he  objected. 

The  message  of  1831,  when  treating  of  the  Bank,  was  very  brief. 
"Entertaining  the  opinions  (says  the  President)  heretofore  ex- 
"  pressed  in  relation  to  the  Bank  of  ,#ui  United  States,  <ta  at  present 
"  organized,"  [non-committal  once  more  ;  and  whaU7ia£  means,  Mr. 
President,  nobody  better  knows  than  you  and  I — cheering  in  the 
galleries] — "  I  felt  it  my  duty,  in  my  former  messages,  '-frankly  to 
"  disclose  them.'  "  [Frank  disclosures!]  Now,  sir,  I  recollect  per 
fectly  well  the  impressions  made  on  my  mind,  and  on  those  of  other 
Senators  with  whom  I  conversed,  immediately  after  that  message  was 
read.  We  thought,  and  said  to  each  other,  the  President  has  left  a 
door  open  to  pass  out.  It  is  not  the  Bank ;  it  is  not  any  Bank  of  the 
United  States  to  which  he  is  opposed,  but  it  is  to  the  particular  or 
ganization  of  the  existing  Bank.  And  we  all  concluded  that,  if 
amendments  could  be  made  to  the  charter  satisfactory  to  the  Presi 
dent,  he  would  approve  a  bill  for  its  renewal. 

We  come  now  to  the  famous  message  of  July,  1832,  negativing 
the  bill  to  recharter  the  Bank.  Here,  it  might  be  expected,  we  should 
certainly  find  clear  opinions,  unequivocally  expressed.  The  Presi 
dent  cannot  elude  the  question.  He  must  now  be  perfectly  frank. 
We  shall  presently  see.  He  says:  "  A  Bank  of  the  United  States  is, 
"  in  many  respects,  convenient  to  the  Government,  and  useful  to  the 
"  people.  Entertaining  this  opinion,  and  deeply  impressed  with  the 
"  belief  that  some  of  the  powers  and  privileges  possessed  by  the  ex- 
"isting  Bank  are  unauthorized  by  the  constitution,"  &c.,  "  I  felt  it 
"  my  duty,  at  an  early  period  of  my  administration,  to  call  the  at- 
"  tendon  of  Congress  to  the  practicability  of  organizing  an  institu- 
"  tion  combining  all  its  advantages,  and  obviating  these  objections. 
"  I  sincerely  regret  that  in  the  act  before  me  I  can  perceive  none  of 
«  those  modifications,"  &c.  "  That  a  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
"  competent  to  all  the  duties  which  may  be  required  by  the  Govern- 
"  ment,  might  be  so  organized  as  not  to  infringe  on  our  owndeJegat- 
"  ed  powers,  or  the  reserved  rights  of  the  States,  I  do  not  enter 
tain  a  dow&£.  Had  the  Executive  been  called  on  to  furnish  the 
"  project  of  such  an  institution,  the  duty  would  have  been  cheer- 
tc  fully  performed."  The  message  is  principally  employed  in  dis 
cussing  the  objections  which  the  President  entertained  to  the  parti 
cular  provisions  of  the  charter,  and  not  to  the  Bank  itself;  such  as  the 
right  of  foreigners  to  hold  stock  in  it ;  its  exemption  from  State 
taxation  ;  its  capacity  to  hold  real  estate,  &c.  £c.  Does  the  Presi- 


35 

dent,  even  in  this  message,  array  himself  in  opposition  to  any  Bank  of 
the  United  States  ?     Does  he  even  oppose  himself  to  the  existing 
Bank,  under  every  organization  of  which  it  is  susceptible  ?     On  the 
contrary,  does  he  not  declare  that  he  does  not  entertain  a  doubt  that 
a  bank  may  be  constitutionally  organized  ?     Does  he  not  even  re 
buke  Congress  for  not  calling  on  him  to  furnish  a  project  of  a  bank, 
which  he  would  have  cheerfully  supplied  ?     Is  it  not  fairly  deduei- 
ble,  from  the  message,  that  the  charter  of  the  present  Bank  might  have- 
been  so  amended  as  to  have  secured  the  President's  approbation  to 
the  institution  ?     So  far  was  the  message  from  being  decisive  against 
all  Banks  of    the   United    States,   or  against  the    existing    Bank, 
under  any  modification,  the   President  expressly  declares  that  the 
question  was  adjourned.  He  «*ys  :'  "  A  general  discussion  will  now 
"  take  place,  eliciting  new  light,  and  settling  important  principles ; 
"jand  a  new  Congress,  elected  in  the  midst  of  such  discussion,  and 
"  furnishing  an  equal  representation  of  the  people,  according  to  the 
u  last  census,  will  bear  to  the  Capitol  the  verdict  of  public  opinion, 
u  and    I  doubt  not  bring  this    important  question  to  a  satisfactory 
"  result." 

This  review  of  the  various  messages  of  the  President  conclu 
sively  evinces  that  they  were  far  from  expressing,  frankly  and  de 
cisively,  any  opinions  of  the  Chief  Magistrate,  except  that  he  was 
opposed  to  the  amendments  of  the  charter  contained  in  the  bill  sub 
mitted  to  him  for  its  renewal,  and  that  he  required  further  amend 
ments.  It  demonstrates  that  he  entertained  no  doubt  that  it  was 
practicable  and  desirable  to  establish  a  Bank  of  the  United  States; 
it  justified  the  hope  that  he  might  be  ultimately  reconciled  to  the 
continuation  of  the  present  Bank,  with  suitable  modifications  ;  and  it. 
expressly  proclaimed  that  the  whole  subject  was  adjourned  to  the 
new  Congress,  to  be  assembled  under  the  last  census.  If  the  parts 
of  the  messages  which  I  have  cited,  or  other  expressions  in  the 
same  document,  be  doubtful,  or  susceptible  of  a  different  interpreta 
tion,  the  review  is  sufficient  for  my  purpose  ;  which  is,  to  refute  the 
argument  so  confidently  advanced,  that  the  President's  opinion,  in 
opposition  to  the  present  or  any  other  Bank  of  the  United  States,  was 
frankly  and  fairly  stated  to  the  people  prior  to  the  late  election,  wa& 
fully  understood,  and  finally  decided  by  them. 

Accordingly,  in  the  canvass  which  ensued,  it  was  boldly  asserted 
by  the  partisans  of  the  President  that  he  was  not  opposed  to  a  Bank 
of  the  United  States,  nor  to  the  existing  Bank,  with  proper  amend 
ments.  They  maintained,  at  least,  wherever  those  friendly  to  a  na 
tional  bank  were  in  the  majority,  that  his  re-election  would  be  fol 
lowed  by  a  recharter  of  the  Bank,  with  proper  amendments.  They 
dwelt,  it  is  true,  with  great  earnestness,  upon  his  objections  to  the 
Bank,  as  at  present  modified,  and  especially  to  the  pernicious  in 
fluence  of  foreigners  in  holding  stock  in  it ;  but  they  nevertheless 
contended  that  these  objections  wrould  be  cured  if  he  was  re-elected,, 
and  the  Bank  sustained.  I  appeal  to  the  whole  Senate,  to  my  col 
league,  to  the  people  of  Kentucky,  and  especially  to  the  citizens  of 
the  city  of  Louisville,  for  the  correctness  of  this  statement. 


36 

After  all  this,  was  it  anticipated  by  the  people  of  the  United 
States  that,  in  the  re-election  of  the  President,  they  were  deciding 
against  an  institution  of  such  vital  importance  ?  Could  they  have 
imagined  that,  after  an  express  adjournment  of  the  whole  matter  to 
a  new  Congress  by  the  President  himself,  he  would  have  pre 
judged  the  action  of  this  new  Congress,  and  pronounced  that  a  ques 
tion  expressly  by  himself  referred  to  its  authority  was  previously 
settled  by  the  people  ?  He  claimed  no  such  result  in  his  message, 
immediately  after  the  re-election ;  although  in  it  he  denounced  the 
Bank  as  an  unsafe  depository  of  the  public  money,  and  invited  Con 
gress  to  investigate  its  condition.  The  President,  then,  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  are  without  all  color  of  justification  for 
their  assertions  that  the  question  of  bank  or  no  bank  was  fully  and 
fairly  submitted  to  the  people,  and  a  decision  pronounced  against  it 
by  them. 

Sir,  I  am  surprised  and  alarmed  at  the  new  source  of  Executive 
power  which  is  found  in  the  result  of  a  Presidential  election.  I  had 
supposed  that  the  constitution  and  the  lawrs  were  the  sole  source  of 
Executive  authority  ;  that  the  constitution  could  only  be  amended 
in  the  mode  which  it  has  itself  prescribed  ;  that  the  issue  of  a  Presi 
dential  election  was  merely  to  place  the  Chief  Magistrate  in  the 
post  assigned  to  him  ;  and  that  he  had  neither  more  nor  less  power, 
in  consequence  of  the  election,  than  the  constitution  defines  and 
delegates.  But  it  seems  that  if,  prior  to  an  election,  certain  opinions, 
no  matter  howr  ambiguously  put  forth  by  a  candidate,  are  knowrn  to 
the  people,  these  loose  opinions,  in  virtue  of  the  election,  incor-. 
porate  themselves  with  the  constitution,  and  afterwards  are  to  be  re 
garded  and  expounded  as  parts  of  the  instrument ! 

4  The  public  money  ought  not,  the  Secretary  thinks,  to  remain 
in  the  Bank  until  the  last  moment  of  the  existence  of  the  charter. 
But  that  was  not  the  question  which  he  had  to  decide  on  the  26th 
September  last.  The  real  question  then  was,  could  he  not  wait 
sixty  days  for  the  meeting  of  Congress?  There  were  many  last 
moments,  near  two  years  and  a  half,  between  the  26th  of  September 
and  the  day  of  the  expiration  of  the  charter.  But  why  not  let  the 
public  money  remain  in  the  Bank  until  the  last  day  of  the  charter  ?  It 
is  a  part  of  the  charter  that  it  shall  so  remain  ;  and  Congress  having  so 
ordered  it,  the  Secretary  ought  to  have  acquiesced  in  the  will  of 
Congress,  unless  the  exigency  had  arisen  on  which  alone  it  was  sup 
posed  his  power  over  the  deposites  would  be  exercised.  The  Secre 
tary  is  greatly  mistaken  in  believing  that  the  Bank  will  be  less 
secure  in  the  last  hours  of  its  existence  than  previously.  It  will 
then  be  collecting  its  resources,  with  a  view  to  the  immediate  pay 
ment  of  its  notes,  and  the  ultimate  division  among  the  stockholders 
of  their  capital  ;  and  at  no  period  of  its  existence  will  it  be  so  strong 
and  able  to  pay  all  demands  upon  it.  As  to  the  depreciation  in  the 
value  of  its  notes  in  the  interior  at  that  time,  why,  sir,  is  the  Secre 
tary  possessed  of  the  least  knowledge  of  the  course  of  the  trade  of 
the  interior,  and  especially  of  the  Western  States  ?  If  he  had  any, 


37 

he  could  not  have  made  such  a  suggestion.  When  the  Bank  itself  is 
not  drawing,  its  notes  form  the  best  medium  of  remittance  from  the 
interior  to  the  Atlantic  capitals.  They  are  sought  after  hy  merchants 
and  traders  with  avidity,  are  never  below  par,  and,  in  the  absence  of 
bank  drafts,  may  command  a  premium.  This  will  continue  to  be  the 
case  as  long  as  the  charter  endures,  and  especially  during  the  last 
moments  of  its  existence,  when  its  ability  will  be  unquestionable, 
Philadelphia  being  the  place  of  the  redemption ;  whilst  the  notes 
themselves  will  be  receivable  in  all  the  large  cities  in  payment  of 
duties. 

5.  The  Secretary  asserts  that  "  it  is  well  understood  that  the  su- 
"  perior  credit  heretofore  enjoyed  by  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the 
"  United  States  was  not  founded  on  any  particular  confidence  in  its 
"  management  or  solidity.  It  was  occasioned  altogether  by  the 
"  agreement,  on  behalf  of  the  public,  in  the  act  of  incorporation,  to 
"  receive  them  in  all  payments  to  the  United  States."  I  have  rarely 
seen  any  State  paper  characterized  by  so  little'  gravity,  dignity,  and 
circumspection  as  the  report  displays.  The  Secretary  is  perfectly 
reckless  in  his  assertions  of  matters  of  fact,  and  culpably  loose  in  his 
reasoning.  Can  he  believe  the  assertion  which  he  has  made  ?  Can 
he  believe,  for  example,  that,  if  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  Me 
tropolis  were  made  receivable  in  all  payments  to  the  Government, 
they  wrould  ever  acquire,  at  home  and  abroad,  the  credit  and  confidence 
which  are  attached  to  those  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  ?  If  he 
had  stated  that  the  faculty  mentioned  was  one  of  the  elements  of  the 
great  credit  of  those  notes,  the  statement  would  have  been  true  ;  but 
who  can  agree  with  him  that  it  is  the  sole  cause  ?  The  credit  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States  results  from  the  large  amount  of  its  capi 
tal  ;  from  the  great  "ability  and  integrity  with  which  it  has  been  ad 
ministered  ;  from  the  participation  of  the  Government  in  its  affairs ; 
from  its  advantageous  location ;  from  its  being  the  place  of  deposite 
of  the  public  moneys,  and  its  notes  being  receivable  in  all  payments 
to  the  Government ;  and  from  its  being  emphatically  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States.  This  latter  circumstance  arranges  it  with  the  Banks 
of  England,  France,  Amsterdam,  Genoa,  &c. 

6.  The  expansion  and  contraction  of  the  accommodations  of  the 
Bank  to  its  individual  customers,  are  held  up  by  the  Secretary,  in 
bold  relief,  as  evidences  of  misconduct,  \vhich  justified  his  with 
drawal  of  the  deposites.  He  represents  the  Bank  as  endeavoring  to 
operate  on  the  public,  by  alternate  bribery  and  oppression,  with  the 
same  object,  in  both  cases,  of  influencing  the  election  or  the  adminis 
tration  of  the  President.  Why  this  perpetual  reference  of  all  the 
operations  of  the  institution  to  the  Executive  ?  Why  does  the 
Executive  think  of  nothing  but  itself?  It  is  I !  It  is  I !  It  is  I,  that 
is  meant,  appears  to  be  the  constant  exclamation.  Christianity  and 
charity  enjoin  us  never  to  ascribe  a  bad  motive,  if  we  can  suppose  a 
good  one.  The  Bank  is  a  moneyed  corporation,  whose  profits  result 
from  its  business.  If  that  be  extensive,  it  makes  better ;  if  limited, 
less  profit.  Its  interest  is  to  make  the  greatest  amount  of  dividends 


38 

which  it  can  safely ;  and  all  its  actions  may  be  more  certainly  as 
cribed  to  that  than  any  other  principle.  The  administration  must 
have  a  poor  opinion  of  the  virtue  and  intelligence  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  if  it  supposes  that  their  judgments  are  to  be 
warped,  and  their  opinions  controlled,  by  any  scale  of  graduated 
bank  accommodations.  The  Bank  must  have  a  still  poorer  concep 
tion  of  its  duty  to  the  stockholder,  if  it  were  to  regulate  its  issues  by 
the  uncertain  and  speculative  standard  of  political  effect,  rather  than 
a  positive  arithmetical  rule  for  the  computation  of  interest. 

As  to  the  alleged  extension  of  the  business  of  the  Bank,  it  has 
$>een  again  and  again  satisfactorily  accounted  for  by  the  payment  of 
4he  public  debt,  and  the  withdrawal  from  Europe  of  considerable 
sums,  which  threw  into  its  vaults '  a  large  amount  of  funds,  which,  to 
be  productive,  must  be  employed;  and  as  the  commercial  wants, 
proceeding  from  extraordinary  activity  of  business,  created  great 
demands,  about  the  same  period,  for  bank  accommodations,  the  in 
stitution  naturally  enlarged  its  transactions.  It  would  have  been 
treacherous  to  the  best  interests  of  its  constituents  if  it  had  not 
done  so.  The  recent  contraction  of  its  business  is  the  result  of  an 
obvious  cause.  Notwithstanding  the  confidence  in  it,  manifested  by 
one  of  the  last  acts  of  the  last  House  of  Representatives,  Congress 
had  scarcely  left  the  District  before  measures  were  put  in  operation 
to  circumvent  its  authority.  Denunciations  and  threats  were  put 
forth  against  it.  Rumors,  stamped  with  but  too  much  authority, 
were  circulated,  of  the  intention  of  the  Executive  to  disregard  the 
admonition  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  An  agent  was  sent 
out — and  then  such  an  agent — [Here  Mr.  ("LAY  was  interrupted 
with  bursts  of  applause  from  the  galleries,  which  occasioned  the 
interference  of  the  Vice  President] — to  sound  the  local  institutions 
as  to  the  terms  on  which  they  would  receive  the  deposites.  Was 
the  Bank,  who  could  not  be  ignorant  of  all  this,  to  sit  carelessly  by, 
without  taking  any  precautionary  measures  ?  The  prudent  mariner, 
when  he  sees  the  coming  storm,  furls  his  sails,  and  prepares  for  all 
its  rage.  The  Bank  knew  that  the  Executive  was  in  open  hostility 
to  it,  and  that  it  had  nothing  to  expect  from  its  forbearance.  It  had 
numerous  points  to  defend,  the  strength  or  weakness  of  all  of  which 
was  well  known  from  its  weekly  returns  to  the  Secretary,  and  it  could 
mot  possibly  know  at  which  the  first  mortal  stroke  would  be  aimed. 
If,  on  (lie  20th  of  September  last,  instead  of  the  manifesto  of  the 
President  against  the  Bank,  he  had  officially  announced  that  he  did 
not  mean  to  make  war  upon  the  Bank,  and  intended  to  allow  the 
public  deposites  -to  remain  until  the  pleasure  of  Congress  was  ex 
pressed,  public  confidence  would  have  been  assured  and  unshaken, 
die  business  of  the  country  continued  in  quiet  and  prosperity,  and 
the  numerous  bankruptcies  in  our  commerical  cities  averted.  The 
wisdom  of  human  actions  is  better  known  in  their  results  than  at 
their  inception.  That  of  the  Bank  is  manifest  from  all  that  has  hap 
pened,  and  especially  from  its  actual  condition  of  perfect  security. 

7.  The   Secretary  complains  of  misconduct  of  the  Bank  in  dele- 


39 

gating  to  the  Committee  of  Exchange  the  transaction  of  important 
business,  and  in  that  committee  being  appointed  by  the  President, 
and  not  the  Board,  by  which  the  Government  directors  have  been 
excluded.  The  directors  who  compose  the  Board,  meet  only  periodi 
cally.  Deriving  no  compensation  from  their  places,  which  the 
charter  indeed  prohibits  them  from  receiving,  it  cannot  be  expected 
that  they  should  be  constantly  in  session.  They  must  necessarily, 
therefore,  devolve  a  great  part  of  the  business  of  the  Bank,  in  its 
details,  upon  the  officers  and  servants  of  the  corporation.  It  is  suf 
ficient  if  the  Board  controls,  governs,  and  directs  the  whole  ma 
chine.  The  most  important  operation  of  a  bank  is  that  of  paying 
out  its  cash,  and  that  the  cashier  or  teller,  and  not  the  Board,  per- 
. forme.  As  to  Committees  cjf  Exchange,  the  Board  not  being  always 
in  session,  it  is  evident  that  the  convenience  of  the  public  requires 
that  there  should  be  some  authority  at  the  Bank  daily,  to  pass 
daily  upon  bills,  either  in  the  sale  or  purchase,  as  the  wants  of 
the  community  require.  Every  bank,  I  believe,  that  does  business 
to  any  extent,  has  a  Committee  of  Exchange  similar  to  that  of 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  In  regard  to  the  mode  of  appoint 
ment  by  the  president  of  the  Board,  it  is  in  conformity  with  the 
invariable  usage  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  with  the  practice 
of  the  Senate  for  several  years,  and,  until  altered  at  the  commence 
ment  of  this  session,  with  the  usage  in  a  great  variety,  if  not  all,  of 
the  State  Legislatures,  and  with  that  which  prevails  in  our  popular 
assemblies.  The  president,  speaker,  chairman,  moderator,  almost 
uniformly  appoints  committees.  That  none  of  the  Government  di 
rectors  have  been  on  the  Committee  of  Exchange,  has  proceeded,  it 
is  to  be  presumed,  from  their  not  being  entitled,  from  their  skill  and 
experience,  and  standing  in  society,  to  be  put  there.  The  Govern 
ment  directors  stand  upon  the  same  equal  footing  with  those  ap 
pointed  by  the  stockholders.  When  appointed,  they  are  thrown 
into  the  mass,  and  must  take  their  fair  chances  writh  their  colleagues. 
If  the  President  of  the  United  States  will  nominate  men  of  high 
character  and  credit,  of  known  experience  and  knowledge  in  busi 
ness,  they  will  no  doubt  be  placed  in  corresponding  stations.  If  he 
appoints  different  men,  he  cannot  expect  it.  Banks  are  exactly  the 
places  where  currency  and  value  are  well  understood  and  duly  esti 
mated.  A  piece  of  coin,  having  even  the  stamp  of  the  Government, 
will  not  pass  unless  the  metal  is  pure. 

8.  The  French  bill  forms  another  topic  of  great  complaint  with 
the  Secretary.  The  state  of  the  case  is,  that  the  Government  sold 
to  the  Bank  a  bill  on  that  of  France  for  $900,000,  which  the  Bank 
sold  in  London,  whence  it  was  sent  by  the  purchaser  to  Paris  to  re 
ceive  the  amount.  When  the  Bank  purchased  the  bill,  it  paid  the 
amount  to  the  Government,  or,  w^hich  is  the  same  thing,  passed  it  to 
the  credit  of  the  Treasury,  to  be  used  on  demand.  The  bill  was 
protested  in  Paris,  and  the  agents  of  the  Bank,  to  avoid  its  being 
liable  to  damages,  took  up  the  bill  on  account  of  the  Bank.  The  bill 
being  thus  dishonored,  the  Bank  comes  back  on  the  drawer,  and  de- 


40 

mands  the  customary  damages  due,  according  to  the  course  of  all 
such  transactions.  The  complaint  of  the  Secretary  is,  that  the  Bank 
took  up  the  bill  to  save  its  own  credit,  and  that  it  did  not  do  it  on 
account  of  the  Government ;  in  other  words,  that  the  Bank  did  not  ad 
vance  at  Paris  $900,000  to  the  Government,  on  account  of  a  bill  for 
which  it  had  already  paid  every  dollar  at  Philadelphia.  Why,  sir> 
has  the  Secretary  read  the  charter  ?  If  he  has,  he  must  have  known 
that  the  Bank  could  not  have  advanced  the  $900,000  for  the  Govern 
ment,  at  Paris,  without  subjecting  itself  to  a  penalty  of  three  times- 
the  amount,  ($2,700,000.)  The  13th  section  of  the  charter  is  ex 
press  and  positive  :  "  That  if  the  said  corporation  shall  advance  or 
lend  any  sum  of  money  for  the  use  or  on  account  of  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States,  to  an  amount  exceeding  $.500,000,  all 
persons  concerned  in  making  such  unlawful  advance  or  loan,  shall 
forfeit  treble  the  amount,  one-fifth  to  the  informer,"  &c. 

9.  The  last  reason  which  I  shall  notice  of  the  Secretary  is,  that 
this  ambitious  corporation  aspires  to  possess  political  power.  Those 
in  the  actual  possession  of  power,  especially  when  they  have  grossly 
abused  it,  are  perpetually  dreading  its  loss.  The  miser  does  not 
cling  to  his  treasure  with  a  more  death-like  grasp.  Their  suspicions 
are  always  active  and  on  the  alert.  In  every  form  they  behold  a 
rival,  and  every  breeze  comes  charged  with  alarm  and  dread.  A 
thousand  spectres  glide  before  their  affrighted  imaginations,  and 
they  see,  in  every  attempt  to  enlighten  those  who  have  placed  them 
in  office,  a  sinister  design  to  snatch  from  them  their  authority.  On 
what  other  principles  can  we  account  for  the  extravagant  charges 
brought  foward  by  the  Secretary  against  the  Bank  ?  More  ground 
less  and  reckless  assertions  than  those  which  he  has  allowed  himself 
to  embody  in  his  report,  never  were  presented  to  a  deceived, 
insulted,  and  outraged  people.  Suffer  me,  sir,  to  groupe  some  of 
them.  He  asserts  "  that  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  prove  that  the 
"  Bank  has  used  its  means  to  obtain  political  power  ;"  that,  in  the 
Presidential  election,  "  the  Bank  took  an  open  and  direct  interest, 
"  demonstrating  that  it  was  using  its  money  for  the  purpose  of 
"  obtaining  a  hold  upon  the  people  of  this  country  ;"  that  it  "  enter— 
u  ed  the  political  arena  ;"  that  it  circulated  publications  containing 
a  attacks  on  the  officers  of  Government ;"  that  "  it  is  now  openly  in 
"  the  field  as  a  political  partisan  ;"  that  there  are  " positive  proofs" 
of  the  efforts  of  the  Bank  to  obtain  power  ;  and,  finally,  he  concludes, 
as  a  demonstrated  proposition,  "  Fourthly,  that  there  is  sufficient 
a  evidence  to  show  that  the  Bank  has  been,  and  still  is,  seeking  to 
"  obtain  political  power,  and  has  used  its  money  for  the  purpose  of 
"  influencing  the  election  of  the  public  servants." 

After  all  this,  who  can  doubt  that  this  ambitious  corporation  is  a 
candidate  for  the  next  Presidency  ?  Or,  if  it  can  moderate  its  lofty 
pretensions,  that  it  means  at  least  to  go  for  the  office  of  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  upon  the  next  removal  ?  But,  sir,  where  are  the 
proofs  of  these  political  designs  ?  Can  any  thing  be  more  reckless 
than  these  confident  assertions  of  the  Secretary  ?^  Let  us  have  the 


41 

proofs,  I  call  for  the  proofs.  The  Bank  has  been  the  constant 
object  for  years  of  vituperation  and  calumny.  It  has  been  assailed 
in  every  form  of  bitterness  and  malignity.  Its  operations  have  been 
misrepresented  ;  its  credit,  and  the  public  confidence  in  its  integrity 
and  solidity,  attempted  to  be  destroyed  ;  and  the  character  of  its 
officers  assailed.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  has  dared  to  defend 
itself.  It  has  circulated  public  documents,  speeches  of  members  of 
Congress,  reports  made  by  chairmen  of  committees,  friends  of  the 
administration,  and  other  papers.  .  And,  as  it  was  necessary  to  make 
the  defence  commensurate  with  the  duration  and  the  extensive 
theatre  of  the  attack,  it  has  been  compelled  to  incur  a  heavy  expense 
to  save  itself  from  threatened  destruction.  It  has  openly  avowed, 
and  ypt  avows,  its  right  and  purpose  to  defend  itself.  All  this  was 
known  to  the  last  Congress.  Not  a  solitary  material  fact  has  been 
since  disclosed.  And  when  before,  in  a  country  where  the  press  is 
free,  was  it  deemed  criminal  for  any  body  to  defend  itself?  Who 
invested  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  with  power  to  interpose  him 
self  between  the  people  and  light  and  intelligence  ?  Who  gave  him 
the  right  to  dictate  Avhat  information  shall  be  communicated  to  the 
people,  and  by  whom  ?  Whence  does  he  derive  his  jurisdiction  ? 
Who  made  him  censor  of  the  public  press  ?  From  what  new  sedi 
tion  law  does  he  deduce  his  authority  ?  Is  the  superintendence  of 
the  American  press  a  part  of  the  financial  duty  of  a  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  ?  Why  did  he  not  lay  the  whole  case  before  Congress, 
and  invite  their  revival  of  the  old  sedition  law  ?  Why  anticipate  the 
arrival  of  their  session  ?  Why  usurp  the  authority  of  the  only 
department  of  the  Government  competent  to  apply  a  remedy,  if 
there  be  any  power  to  abridge  the  freedom  of  the  press  ?  If  the 
Secretary  wishes  to  purify  the  press,  he  has  a  most  Herculean  duty 
before  him.  And  when  he  sallies  out  on  his  Quixotic  expedition, 
he  had  better  begin  with  the  Augean  stable,  the  press  nearest  to 
him,  his  organ,  as  most  needing  purification. 

I  have  done  with  the  Secretary's  reasons.  They  have  been 
weighed,  and  found  wanting.  There  was  not  only  no  financial 
motive  for  his  acting — the  sole  motive  which  he  could  officially 
entertain — but  every  financial  consideration  forbade  him  to  act.  I 
proceed  now,  in  the  third  and  last  place,  to  examine  the  manner  in 
which  he  has  exercised  his  power  over  the  deposites. 

Third.  The  whole  people  of  the  United  States  derive  an  interest 
from  the  public  deposites  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  as  a 
stockholder  in  that  institution.  The  Bank  is  enabled,  through  its 
branches,  to  throw  capital  into  those  parts  of  the  Union  where  it  is 
most  needed.  Thus  it  distributes  and  equalizes  the  advantages 
accruing  from  the  collection  of  a  large  public  revenue,  and  the 
consequent  public  deposites.  Thus  it  neutralizes  the  injustice 
which  would  otherwise  flowT  from  the  people  of  the  West  and  the 
interior,  paying  their  full  proportion  of  the  public  burdens,  without 
deriving  any  corresponding  benefit  from  the  circulation  and  deposites 
of  the  public  revenue.  The  use  of  the  capital  of  the  Bank  has  been 
6 


42 

signally  beneficial  to  the  West.  We  there  want  capital,  domestic, 
foreign — any  capital  that  we  can  honestly  get.  We  want  it  to  stimu 
late  enterprise,  to  give  activity  to  business,  and  to  develop  the  vast 
resources  which  the  bounty  of  nature  has  concentrated  in  that  region. 
But,  by  the  Secretary's  financial  arrangements,  the  twenty-five  or 
thirty  millions  of  the  public  revenue  collected  from  all  the  people  of 
he  United  States,  (including  those  of  the  West,)  will  be  retained 
in  a  few  Atlantic  ports.  Each  port  will  engross  the  public  moneys 
there  collected  ;  and,  as  that  of  New  York  collects  about  one-half  of 
the  public  revenue,  all  the  people  of  the  United  States  will  be  laid 
under  contribution,  not  for  the  sake  of  the  people  of  the  city  of  New 
York,  but  of  two  or  three  banks  in  that  city,  in  which  the  people  of 

the     United     States,    collectively,    have    not    a    particle    Of    in  tercet.  $ 

banks,  the  stock  in  which  is,  or  may  be,  held  by  foreigners. 

Three  months  have  elapsed,  and  the  Secretary  has  not  yet  found 
places  of  deposite  for  the  public  moneys,  as  substitutes  for  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States.  He  tells  us,  in  his  report  of  yesterday,  that 
the  Bank  at  Charleston,  to  which  he  applied  to  receive  them, 
declined  the  custody,  and  that  he  has  yet  found  no  other  bank 
willing  to  assume  it.  But  he  states  that  the  public  interest  does  not 
in  consequence  suffer.  No  !  What  is  done  with  the  public  moneys 
constantly  receiving  in  the  important  port  of  Charleston,  the  largest 
port  (New  Orleans  excepted)  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  ?  What  with  the  revenue  bonds  ?  It  appears  that  he  has 
not  yet  received  the  charters  from  all  the  banks  selected  as  places 
of  deposite.  Can  any  thing  be  more  improvident  than  that  the 
Secretary  should  undertake  to  contract  with  banks,  without  knowing 
their  power  and  capacity  to  contract  by  their  charters  ?  That  he 
should  venture  to  deposite  the  people's  money  in  banks,  without  a 
full  knowledge  of  every  thing  respecting  their  actual  condition  ?  But 
he  has  found  some  banks  willing  to  receive  the  public  deposites,  and 
he  has  entered  into  contracts  with  them.  And  the  very  first  step 
he  has  taken  has  been  in  direct  violation  of  an  express  and  positive 
statute  of  the  United  States.  By  the  act  of  the  1st  May,  1820,  sixth 
section,  it  is  enacted,  "  that  no  contract  shall  be  hereafter  made  by 
"  the  Secretary  of  State,  or  of  the  Treasury,  or  of  the  Department 
"  of  War,  or  of  the  Navy,  except  under  a  law  authorizing  the  same, 
"  or  under  an  appropriation  adequate  to  its  fulfilment ;  and  excepting, 
"  also,  contracts  for  the  subsistence  and  clothing  of  the  army  or 
u  navy,  and  contracts  by  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  which 
"  may  be  made  by  the  Secretaries  of  those  departments."  Now, 
sir,  what  law  authorized  these  contracts  with  the  local  banks,  made 
by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  9  The  argument,  if  I  understand 
the  argument  intended  to  be  employed  on  the  other  side,  is  this  : 
that,  by  the  Bank  charter,  the  Secretary  is  authorized  to  remove 
the  public  deposites,  and  that  includes  the  power  in  question.  But 
the  act  establishing  the  Treasury  Department  confides,  expressly, 
the  safe  keeping  of  the  public  moneys  of  the  United  States  to  the 
Treasurer  of  the  United  States,  and  not  to  the  Secretary ;  and  the 


43 

Treasurer,  not  the  Secretary,  gives  a  bond  for  the  fidelity  with 
which  he  shall  keep  them.  The  moment,  therefore,  that  they  are 
withdrawn  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  they  are  placed,  by 
law,  under  the  charge  and  responsibility  of  the  Treasurer  and  his 
bond,  and  not  of  the  Secretary,  who  has  given  no  bond.  But  let  us 
trace  this  argument  a  little  further.  The  power  to  remove  the 
deposites,  says  the  Secretary,  from  a  given  place,  implies  the  power 
to  designate  the  place  to  which  they  shall  be  removed.  And  this 
implied  power  to  designate  the  place  to  which  they  shall  be  removed, 
implies  the  power  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  contract  with 
the  new  banks  of  deposite.  And  on  this  third  link  in  the  chain  of 
implications  a  fourth  is  constructed,  to  dispense  with  the  express 
duties  ol  the  Treasurer  of  the  United  States,  defined  in  a  positive 
statute  ;  and  yet  a  fifth,  to  repeal  a  positive  statute  of  Congress, 
passed  four  years  after  the  passage  of  the  law  containing  the  parent 
source  of  this  most  extraordinary  chain  of  implications.  The  excep 
tions  in  the  act  of  1820  prove  the  inflexibility  of  the  rule  which  it 
prescribes.  Annual  appropriations  are  made  for  the  clothing  and 
subsistence  of  the  army  and  navy.  These  appropriations  might  have 
been  supposed  to  contain  a  power  to  contract  for  those  articles, 
notwithstanding  the  prohibitory  clause  in  that  act.  But  Con 
gress  thought  otherwise,  and  therefore  expressly  provided  for  the 
exceptions.  It  must  be  admitted  that  our  Clerk  (as  the  late 
Governor  Robinson,  of  Louisiana,  one  of  the  purest  republicans  I 
have  ever  known,  used  to  call  a  Secretary  of  the  Treasury)  tramples 
with  very  little  ceremony  upon  the  duties  of  the  Treasurer,  and  of 
the  acts  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  when  they  come  in 
his  way. 

These  contracts,  there  fore,  between  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
and  the  local  banks  are  mere  nullities,  and  absolutely  void,  enforce 
able  in  no  courts  of  justice  whatever,  for  two  causes.  1st.  Because 
they  are  made  in  violation  of  the  act  of  the  1st  May,  1820  ;  and,  2dly, 
because  the  Treasurer,  and  not  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  alone 
had,  if  any  federal  officer  possessed,  the  power  to  contract  with  the 
local  banks.  And  here  again  we  perceive  the  necessity  there  was 
for  avoiding  the  precipitancy  with  which  the  Executive  acted,  and 
for  waiting  the  meeting  of  Congress.  Congress  could  have  delibe 
rately  reviewed  the  previous  legislation,  decided  upon  the  expedi 
ency  of  a  transfer  of  the  public  deposites,  and,  if  deemed  proper, 
could  have  passed  the  new  laws  adapted  to  the  new  condition  of  the 
Treasury.  It  could  have  decided  whether  the  local  banks  should 
pay  any  bonus,  or  pay  any  interest,  or  diffuse  the  public  deposites 
throughout  the  United  States,  so  as  to  secure  among  all  their  parts 
equality  of  benefits  as  well  as  of  burdens,  and  provided  for  ample 
guaranties  for  the  safety  of  the  public  moneys  in  their  new  deposi 
tories. 

But  let  us  now  inquire  whether  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  has 
exercised  his  usurped  authority,  in  the  formation  of  these  contracts, 
with  prudence  and  discretion.  Having  substituted  himself  to  Con- 


44 

gress  and  to  the  Treasurer  of  the  United  States,  he  ought  at  least  to 
show  that,  in  the  stipulations  of  the  contracts  themselves,  he  has 
guarded  the  public  moneys,  and  provided  for  the  public  interest.  I 
will  examine  the  contract  with  the  Girard  bank  of  Philadelphia, 
which  is  presented  as  a  specimen  of  the  contracts  with  the  Atlantic 
banks.  The  first  stipulation  limits  the  duty  of  the  local  bank  to  re 
ceive  in  deposite,  on  account  of  the  United  States,  only  the  notes  of 
banks  convertible  into  coin  "  in  its  immediate  vicinity,"  or  which 
it  is,  "  for  the  time  being,  in  the  habit  of  receiving."  Under  this 
stipulation,  the  Girard  bank,  for  example,  will  not  be  bound  to  re 
ceive  the  notes  of  the  Louisville  bank,  although  that  also  be  one  of 
the  deposite  banks,  nor  the  notes  of  any  other  bank,  not  in  its  imme 
diate  vicinity,  even  if  it  be  a  deposite  bank.  As  to  the  provision 
that  it  will  receive  the  notes  of  banks  which,  for  the  time  being,  it  is 
in  the  habit  of  receiving,  it  is  absurd  to  put  such  a  stipulation  in  a 
contract,  because,  by  the  power  retained  to  change  the  habit,  for 
the  time  being,  it  is  an  absolute  nullity.  Now,  sir,  how  does  this 
contract  compare  with  the  charter  and  practice  of  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States?  That  bank  receives  ever}7  where,  and  credits  the 
Government  with  the  notes,  whether  issued  by  the  branches  or  the 
principal  bank.  The  amount  of  all  these  notes  is  every  where 
available  to  the  Government.  But  the  Government  may  be  over 
flowing  in  distant  bank  notes  when  they  are  not  wanted,  and  a  bank 
rupt  at  the  places  of  great  expenditure,  under  this  singular  arrange 
ment. 

With  respect  to  the  transfer  of  moneys  from  place  to  place,  the 
local  bank  requires  in  this  contract  that  it  shall  not  take  place  but 
upon  reasonable  notice.  And  what  reasonable  notice  is,  has  been 
left  totally  undefined,  and  of  course  open  to  future  contest.  When 
hereafter  a  transfer  is  ordered,  and  the  bank  is  unable  to  make 
it,  there  is  nothing  to  do  but  to  allege  the  unreasonableness  of  the 
notice.  The  local  bank  agrees  to  render  to  the  Government  all  the 
services  now  performed  by  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  subject, 
however,  to  the  restriction  that  they  are  required  "  in  the  vicinity" 
of  the  local  bank.  But  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  is  under  no 
such  restrictions ;  its  services  are  co -extensive  with  the  United 
States  and  their  territories. 

The  local  banks  agree  to  submit  their  books  and  accounts  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  or  to  any  agent  to  be  appointed  by  him, 
but  to  be  paid  by  the  local  banks  pro  rata,  as  far  as  such  examination 
is  admissible  without  a  violation  of  their  respective  charters  ;  and 
how  far  that  may  be,  the  Secretary  cannot  tell,  because  he  has  not 
yet  seen  all  the  charters.  He  is,  however,  to  appoint  the  agents 
of  examination,  and  to  fix  the  salaries  which  the  local  banks  are 
to  pay.  And  where  does  the  Secretary  find  the  power  to  create 
offices  and  fix  their  salaries,  without  the  authority  of  Congress  ? 

But  the  most  improvident,  unprecedented,  and  extraordinary  pro 
vision  in  the  contract  is  that  which  relates  to  the  security.  When, 
and  not  until,  the  deposites  in  the  local  bank  shall  exceed  one-half 


45 

of  the  capital  stock  actually  paid  in,  collateral  security,  satisfactory 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  is  to  be  given  for  the  safety  of  the 
deposites.  Why,  sir,  a  freshman,  a  schoolboy,  would  not  have  thus 
dealt  with  his  father's  or  guardian's  money.  Instead  of  the  security 
preceding,  it  is  to  follow  the  deposite  of  the  people's  money  !  That 
is,  the  local  bank  gets  an  amount  of  their  money,  equal  to  one-half 
of  its  capital,  and  then  it  condescends  to  give  security !  Does  not 
the  Secretary  know  that,  when  he  goes  for  the  security,  the  money 
may  be  gone,  and  that  he  may  be  entirely  unable  to  get  the  one  or 
the  other  ?  We  have  a  law,  if  I  mistake  not,  which  forbids  the  ad 
vance  of  any  public  money,  even  to  a  disbursing  agent  of  the  Go 
vernment,  without  previous  security.  Yet,  in  violation  of  the  spirit 
^f  iKcvt  !«.>»,  or,  ai  least,  of  all  common  sense  and  common  prudence, 
the  Secretary  disperses  upwards  of  twenty-five  millions  of  public 
revenue  among  a  countless  number  of  unknown  banks,  and  stipu 
lates  that,  when  the  amount  of  the  deposite  exceeds  one-half  of  their 
respective  capitals,  security  is  to  be  given ! 

The  best  stipulation  in  the  whole  contract  is  the  last,  which  re 
serves  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  the  power  of  discharging 
these  local  banks  from  the  service  of  the  United  States  whenever 
he  pleases ;  and  the  sooner  he  exercises  it,  and  restores  the  public 
deposites  to  the  place  of  acknowledged  safety,  from  which  they  have 
been  rashly  taken,  the  better  for  all  parties  concerned. 

Let  us  look  into  the  condition  of  one  of  these  local  banks,  the 
nearest  to  us,  and  that  with  respect  to  which  we  have  the  best  in 
formation.  The  banks  of  this  District  (and  among  them  that  of  the 
Metropolis)  are  required  to  make  annual  reports  of  their  condition 
on  the  first  day  of  January.  The  latest  official  return  from  the  Metro 
polis  bank  is  of  the  first  of  January,  1832.  Why  it  did  not  make 
one  on  the  first  of  last  January,  along  with  the  other  banks,  I  know 
not.  In  point  of  fact,  I  am  informed,  it  made  none.  Here  is  its  ac 
count  of  January,  1832,  and  I  think  you  will  agree  that  it  is  a  Flem 
ish  one.  On  the  debit  side  stand,  capital  paid  in,  five  hundred  thou 
sand  dollars ;  notes  in  circulation,  62,855  dollars ;  due  to  banks 
$20,911  10;  individuals  on  deposite,  $74,977  42;  dividend  and 
expenses,  $17,591  77;  and  surplus,  $8,131  02;  making  an  aggre 
gate  of  $684,496  31.  On  the  credit  side  there  are,  bills  and  notes 
discounted,  and  stock  [What  sort?]  bearing  interest,  $626,011  90- 
real  estate,  $18,404  86;  notes  of  other  banks  on  hand,  and  checks 
on  ditto,  $23,213  80;  specie— now,  Mr.  President,  how  much  do 
you  imagine  ?  Recollect  that  this  is  the  bank  selected  at  the  seat  of 
Government,  where  there  is  necessarily  concentrated  a  vast  amount 
of  public  money,  employed  in  the  expenditure  of  Government  at 
this  place.  Recollect  that,  by  another  Executive  edict,  all  public 
officers,  charged  with  the  disbursement  of  the  public  money  here 
are  required  to  make  their  deposites  with  this  Metropolis  bank  •  and 
how  much  specie  do  you  suppose  it  had  at  the  date  of  its  last  official 
return?  $10,974  76.  Due  from  other  banks  $5,890  99;  making  in 
the  aggregate,  on  the  credit  side,  $684,496^  31.  Upon  lookin°-  into 


46 

the  items,  and  casting  them  up,  you  will  find  that  this  Metropolis 
bank,  on  the  first  day  of  January,  1832,  was  liable  to  an  immediate 
call  for  $176,335  29,  and  that  the  amount  which  it  had  on  hand 
ready  to  meet  that  call  was  $40,079  55.  And  this  is  one  of  the 
banks  selected  at  the  seat  of  the  General  Government  for  the  de- 
posite  of  the  public  moneys  of  the  United  States.  A  bank,  with  a 
capital  of  thirty-five  millions  of  dollars,  and  upwards  of  ten  millions 
of  specie  on  hand,  has  been  put  aside,  and  a  bank,  with  a  capital  of 
half  a  million,  and  a  little  more  than  ten  thousand  dollars  in  specie 
on  hand,  has  been  substituted  in  its  place  !  How  that  half  million 
has  been  raised ;  whether,  in  part,  or  in  the  whole,  by  the  neutral 
izing  operation  of  giving  stock  notes  in  exchange  for  certificates  of 
stock,  does  not  appear. 

The  design  of  the  whole  scheme  of  this  Treasury  arrangement 
seems  to  have  been  to  have  united,  in  one  common  league,  a  nuui-, 
ber  of  local  banks,  dispersed  throughout  the  Union,  and  subject  to 
one  central  will,  with  a  light  of  scrutiny  instituted  by  the  agents  of 
that  will.  It  is  a  bad  imitation  of  the  New  York  project  of  a  safety 
fund.  This  confederation  of  banks  will  probably  be  combined  in 
sympathy  as  well  as  interest,  and  will  be  always  ready  to  fly  to  the 
succor  of  the  source  of  their  nourishment.  As  to  their  supplying 
a  common  currency  in  place  of  that  of  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  the  plan  is  totally  destitute  of  the  essential  requisite.  They 
are  not  required  to  credit  each  other's  paper,  unless  it  be  issued  in 
the  "  immediate  vicinity." 

We  have  seen  what  is  in  this  contract.  Now  let  us  see  what  is 
not  there.  It  contains  no  stipulation  for  the  preservation  of  the 
public  morals ;  none  for  the  freedom  of  elections  ;  none  for  the  pu 
rity  of  the  press.  All  these  great  interests,  after  all  that  has  been 
said  against  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  are  left  to  shift  and  take 
care  of  themselves  as  they  can.  We  have  already  seen  the  presi 
dent  of  a  bank  in  a  neighboring  city  rushing  impetuously  to  the 
defence  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  against  an  editorial  article 
in  a  newspaper,  although  u  the  venom  of  the  shaft  was  not  quite 
equal  to  the  vigor  of  the  bow."  Was  he  rebuked  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  ?  Was  the  bank  discharged  from  the  public  service  ? 
Or,  are  morals,  the  press,  and  elections,  in  no  danger  of  contamina 
tion,  when  a  host  of  banks  become  literary  champions  on  the  side  of 
power  and  the  officers  of  Government  ?  Is  the  patriotism  of  the  Se 
cretary  only  alarmed  when  the  infallibility  of  high  authority  is  ques 
tioned  ?  Will  the  States  silently  acquiesce,  and  see  the  federal  au 
thority  insinuating  itself  into  banks  of  their  creation,  and  subject  to 
their  exclusive  control  ? 

We  have,  Mr.  President,  a  most  wonderful  financier  at  the  head 
of  our  Treasury  Department.  He  sits  quietly  by  in  the  cabinet, 
and  witnesses  the  contest  between  his  colleague  and  the  President. 
Sees  the  conflict  in  the  mind  of  that  colleague  between  his  personal 
attachment  to  the  .President,  on  the  one  hand,  and  his  solemn  duty  to 
the  public,  on  the  other.  Beholds  the  triumph  of  conscientious  ob- 


47 

ligation.  Contemplates  the  noble  spectacle  of  an  honest  man,  pre 
ferring  to  surrender  an  exalted  office,  with  all  its  honors  and  emolu 
ments,  rather  than  betray  the  interests  of  the  people.  Witnesses  the 
insulting  and  contemptuous  expulsion  of  that  colleague  from  office  ; 
and  then  coolly  enters  the  vacated  place,  without  the  slightest  sym 
pathy  or  the  smallest  emotion.  He  was  installed  on  the  23d  of  Sep 
tember,  and  by  the  26th,  the  brief  period  of  three  days,  he  discovers 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  had  been  wrong  from  its 
origin  ;  that  every  one  of  his  predecessors  from  Hamilton  down,  in 
cluding  Gallatin,  ( who,  whatever  I  said  of  him  on  a  former  occasion, 
and  that  I  do  not  mean  to  retract,  possessed  more  practical  know 
ledge  of  currency,  banks,  and  finance,  than  any  man  I  have  ever 
nip*  i«  ^~  public  uuunuiin,)  Do.iiao,  <uid  Crawford,  had  been  mis 
taken  about  both  the  expediency  and  constitutionality  of  the  Bank  ; 
that  every  Chief  Magistrate,  prior  to  him  whose  patronage  he  en 
joyed,  had  been  wrong ;  that  Congress,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  people  of  the  United  States,  during  the  thir 
ty-seven  years  that  they  had  acquiesced  in  or  recognised  the  utility 
of  a  Bank,  were  all  wrong.  And,  opposing  his  single  opinion  to 
their  united  judgments,  he  dismisses  the  Bank,  scatters  the  public 
money,  and  undertakes  to  regulate  and  purify  the  public  morals,  the 
public  press,  and  popular  elections  ! 

If  we  examine  the  operations  of  this  modem  Turgot  in  their  finan 
cial  bearing  merely,  wre  shall  find  still  less  for  approbation. 

1.  He  withdraws  the  public  moneys,  where,  by  his  own  deliberate 
admission,  they  wTere  perfectly  safe,  with  a  bank  of  thirty-five  mil 
lions  of  capital,  and  ten  millions  of  specie,  and  he  places  them,   at 
great  hazard,  with  banks  of  comparatively  small  capital  and  but  lit 
tle  specie,  of  which  the  Metropolis  bank  is  an  example. 

2.  He  withdraws  them  from  a  bank   created  by,  and  over  which 
the  Federal  Government  had  ample  control,  and  puts  them  in  other 
banks,  created  by  different  Governments,  and  over  which  it  has  no 
control. 

3.  He  withdraws  them  from  a  bank  in  which  the  American  peo 
ple,  as  a  stockholder,  were  drawing  their  fair  proportion  of  interest 
accruing  on  loans,  of  which  those  deposites  formed  the  basis,  and 
puts  them  where  the  people  of  the  United  States  draw  no  interest. 

4.  From  a  bank  which  has  paid  a  bonus  of  a  million  and   a  half 
which  the  people  of  the  United  States  may  be  now  liable  to  refund' 
and  puts  them  in  banks  which  have  paid  to  the  American  people   no 
bonus. 

5.  Depreciates  the  value  of  the  stock  in  a  bank  where  the  Gene 
ral  Government  holds  seven   millions,  and  advances  that  of  banks 
in  whose  stock  it  does  not  hold  a  dollar,  and  whose  aggregate  capi 
tal  does  not  probably  much  exceed  that  very  seven  millions.     And 
finally, 

6.  He  dismisses  a  bank  whose  paper  circulates,  in   the  greatest 
credit,  throughout  the  Union  and  in  foreign  countries,  and  engages  in 
the  public  service   banks  whose   paper  has  but  a  limited  and  local 
circulation  in  their  "  immediate  vicinities.5' 


48 

These  are  immediate  and  inevitable  results.  How  much  that 
large  and  long  standing  item  of  unavailable  funds,  annually  reported 
to  Congress,  will  be  swelled  and  extended,  remains  to  be  developed 
by  time. 

And  now,  Mr.  President,  what,  under  all  these  circumstances,  is 
it  our  duty  to  do  ?  Is  there  a  Senator  who  can  hesitate  to  affirm,  in 
the  language  of  the  resolutions,  that  the  President  has  assumed  a 
dangerous  power  over  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  not  grant 
ed  to  him  by  the  constitution  and  the  laws  ;  and  that  the  reasons  as 
signed  for  the  act  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  are  insufficient 
and  unsatisfactory  ? 

The  eyes  and  the  hopes  of  the  American  people  are  anxiously 
turned  to  Congress.  r\  hey  feel  that  they  have  been  deceived  aim 
insulted ;  their  confidence  abused  ;  their  interests  betrayed  ;  and 
their  liberties  in  danger.  They  see  a  rapid  and  alarming  concen 
tration  of  all  power  in  one  man's  hands.  They  see  that,  by  the  ex 
ercise  of  the  positive  authority  of  the  Executive,  and  his  negative 
power  exerted  over  Congress,  the  will  of  one  man  alone  prevails, 
and  governs  the  Republic.  The  question  is  no  longer  what  laws 
will  Congress  pass,  but  what  will  the  Executive  not  veto  ?  The 
President,  and  not  Congress,  is  addressed  for  legislative  action.  We 
have  seen  a  corporation,  charged  with  the  execution  of  a  great  nation 
al  work,  dismiss  an  experienced,  faithful,  and  zealous  president,  after 
wards  testify  to  his  ability  by  a  voluntary  resolution,  and  reward  his  ex 
traordinary  services  by  a  large  gratuity,  and  appoint  in  his  place  an  Ex 
ecutive  favorite,  totally  inexperienced  and  incompetent,  to  propitiate 
the  President.  We  behold  the  usual  incidents  of  approaching  tyranny. 
The  land  is  filled  with  spies  and  informers ;  and  detraction  and  de 
nunciation  are  the  orders  of  the  day.  People,  especially  official  in 
cumbents  in  this  place,  no  longer  dare  speak  in  the  fearless  tones  of 
manly  freemen,  but  in  the  cautious  whispers  of  trembling  slaves. 
The  premonitory  symptoms  of  despotism  are  upon  us  ;  and  if  Congress 
do  not  apply  an  instantaneous  and  effective  remedy,  the  fatal  collapse 
will  soon  come  on,  and  we  shall  die — ignobly  die  !  base,  mean,  and 
abject  slaves — the  scorn  and  contempt  of  mankind — unpitlod,  urv^ ppt, 
unmourned  ! 

[The  conclusion  of  the  speech  was  followed  by  repeated  and  loud 
applause  in  the  galleries,  as  it  had  been  often  interrupted  before.] 


USIVBBSITT 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


JUN5 


LD  21-100m-6,'56 
(B9311slO)476 


Mttl7tttt 


fFC'D  "  ,D 


AUU    21963 
!EC.  10FFITT  AUG  i  i  '94 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


